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Research Summary 
Evidence of firms disclosing occupational health and safety (OHS) information in annual 
reports dates back more than a century. Despite this, critical scrutiny of OHS disclosure 
quality has been limited. This critique is important given two major debates evident within 
the safety literature. The first is an ideological debate over the cause of work-related 
injury and illness and the strategies for managing OHS risk subsequently deemed 
appropriate. The second is debate over the measurement of OHS outcomes and criticism 
surrounding the validity and reliability of familiar performance indicators. These conflicting 
positions each have important implications for managerial choice of OHS strategy, 
processes and performance measures. The information offered to discharge corporate 
accountability to stakeholders for these choices and outcomes therefore needs to be 
evaluated within this context. However, this depth of analysis appears absent from the 
literature. Consequently, the implications for stakeholders of the diverse range of metrics 
and narratives identified in prior OHS disclosure research, has been left unexplored.   
The thesis seeks to address this gap by employing a multi-method research design to 
meet three primary objectives. First, 135 stakeholders are surveyed to identify their 
expectations for OHS disclosure content and quality and to tease out issues of particular 
concern to the various stakeholder groups. These respondents included OHS managers, 
OHS professionals, regulators, employees, trade unions, academics and investors. The 
results identified a strong demand for the public disclosure of corporate OHS information, 
clear preferences for reporting on particular OHS outcome metrics over available 
alternatives and shared concerns relating to the quality of corporate OHS disclosures. 
Second, a content analysis of OHS disclosures issued by a sample of 15 large, high risk 
firms over an 11 year period sought to provide a detailed description of OHS content, to 
identify trends in reporting over time and to critically evaluate disclosure quality. 
Examined through an institutional theory lens, this analysis provided a rich insight into 
those accountability templates and reporting practices that did, and did not, become 
increasingly institutionalised over time. Importantly, the findings revealed different 
patterns of institutional change at macro and micro levels. At the macro-level, 
increasingly institutionalised patterns of disclosure on the broad themes of OHS 
governance, processes and performance were evident. At the micro-level, however, the 
absence of a generally agreed approach to performance evaluation was clearly evident 
and different metrics and narratives appeared to compete for legitimacy. Notably, this 
analysis also provided insight into the extent to which the GRI’s sustainability reporting 
guidelines have influenced, or rather failed to influence, the quality of corporate OHS 
disclosures issued over the past decade. 
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Finally, the study sought to reconcile this evidence of stakeholder demand and corporate 
supply to identify the extent to which disclosures appeared to meet, exceed or fall short 
of expectations for the discharge of corporate OHS accountability to stakeholders. In 
doing so, various reporting gaps were identified as firms failed to report on issues of most 
importance to report users, instead addressing loosely related but less relevant themes 
and metrics and offering incomplete and generally incomparable performance data. This 
highlighted considerable room for improvement in the quality of OHS accountability 
disclosures. 
In addition to providing important insights into stakeholder demand for OHS disclosure 
and the corporate construction of public accounts of OHS performance, this study offers 
additional contributions to the literature. First, the study contributes, from a uniquely 
‘accounting’ perspective, to the debate in the safety management literature concerning 
the quality of various performance indicators for assessing and communicating OHS 
performance. The application of the qualitative characteristics of financial reporting 
information to reporting on OHS performance highlights limitations of existing OHS 
assessment practices and underscores a need for the development of an overarching 
framework for OHS assessment and reporting that is supported by generally accepted 
and rigorously defined performance metrics.  
Methodological implications for future research are also revealed as the findings illustrate 
the need for careful attention to the level of analysis in CSD content analysis to ensure 
that the performance categories captured within disclosure indices are fundamentally 
capable of providing the information needed to evaluate disclosure quality. In particular, 
the poor correlation between those KPIs recommended by the GRI and those identified 
as important to both stakeholders and report preparers caution against the uncritical use 
of rating tools and reporting frameworks, such as the GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines, as disclosure indices for CSR research. In particular, the findings imply that 
reporting on GRI recommended metrics does not necessarily guarantee high-quality 
disclosure and conversely, that a failure to report on GRI indicators does not necessarily 
equate to a failure to deliver high quality, accountability-focused performance information. 
Finally, various recommendations for the GRI technical committee, policy-makers, the 
professions, corporate report preparers and rating agencies are offered and issues for 
future research identified. 
    3
 
Chapter 1. INTRODUCTION      
The advent of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and sustainability reporting over 
recent decades is a corporate response to global expectations that organisations 
operate in an ethically, socially and environmentally responsible manner (Deegan 
2002; Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Gray et al. 1996; Gray et al. 1988; Hoffman 1997). 
These expectations became increasingly apparent in the late 20th century as society 
‘discovered’ critical problems such as global warming, natural resource and ozone 
depletion and a seemingly endless range of specific, high profile examples of 
industry’s failure to operate in a socially responsible manner (Dunlap and Scarce 1991; 
Gray 1992a, b; Gray and Laughlin 1991; Gray et al. 1996; Gray et al. 1995c; Greeno and 
Robinson 1992; Hoffman 1997; Shrivastava 1995). Together these incidents 
demonstrated failures of individual corporations, industry groups and government 
agencies to provide a duty of care to the environment1, to employees2, to 
customers3, to suppliers4, to shareholders5 and to the wider society6 (see for example, 
Ghillyer 2008; Weiss 2006).  
As public sensitivity to these business externalities heightened, so did an awareness 
of the need for society to actively ensure its long term sustainability and therein to 
hold organisations accountable for their actions (Gray 1992b; Gray et al. 1993; Gray et 
al. 1996; Kolk 2008; Ullmann 1985). The subsequent combination of mounting public 
scrutiny and increasingly stringent regulation of organisational practices and 
outcomes has changed the competitive dynamics and risk profile of many industries 
(Hoffman 1997). Consequently, the responsible management of corporate economic, 
environmental and social performance has become a strategic issue for many firms 
(Burritt 2002; Burritt and Schaltegger 2002; Epstein 1994, 1996; Epstein and Roy 1998; 
Fiedler and Lehman 1995; Hoffman 1997; Maunders and Burritt 1991; Shrivastava 1995). 
                                                 
1  See for examples, case studies of corporate environmental disasters (Grace and Cohen 1998; Russo 
1999; Velasquez 1992). 
2  See for examples, case studies involving: sweatshops and the use of child and forced labour; bullying, 
harassment and sexual discrimination (Ghillyer 2008; Weiss 2006); and the failure of firms to ensure 
workplace health and safety (Hopkins 2005a, 2006a; Weiss 2006). 
3  See for examples, cases involving absent, misleading or false information given to customers about 
products such as: breast implants; cigarettes and tobacco; baby formula; fans; asbestos; vitamins and 
pharmaceuticals; and vehicle safety (Ghillyer 2008; Grace and Cohen 1998; Weiss 2006). 
4  See for examples, cases studies of unfair contracting practices, sweatshops and absence of 
professional independence (Dellaportas et al. 2005; Hartman and Desjardins 2008; Weiss 2006).   
5  See for examples, case studies exploring recent examples of inadequate governance, corporate fraud 
and corporate collapses (Clarke et al. 2003; Ghillyer 2008; Hartman and Desjardins 2008). 
6  See for examples, case studies of detrimental public health and community (social) impact resulting 
from industrial disasters and business activity (Ghillyer 2008; Grace and Cohen 1998; Russo 1999). 
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The provision of CSR information in corporate annual reports and supplementary 
stakeholder reports7 is seen as a means by which individual organisations could 
“[proclaim] their social responsibility credentials” and publicly discharge accountability 
for CSR to a wide range of stakeholders (Cooper and Owen 2007, p649; Deegan and 
Gordon 1996). Indeed, Cooper and Owen (2007) remark that “a notable feature of the 
reports analysed [in their study] is the impression conveyed, explicitly or implicitly, 
that the relationship with stakeholders is one of accountability of the organisation to 
the latter” (p654). These corporate social disclosures (CSD) seek to alert institutional 
participants to the alignment of sustainable development and corporate policies and 
practices by disclosing information about a wide range of economic, social and 
environmental performance issues (Hamann and Kapelus 2004). However, an 
alternative motivation for the use of CSD is also widely recognised, that being to 
secure corporate reputation and legitimacy, and therein access to capital, resources 
and markets (Deegan 2006b; Dillenburg et al. 2003; Patten 1992; Whitehouse 2006).  
The development of CSD has consequently captured the interest of academics in 
various fields, from environmental science, management and public relations, to 
accounting where issues of performance evaluation and corporate accountability are 
highlighted. Building on that literature, this study seeks to provide a detailed 
examination of one aspect of CSD, namely the extent to which corporate disclosure 
facilitates the discharge of corporate accountability to stakeholders for occupational 
health and safety (OHS).  
1.1 Justification for the research 
A recent surge in attention to corporate social issues has led to an increasing 
academic focus on examining those corporate disclosures relating to, for example, 
intellectual capital, human resources, minority interests, gender and equal 
opportunity, ethical investment, corporate philanthropy and corruption (see for 
example, Abeysekera 2003; Adams et al. 1995; Adams and Harte 1998; Adams and Zutshi 
2004; Bennett 1998; Brown and Butcher 2005; Epstein and Freedman 1994; Guthrie and 
Petty 2000; Guthrie et al. 2004, Guthrie et al. 2006; Mathews 1997; Neilsen and Thomsen 
2007). However, despite the substantial academic attention devoted to those issues, 
other areas of social concern, such as corporate reporting on the management of 
OHS performance, are yet to be subjected to the same level of scrutiny. This is in 
spite of the repeated identification over many decades of the presence of OHS 
information in annual reports (see for example, Andrew et al. 1989; Deegan et al. 2000; 
Gray et al. 1995b; Guthrie and Parker 1989). 
                                                 
7  These supplementary, stand-alone reports have various titles including Triple-Bottom-Line Reports; 
Environment, Health and Safety Reports (EHS); Community Reports and Sustainability Reports.  
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The importance of OHS disclosure as a mechanism for discharging OHS 
accountability to stakeholders is underpinned by the legal obligation of employers to 
ensure a safe and healthy work environment (CCH 2000). This seeks to minimise the 
impact of workplace injury and illness on a firm and its employees, and thereby 
curtail the substantial externalities that poor OHS performance imposes on a wide 
range of internal and external stakeholders (NOHSC 2004a). Conflicting views on the 
most effective approaches to managing and evaluating OHS performance are 
evident, however, in a considerable debate within the OHS literature. This debate 
concerns both the philosophical approach to understanding OHS risk, as well as 
concern about the relevance and reliability of the various methods and metrics used 
to evaluate OHS performance. Within this context, organisations are, through their 
managers, ethically accountable to stakeholders for their choices in relation to OHS 
strategy and ultimately for OHS outcomes.  
Nevertheless, little is presently known about the quality of the OHS information 
voluntarily communicated by organisations to their stakeholders – particularly in 
terms of the extent to which these disclosures provide the relevant, reliable, 
comparable and complete8 OHS information needed to discharge accountability to 
stakeholders for OHS strategy and performance. The motivation for this project is 
therefore grounded in the need for research to address this gap. This study therefore 
explores both corporate OHS disclosures and stakeholder demand for these 
disclosures, identifying and describing the OHS information stakeholders value most. 
This provides important insights that can not only guide report preparers in the 
development of effective OHS disclosures but also assist those seeking to evaluate 
the quality of OHS information provided publicly by organisations. The results of a 
gap analysis between stakeholder expectations for, and corporate supply of, OHS 
disclosure also has important implications for reporters, legislators, policy-makers 
and researchers.  
1.2 Research objectives 
As noted in the preceding section, although the provision of OHS information in 
annual reports has long been acknowledged, limited academic attention has yet been 
devoted to examining these disclosures in detail. This is somewhat surprising given 
that a review of the management literature reveals a somewhat protracted struggle to 
identify effective approaches to OHS management and an ongoing debate over the 
merits of outcome metrics, such as the ‘lost time injury’ (LTI) rate. In particular, the 
ability of OHS metrics to provide a meaningful assessment of performance for OHS 
                                                 
8   Definitions of these characteristics of OHS information quality, namely relevance, reliability, 
completeness and consistency, for the purposes of this study are provided in Section 1.3. 
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evaluation and control is questioned. This exploratory study extends the existing 
sustainability reporting and accountability literature by undertaking a detailed 
examination of the construction of corporate ‘accounts’ of OHS performance and the 
quality of information provided therein.  
The primary aim of this research is to examine whether the quality of corporate OHS 
disclosures (defined in Section 1.3 in terms of qualitative characteristics of 
information relevance, reliability, comparability and completeness) meets the OHS 
information needs of stakeholders and is therefore adequate to discharge 
accountability for OHS to those stakeholders. Chapter 2 commences with a review of 
the literature to identify the OHS performance management and assessment issues 
that shape the construction of publicly available OHS disclosures. The study then 
seeks to address three objectives within the broader aim identified above. These 
three objectives each reflect a separate phase of the study and are identified as 
follows. 
Objective 1:  
To explore stakeholder perceptions of corporate OHS accountability and 
describe stakeholder demand for OHS information. In particular, the study 
seeks to detail those OHS disclosures deemed by a sample of 
stakeholders as fundamental to an organisation’s ability to discharge OHS 
accountability. These results are then used to inform an analysis of the 
extent to which stakeholder demands are met, as outlined in Objective 3. 
Objective 2:  
To describe and evaluate the quality of those publicly disseminated 
accounts of OHS management and performance offered by a sample of 
high (OHS) risk firms over the past decade. Viewed through a lens of 
institutional theory this phase of the research also seeks:  
o to identify whether institutionalised accountability templates (that 
is, established patterns of disclosure) exist across organisations 
and across time;  and  
o to explore the extent to which the introduction of the Global 
Reporting Initiative (GRI) has influenced the quality of OHS 
disclosures over time. 
Objective 3:  
To reconcile the evidence of stakeholder demand for, and corporate supply 
of, OHS information. By comparing the results obtained in phases one and 
two above, this study seeks to identify the extent to which contemporary 
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disclosures meet, exceed or fall short of stakeholder demand for information 
necessary to discharge corporate accountability for OHS. This is facilitated 
by reflecting on the results of the stakeholder survey (see Objective 1) to 
develop an index, the Occupational Safety and Health Accountability Index 
(OSHAI), for rating OHS disclosure quality. 
1.3 Issues for research  
This research extends the growing body of sustainability reporting and accountability 
literature by providing insight into the largely unexamined practice of corporate OHS 
reporting. The study is rooted in the premise that each organisation owes 
accountability to its stakeholders (Gray et al. 1996), both internal and external (Roome 
and Wijen 2005), for the intended and unintended impact of organisational activities. 
An important example of this impact is provided by the ongoing incidence of 
occupational injury and illness suffered by workers around the world (ABS 2001, 2002; 
Al-Tuwaijri 2008; ASCC 2008a; NOHSC 2005). This continues despite the robust inverse 
relationship between the level of managerial OHS prevention effort and the frequency 
and severity of workplace injury and illness (Chelius 1991; Ginter 1979). Employees 
and contractors are therefore important stakeholders (Corocan 2003) who possess 
“intrinsic rights” to safe working conditions (Deegan 2006b, p296). So too are the many 
other stakeholder groups to whom the costs arising from OHS incidents are 
externalised9 (Chelius 1991; NOHSC 2004a). Within this context it is therefore not 
surprising that prior research confirms a variety of stakeholder groups to perceive 
corporate OHS disclosures as important (see for example Deegan and Rankin 1997; 
Deegan and Rankin 1999; Epstein 2008).  
The particular field of interest on which this research is focused is OHS in the 
resource sector. The selection of this industry is justified by a combination of its 
importance in the Australian economy, the current investor demand for resource 
shares, the considerable health and safety risk associated with these operations and 
the historically high rates of fatality and serious injury experienced by workers in this 
industry (ASCC 2006, 2008a, c; Hamann and Kapelus 2004; MISHC 2005; Poplin et al. 
2008). Further justification for this choice of industry sector is provided in Chapter 2. 
The primary concern in this thesis is the extent to which corporate OHS disclosures 
are of sufficient quality to meet stakeholder demand for OHS accountability. This 
accountability is grounded in both the employer’s duty of care for employees and 
research evidence as to the ability of organisational policies and practices to 
                                                 
9 These stakeholder groups and the various externalities are identified and discussed further in Chapter 2. 
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influence the rate of workplace injury and illness (see for example, Ginter 1979). For 
the purposes of this study the following definitions are relevant: 
Quality: The extent to which the information exhibits the qualitative characteristics of 
relevance, reliability, consistency and completeness. Although much of the 
information addressed in this thesis is non-financial, the characteristics of 
financial reporting information as identified in AASB ED164 are relevant. 
These are defined as follows.  
Relevance: The extent to which the information is capable of making a difference in 
decision-making by virtue of its predictive or confirmatory value. That is, 
relevant information is useful to the decision-maker (in this case, the 
stakeholder). 
Reliability: The extent to which the substance of the phenomenon is depicted in a 
neutral manner and without material error (that is, it is free from error and free 
from bias). 
Consistency: The ability to which performance measures can be replicated. In 
particular, consistency in the method of calculating and presenting OHS 
performance measures is important to ensure similarities and differences 
between two sets of phenomena can be compared (for example, comparison 
of results over time, or across firms). 
Completeness: The provision, without omission, of all relevant information necessary 
for the faithful representation of that event or phenomenon the disclosure 
purports to represent. 
The thesis begins by exploring the justification for corporate accountability for OHS 
and examining the processes and practices by which employers can seek to control 
OHS outcomes. The literature on OHS reporting is then framed with reference to the 
activities and outcomes for which firms may be legitimately held accountable to 
stakeholders. This is followed by a review of various influences on the format and 
content of corporate accounts of OHS, most notably the emergence of the GRI and 
its corporate sustainability reporting guidelines. 
Adopting a mixed method approach to data collection, a survey instrument is 
developed to explore stakeholder perceptions of OHS accountability and to identify 
issues of particular concern to each of a number of relevant stakeholder groups. 
These stakeholders included employees, OHS professionals and managers, unions, 
OHS regulators, academics, shareholders and small business owners. A disclosure 
index is then employed “to assess, compare and explain differences in the extent and 
comprehensiveness of disclosure[s]” (Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006, p118 ) in a content 
analysis of a sample of corporate annual and sustainability reports covering an 11-
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year period (1997 to 2007). The results of this analysis were examined through the 
lens of neo-institutional theory to describe patterns of disclosure over time and 
identify exogenous factors, such as the introduction of the GRI, which could 
potentially explain identified changes in OHS reporting practice.  
Finally, a comparison of the results of the survey and content analysis is undertaken 
to identify the extent to which OHS disclosures appear to meet the information needs 
of stakeholders. By triangulating user perceptions against disclosures recommended 
in the literature and those observed in sampled corporate reports, this study identifies 
important OHS reporting gaps that raise questions about the extent to which the 
sampled disclosures succeed in discharging accountability for OHS to stakeholders.  
1.4 Contribution to knowledge  
Although sustainability reporting has only risen to prominence over the past 30 years, 
organisations have a long history of providing ‘health and safety’ information in 
corporate annual reports (see for example, Andrew et al. 1989; Deegan et al. 2000; Gray et 
al. 1995b; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Kolk 2003) and sustainability reports (see Adams 
2002, 2004; Clarke and O'Neill 2006; Frost et al. 2005). Despite this practice, there have 
been only limited attempts (see for example, Brown and Butcher 2005; Vuontisjarva 2006) 
to either describe the content of OHS disclosures or to examine the quality of the 
particular OHS metrics employed to control, to assess and to communicate 
accountability for OHS performance.  
Within the management control literature however, debate has raged for more than a 
decade over the fundamental validity, reliability and timeliness of the ‘lost time’ 
indicators typically employed to evaluate OHS performance (Bottomley 2000; Frederick 
and Lessin 2000; Hopkins 1994; Stricoff 2000). Indeed, the use of lost time metrics for 
performance management is claimed to have left stakeholders “increasingly 
dissatisfied” (Stricoff 2000, p36). Yet there has been little empirical evidence to 
indicate the extent to which these indicators, or some alternative measures of 
performance, continue to be employed in the public communication of OHS 
outcomes to stakeholders.   
The combination of content analysis and survey in this study therefore provides three 
important contributions to the existing literature. First, the study provides insight into 
the construction of public accounts of OHS performance by offering a detailed 
description and critique of the contemporary OHS disclosures provided by large 
Australian resource companies. In doing so, the study contributes, from a uniquely 
‘accounting’ perspective, to the safety management debate concerning the quality of 
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performance indicators, such as the ‘lost time injury frequency rate’ (LTIFR), used in 
the discharge of public accountability for OHS performance.  
Second, the examination of corporate OHS disclosure in the context of its wider 
institutional environment provides a rich insight into those accountability templates10 
and reporting practices that appear to have become institutionalised (or generally 
accepted and adopted), in this industry. Notably, the results also provide insight into 
the extent to which the GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines have influenced, or 
failed to influence, the quality of corporate OHS disclosures over the past decade. 
Finally, these findings provide insight into the expectations for corporate 
accountability held by stakeholder groups to whom resource firms are answerable in 
respect of OHS. This examination of stakeholder demand for OHS information in 
concert with the current reporting practices of a sample of large mining and energy 
firms provides valuable insight into the extent to which OHS disclosures provide the 
valid and reliable accounts of OHS performance needed to discharge OHS 
accountability to stakeholders. A number of recommendations are then offered in an 
effort to improve the quality of OHS accountability disclosures. 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis is comprised of eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, 
Chapter 2 provides a summary of literature relating to OHS accountability and 
examines issues relating to OHS performance management, evaluation and 
reporting. Chapter 3 presents a review of stakeholder, legitimacy and institutional 
theory literature, outlining the theoretical framework utilised within this research and 
developing a number of research propositions. The research method employed is 
discussed and justified in Chapter 4.  
The results of the study are presented in Chapters 5 and 6. First, Chapter 5 presents 
the results of the stakeholder survey and in doing so describes stakeholder demand 
for OHS disclosure. Chapter 6 presents the results of the content analysis, 
summarising and critiquing the corporate supply of OHS information. The results of 
Chapters 5 and 6 are then contrasted in Chapter 7 and various reporting gaps 
identified. Finally, Chapter 8 presents a summary of the project, outlines implications 
for both research and practice and offers recommendations for policy makers, 
standard setters, professional bodies, the GRI technical committee and corporate 
reporters. This final chapter also acknowledges a number of limitations of the study, 
identifies opportunities for future research, and presents the research conclusion.  
                                                 
10 See Chapter 3 for further details about institutionalised templates. 
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Chapter 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
While the previous chapter grounded this study in relevant accounting and 
accountability literature, this chapter opens by defining OHS and contextualising 
OHS obligations within relevant ethical and regulatory responsibility frameworks. In 
doing so, two important influences that have shaped OHS legislation over the period 
of this study11 are discussed. The first examines the influence on Australian OHS 
regulation of the release of the Robens’ Report in the United Kingdom (UK). The 
second highlights the influence of changes in industrial relations regulation during the 
period on perceptions of corporate OHS responsibility. Section 2.1 concludes by 
summarising the case for corporate responsibility for OHS and therein corporate 
accountability to stakeholders for OHS strategy, practices and outcomes.  
Section 2.2 explores issues relevant to the construction of these corporate accounts 
of OHS strategy, processes and outcomes. Together, this discussion is important 
because it contextualises the OHS risk management strategies, programs and 
practices available to managers and identifies critical issues to be considered in the 
design of effective OHS performance measurement systems. This begins with a 
review of the safety, management and accounting literature to identify and critique 
the financial and non-financial metrics that may be used to assess OHS 
performance. A discussion of the two competing philosophical ideologies that shape 
OHS strategy and performance measurement at an organisational level is presented. 
This demonstrates how vividly contrasting ideological perspectives, combined with a 
diverse selection of OHS management practices, underscore the ethical obligation 
for organisations to be accountable to stakeholders for their particular choice of OHS 
risk management activity and the subsequent performance outcomes.  
Finally, section 2.3 examines the literature relating to OHS disclosures provided in 
corporate annual reports and in sustainability reports such as Triple-Bottom-Line 
reports (TBL), Environment Health and Safety reports (EHS), Corporate Social and 
Environmental reports (CSER) and sustainability reports. In doing so, widespread 
concern over the quality of CSR disclosures is identified. The development of the 
GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines as a framework for improving the quality of 
CSR disclosures and guiding best practice disclosure is then discussed.  
                                                 
11 Since the completion of this study, the Federal Government has begun a National OHS harmonisation 
process. The new legislation has yet to be finalised. 
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2.1 Corporate accountability for OHS  
The evolution in globalisation, technologies, work processes and management 
techniques has led to various forms of workplace restructuring and resulted in 
increasing evidence of downsizing, increased hours of work, intensification of work 
(workload) and work pace (Frederick and Lessin 2000). Those changes, aimed at 
making workplaces more competitive and productive, have simultaneously “been 
associated with significant adverse health and safety impacts – such as repetitive 
strain injuries, stress, workplace violence, fatalities and other work-related injuries 
and illnesses” (Frederick and Lessin 2000, p10; Watson et al. 2003).  
The vast majority of these occupational injuries and illnesses however, are 
fundamentally preventable (Borys 2000b; Reason 1993). To this end, considerable 
progress in the behavioural and social sciences has resulted in enhanced confidence 
in OHS cause-effect relationships (Chhokar 1987) and “an unprecedented volume of 
research and knowledge concerning risk management in general and the control of 
public and workplace risks in particular” (Al-Tuwaijri 2008, pvii). Indeed, a substantial 
body of research over the past 30 years has confirmed a robust inverse relationship 
between the preventative OHS control efforts of employers and the subsequent 
frequency and severity of workplace injury and illness (e.g. Ginter 1979; Chelius 1991). 
It is this inherently predictable and preventable characteristic of occupational injuries 
and illnesses that presents a case for organisations to be held responsible for 
ensuring workplace health and safety, and subsequently for them to be held 
accountable for OHS outcomes. 
This section examines OHS accountability in detail. It begins by outlining 
fundamental concepts of OHS and defining key terms such as work-related incident, 
injury and illness. OHS is then contextualised within relevant ethical and regulatory 
responsibility frameworks. In doing so, the various individuals and constituent groups, 
that is, stakeholders (Freeman 1984; Jones 1980), affected by workplace injury and 
illness are identified. Finally, the section concludes by summarising the case for 
corporate accountability to stakeholders for their decisions in relation to the 
management of OHS and the prevention of workplace fatality, injury and illness. 
2.1.1 Defining OHS  
The phrase ‘occupational health and safety’ refers to the absence, rather than the 
presence, of work-related injury and illness and is defined as “the maintenance and 
improvement of the health and safety of workers in their place of work” where health 
refers to a “state of well-being in mind and body” and safety, the “freedom from 
danger or risk” (Oxford Dictionary 2004, pp969, 645, 1247). A safe working environment 
    13
is therefore one in which there is “minimal risk in the workplace from probable factors 
causing health and safety problems” (CCH 2004a, p129). This is distinct from a work 
environment that, due to a range of factors, including sheer good luck, is simply yet 
to experience a work-related injury or illness (Hopkins 2005b).  
Workplace injuries and illnesses constitute “a major, if not the major, source of health 
risks in Australian society” (Johnstone 2003b, p1). Work-related injuries are unplanned 
events causing physical harm to any person in the work environment including 
employees, suppliers, contractors, visitors and bystanders in the workplace (CCH 
2003). These incidents12 may result from falls, slips and trips, fire, electrical shock, 
lifting, equipment breakage or malfunction, spillage, journey mishaps, or fundamental 
deficiencies in task organisation (CCH 2006a; Johnstone 2003b). Outcomes may 
include temporary disability, permanent disability, or death (McDonald 1994).  
Work-related illness on the other hand, refers to occupational illness or disease that 
typically results from exposure to excessive heat, noise, dust or fibres; inappropriate 
levels of lighting; exposure to chemicals, toxins, carcinogens or viruses; or stress-
related psychosocial disturbances associated with excessive workload or 
psychological abuse, such as bullying, harassment and intimidation and workplace 
violence (Delaney 2001; Shikdar and Sawaqed 2003; Stone 1995). Again, occupational 
illness and disease outcomes may be temporary, permanent or fatal.  
2.1.2 Ethical duty of care – OHS as a human right 
An employer’s ethical duty to prevent these workplace injuries and illnesses and to 
ensure a safe and healthy work environment is underscored by Kofi Annan, former 
Secretary of the United Nations, who stated, 
All too often lives are shattered unnecessarily because of poor working 
conditions and inadequate safety systems… Let me encourage everyone 
to join the International Labour Organization in promoting safety and 
health at work. It is not only sound economic policy, it is a basic human 
right … (Takala 2005, p1, emphasis added).      
This right of employees to return home from work each day safely and in good health 
is recognised both within Australia and internationally. It is, for example, articulated in 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted and proclaimed by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 10th December 1948. The declaration “represents 
                                                 
12 Critics argue the term ‘incident’ is preferred over  ‘accident’ as the latter infers unpredictability and a 
lack of causality (see for example, Hopkins 2005b; McDonald 1994, 2006) 
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a contract between Governments and their people” (United Nations 2008a, p1) and 
recognises, among others, the following human rights: 
Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person (Article 3). 
Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment, to just and 
favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment 
(Article 23). 
The applicability to OHS of the “right to life” identified in Article 3 is punctuated by 
the 2.2 million men and women each year deprived of their lives in work-related 
fatalities (Somavia 2005). Documentation issued by the United Nations clarifying the 
right to work articulates the relevance of the “right to safe and healthy working 
conditions” as a key component within both the “decent work”, and “just and 
favourable conditions of work” aspects of the overarching right to work (see, Article 7 
of the United Nations’ International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
United Nations 2009).  
The UN’s Global Compact, a voluntary international citizenship network to which 
numerous Australian firms are signatories, also clearly identifies OHS as a 
fundamental human right within its principles and guidelines (United Nations 2008a). 
For example, the Global Compact’s guidelines for Principle 1: Business should 
support and respect the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights, 
identify a number of ways in which “companies can guarantee human rights through 
their daily activities” with the provision of safe and healthy working conditions at the 
very top of the list (United Nations 2008b, p2). 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) also recognises a basic right to life and 
therein a right to health and safety (ILO 2008e; Somavia 2005) and has released 
numerous OHS conventions and protocols reinforcing these rights over its 80-year 
history13 (Al-Tuwaijri 2008; see for example; ILO 2008a, b). Governments are encouraged 
to ratify, as a priority, various conventions on safety and health at work, such as No. 
187, Promotional Framework for Occupational Safety and Health Convention 2006, 
which seeks to ensure the systematic implementation of OHS provisions to promote 
the continuous improvement of OHS. The provisions of Convention 187 require 
states to develop a national policy and program to promote the rights of workers to a 
                                                 
13 An ILO Declaration on Safety and Health at Work was recently signed at the Safety and Health Summit 
(29 June-2 July, 2008) by a gathering of government ministers, multinational company CEOs, social 
security experts, OHS experts and employer and employee representatives. This declaration “sets a 
benchmark for employers, workers and governments to reinforce cooperation to reduce workplace 
accidents and diseases” (ILO 2008f, p1) in which signatories “committed to taking the lead in promoting 
a preventative health and safety culture [and] placing occupational health and safety high on national 
agendas” (ILO 2008e, p1). The signatories did not include any representatives from Australian 
government, industry or NGOs.  
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safe and healthy work environment and to promote the development of a national 
preventative OHS culture through principles of risk assessment, hazard reduction, 
OHS performance targets, indicators of progress, consultation and training. This 
convention also requires the implementation of a national OHS system that 
incorporates an authority responsible for OHS, appropriate laws and regulations and 
mechanisms to ensure statutory compliance including a strong and effective labour 
inspection system (ILO 2008e).  
Although the Australian government is yet to ratify ILO Convention 187, in 2004 it 
ratified Convention 155 (ILO 2008a), containing similar elements of OHS risk 
identification and reduction, consultation, training, legislation, regulation and 
enforcement. Van Beuren (2002) suggests that the minimum OHS obligations 
advocated in these conventions must be “based on international scientific input”, 
must apply to all workers (with additional protections offered to especially vulnerable 
groups) and “must be promulgated in statutes and regulations” which are “enforced 
effectively in relation to obligations of result, including criminal and civil sanctions for 
gross violations” (p154).  
2.1.3 Legislated duty of care – OHS as a legal obligation  
Consistent with the ILO’s recommendations outlined above, each Australian 
employer’s ethical responsibility to ensure the health and safety of their employees is 
enshrined in OHS legislation and regulation (CCH 2006a). As a Federation of States 
and Territories, independent OHS legislation and associated regulations exist14 for 
each Commonwealth, State and Territory government in Australia15 (CCH 2004a). 
Notably, international law offers no clear definitions to guide the development of 
national and state OHS legislation. Instead: 
The duty is placed on State parties to determine after consultation with 
organizations of employers and workers, the types of work that fall within that 
definition … [and] States and the international community must periodically revise 
their definitions of hazardous work to take account of advancing knowledge and 
epidemiological research (Siegel 2003, p10). 
The following sections outline the two key legislative developments that have shaped 
the institutional context in which corporate OHS decision-making occurs in Australia. 
                                                 
14 Since the completion of the empirical component of this study, the Federal Government has begun a 
National OHS harmonisation process that seeks to provide a single national system of OHS legislation 
and regulation. This legislation has yet to be finalised. 
15 The OHS Acts operating in Australia are the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW), 
Occupational Health and Safety Act 1985 (Vic), Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Qld), Work 
Health Act 1986 (NT), Occupational Health, Safety and Welfare Act 1986 (SA), Occupational Health 
and Safety Act 1984 (WA), Workplace Health and Safety Act 1995 (Tas), Occupational Health and 
Safety Act 1989 (ACT) and the federally enacted Occupational Health and Safety (Commonwealth 
Employment) Act 1991. 
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Both changes have led to fundamental changes in legal conceptions of the 
accountability of employers and employees for OHS and in approaches to managing 
OHS at an organisational level. The first relates to global changes in the focus of 
OHS legislation. The second development relates to the more recent changes in the 
Australian legislative framework governing employer / employee relationships 
following the introduction of WorkChoices legislation16. This has also been reported 
to have had implications for the management of OHS within organisations. 
2.1.3.1 Robens: Reshaping OHS regulation  
Although OHS legislation has existed in Australia for over a century in one form or 
another, widespread reforms have taken place in recent decades. Historically this 
legislation was compliance focused, comprising numerous separate OHS standards 
to address specific health and safety issues, each one enforceable only within the 
particular jurisdiction in which it was enacted. This body of legislation includes, for 
example, the Construction Safety Act 1912 (NSW), Shearer’s Accommodation Act 
1912 (WA), Pesticides ACT 1968, 1969 (Tas), Explosives Act 1936 (SA), Machinery 
Act 1949 (ACT), Labour and Industry Act 1958 (Vic), Liquefied Petroleum Gas Act 
1961 (NSW), The Dangerous Substances Act 1979 (SA), Radiation Safety Act 1975 
(WA), Marine Act 1981 (NT), Coal Mines Regulations Act 1982 (NSW), Rail Safety 
Act 1993 (NSW), Mines Rescue Act 1994 (NSW), and the Smoke Free Environment 
Act (NSW) 2000, (CCH 2003, 2004a, 2006a). 
The general focus of OHS regulation has, however, undergone significant change 
following the presentation to Parliament (in the UK) of the Robens Report of the 
Committee of Safety and Health and Work (see Robens 1972). In essence the 
Robens Committee recognised practical limitations of ad hoc regulation for individual 
OHS risks and argued that “there is a limit to the extent to which it is possible to add 
increasingly specific prescriptions … [within a traditional ‘command-and-control’ 
framework] without this resulting in counterproductive regulatory overload” on 
employers (Bluff et al. 2004, p4). Instead of an ever-increasing plethora of compliance-
based standards, the committee called for a “more effectively self-regulating system” 
(Robens 1972, p12). 
The Robens Report had a profound effect on OHS policy making, not only in the UK 
but around the world. Australian regulation followed the ‘Robens Model’, moving 
away from the enactment of a plethora of detailed and prescriptive standards in the 
                                                 
16 Note: since the empirical component of this study was conducted much, although not all, of the changes 
introduced with WorkChoices have subsequently been repealed. The period before and during the 
operation of WorkChoices is, however, the period in which the data for this study was collected and 
therefore relevant to this analysis. 
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late 1980s and 1990s toward a more ‘self-regulatory’ risk management approach to 
the prevention of occupational injury and illness (Bluff et al. 2004; Goldie 2000; Hopkins 
2000b). This recognised that the chance of a particular OHS incident differs from 
workplace to workplace and the risk of a worker sustaining a specific type of injury 
therefore varies across industries, occupations and types of work17 (CCH 2003; 
Williamson et al. 1996). Consequently, there is no ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach to 
occupational injury and disease prevention.  
The OHS Acts currently operating in Australia therefore now require employers to 
fulfil a duty of care to workers by ensuring that they provide a safe and healthy work 
environment. The Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 (NSW), for example, 
includes provisions that require employers to identify OHS risks and implement 
appropriate interventions and controls to address those risks so as to provide 
workers with a safe place of work, safe systems of work, adequate training and 
competent supervision (CCH 2003, 2004a, b). This effectively places primary 
responsibility for OHS outcomes on individual employers and, to a lesser extent, on 
their employees18 (CCH 2006a; Walters 2004). 
The move to self-regulation has nevertheless been subject to some criticism (Hopkins 
2000b). Under the former prescriptive legislation, employers had to comply with clear, 
precise and often technical rules. In contrast, the new self-regulatory approach 
imposes an overriding obligation on employers to provide a safe and healthy 
workplace (Gunningham and Johnstone 1999) although fails to advise employers how 
to achieve it (Hopkins 2000b). Employers and small business operators in particular, 
are claimed to resent the associated ambiguity in the self-regulation, preferring to be 
told precisely how to manage OHS so they can be certain of complying with their 
obligations (Hopkins 2000b). Compliance-related uncertainty is compounded by 
anxiety about serious penalties that could be imposed on employers who are found 
to have failed in their duty to provide a safe workplace. These penalties include the 
introduction in some states19 of industrial manslaughter legislation that enables 
company directors and managers to be held criminally liable for negligence that 
results in workplace fatality. The New South Wales “workplace death” provisions, for 
example, include “a maximum penalty of $1.6 million for corporations and $165,000 
                                                 
17 For example, industries such as mining, transport, agriculture, construction, manufacturing and health 
have routinely demonstrated a particularly high incidence of death and serious injury (ASCC 2008a; 
Poplin et al. 2008). 
18 Employers are charged with greater responsibility as they are generally in the position to dictate work 
policies, processes and resource inputs.  
19 See the New South Wales Occupational Health and Safety Amendment (Workplace Deaths) Act 2005, 
for example.  
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and / or imprisonment of five years for individuals where a breach of safety legislation 
results in a death in the workplace” (Gunningham 2007, p175). 
Within this context, however, the erosion of government resources allocated to 
inspection and oversight since the introduction of self-regulation has generated 
concern. Since each employer is now ultimately responsible for determining how they 
will pursue OHS, critics warn that without active “employee involvement and … a 
commitment by the State to ensuring safe outcomes [through active law 
enforcement] self-regulation runs the risk of degenerating into deregulation” (Hopkins 
2000b, p94). Echoing these concerns, Towler (1997) argues: 
By shutting down these external controls Governments have created a void of 
safety. When performance-based standards are introduced in conjunction with a 
withdrawal of government services and the political support for employee 
participation, the result is a deregulation of essential safety arrangements (p12).  
Concern about the ability of employees to effectively participate in OHS risk 
identification and management and to voice safety concerns in this self-regulatory 
environment is also highlighted by Berger (1999) who notes: 
On sites without union involvement, the application of performance-based laws … 
is often perceived to mean deregulation … Workers who might tentatively 
propose to their employer that a truck needs a reversing beeper or that a guard 
should be 90cm high, are likely to be told, rightly or wrongly, that there are no 
longer such [specific] requirements and that it all depends on whether the 
employer thinks it’s safe enough. 
As noted above, the absence of prescriptive requirements and the resulting 
discretion this OHS legislation affords employers can present a serious challenge for 
those who are not clear about how best to ensure workplace health and safety. 
Indeed, evidence calls into question whether self-regulation is likely to even be 
effective for those large employers with ample resources to secure specialist in-
house health and safety expertise. The presumption is that self-regulation allows 
companies to implement tailored management systems; however, the 1998 findings 
of the Royal Commission into the ESSO gas explosion at Longford found “to the 
contrary, that self-regulation at Longford allowed Esso to fall considerably short of 
best practice” (Hopkins 2000b, p94). Describing “inadequate training and procedures” 
as the “real causes” of the Longford gas explosion, the commission deemed Esso 
liable under the Victorian OHS Act for failing to take the “plainly practicable” 
measures necessary to provide a safe working environment (Hopkins 2000b, pp127-8) 
and stated: 
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There could have and should have been appropriate procedures to deal with … 
[the technical issues that arose]. Furthermore, the operators and supervisors 
could and should have known of and understood the real hazards confronting 
them on the day (Dawson pp12, 14). 
The Commission concluded that “external obligations of a detailed and 
comprehensive kind … should be imposed upon Esso in order to avoid the repetition 
of an accident such as occurred on 25 September 1988” (Hopkins 2000b, pp 94-95). 
Findings such as these underscore the argument for self-regulation to be supported, 
as encouraged by the United Nations and the ILO, by appropriate mechanisms of 
inspection and enforcement. They also emphasise the need for employees to actively 
and effectively participate in OHS decision-making. Concern over their ability to do 
so, however, has been raised following recent changes in the industrial relations 
arena. Particular reference is made to the introduction of ‘WorkChoices’ legislation20 
and the promotion of individual contracting arrangements and changes to unfair 
dismissal laws that held potentially significant implications for employee voice and 
representation.    
2.1.3.2 WorkChoices: Reshaping industrial relations  
The post-Robens’ OHS regulatory changes discussed in section 2.1.3.1 were 
followed by moves by federal governments to ‘re-regulate’ industrial relations (IR) 
(Fairbrother et al. 2002). This began with the Industrial Relations Reform Act 1993 
(Cth) before two subsequent changes, namely the Workplace Relations Act 1996 
(Cth) and Workplace Relations Amendment (Work Choices) Bill 2005, heralded a 
new phase of Australian IR (King and Stilwell 2005, p7) that fundamentally altered 
nearly all aspects of the IR system which had operated in Australia for over a century 
(CCH 2006b; Hor and Keats 2007).  
The greatest changes arose from the provisions of the 2005 WorkChoices 
amendment (Hor and Keats 2007) which built on elements of the 1996 legislation to 
strip existing award21 provisions by limiting the scope of agreements to a specified 
maximum of 15 and minimum of five ‘standard’ conditions22. In doing so the 2005 
amendment identified specific matters of ‘prohibited content’23 which employers and 
                                                 
20 Although the Fair Work Act (2009) has repealed some WorkChoices legislative provisions, 
WorkChoices remains relevant to this study as it was in place during the period in which the data was 
collected. 
21 The previous system was based largely on industry awards, “decision[s] of an industrial tribunal, such 
as the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (AIRC), that sets out minimum conditions of 
employment (Peetz 2006).   
22 The five minimum conditions relate to wages, annual, personal and parental leave and ordinary hours of 
work, while long service leave, superannuation, redundancy pay, notice of termination as jury service 
were no longer award matters. 
23 Prohibited content must be removed. Fines to $33,000 for each item included in an agreement applied. 
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employees were no longer legally able to negotiate within collective or individual 
agreements, contrary to the stated purpose of promoting free and flexible bargaining 
on those issues that matter to employers and employees (Lee 2005). WorkChoices 
also removed unfair dismissal rights from most employees24, abolished the no-
disadvantage test for Australian Workplace Agreements (AWAs)25 and removed 
provisions requiring employers and employees to bargain fairly (Lee 2005).  
Following these changes substantial power imbalances between individual workers 
and corporations were quickly exposed. These included coercive recruitment 
practices26, a curtailing of opportunities for employee representation27 and industrial 
action28, and the removal of the general right for employees to seek arbitration on 
disputes from an independent umpire such as the Australian Industrial Relations 
Commission (Campling and Gollan 1999; Fairbrother et al. 2002; King and Stilwell 2005, p7; 
Peetz 2006). Together, these changes were argued to have potentially important 
implications for workplace health and safety (see for example Peetz 2006; Gunningham 
and Johnstone 1999; Frederick and Lessin 2000). 
Implications for OHS 
Commentators argued that implications for OHS arose due to the likely impact of 
these IR changes on the historical drivers of occupational injury and illness. In 
particular these related to the potential impact of provisions allowing for increases in 
hours of work, work intensification (workload issues) and changes to work 
organisation (structural and procedural issues) (see for example Bluff et al. 2004; 
Frederick and Lessin 2000; Gunningham and Johnstone 1999; Hopkins 2005b; Peetz 2006; 
Watson et al. 2003). For example, clauses promoting full labour capacity utilisation by 
allowing contracts to amend or remove award conditions such as meal breaks, rest 
breaks, annual leave, sick leave and public holidays were argued to inevitably lead to 
work intensification. So too were changes permitting both the removal of penalty 
rates, allowances and overtime payments and the increase of maximum weekly 
hours of work by means of a flexibility of hours clause which permitted annualised 
                                                 
24 Unfair dismissal provisions no longer applied to employees with less than six months service, or to firms 
with less than 100 employees, or those with greater than 100 employees whose reasons for termination 
includes operational reasons such as redundancy or other economic, structural or similar reason. 
25 AWAs were employment contracts introduced in 1996 enabling employers and individual employees to 
bargain directly (Campling and Gollan 1999; Fairbrother et al. 2002, p16). The no-disadvantage test 
requiring AWAs to be evaluated against the various minimum conditions of relevant awards or collective 
agreements (King and Stilwell 2005, p7; Peetz 2006) was abolished in the 2005 amendment, then later 
partly reinstated following evidence of employees coerced to accept significant reductions in wages and 
conditions. 
26 These include practices such as making recruitment and selection conditional on signing an AWA. 
27 This included restrictions on union rights of entry to a workplace. 
28 Again, the new restrictions imposed on industrial action leaves Australia again in contravention of UN 
Declaration on Human Rights, ILO Conventions and international labour law (King and Stilwell 2005; 
White 2005a, b). 
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averaging of a 38-hour working week plus reasonable [although unspecified] 
additional overtime (Peetz 2006).  
Peetz (2006) argued that these changes would motivate employers to behave 
differently – to keep increasing the working hours of employees during peak periods 
rather than expend additional recruitment and training costs to engage additional 
workers. Indeed, research reveals extended hours and high work pressure are 
greatest for employees who received neither paid overtime, nor time off in lieu, and 
comparisons of individual and collective agreements found individual contracts 
required longer working hours, usually failed to pay penalty rates and nearly always 
contained provisions that increased the ‘flexibility’ of hours (Peetz 2006; Plowman and 
Preston 2005). Critics suggested the benefit of “short run boosts in labour productivity” 
will come at a “significant cost [including] threats to workplace safety; the quality of 
output; the process of skill formation; the balance between work and life; and the 
actual enjoyment of work on the job” (Bohle and Quinlan 2005; Watson et al. 2003, p98).  
The legislators did, however, recognise the potential OHS implications of increasing 
working hours, and specifically required employers to take into consideration29 
factors such as “any risk to the employees health and safety that might reasonably 
be expected to arise if the employee worked the additional hours” (Hor and Keats 
2007, p12). One might perceive a conflict of interest arising in an employer’s 
assessment of OHS risk given their desire to increase working hours. In the end, 
determining the safety of a designated task is at the employer’s discretion (note 
Berger’s (1999) quote in section 2.2.1).  
In a study of Victorian OHS offences Johnstone (2003b) found some magistrates to 
be sceptical about the competing interests of profits and safety. In reporting quotes 
from the judiciary, Johnstone revealed Magistrates were “aware that employees had 
very little bargaining power in the workplace” and that they recognised that it was 
“very difficult for an employee to just stop working in a situation of danger, because 
his or her job would be under threat if he or she did” (Johnstone 2003b, p193). With the 
removal of unfair dismissal protections, critics argue that employees would be even 
less likely to voice safety concerns. In the event that a dispute between the employer 
and employee does arise however, the new legislative provisions state: 
An employee who is a party to a dispute must, while the dispute is being resolved, 
continue to work in accordance with his or her contract of employment, unless the 
employee has a reasonable concern about an imminent risk to his or her health or 
                                                 
29 Of interest is a 1922 case in the High Court of Australia, in which Justice Beeby contended that the 
court should subject all applications to inquiry on health and safety grounds prior to sanctioning any 
increases in ordinary working hours (Patmore 2003, p121). 
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safety and [must] comply with any reasonable direction given by his or her employer 
to perform other available work, either at the same workplace or at another 
workplace. (WorkChoices 2005 s697, emphasis added). 
In the event a dispute exists and an employee refuses to complete an assigned task 
on OHS grounds, this “subtle legal change” (White 2005b, p76) now places the onus 
on the employee to ‘prove’ the OHS risk was both unreasonable and imminent (CCH 
2006b, p34). Should the employee fail, the refusal to complete the task may be 
deemed ‘unprotected’ action for which penalties, including fines of up to $6,600 for 
each individual and up to $33,000 for organisations (unions), uncapped civil 
remedies and termination of employment may apply (CCH 2008). Further, where an 
employee is employed in a workplace related in any way to the building industry or 
building supply, including “almost every aspect of construction … landscaping, 
refurbishment and fitting out, along with offsite manufacture of building needs” (such 
as production of window frames, nails, pipes, door handles etc), unprotected action 
constitutes a breach of the Building and Construction Industry Improvement (BCII) 
Act 2005. Personal penalties for breaches of BCII range from up to $22,000 for an 
individual to $110,000 for organisations, plus uncapped compensation and the ability 
to sequester assets (Ross 2005, p178).  
Within this context, recent data on Australian work-related fatalities by industry since 
the passing of WorkChoices and BCII legislation is compelling. In particular, the 
significant increase in work-related fatalities within the construction industry raises 
questions about the ability of employees and employers to make adequate 
assessments of OHS risk in an environment where unfair dismissal rights have been 
removed; the ability of union representatives to inspect sites, deliver safety risk 
awareness training and generally provide support to members is largely curtailed; 
and the threat of personal financial penalties exist for employees who ‘unlawfully’ 
stop work. The following table summarises these recent changes in the annual 
number of work-related fatalities. 
Annual number of 
work-related fatalities  
2004-05 
(pre-WorkChoices)
2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 
Construction industry          
Change since 2005 
18 25       
? 38.9% 
28       
? 55.6% 
36       
? 100% 
Other                             
Change since 2005 
110 119      
? 8.2% 
119      
? 8.2% 
95       
? 13.5% 
Total (all industries)             
Change since 2005 
128 144      
? 12.5% 
147      
? 14.8% 
131      
? 2.3% 
Table 2-1: Australian work-related fatalities by industry (2005-2008) 
Source: ASCC (2008b) 
The continuing incidence of work-related fatality in Australia underscores the need for 
both employers and employees to receive adequate training in OHS risk and hazard 
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assessment so as to ensure that the risks to which workers are (or are not) subjected 
are clearly understood. Analyses of registered enterprise agreements, however, 
found 82% dealt with the issue of working hours while in contrast, only 55% dealt 
with training issues and only 42% dealt specifically with OHS issues (Watson et al 
2003, p85). Evidence suggests those engaged in non-standard forms of employment, 
such as casuals and independent contractors, are significantly less likely to receive 
training than the permanent employees they work alongside; AWAs are even less 
likely to contain provisions for training (34%) compared with collective agreements 
(86%); and organisations offering training are more likely to be public rather than 
private sector, large rather than small and unionised rather than non-unionised 
(Campling and Gollan 1999; Hall et al. 2002; Morehead et al. 1997; Peetz 2006). The 
increasing use of individual contracts coupled with the reduction of unfair dismissal 
protections and restrictions on union rights means that the introduction of 
WorkChoices was likely to substantially narrow the range of issues in which 
employees have a voice, including the assessment of OHS risk and the delivery of 
OHS training (Peetz 2006, p77; Lee 2005). 
Overall, the OHS implications arising from these regulatory changes, in particular the 
potential for increases in work intensification, reductions in OHS training, declining 
capacity of employees to raise and address OHS issues without fear of unfair 
dismissal and the loss of traditional mechanisms of OHS expertise and oversight, are 
widely recognised (CCH 2007). Watson et al (2003) therefore called for employers to 
be held accountable to society for how they deploy human resources, including both 
employees and contractors, in view of evidence that managers increasingly pursue 
profitability goals “at great cost to their workforce, insisting on short-term cost cutting 
measures and minimising employment entitlements” and training (p206).  
This has led to calls to examine forms of corporate governance which both recognise 
employees as legitimate stakeholders30 and provide a means of monitoring the 
activities of boards, directors and corporations (Markey 2004; Peetz 2006). 
Mechanisms for discharging accountability, such as the public provision of OHS 
disclosures, provide an important means of addressing these concerns. Before 
exploring the construction of these corporate accounts (see section 2.2), section 
2.1.4 examines the impact of OHS failures so as to identify those stakeholders to 
whom organisations are accountable. 
                                                 
30 Stakeholders were defined above (see page 12) using Freeman’s (1984) definition as being any group 
or individual who may affect or be affected by the activities of an organisation. 
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2.1.4 Consequences of OHS failure 
The preceding sections have shown that employers are able, morally obligated and 
legally required to engage in illness and injury prevention through the implementation 
of effective OHS risk management including hazard management, training and 
consultation (CCH 2004a, b). Despite this, significant numbers of workplace injuries 
and illnesses continue to occur each year – both in Australia and around the world. 
This results in substantial economic and non-financial implications for a range of 
stakeholders as identified below.  
2.1.4.1 Economic consequences of OHS  
The economic impact of OHS covers a diverse range of expenditure, from process 
costs associated with providing a safe workplace such as costs of regulatory 
compliance, equipment upgrade, insurance premiums and OHS training to those 
costs relating to OHS failures such as medical expenses, OHS fines and penalties, 
repairs to equipment, recruitment of replacement labour or damage to corporate 
reputation. While a detailed analysis of the categories of corporate OHS expenditure 
is presented in section 2.2.1, the economic costs discussed in this section capture 
both corporate expenditure and the various externalities associated with an 
occupational fatality, injury or illness.  
The most recent study of the economic cost of workplace injury and illness in 
Australia reveals the ex-post31 economic cost for the 2005-2006 financial year to be 
$57.5 billion or approximately 5.9% of GDP (ASCC 2009) which “represents a 
significant increase in costs as a proportion of GDP from the [previous] 2000-2001 
study” (see ASCC 2009, p2; NOHSC 2004a). This estimate captures only the “human 
cost … associated with actual [compensated] injuries or illnesses” (ASCC 2009, p8). In 
line with the previous (NOHSC 2004a) study, costs associated with loss of goodwill or 
reputation and property damage are excluded, as are costs relating to those injuries 
or illnesses for which a workers’ compensation claim is not accepted. Also excluded 
from the ASCC’s (2009) analysis however, is the estimated economic value of 
associated pain, suffering and early death. This was ‘conservatively’ placed at an 
additional 141% of the $34.3 billion economic cost for the 2000-2001 year in the 
previous study (NOHSC 2004a). Using a similar ratio suggests an approximate total 
economic cost of $138.8 billion for the year 2005-2006.  
The ASCC (2009) report reveals that items captured in the actual $57.5 billion OHS 
cost for 2005-2006 include workers’ compensation payments to afflicted employees, 
                                                 
31 This approach considered only the costs of OHS incidents that occurred within the reference year. 
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legal costs, uncompensated medical expenses, funeral costs and the costs of 
overtime, sick leave and staff turnover. These are summarised in Appendix 1. 
Importantly, the vast majority of these costs are not borne by the firms in which the 
injury or illness occurred but are externalities distributed across stakeholder groups.  
Evidence in both the NOHSC (2004a) and ASCC (2009) reports suggests that while 
an employer will bear 100% of the cost of the injury and disease prevention programs 
and interventions they undertake, they incur only 4%, on average, of the substantial 
economic cost of a serious incident32 occurring in their workplace. The remaining 
96% of the cost burden of OHS failures is externalised with injured workers meeting 
up to 49% (44% in 2004) and the remaining 47% (53% in 2004) met by institutions 
such as public health and social security systems (largely tax-payer funded), other 
corporations (including cross-subsidisation via compensation premiums) and the 
wider community (including charities, non-government organisations and the public) 
(ASCC 2009; NOHSC 2004a). This is illustrated in Figure 2.1. 
Distribution of the Economic Burden of OHS
 in Australia (2005-2006)
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Figure 2-1: The economic cost of OHS in Australia 
NOHSC (2004a) suggests that the relationship between the level of physical damage 
and the associated OHS cost distribution is such that, although the employer bears 
most of the cost of very minor injuries and diseases33, such as first aid injuries, the 
burden on employers is largely externalised to workers and the community as 
severity increases. The share of costs borne by the employer decreases sharply with 
the increasing severity of damage, leaving “the majority of economic cost associated 
with permanent incapacity borne by the community, through social welfare and other 
support schemes, and loss of human capital” (NOHSC 2004a, p27). Together this 
highlights the economic stake that employees, their families and benefactors, other 
                                                 
32 This refers to injuries and illnesses requiring a minimum of three days’ absence from work and includes 
work-related fatalities. 
33 Note: minor injuries, such as first aid injuries, are not shown in Figure 2.1. 
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corporations, taxpayers and the general public each have in the effective 
management of OHS performance. Managers therefore owe accountability to these 
stakeholders for their OHS choices, actions and subsequent OHS performance.  
2.1.4.2 Non-financial consequences of OHS  
The impact of OHS activity on organisational stakeholders, however, extends well 
beyond that which can be measured in financial terms. The occurrence of workplace 
injuries or illnesses can have a direct or indirect affect on a range of stakeholders, 
most obvious being the physical and emotional impact on the injured individual. 
Global estimates place the number of workers killed in occupational fatalities at over 
2.2 million per year and total annual work-related injuries and disease in excess of 
430 million cases (ILO 2008d). Locally, Australian compensation data suggests, on 
average, over 17 cases of serious injury or illness occur every hour (ASCC 2008a) and 
134 people every day are permanently impaired as a result of employment-related 
injury and disease (NOHSC 2004b). Some are never able to work again, others need 
to work at less skilled jobs, work for fewer hours per week, or work at a slower pace, 
and many experience chronic pain. A combination of injury and occupational 
exposure to hazardous substances such as chemicals, toxins and viruses cause a 
further six work-related deaths each day (ASCC 2008a; Kerr et al. 1996).  
This compensation data has, however, been shown to significantly under-report the 
total number of OHS incidents34 (ABS 2001; ASCC 2008c). Estimates suggest 
Australian outcomes may be as high as 4,500 work-related deaths and half a million 
new work-related incidents per year (ACTU 2005; ASCC 2008a; NOHSC 1999). These 
injuries, illnesses and fatalities not only impact the physical and emotional quality of 
life of the damaged individual, but can also have a substantial affect on interpersonal 
relationships with family, friends, colleagues, social networks and community groups. 
Indeed the potential for serious workplace injury and illness to cause immeasurable 
physical, emotional, family, social and recreational consequence is well recognised 
(Johnstone 2003b; McDonald 2001, 2006). Together these outcomes underscore the 
urgent need to ensure the basic human rights of Australian workers. 
2.1.5 Summary 
This section has shown that OHS is an internationally recognised human right that 
may be secured through the effective identification and management of OHS risk. As 
such, employers and employees have not only an ethical responsibility, but also a 
legal responsibility, to ensure workplace health and safety by actively engaging in 
                                                 
34 See section 2.2.3.1 for more detail. 
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illness and injury prevention. Despite these requirements, workplace fatalities, 
illnesses and injuries continue to occur with the frequency of incidents increasing in 
some sectors. One might reasonably ask, “Why then, is more not done to ensure the 
workplace health and safety of employees?’ (Chelius 1991). A common response is 
that organisations engaging in programs of safety training, risk identification, risk 
control and safety incentive schemes incur added, and measurable, implementation 
expenses, although the benefits that accrue are not so easily traced to the bottom 
line (Chen and Chan 2004; Ginter 1979; Reber et al. 1993).  
Chelius (1991) offers a different explanation, pointing not to the difficulty of measuring 
benefits but to the very nature of the employment relationship:  
The unregulated relationship between employer and employee does not contain 
sufficient incentives for employer investments in injury and illness prevention. [It 
represents] a classic externality – the employer bears the cost of prevention while 
employees [and other external stakeholders] enjoy greater safety (Chelius 1991, p22). 
Not only does the employer bear the costs of prevention activity but, as shown 
above, the great majority of OHS failure costs are essentially externalised to 
stakeholders. Chelius (1991) therefore suggests that employers will spend less on 
injury and disease prevention than “socially desirable” because they neither receive 
the full benefits of improved health and safety35 nor bear the full cost arising from 
OHS damage occurring in their workplace (Chelius 1991, p22). Furthermore, within 
the post-Robens self-regulatory framework, decisions regarding design, resourcing 
and implementation of OHS risk assessment and control activities are left to each 
individual enterprise (CCH 2004a, b). Consequently the allocation of OHS expenditure, 
beyond that necessary to provide the most basic employee safeguards and 
insurance, remains entirely at management’s discretion (Ginter 1979; Walters 2004). 
The considerable physical, social and financial burden OHS failures impose on 
internal and external stakeholders therefore justifies the need for managers to be 
accountable for their selection and implementation of OHS strategy and control 
initiatives and for the subsequent OHS outcomes (Ginter 1979). Roberts and Scapens 
(1985) suggest that in its broadest sense, accountability “simply refers to the giving 
and demanding of reasons for conduct” (p447). This recognises the existence of 
“social interdependencies” (Johansen 2008, p249) between those responsible for 
corporate governance and those subsequently affected by corporate outcomes. 
Accountability is therefore defined as:  
                                                 
35 Chelius (1991) suggests that it is the employees who gain the benefits by enjoying greater safety. 
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The duty to provide an account (by no means necessarily a financial account) or 
reckoning of those actions for which one is held responsible (Gray et al. 1996, 
p38). 
Regulatory forms of accountability such as OHS legislation have sought to ensure 
“that duty holders who breach statutory provisions are ‘held to account’ through 
prosecution" (Johnstone 2003a, p3). However, as the over-arching legislative 
frameworks of both OHS and IR have moved further toward self-regulation, “the two 
institutions most capable of providing effective OHS oversight [namely] state 
regulators and organised labour, are both confronting increased pressures and 
difficulties in fulfilling this role” (Bluff et al. 2004, p3). Consequently, alternative 
mechanisms such as external reporting are increasingly important vehicles through 
which those charged with corporate governance are able to fulfil their duty to 
discharge accountability for OHS to stakeholders. The following section examines the 
construction of these publicly disseminated corporate ‘accounts’ of OHS. 
2.2 Constructing corporate accounts of OHS 
Accountability, as defined by (Gray et al. 1996) above, involves the duty of those 
charged with corporate governance “to provide an account”  to stakeholders for their 
choices and actions. Embracing this perspective of accountability, parties charged 
with corporate governance for OHS therefore have a duty to provide an account to 
stakeholders of their decisions on OHS inputs and activities and of the outcomes of 
OHS processes. This section explores the construction of such corporate accounts of 
OHS. Particular attention is given to alternative approaches to conceptualising and 
evaluating OHS strategy and practices, or as framed by Johnstone (2003a) 
“conceptions of culpability, reflecting dominant and individualistic ideologies of OHS” 
(p208). These ideologies have implications not only for OHS risk management but 
also for the evaluation of OHS performance outcomes.    
The section begins with a review of the safety, management and accounting 
literature to identify and critique the financial and non-financial metrics typically used 
to account for OHS outcomes. However, before exploring which of these metrics an 
organisation will employ to evaluate OHS inputs and processes, one must appreciate 
which of two ideologically opposed philosophical positions is driving OHS strategy. 
This has important implications for the way in which OHS policies, processes and 
performance are designed, evaluated and communicated. Section 2.2 therefore 
includes a brief overview of the primary OHS ideologies and examines the role of 
each in shaping not only OHS strategy but also the metrics and narratives employed 
in the construction of corporate accounts of OHS interventions and performance. 
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2.2.1 Accounting for corporate OHS performance 
Efforts to provide information that address the decision needs of managers and the 
accountability expectations and needs of external stakeholders hinge on the capacity 
to reliably evaluate and communicate OHS performance (Else and Beaumont 2000). 
This means organisations must be capable of measuring those indicators that 
unambiguously reflect OHS inputs, activities and outcomes (Else and Beaumont 2000, 
Bottomley 2000). Campbell (1938) defines measurement as “the assignment of 
numerals to represent properties of material systems other than numbers, in virtue of 
the laws governing these properties” (p126). The inherent difficulty in obtaining 
objective measures of workplace ‘health’ and ‘safety’ arises, however, because these 
are constructs, not observable properties of material systems. Social outcomes such 
as death, injury and illness can signify a multidimensional concept of health and 
safety, but do not faithfully represent that concept (Van Peursem et al. 1995). 
Consequently, measures of OHS are described as “genuinely difficult to construct 
and manage” (Bottomley 2000, p1). 
While surrogate ‘measures’ of the financial cost of workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums and the rate of workplace incidents are commonly employed proxies, their 
ability to provide accurate and reliable measures of ‘workplace safety’ is widely 
criticised in the literature. Employers are claimed to “demand more effective 
measures to reduce the rising [OHS] costs” while workers are “demanding better 
measures to reduce their exposure to hazards that affect their health and safety” 
(Whitfield 1994, p74). Consequently, the ongoing pursuit of valid, relevant, 
comparable and reliable proxies for evaluating and communicating health and safety 
performance to stakeholders is evident. The following section presents and critiques 
the financial measures and non-financial indicators that are proposed in the literature 
as proxies for workplace health and safety.  
2.2.1.1 Financial measures of OHS performance 
The quest for high quality financial measures of OHS performance presents 
particular challenges for accountants. For example, the current set-up of accounting 
information systems in most firms is often not conducive to capturing and presenting 
OHS-related cost information in a meaningful way (Rikhardsson 2004) and there is 
often significant uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of OHS expense 
recognition (Drexel 1992). Overall, the attempts of OHS managers to deal with their 
organisation’s accounting systems have been described as an exercise in futility 
because, although managers may receive a lot of financial information, there is a 
substantial lag between OHS incidents and any subsequent financial impact, leaving 
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financial data of little use for timely OHS analysis and decision-making (Drexel 1992; 
MacCorkle 1994). Despite these criticisms, some OHS costs, such as the cost of 
workers’ compensation insurance premiums, are relatively easy to capture in 
financial accounting systems and to make visible in management reports (ABS 2002). 
Workers’ compensation costs 
The substantial costs associated with workers’ compensation insurance premiums, or 
direct compensation payments to injured employees for those firms licensed to self-
insure, are the most frequently employed financial ‘measures’ of OHS performance 
(Ackers et al. 1992). This is illustrated by the estimated $8 billion in premiums to 
workers’ compensation schemes paid collectively by employers across Australia in 
the 2005/06 financial year (ASCC 2009). The routine presentation of compensation 
costs in management accounting reports is claimed to have a “dramatic safety effect” 
as their impact on bottom-line profitability provides both an incentive for managers to 
pursue safety improvement and positive reinforcement when these improvements are 
reflected in cost reductions (Chelius 1991, p24; Reber et al. 1993).  
Nevertheless, while compensation costs may be useful they fail to provide a valid 
and reliable proxy for current OHS performance for a number of reasons. First, the 
inability of accountants to allocate these costs across departments or business units 
in a meaningful way is often due to the tendency to allocate cost arbitrarily or using 
inappropriate cost drivers (Bottomley 2000; Chelius 1991; Clarke and O'Neill 2006; Stewart 
1991; WorkCover NSW 2005a). Second, an inconsistent relationship exists between the 
cost of a firm’s insurance premium and its underlying health and safety performance 
(WorkCover NSW 2005c). This is typically due to the method of determining insurance 
premiums in that the calculation of workers’ compensation premiums, particularly for 
small employers, typically does not even consider their previous compensation 
claims history. However, costs are more informative for very large employers, as their 
premiums are “close to 90 percent experience-based” (WorkCover NSW 2005c). Third, 
both cost and injury data provided by the various State or Federal workers’ 
compensation schemes is widely recognised as a poor measure of work-related ill 
health since compensation payments tend to grossly under-estimate the total cost of 
occupational injury and illness (Drexel 1992; Herr 1998; NOHSC 2004a). This is often 
because aggregated compensation statistics only reflect those injuries and illnesses 
for which a claim is registered with and accepted by a workers’ compensation 
insurer36 (CCH 2003). Indeed, research both locally and internationally has 
acknowledged the systematic under-reporting and under-estimation of workplace 
                                                 
36 This includes reports of compensation claims made to firms licensed to self-insure. 
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related deaths and injury rates (Herr 1998; NOHSC 2004b). Illustrating the failure of 
workers’ compensation data to provide a complete picture of workplace health and 
safety, annual Australian data reveals only 189,400 (or 39.6%) of the 477,800 
persons who experienced a work-related injury or illness37 actually applied for 
compensation from a workers’ compensation insurer (ABS 2001, p1). In a separate 
study of work-related fatalities, evidence from coronial enquiries revealed 249 deaths 
in the 2004/5 reporting year, although only 14938 (60%) of these were captured by 
the National Data Set for Compensation-based Statistics  (ASCC 2008c, p1).  
OHS incidents may go uncompensated for a variety of reasons, most typically 
because the injured party failed to lodge a compensation claim. In many such cases, 
the injury was considered too minor. Other reasons include: a lack of awareness of 
the eligibility or availability of benefits; the perceived negative impact of a claim on 
current and future employment; the effort involved in making a claim; the employer 
agreeing to cover the injured worker’s costs outside a workers’ compensation 
scheme; or an inability to clearly trace the illnesses or injuries back to their work-
related drivers (Productivity Commission 2004; Ringleb and Wiggins 1990; Yu and Hunt 
2002).  Finally, workers’ compensation cost is an incomplete measure of OHS 
outcomes because compensation premiums fail to capture a wide range of non-
compensable and often externalised occupational illness and injury expenses39 such 
as those identified in Section 2.1.4 above (Stewart 1991).  
Non-compensated costs 
In addition to the financial costs associated with workers’ compensation premiums or 
payments, financial accounting information systems may capture a range of non-
compensated, OHS-related business costs. Some, such as the costs associated with 
the repair or replacement of damaged physical assets, tort liability, litigation 
expenses, insurance losses, OHS training, fines and other penalties, can be captured 
and directly traced to their relevant cost drivers (MacCorkle 1994; Stone 1995).  
More difficult to identify, difficult to clearly trace back to work-related illness or injury 
drivers, and therefore difficult to isolate as OHS costs within the accounting system, 
are a broad array of other indirect and often immeasurable costs such as costs 
associated with lost productivity, workplace disruption or decreased employee morale 
(MacCorkle 1994). These may also relate to the cost incurred to repair or replace 
company property damaged through accident, sabotage or vandalism, personnel 
                                                 
37 This study relates to the year ended September 2000. 
38 Table 2-1 revealed 128 worker fatalities for 2004-5 as reported in ASCC (2008b) whereas the ASCC 
(2008c) Compendium reflects all work-related deaths, including workers and others (e.g. bystanders). 
39 For example, these injury-related costs may be transferred to public health and social security systems 
or to the injured person or their benefactors. This is explained further below. 
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costs such as work-related sick leave or other leave, lowered employee morale, 
higher staff turnover, unscheduled overtime, recruitment of replacement employees 
and lost productivity due to inexperienced replacement workers. Alternatively, costs 
of business disruption may be associated with production disturbances and 
downtime, reduced productivity, internal administration, training or retraining, 
dissemination of information, corporate reporting and compliance, public relations 
and reputation damage. Finally, there are also the additional expenses incurred to 
evaluate and modify systems, equipment or processes to prevent repeated 
occurrences of the injury or illness (MacCorkle 1994; Rikhardsson 2004; Stone 1995).  
Not captured at all are those financial expenses that remain uncompensated by 
either employers or insurers (Ringleb and Wiggins 1990; Yu and Hunt 2002). These 
include expenses such as uncompensated pharmaceuticals; the opportunity costs of 
lost earning capacity; personal costs of relocation or retraining; and costs that are 
inevitably subsidised by social security or public health systems or transferred to the 
afflicted employee (Stewart 1991). These challenges notwithstanding, MacCorkle 
(1994) suggests the inability to accurately capture the full range of OHS costs should 
not preclude use of the best estimate obtainable. Given the difficulty identifying and 
quantifying many indirect health and safety costs, and in spite of the limitations of the 
compensation costs, the total OHS cost to an employer is traditionally estimated at 
four times the direct workers’ compensation cost (MacCorkle 1994).  
2.2.1.2 Non-financial indicators of OHS outcomes 
The search for health and safety performance indicators by which organisations may 
give an account of OHS outcomes has led to the identification of key performance 
indicators (KPIs) based on quantitative measures of work-related injuries, illnesses 
and fatalities occurring in a given period. These injury and illness outcomes vary in 
severity along a continuum from those requiring minor first aid to those resulting in 
death. Classifying work-related illness can be tenuous however, as multiple 
contributing factors may make it impossible to state the definitive source of an OHS 
ailment (CCH 2003). Obtaining an accurate assessment of workplace illness is 
therefore particularly difficult since there is often a failure to recognise occupational 
diseases as ‘work-related’ and many occupational illnesses are neither claimed nor 
compensated for (Kyaw-Myint 2006). In contrast, the identification of work-related 
injury is relatively more straight-forward. 
Although organisations are required to notify regulators of serious work-related 
injuries and illnesses, Australian OHS legislation does not require organisations to 
aggregate, periodically evaluate, or periodically report occupational injury or illness 
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outcome data40. Furthermore, the absence of an accepted international standard for 
the measurement of occupational injury and illness performance, or of an agreed 
conceptual framework for evaluating OHS outcomes has led to national, industry and 
organisational variations in outcome classification and measurement. For example, 
OHS measures may be based on classifications of organisational response to the 
injury (or treatment), such as first aid injury, medical treatment injury and LTI (see for 
example Brown and Butcher 2005; Clarke and O'Neill 2006) or classifications of severity 
such as minor injury, temporary disability, permanent disability or fatality (see for 
examples McDonald 1994, 2006; NOHSC 2004c, 2005; WorkCover NSW 2004, 2005b).  
In the absence of an international injury measurement standard, organisations are 
likely to be guided by AS1885: Australian ‘Injury Recording’ Standard. This standard 
recommends organisations measure OHS outcomes using an LTI frequency rate. 
AS1885 defines LTI as “those occurrences that resulted in a fatality, permanent 
disability or time lost from work of one day/shift or more” (NOHSC 1990, p6). The rate 
of LTIs, therefore, captures the number of injuries that are sufficiently serious to 
result in time ‘lost’ (worker absence) and for which a compensation claim is therefore 
likely to be lodged. LTIs may also have a potential impact on future workers’ 
compensation premium rates. Consequently, LTIs are highly correlated with the 
financial impact of LTIs on the employer. 
While the US-based Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) also 
recommends a response-based metric as the primary measure of OHS outcomes, its 
‘recordable injury’ (RI) rate captures a much broader range of minor injuries and 
illnesses than the LTI. The RI is defined on the OSHA website as:  
Any case where (1) an injury or illness exists, and (2) is work-related, and (3) 
meets one or more of the following criteria: (a) involves medical treatment, OR (b) 
involves death, loss of consciousness, or in-patient hospitalisation for treatment, 
OR (c) involves a day(s) away from work, restricted work activity, or job transfer, 
OR (d) includes any condition as listed in Mandatory Appendix B (OSHA 1996, p1).  
The method of classifying OHS outcomes has important implications for performance 
information communicated. Response-based classifications such as the LTI or RI can 
identify the number or frequency of worker injury and illness but they cannot provide 
information about the degree of impairment sustained. This requires the use of the 
severity-based classifications identified above which report on the levels of employee 
impairment, that is, the damage sustained by workers over a given period. For 
example, if an employee loses a finger on the final day of a week-on-week-off roster 
                                                 
40 Companies operating in Australia are required to document and retain OHS incident information and to 
report serious workplace injuries to the relevant state regulatory authority as they occur. 
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and seeks medical treatment immediately, they may be able to return to work a week 
later as scheduled. A severity-based scheme would record the injury. In contrast, a 
response-based LTI metric would not capture this permanent disability (loss of a 
finger) as there was no unscheduled absence from work. Furthermore, while an RI 
metric would capture the injury, it cannot discriminate between a cut requiring 
stitches that will heal in a matter of weeks and the permanent impairment that is 
suffered from the loss of a finger. 
Hopkins (2000b) claims that by aggregating the typically low volume of very serious 
injuries with the relatively high volume of less damaging injuries, LTI indicators 
essentially measure how well a company is managing minor hazards which result in 
routine injuries, but they do not provide useful information about how well major 
hazards are managed. Consequently, the use of the LTI can focus attention on low 
consequence aspects of health and safety and in doing so privilege certain OHS 
management strategies and outcomes at the expense of others (Else and Beaumont 
2000; Hopkins 2000b; Zahlis 1995). The metric is also criticised as highly unreliable due 
to its susceptibility to under-reporting, manipulation, the vagaries of chance, the 
influence of extraneous factors and the overall tendency to underestimate the 
incidence of illness and disease (Bottomley 2000; Stricoff 2000). Nevertheless, in spite 
of increasing condemnation over their failure to provide an accurate measure of 
workplace safety there remains an almost exclusive “status quo-reliance on 
recordable and LTI rates as [the] safety performance measures” (Stricoff 2000, p36).  
In terms of relevance to organisational decision-making, lost time measures41 are 
also criticised for being so far downstream that they are irrelevant for proactive safety 
management decisions, for measuring only failure rather than success and for failing 
to either provide reliable information about the causes of injury or to motivate 
improvement (Bottomley 2000; Stricoff 2000). In view of these limitations, safety 
professionals, union leaders, regulators and managers are reported to be 
“increasingly dissatisfied” with the continued reliance on recordable and LTI rates 
and have called for the identification of more relevant and reliable outcome measures 
and the adoption of ‘positive’ or ‘leading’ OHS indicators (Stricoff 2000, p36).  
This is consistent with management accounting trends that have seen shifts in the 
general focus of organisational performance measurement systems from traditional, 
financially-based, divisional and departmental level measures to more innovative 
performance measurement systems that can better support operational decision-
making and strategy (Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 2003). Such shifts are demonstrated 
                                                 
41 Lost time metrics include both the LTI indicator and the recordable injury indicator. 
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in the evolution of balanced scorecards and the development of an array of 
specialised, activity-based KPIs to support quality performance management 
systems, environmental performance management systems and now OHS 
performance management systems. An overview of KPIs for evaluating OHS inputs 
and processes is presented below. 
2.2.1.3 Non-financial indicators of OHS inputs and processes 
Bottomley (2000) argues that OHS performance indicators would be “more powerful if 
they identify [the] critical sequences that result in failure” (p139) and has urged 
managers to also identify proxies for OHS processes, such as risk exposure, rather 
than rely simply on OHS outcomes. He suggested OHS programs ought to 
systematically include a combination of input, process and outcome indicators. Input 
and process indicators, known collectively as ‘lead’ process performance indicators 
(PPIs)42, provide a proactive assessment of OHS performance drivers that can guide 
management initiatives. OHS input indicators reflect “hazard at source interventions” 
(Bottomley 2000, p138) and reflect health and safety policies, strategies and resources 
(CCH 2003, p162). In contrast, OHS process indicators “focus on assessing how 
successfully a workplace … is performing through monitoring the processes which 
should produce good outcomes” (Bottomley 2000, p138, emphasis added). Processes 
include indicators of OHS training, consultation, auditing and review.  
The leading PPIs that might be captured and reported by each firm will reflect, 
however, the philosophical ideology underpinning its particular OHS strategy. For 
example, firms employing an egocentric43 model of OHS management are more 
likely to capture PPIs relating to behaviour-based processes such as the rates of 
(non)compliance with personal protective equipment (PPE) policies and the number 
of unsafe behaviours reported. In contrast, those adopting an ergonomic approach 
are more likely to purse hazard-based PPIs such as levels of noise, chemicals or 
radiation, or structural processes such as number of emergency equipment audits, 
workplace hazards identified, controlled or eliminated or safe design improvements.  
An understanding of the philosophical foundations of OHS strategy is therefore 
needed to appreciate the particular choice of metrics and narratives one might 
employ to account for their selection of managerial inputs and processes. Sections 
2.2.2 and 2.2.3, therefore, provide a brief overview of OHS strategy and of the 
programs or activities that might be employed within each overarching strategy. In 
                                                 
42 Leading KPIs are also identified within the safety literature as ‘upstream’ or ‘positive’ performance 
indicators (PPIs).  
43 These models are explained in the following section. 
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section 2.2.4 a matrix of potential indicators for the construction of corporate 
accounts of OHS is developed. 
2.2.2 Philosophical foundations of OHS strategy 
Evidence suggests that most occupational incidents, including workplace fatalities, 
are inherently avoidable (Borys 2000b). To meet the obligation to provide a safe and 
healthy workplace it is essential that organisations identify and control the risk factors 
that drive workplace illness and injury (Frick 2004). This requires an understanding of 
how and why injuries and illnesses occur because “only by knowing their causes can 
accidents be prevented” (Hopkins 2005b, p136). Indeed, examination of past OHS 
catastrophes “reveals that there were always warning signs, prior to the occurrence, 
whose significance was either missed or dismissed” (Hopkins 2005a, p10). 
At an organisational level, causal analysis of workplace incidents, and the strategies 
subsequently adopted to identify and control OHS risk, are underpinned by one of 
two somewhat competing philosophical ideologies. The first is the ‘safe person’ or 
‘safe act’ philosophy which promotes an egocentric model of OHS risk. This view is 
criticised by safety scholars who advocate an alternative perspective, known as a 
‘safe place’ philosophy, which advances an ergonomic model of risk management. 
Indeed, the latter has provided the framework for current OHS legislation around the 
world. Each model, and their respective implications for identifying and controlling the 
risks driving preventable injury and illness, is briefly explained below. 
2.2.2.1 Egocentric ideology 
The egocentric model of safety management is based on the work of Heinrich (1959), 
an insurance investigator whose 1930s research into injury causation using 
supervisor incident reports concluded that workplace accidents are, on average, 88% 
due to unsafe acts on the part of the employee, 10% due to unsafe working 
conditions and 2% simply unpreventable (Borys 2000a). Adopting a ‘safe person’ or 
‘safe act’ philosophy, the egocentric model “places a person, or persons, at the 
centre of incident causation” (Byard 2006, p25). In doing so, it assumes the root 
cause of a workplace incident is human errors of commission or omission (LaBar 
1996). Morris (2006) describes human errors as mistakes (acts) due to, for example, 
inexperience or incompetence, habit, carelessness, workload stress, poor or 
inadequate communications, poor fitness, ill health, rushing a task, reliance on poor 
memory or discretionary decision-making. 
Proponents of the ‘safe act’ philosophy advocate a behaviourist approach to 
workplace safety management in which management’s OHS responsibility centres on 
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ensuring workers under their supervision act safely (Reason 1993). Consequently, 
OHS control activities focus on the identification of unsafe behaviours and the 
provision of appropriate training and incentives to motivate safe behaviour (Chhokar 
1987; Frederick and Lessin 2000; Hopkins 2006c).  
A substantial body of research has, however, challenged this view – particularly on 
the grounds that personal variables such as employee knowledge and attitude are 
seldom sufficient to ensure safe behaviour (DeJoy et al. 2004) given that human errors 
may be “shaped and provoked by upstream workplace and organisational factors” 
(Borys 2000b, p163; Reason 1993). Indeed, evidence suggests that environmental 
constraints and management decisions relating to resource allocation, training, cost-
cutting and reduced manning levels, for example, “can create error-enforcing and 
violation-promoting conditions at the sharp end” (Reason 1995, p1714) which “easily 
overwhelm the employee’s best intentions to work safely” (DeJoy et al. 2004, p56).  
Critics of the safe person model, therefore, argue that simply holding employees 
accountable for safety without due consideration of the organisational context in 
which a human error occurred promotes a ‘blame’ culture (Byard 2006). This is 
underscored by the institutionalised language of the safe act philosophy, which tends 
to centre on highly emotive and subjective terminology such as ‘safe / unsafe act’, 
‘careless / careful’, ‘fault’, ‘error’, ‘cause’, ‘blame’, and even ‘safety’ itself (Byard 2006). 
To this end Hopkins (2005b) suggests, 
Asking why errors were made is far more useful than asking who is to blame. 
Asking why leads invariably to more fundamental cultural and organisational 
causes. Inquiries must get to this level if they are to be of any value in 
preventing reoccurrences (Hopkins 2005b, p27). 
2.2.2.2 Ergonomic ideology 
Proponents of the ergonomic model of OHS risk management therefore suggest the 
behaviourist ‘safe person’ approach is an inappropriate OHS strategy since unsafe 
acts or human errors are unlikely to be the single ‘root cause’ of a workplace incident 
(Hopkins 2000b). This is consistent with early accident models such as the 
Epidemiological Model developed by Gordon (1949) which proposed that an accident 
required a host (human participant), agent (some form of damage inflicting energy 
such as gravity, kinetic energy or mechanical force) and the environment (Attwood et 
al. 2006). Empirical studies examining OHS risk factors within a broader contextual 
setting have since identified how chains of events lead to an accident, the cause of 
which is the combined result of various organisational factors (Hopkins 2000a, 2005b, 
2006b; Lind 2008; Reason 1997). This means that for OHS incidents to occur, a number 
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of necessary conditions must be simultaneously present, leading to a multiplicity of 
potential root causes of the incident (Hopkins 2005b).       
Research has demonstrated that the most common cause of workplace death and 
injury is not unsafe behaviours per se but rather, a necessary combination of worker 
error and pre-existing unsafe work practices, work environment or hazards (see for 
example, CCH 2003; Hopkins 2000b; Williamson et al. 1996). Therefore, although 
employee behaviour may contribute to a workplace incident, it is not the sole 
determining driver. This suggests that individual behaviours are only ‘unsafe’ if 
organisational and local workplace factors enable them to be so (Lind 2008). To 
illustrate this, one might suggest that the failure to wear safety gloves and protective 
eye wear is not an unsafe act, for example, while delivering an economics lecture, 
but would be unsafe behaviour when working in an organisational environment in 
which acid splashes frequently occur.  
Consequently, the ‘safe place’ philosophy requires managers to understand and 
address those risk factors that produce an unsafe work environment. These typically 
include factors such as: proximity to dangerous materials; adverse environment 
(often associated with inappropriate levels of heat, noise, light, dust); improper 
workplace design; ergonomic deficiencies; inadequate facilities, procedures, 
resources or training; inappropriate management systems; work pressure; poor 
communication or cooperation; confusing control panels; poor design of human-
machine systems and interactions; ill-structured tasks and a mismatch between a 
workers’ capability and the requirements of the job (Ayers and Kleiner 2002; Ousnamer 
2001; Shikdar and Sawaqed 2003). Workplace injuries are therefore manifestations of 
multiple organisational failures (Lind 2008).  
Proponents of the ‘safe place’ philosophy recognise that the complete elimination of 
worker error is unlikely since humans are inherently ‘human’ and therefore fallible. 
Consequently, although OHS activities may seek to motivate safe behaviour, the 
primary focus of OHS responsibility under an ergonomic model is the provision of a 
safe work environment. This, therefore, promotes a corporate OHS strategy that 
focuses on choosing to adopt those activities that identify and ‘engineer out’, or 
eliminate, the latent organisational hazards, failures, unsafe processes, practices and 
events which must be present for an injury or illness to occur (Gallagher 2000). 
2.2.3 OHS strategy, programs and performance  
Organisational accountability for OHS requires managers to provide an account of 
both OHS outcomes and the management control actions taken to fulfil their duty of 
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care to employees and related stakeholders44.  The worldwide move from ad hoc and 
reactive OHS interventions, based around “knee-jerk hazard management” and 
statutory compliance (Goldie 2000), toward a more coordinated and proactive (i.e. 
‘systematic’) approach to OHS control has gained momentum in recent decades 
(Pearse 2000). This is most notable in those countries that, like Australia, have 
enacted Robens’ style OHS legislation (Jackson and Niblo 2000).  
Unlike most European countries, OHS legislation in the United States and Australia 
falls short of overtly mandating that managers either take a systematic approach to 
OHS or that they implement more formalised and documented processes via an OHS 
management system (OHSMS)45. Nevertheless, regulations46 encourage a 
systematic approach by requiring employers to have an OHS committee whose 
members are trained on a range of topics, including ‘Systematic management of 
health and safety’ and ‘Continuous improvement of OHS systems’ (CCH 2006a). 
Evidence suggests that systematic approaches to OHS involve the implementation of 
one or more proactive, structured programs such as hazard control programs, 
behavioural safety programs and safety incentive programs.  
Section 2.2.3 briefly describes these three types of OHS programs. Section 2.2.4 
then reconsiders the provision of corporate accountability to stakeholders for OHS 
strategy, practices and performance by identifying the metrics and narratives 
appropriate to each of these approaches to OHS risk management.  
2.2.3.1 Risk identification and assessment  
OHS risk identification seeks to examine the work environment, equipment, 
substances and systems to identify the potential hazards that may cause OHS 
injuries and illnesses. The somewhat subjective process (Csontos 2005) of risk 
assessment then requires an estimate of the likelihood of occurrence and 
seriousness of outcome so risk control activities can be prioritised. These processes 
together require an understanding of the nature of the risk, the sources of hazards, 
the forms in which they may arise and which ones can potentially harm life, health 
and property (CCH 2006a).  
These workplace risks and hazards have been shown to vary across industries. For 
example, in the industrial maintenance sector the majority of fatal incidents involved 
                                                 
44 ‘Related’ refers to generally related to the impact of OHS, not personally related to the employee(s). 
45 OHS management systems (OHSMS) take the systematic management of OHS one step further by 
following an accepted Management Standard, such as ISO 4804, and formalised mechanisms for 
documenting policies and processes, undertaking performance evaluation, routine monitoring, system 
audits and continuous improvement. 
46 Reference is made here to the NSW OHS Act (2000) and supporting NSW OHS Regulations (2001). 
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crushing and falling objects and those resulting in serious injury involved interactions 
with machinery while it was operating (Lind 2008). In the mining and energy sector the 
majority of fatal injuries involved vehicle accidents, crushing (rock or ground falls), 
electrocutions, falling from heights, falling or flying objects, conveyor belts, fire and 
explosions (Kecojevic et al. 2007; MISHC 2005). In demonstrating accountability for 
OHS to stakeholders, organisations need to identify risks and report how they have 
sought to address these risks, e.g. using primarily ergonomic means (hazard control 
programs) or relying on egocentric means (behaviour control programs). These are 
each briefly discussed below. 
2.2.3.1.1 Hazard control programs 
The ability to identify the risks that contribute to workplace injuries and illnesses 
reflects the predictability, and thus the ultimate controllability, of OHS hazards (CCH 
2006a). Hazard control programs therefore seek to address workplace hazards by, 
ideally, eliminating the hazard, or where that is not possible, seeking to minimise the 
risk using one or more of the other engineering and design controls. The final resort 
is to encourage risk awareness and personal responsibility through the use of 
behavioural (or administrative) controls. This hierarchy of control (HOC) model is 
briefly outlined below (CCH 2003) 
Hierarchy of Control 
Engineering and design controls 
  Primary control 
Eliminate the hazard by devising an alternative way of doing the job or task, modifying 
workplace layout. 
  Secondary controls 
Substitute the hazard by replacing it with a less hazardous process or material. 
Isolate the hazard by isolating or enclosing the problematic work process, machine or 
substance by physically separating workers from it. 
Modify the work system, tools or process to reduce the hazard. This may include 
changes in duties or responsibilities, changes in work organisation (workflow) or 
changes to plant and equipment. Examples include the use of engineering controls 
such as replacing the hazardous manual process with mechanical aides such as jacks, 
cranes, hoists, forklifts, trolleys or adjustable tables and platforms; redesigning or 
guarding machinery to reduce hazards; or reducing environmental hazards relating to 
noise, ventilation and temperature.  
Behaviour controls 
Use administrative or back-up controls, such as personal protective equipment, safety 
harnesses, warning signs and systems, provision of fire-fighting equipment, information 
and training, documenting safe procedures, monitoring chemical, biological, noise and 
radiation exposures (CCH 2003, 2006a; Hopkins 2005b).  
 
Figure 2-2: OHS control measures 
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The OHS hazard control model presented in Figure 2-2 above reflects an ergonomic 
approach to OHS management in which behavioural controls are used only to 
supplement the engineering and design control activities. Egocentric models, in 
contrast, view the use of behaviour controls as the primary means of controlling 
identified OHS hazards, either through ad hoc behaviour management or through 
extensive use of behaviour-based safety monitoring and incentive systems.    
2.2.3.2 Behaviour-based programs  
Behaviour-based safety (BBS) is grounded in the recognition that workplace injuries 
result from the interaction between workers and their work environments (Chhokar 
1987; Hopkins 2006c). Consequently, attention is directed to ‘human factors’ – what 
employees do (or fail to do) that contributes to an industrial accident or injury 
(Chhokar 1987; Reber et al. 1993). By encouraging employees to maintain a conscious 
awareness of safety (Frederick and Lessin 2000), BBS programs employ behaviour 
modification techniques that focus on reducing the number of ‘unsafe’ acts in an 
attempt to reduce the likelihood of a worker sustaining an injury (Chhokar 1987; 
Hopkins 2006c).  
Evidence suggests that BBS programs are an increasingly popular OHS strategy in 
large organisations (Hopkins 2006). In practice, they are described as a “bottom-up”, 
data-driven process in which critical safe / unsafe behaviours of front-line employees 
are identified and targeted for change (DeJoy 2005, p107). Routine performance 
evaluations are undertaken, targeted behaviours monitored by peers and recorded to 
calculate performance measures (such as the ‘percentage of safe-behaviours’) and 
feedback is provided to encourage continuous improvement (BehaviouralSafety 2008; 
Cox et al. 2004; DeJoy 2005). This process allows responsive adjustments to be 
implemented if desired behaviours are not becoming evident (Reber et al. 1993).  
While safe behaviour measures are claimed to allow changes in ‘safety’ to be 
identified more quickly than traditional injury outcome data, such as accident rates, a 
potential disconnect exists between safe/unsafe ‘actions’ and injury ‘outcomes’. A 
common criticism of BBS programs is that they tend to assume employees who work 
safely do not get injured while those who behave unsafely sustain accidents and 
injuries (Frederick and Lessin 2000, p12). Intentionally or otherwise, this transfers the 
onus for providing a safe workplace to employees and has a tendency to blame 
victims for their injuries (Byard 2006; Frederick and Lessin 2000, p10). Advocates 
suggest, for example, 
Given that 96% of all workplace accidents are triggered by unsafe behaviour, most 
will be aware that reducing accidents and improving safety performance can only be 
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achieved by systematically focusing on unsafe behaviours in the workplace 
(BehaviouralSafety 2008, p1, emphasis added). 
These statements suggest that unsafe behaviour is the only accident cause worthy of 
attention and fails to recognise that accidents are multi-causal and unsafe behaviour 
is merely the final link in a chain of events or failures (see for example, Hopkins 2005; 
Reason 1993). Relying on behavioural analyses may fail to identify and control 
critically important risks relating to, for example, unsafe behaviours that are not 
readily observable or those that do not occur regularly (Hopkins 2006c; Seo 2005). It 
would also fail to identify or address structural hazards such as inappropriate work 
organisation, poor design, or hazards “relating to the actions or inactions of 
management” (Hopkins 2006, p585). Consequently, “simplistic explanations” that 
attempt to “attribute injuries to worker’s carelessness or to ‘freak’ combinations of 
events fail to appreciate the many factors that make injuries and incidents 
predictable” (CCH 2006a). Chhokar (1987) argues instead that “highlighting the 
efficacy of a behavioural approach should not undermine the importance of the 
technological and engineering approaches to safety” (p177). Rather, a behavioural 
approach needs to be viewed as complementary to a conventional, technological and 
engineering safety program because, 
While it may be said that, however safe the environment may be, so long as a worker 
behaves in an unsafe manner accidents will continue to occur; it also holds, perhaps 
with equal force, that however safely one may behave, it may be impossible to avoid 
accidents in an unsafe and hazardous working environment (Chhokar 1987, p176).   
Rather than examining how core work processes affect OHS, some employers see 
employees as the problem, failing to recognise the need to restructure work or 
address hazardous job conditions (Frederick and Lessin 2000, p10). Not only is this 
perceived by employees as “a convenient way for management to dodge their safety 
responsibilities and apportion blame to the workforce”, but it suggests managers are 
not prepared to undertake “those safety improvements that require capital 
expenditure or considerable effort” (BehaviouralSafety 2008, p1). Indeed, limiting 
managerial attention to worker carelessness and unsafe behaviours is an 
“inexpensive” approach to safety management (Chhokar 1987, p177) that leads to 
reduced injury claims without requiring large capital investment (Reber et al. 1993; 
Rogers 1995).  
2.2.3.3 Safety incentive programs 
Often linked to BBS programs, safety incentive schemes gained popularity in the 
1940s as another behavioural tool to motivate the pursuit of improved performance 
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(Atkinson 2000). Adopting an agency theory approach, incentive systems recognise 
that dysfunctional behaviour arises when agents and principals have different risk 
preferences and conflicting goals (Chong and Eggeleton 2007) and so seek to provide 
mechanisms to align the interests of agents with principals (Deegan 2006b; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Watts and Zimmerman 1978). A recent study of the interaction between 
behavioural and agency influences (Chong and Eggeleton (2007) found compensation-
based incentives to be most effective in motivating employee performance when 
levels of organisational commitment were low and reliance on incentive-based 
compensation schemes and the degree of information asymmetry were both high 
(p327). In contrast, performance levels of managers whose organisational 
commitment levels were high remained relatively unaffected by the incentive 
schemes (p328).  
The competing incentives that arise, however, from the trade-off between safety and 
production, or cost-based versus OHS outcome-based performance evaluations, 
may complicate the development of effective incentive systems. Furthermore, the 
influence of implicit versus explicit communications is also identified where explicit 
communications prioritise higher safety while implicit and institutionalised rules 
prioritise production or cost reduction (Hoogervorst et al. 2004). Commitment to safe 
behaviours may also be low, for example, where employees find the use of PPE such 
as earplugs, goggles or gloves uncomfortable, unnecessary, or inappropriate (this 
may arise where when the potential exists to redesign tasks or infrastructure and 
thereby remove the need for PPE).  
The use of incentive-based OHS schemes involves offering rewards, be they 
monetary, non-monetary, or a combination of the two, to individuals or work groups 
(such as work teams, shifts, departments or divisions) in return for meeting 
predetermined safety targets or undertaking particular OHS control activities (Gillings 
and Kleiner 1993). Some programs also actively punish poor OHS performance (Reber 
et al. 1993). Atkinson (2000) classifies safety incentive programs into three types: 
• Traditional safety incentives: offer outcome-based rewards or recognition 
to employees for achieving a target level of recorded injury and illness 
outcomes (usually zero) over a given period of time.  
• Behavioural-based safety incentives: offer rewards or recognition to 
employees based on the frequency of engaging in specific, safe or unsafe 
behaviours over a given period. 
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• Non-traditional safety incentives: offer rewards or recognition to employees 
for participating in specific activities that proactively address safety issues, 
such as identifying safety hazards or offering suggestions for safety 
improvements. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that safety incentive programs offering tangible safety 
prizes and rewards can, like BBS programs, deliver improvements in LTI statistics 
“that far exceed” program implementation expenditures (Gillings and Kleiner 1993, p11; 
Reber et al. 1993). Importantly, nearly all safety incentives hinge on the reporting of 
injuries by workers, not on injury outcomes themselves and not on the inherent safety 
of the work environment (Frick 2004). Whether intended or unintended, the practice of 
issuing rewards or punishment on the basis of self-reported injury data has been 
shown to result in improvements in measured outcomes due, in part at least, to 
employee reluctance to report injuries (Frick 2004). Workers may also perceive 
management or peer pressure not to report injuries and fear doing so would bring 
retribution or reduce the chance of co-workers and supervisors receiving team based 
safety rewards (Atkinson 2000; O'Neill 2006).  
Furthermore, the issue of competing incentives is again recognised. Despite 
corporate rhetoric about putting safety first, the experience of many workers is that 
production takes precedence (Hopkins 2006c, p585). Consequently, the incentives 
associated with production can be perceived to outweigh those associated with 
safety. Critics therefore argue that the underlying objective of OHS incentive 
programs is “to discourage worker reports of injury and illness” (Frederick and Lessin 
2000, p12). Frick (2004) lends support to this view, suggesting that incentive schemes 
initiate managerial activities such as injury “claims’ management, tougher worker 
selection practices and other avoidance strategies, more than they stimulate 
preventative OHS improvement and foster safer workplaces (p56). It is worth 
remembering that while a failure to report injuries may improve corporate OHS 
performance results, it may also result in the injured employee failing to receive 
necessary medical treatment and / or workers’ compensation benefits and the failure 
of management to address the hazard and thus prevent reoccurrence. Again, 
concerns are evident in the literature that some employers may be simply using 
safety incentive programs as an inexpensive substitute for undertaking appropriate 
hazard identification, elimination and control activities (Atkinson 2000). These 
criticisms have prompted “leading members” of the US National Advisory Committee 
on Occupational Safety and Health to suggest “banning safety incentive programs 
altogether” (Atkinson 2000, p34). 
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2.2.3.4 OHS management systems (OHSMS)  
An OHSMS seeks to bring various OHS hazard identification and control processes 
together into a formal operating system that emphasises documentation of policies 
and processes, the evaluation and routine monitoring of performance and the pursuit 
of continuous improvement (Borys 2000b; Cooke 2000). The OHSMS model is rooted 
in the general management philosophy proposed by John Dewey (Saksvik et al. 2003) 
and follows the efforts of Deming, Juran and other quality management pioneers 
(Stricoff 2000). By providing a procedural framework for the systematic management 
of OHS activities, an OHSMS encourages employers to implement a comprehensive 
program for the management and continuous improvement of processes to detect 
and prevent workplace hazards (Goldie 2000; Pearse 2000). The implementation of an 
OHSMS is also credited with generating potentially significant cost savings, 
demonstrating concern for the well-being of employees and providing verification that 
a general duty of care is being exercised (Gillings and Kleiner 1993; Pearse 2000; Seals 
and Hale 1992) the latter being increasingly important in a self-regulatory OHS 
environment. 
There is increasing evidence that OHSMS, guided by ANS/NZS: 4804, Occupational 
Health and Safety Management Systems Standard (1997), are emerging on the back 
of existing quality (ISO 9000) and / or environmental (ISO 14000) management 
systems (Redinger and Levine 1998). Indeed, the processes adopted to improve worker 
safety and those to improve product quality have much in common (Manzella 1997; Yu 
and Hunt 2002) and “companies embracing best practice” are argued to “recognize the 
value” of integrating OHS into the existing ISO900047 or ISO1400048 performance 
management systems (CCH 2003, p244). Frick et al (2000) suggest that the 
manifestation of self-regulation has been the development of OHSMS to support 
(rather than replace) the fundamentally important activities of OHS risk management 
and statutory compliance. Critics argue, however, that regulatory provisions aimed at 
promoting the use of OHSMS in a self-regulatory environment may be perceived in 
one of three ways (Walters 2004):  
1. “The key method in which ‘systematic OHSM’ is of paramount importance in 
making self-regulation work and lending OHS policy a transparent and 
preventative character, enhancing the participation and influence of workers and 
‘managing’ to contribute to a better work environment; 
                                                 
47 ISO9000 is an International Quality Management System Standard. 
48 ISO14000 is an International Environmental Management System Standard. 
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2. A ‘paper tiger’ in which such ‘systematic OHSM’ becomes synonymous with 
further bureaucratisation, technocratisation and uprooting of OHS from shop floor 
realities;  
3. A sham in which OHSM is merely a disguise behind which a hidden and largely 
economically driven agenda of deregulation is in operation” (Walters 2004, p90). 
Acknowledging the potential for an overwhelming focus on documentation and the 
pursuit of safety system accreditation, rather than on safety itself, Else and 
Beaumont (2000) warn that an “over-emphasis on the assurance programs of an 
OHSMS may result in expensive, complicated paper-based systems that are 
[ultimately] not effective in securing OHS” (p36). The complex systems of 
performance evaluation and monitoring (see for example, Clarke and O'Neill 2006) may 
also run the risk of providing what Hall et al. (2007) call the “illusion of knowledge”, 
where the provision of superfluous cues and necessary information increases 
confidence but results in a deterioration of judgement (p287). Clearly, the mere 
existence of documented processes for managing OHS required by an OHSMS does 
not prevent fatalities or guarantee a safe and healthy workplace (Mansfield 2000). 
This is demonstrated, for example, by the failures of the award-winning OHSMS to 
prevent OHS catastrophes as illustrated in Table 2-2 below.  
 
Date  Site Prior OHS recognition Outcome 
1983  Hlobane Colliery 
(South Africa) 
4-star safety system 68 people killed 
1986 Kinross Mine 
(South Africa) 
5-star safety system 177 people killed 
1993 Middlebult Colliery 
(South Africa) 
5-star safety system 53 people killed    
1999 Esso Longford         
(Australia) 
Industry award for safety 2 killed, 8 injured, City of 
Melbourne without gas for 2 
weeks 
2005 BP Texas City 
(United States) 
Comprehensive OHSMS 15 people killed, 170 injured 
Table 2-2: Safety system failures  
(adapted from Hopkins 2000 and Dell 2007) 
In a study of OHSMS adoptions, eight out of nine organisations described the cost of 
implementing and maintaining an OHSMS as “prohibitive” (Jackson and Niblo 2000, 
p176). Critics have also questioned the strengths and weaknesses of OHSMS, their 
appropriateness for small and medium firms, the extent to which OHSMS “facilitate 
meaningful employee participation” (Bluff et al. 2004, p5) or to which the effectiveness 
of an OHSMS can be evaluated, the role auditors ought to play in assessing OHSMS 
and the best means of measuring improvements in OHS outcomes and linking 
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performance metrics to strategy (Pearse et al. 2001). Perhaps not surprisingly, the rate 
of OHSMS adoption by Australian firms has generally been slow (Pearse 2000). 
2.2.4 Revisiting indicators of OHS  
Section 2.2.3 has identified a number of approaches to managing OHS risk. These 
may be broadly summarised according to the time orientation of risk identification 
and control (see Table 2-3). The communication of a firm’s OHS strategy, activities 
and outcomes would be expected to form the substance of corporate accounts of 
OHS to stakeholders. 
 
OHS Strategy 
Ad Hoc Systematic OHSMS 
Orientation: Reactive 
(often described  as 
‘fire-fighting’ or a 
‘knee-jerk’ response) 
Orientation: Proactive,  
Structured, planned,   
coordinated 
Orientation: Proactive 
Management System 
usually based on the 
OHSAS 18001 or the        
AS 4804 standard. 
Risks are usually 
identified after an 
incident occurs. 
Controls are enacted 
to prevent 
reoccurrences. 
Potential risks identified in 
advance through consultation and 
risk assessment processes. 
Preventative controls are enacted 
with evaluation and feedback to 
assess performance.  
May employ hazard management, 
behaviour management or both. 
May include safety incentive 
programs.  
Risk identification and 
control as per systematic 
strategy. 
Also places a substantial 
emphasis on documenting 
policies and processes, 
conducting audits against 
documented systems and 
continuous improvement. 
Table 2-3: OHS risk management time orientation 
This review has drawn attention to the influence of the prevailing OHS ideology within 
an organisation on the way in which risk identification and control activities are 
operationalised and evaluated. While both egocentric (safe person) and ergonomic 
(safe place) ideologies acknowledge the contribution of human actions and errors to 
OHS incidents, the essential difference is the importance placed on the behaviour of 
individuals in the causal analysis and mitigation of OHS risk. The implications of a 
particular OHS ideology for OHS management and performance evaluation is 
broadly summarised in Table 2-4. Provided too, are examples of performance 
measures that are appropriate to the ideological OHS management strategy, which 
may form the external accounts of OHS to stakeholders.  
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 Egocentric (safe person) approach Ergonomic (safe place) approach 
Foundations of 
causal analysis 
Accidents are typically caused 
by unsafe behaviour,                  
i.e. human errors of  
commission or omission  
Incidents occur as a result of multiple  
failures in the interaction between humans 
and their work environment 
i.e. hazardous environment plus human 
error  
Focus of risk 
mitigation activity 
Behavioural modification to 
promote safe behaviour /  
eliminate unsafe behaviour 
Hazard elimination or reduction based on 
engineering / design 
(may be supported by behavioural and 
administrative controls)  
Measures of risk 
control are likely 
to include: 
Financial: costs of… 
• Safe behaviour training 
• Safety awareness, e.g. signs 
• Incentive programs 
Non-financial: KPIs relating to… 
• # new unsafe behaviours 
identified  
• # employees observed 
behaving unsafely 
• Total # unsafe behaviours 
observed  
• % safe days 
• Rate of PPE compliance  
• Human exposure levels 
• # employees receiving 
behaviour training  
• # employee suggestions 
• # employees receiving 
incentives and / or employees 
receiving punishment/sanction 
Financial: costs of… 
• Hazard elimination 
• Hazard reduction 
o re-engineering / design 
o isolation activities 
o modification activities 
• Hazard awareness training  
• Safe behaviour training 
• Incentive programs 
Non-financial: KPIs relating to… 
• # hazards identified 
• # hazards eliminated 
• # hazards reduced 
• Workplace exposure levels 
• # employees receiving 
o Hazard training 
o Behaviour training  
• # employee suggestions 
• Rate of PPE compliance 
• # employees receiving incentives 
Measures of 
outcome or OHS 
performance  
may include: 
Financial: costs of… 
• Workers’ compensation 
• Fines and penalties 
• Legal costs 
Non-financial: KPIs relating to … 
• Total number or rate of work-related injuries or illnesses 
• Total number of near-miss incidents (potential for injury) 
• Total number of incidents (injuries + near miss) 
• Severity*: The number and rate of new work-related… 
o fatalities 
o permanent disability 
o temporary, long-term disability (e.g. > 6 months) 
o temporary, medium-term disability (e.g. 1 week – 6 months) 
o temporary, minor disability (e.g. < 1 week) 
• Lost productivity**: The number and rate of new work-related… 
o LTIs (and / or illnesses) 
o recordable injuries (and / or illnesses) 
o medical treatment injuries (and / or illnesses) 
o first aid injuries (and / or illnesses) 
* For accounts of performance that relate to externalities (e.g. to external stakeholders) 
** For accounts of performance that relate to operational impact (e.g. to shareholders) 
Table 2-4: Influence of ideology on risk identification, mitigation and measurement 
(Adapted from Clarke and O'Neill 2006) 
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2.2.5 Summary 
Together the literature presented in section 2.2 suggests that while accidents and 
disease are ultimately probabilistic events, the frequency of occurrence and the 
seriousness of the outcome can, to a great extent, be controlled by the preventative 
risk management activities employed within organisations (Chelius 1991, p24). It is 
these characteristics of responsibility and controllability that underscore the 
accountability of organisations to stakeholders for OHS outcomes.  
The implications of existing self-regulatory OHS requirements combined with the 
various approaches to OHS risk management highlight the need for organisations to 
be accountable to stakeholders for their choice of OHS strategy and implementation 
of risk management programs. The available metrics for evaluating the effectiveness 
of those activities over which managerial discretion and control is exercised will 
largely be determined by the choice of OHS programs (as summarised in Table 4 
above). Nevertheless, this review has identified an “entrenched” reliance on highly 
problematic LTI and RI indicators to communicate the effectiveness of OHS 
interventions to stakeholders (Bottomley 2000, p132), despite ongoing concerns as to 
the quality of these measures.  
While numerous approaches to evaluating OHS performance appear to exist, there 
remains a general lack of clarity within either the safety or accounting literature as to 
the appropriate (relevant, reliable, comparable and valid) metrics for constructing the 
corporate accounts of OHS needed to discharge accountability to external 
stakeholders. The following section therefore turns to the literature on OHS 
disclosure in an attempt to identify empirical evidence that might shed light on how 
(and indeed whether) organisations are discharging accountability to stakeholders via 
corporate accounts, OHS management and performance. 
2.3 Empirical evidence of OHS disclosure  
The disclosure of OHS information in corporate annual reports is not a new 
phenomenon. The presentation of workplace health and safety disclosures in annual 
reports dates back over a century. This includes, for example, health and safety 
information provided in the early reports issued by the Australian Agricultural and 
Pastoral Company such as references to the health and moral welfare of (native) 
workers and their families (AAPC 1834)49, life insurance revenues and expenditures 
                                                 
49 The AAPC annual reports are available at the Noel Butlin Archives Centre, Australian National 
University. 
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(AAPC 1835, 1838) and safety improvements to mine ventilation (AAPC 1843). 
Interestingly the latter, like the 1920 corporate disclosure of “unhealthy working 
conditions” at BHP mines identified by Guthrie and Parker (1989), appear to frame 
workplace health and safety information in the context of strikes and associated 
concern for profits, rather than concern for the wellbeing of employees.  
Despite this early disclosure evidence, however, there is surprisingly little detailed 
examination of the composition of health and safety information in the many studies 
of sustainability reporting over the past 35 to 40 years in corporate annual reports, 
internet website disclosures and stand alone TBL, CSR, EHS and sustainability 
reports. The following section presents a review of this literature. 
2.3.1 Exploring OHS disclosures  
Research has confirmed the influence of stakeholder demand on the provision of 
CSR information (for example, Deegan and Blomquist 2006; Deegan and Rankin 1997; Tilt 
1994) and consistently demonstrated stakeholder interest in OHS disclosures (see, 
Brown et al. 2005; Deegan and Rankin 1997; Deegan and Rankin 1999; Epstein 2008). For 
example, in a 2005 survey of 495 stakeholders including employees, consultants, 
academics, NGOs and financiers, 60.4% rated OHS information as “very important” 
(Epstein 2008).  
Early efforts to account for employee capital were evident in the 1960s (Flamholtz et 
al. 2002). Although these sought to ‘value’ employee capital, employee replacement 
costs and identified various acquisition, training (learning) and separation costs, they 
failed to consider OHS issues in the development of costing models (see for example, 
Flamholtz 1973). Attempts at human resource accounting were described as: 
The process of identifying, measuring and communicating information about human 
resources … intended to focus on three broad, interrelated objectives: 1) to identify 
the kinds of information needed to facilitate human resource management, 2) to 
develop a system for providing information about an organisation’s human resources 
and to study the organisational impact of human resource accounting (Lee et al. 
1969, p12). 
These models of human resource cost accounting omitted costs of programs to 
maintain an employee’s safety or those associated with non-standard forms of 
separation (for example, early retirement due to injury or illness). Nevertheless, these 
theoretical and empirical examinations prompted a substantial literature on human 
resource accounting (Baker 1974; see for example, Brummet 1970; Flamholtz 1973; 
Flamholtz et al. 2002; Grojer and Johanson 1998; Jones 1998; Mirvis and Macy 1976). 
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2.3.1.1 Human resource disclosures  
By the start of the 1990s, Harte and Owen (1991) reported that the only regular CSR 
information reported in corporate reports was human resource data. This information 
comprised the majority of CSR disclosures prior to the 1990s, after which attention 
began to turn toward environmental issues. Gray et al. (1996) suggest that this was 
partly because, in the UK at least, “both reporting to employees (‘employee 
reporting’) and reporting about employees (employment reporting) have some 
standing in law” (pp112-116). Notably, the Industrial Relations Act 1971 required 
employers in the UK to disclose information50 to trade unions to fulfil two functions: 
(i) it must be information without which the trade union representatives would be 
to a material extent impeded in carrying on collective bargaining and; 
(ii) it must also be information which it would be in accordance with good industrial 
relations practice that the employer should disclose to them for the purposes of 
collective bargaining                               (Maunders and Foley 1974, p110) 
With regard to the content of these disclosures, Maunders and Foley (1974) suggest, 
“It seems to us … that information used by, and presumably useful to, trade union 
negotiators falls into two broad categories – data which are basically employee or 
labour force oriented and data which indicate ‘ability to pay’” (Maunders and Foley 
1974, p122). The range of topics subsequently disclosed in the reports of UK 
companies covered a wide range of employee-related issues including health and 
safety, staff turnover, pensions, staff training and education, equal opportunities, 
gender and minority issues (Gray et. al. 1996, p116).  
Maunders and Foley (1974) suggest that “if a company is to survive and work 
effectively, this idea of a composite set of goals, including among others the goals of 
the workers, has to be anchored in … the accountability of the company, in the sense 
of the range of topics on which it is required to report and provide accounts” (p118). 
Consistent with this view employee-related disclosures have continued to feature 
prominently in most sustainability reports over the 1990s and early 2000s although 
most of these studies failed to provide information about OHS disclosures in 
particular, instead aggregating OHS information within broader themes or categories.  
                                                 
50 This duty of disclosure was subject to six exceptions. Firms must not provide information that: would be 
against the interest of national security; could not be disclosed without breaking the law; relating 
specifically to an individual unless he consents to the disclosure; that would seriously prejudice an 
employer’s interests apart from its effect on collective bargaining; was obtained by an employer for the 
purpose of legal proceedings; and was obtained by the employer in confidence (Maunders and Foley 
1974, p111) 
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These have included:  
• ’social’ disclosures (for example, Cormier and Gordon 2001; Deegan et al. 2000; 
Epstein and Freedman 1994). 
• ‘employee relations’ (see for example, Subbararo and Zeghal 1997). 
• ‘human resource’ disclosures (see for example, Andrew et al. 1989; Brown et al. 
2005; Danastas and Gadenne 2006; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Purushathman et al. 
2000; Ratabajongkol et al. 2006; Tsang 1998). 
• ‘operations risk’ disclosures (see for example,Linsley and Shrives forthcoming).  
• ‘hse’ (health, safety and environment) disclosures (see, Holland and Foo 2003). 
 
Within the intellectual capital literature, OHS has been aggregated within:  
• ‘human capital’ disclosures (see for example, Ax and Marton 2008; Li et al. 
2008).  
• and the ‘external management’ category, or ‘key performance area’ of a 
knowledge management value hierarchy (see for example, Fletcher et al. 
2003). 
There is a danger, however, in simply assuming studies have aggregated health and 
safety information into categories of employee or human resources CSD. This is 
illustrated in both Schneider and Samkin (2008) and Belal’s (2001) initial recognition of 
OHS as an employee-related issue and subsequent decision to exclude health and 
safety from the definitions of employee-related categories within their respective 
disclosure indices. Schneider and Samkin (2008) provide no explanation for excluding 
OHS, although did explain decisions for other differences between the ‘preliminary’ 
and ‘modified’ versions of the intellectual capital reporting research instrument. Belal 
(2001) also removed OHS from the definition of the employee disclosure category 
because, “in the authors opinion, [it] should have been classified as environmental 
disclosure” (p276). 
2.3.1.2 OHS disclosures  
Overall, most of these studies provide little insight into OHS disclosures, despite the 
substantial attention paid to employee-related issues in the past two decades. 
However, there were some exceptions. Most comprised content analyses of CSR 
disclosures offered in annual reports which identified both the number and 
percentage of companies disclosing OHS information, and the volume (usually 
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measured by pages or sentences) of OHS information disclosed. These insights into 
OHS reporting included the following studies:  
• Gray et al (1995b) examined UK corporate annual reports for the period 
1979-1991, finding employee-related disclosures in each report. The 
results revealed an increasing number of firms including OHS information 
in their reports over the period, from <10% of firms in 1979 to over 50% in 
1991, with a “small but steady change upward trend during the later part 
of the period” in the volume of OHS disclosures over the period in spite of 
an overall fall of approximately 12% in total employee-related disclosure 
over the period (pp 61-62). 
• Hackston and Milne (1996) provided “a taxonomy of the types of CSD that 
form the substance annual report disclosures and is intended to represent 
an exhaustive itemisation of the information with social importance” 
(p100). The taxonomy identified the following OHS issues: reducing or 
eliminating pollutants, irritants or hazards in the work environment, 
promoting employee safety and physical or mental health, disclosing 
accident statistics, complying with health and safety standards and 
regulations, receiving a safety award, establishing a safety 
department/committee/ policy, conducting research to improve work 
safety, providing low cost health care for employees. The study did not 
provide empirical data on each of these items but found, overall, that 
OHS disclosures were made by 79% of firms in the New Zealand sample 
and OHS information comprised 57% of all social disclosures. The vast 
majority of the disclosures were also reported to be declarative, positive 
and narrative. 
• Kolk (2003) found OHS disclosures ranked as the second highest CSR 
disclosure topic in the 33 sustainability reports issued by firms in the “top 
half of the Global Fortune 500”. Of the sampled reports, 91% included 
OHS information, and ‘accident and injury’ rates ranked as the most 
frequently disclosed CSR performance indicator, appearing in 76% of 
reports (p287). 
• Adams (2004) compared annual reports issued by a multi-national firm to 
other publicly available documents and news media. Although her primary 
focus was the study of environmental disclosure, Adams found evidence 
of a “reporting-performance portrayal gap” (p752) relating to OHS 
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disclosure in that the firm failed to report on the OHS risks associated 
with two containment losses which had in fact caused explosions that put 
employees at risk and failed to provide narrative information about a 
workplace death in 1998 and three more deaths in 1999. Adams 
concluded that ‘Alpha’ had generally failed to discharge an adequate level 
of accountability evidenced by a lack of completeness, embeddedness, 
inclusivity and inadequate documentation of policies, practices and 
performance. 
• Vuontisjarva (2006) examined human resource disclosures in corporate 
reports from a sample of 160 Finnish firms and found that employee 
health and well-being was a popular theme (disclosed by 98 firms, 61%) 
and provided evidence on disclosures pertaining to various OHS related 
principles, processes and performance. Data included: 
Principles:  Zero accidents   3 firms   ( 2%) 
Processes: Health and safety training 19 (12%) 
 OHS system audited by third parties 9 (6%) 
 Analysing the causes of accidents and safety surveys 7 (4%) 
 Improving workplace ergonomics 5 (3%) 
 Improving hygiene at work 3 (2%) 
 Improving management of threats and violence 3 (2%) 
Performance:  No. of occupational injuries 6 (4%) 
 Perception measures  0 (0%) 
 
• Yongvanich and Guthrie (2007) examined sustainability disclosures offered 
by a sample of 17 mining companies using an intellectual capital 
framework. Like the studies listed above, this too identified a high 
proportion of firms disclosing OHS information (16/17 firms, or 94%). The 
paper also provided further insight into OHS reporting by reproducing 
various qualitative disclosures from the sampled reports.  
• Brown and Butcher’s (2005) study of New Zealand disclosures was the only 
study to focus solely on the disclosure of OHS information and 
subsequently provided the most in depth detail on the content and quality of 
OHS disclosures. Their study sought to examine in detail the content of 
OHS policy and monitoring information disclosed in a sample of annual 
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reports produced by 100 firms, drawn from 13 industry sectors, across New 
Zealand. Brown and Butcher created a disclosure index adapted from both 
the UK Health and Safety Commission’s guidance on good practice and 
Morhardt et al’s (2002) Pacific Sustainability Index. Summarising the key 
findings: 
? OHS policies: The study found almost 60% of employers provided 
a broad statement of OHS policy, and while 40% reported on 
current progress or forthcoming plans, fewer reported on goals 
against which progress might be measured (p9). Reporting quality 
was generally poor. Only 14% cited significant risks faced by 
employees although 31% reported on consultative arrangements 
(p10). The manufacturing industry was the “only industry group to 
feature a comprehensive outline of the risks their employees faced 
… [while] most reports did not mention this data at all” (p10).   
? OHS monitoring and processes: Approximately a third of the 
sample reported on injury outcomes, with only 22% providing 
quantitative measures of injury outcomes – most as LTI rates 
(although inconsistent measurement methods were evident). The 
next most common was sick leave51, then injury numbers, then 
fatalities. OHS enforcement notices were reported by 5% of 
respondents, wherein 3% of these reported not to have received 
any. The two reports with “appropriate detail and clear 
presentation” were one each from the public sector and the 
manufacturing industry (p14). Only 25% provided evidence of OHS 
programs. Reference was made to OHS committees (16%), OHS 
representatives (9%), internal auditing programs (9%) and OHS 
awards (5%).   
Like Adams (2004), Brown and Butcher (2005) concluded that issues of reporting 
quantity and quality needed to be addressed, identifying particular “concerns” about 
bias and “considerable room for improvement in terms of completeness, consistency, 
verifiability and comparability” (p19). Consequently they were “not convinced that a 
voluntary approach to OHS reporting is sufficient” and suggested a tripartite 
approach comprising government agencies, employers and unions as potentially 
offering “the best prospects for advancement” in efforts to improve OHS reporting 
quality (p17). Overall, these conclusions are disappointingly reminiscent of Maunders 
                                                 
51 Sick leave was largely reported by the health and community services industry only (p14). 
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and Foley’s (1974) assessment of human resource disclosure back in the mid-1970s. 
That is, the authors recognised: 
The concept of a broader ‘social’ responsibility of company management – with 
attendant accountability … in certain minor respects seems already to be part of [the 
UK’s] existing disclosure legislation … [however] It seems to us, in this respect, that 
the balance of both theoretical and practical arguments favours an increase in the 
quantity and quality of external disclosure, certainly from the national interest point of 
view, and probably from the individual company’s viewpoint (Maunders and Foley 
1974, pp117-118). 
Overall, these studies revealed differences in the quantity, quality and presentation 
(media) of various CSR issues (Aerts et al. 2006; Cerin 2002) although they identified 
consistently high levels of reporting on OHS in annual reports, sustainability reports 
and websites (with frequencies typically ranging from 70% to 95%). Unfortunately, 
early examples provided few insights into either the content or quality of OHS 
information in particular. As the field has matured, more recent studies have sought 
to address issues of content and quality, guided to some extent by the development 
of the GRI. Given the absence of an alternative framework to offer specific guidance 
for OHS reporting to stakeholders, the GRI is argued to have gained increasing 
acceptance as a guideline for sustainability reporting (Adams and Frost 2007). It also 
appears to have influenced the way in which content analytic research into 
sustainability reporting is conducted. Section 2.3.2 examines this phenomenon, first 
presenting an overview of the GRI then examining CSD studies undertaken after its 
release to explore the impact of the GRI on corporate OHS disclosure.  
2.3.2 The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
The ability of corporate social disclosures (CSDs) to help stakeholders make 
informed social and economic choices depends on both the availability and the 
quality of information received (Whitehouse 2006). Prior examinations of the quality of 
CSDs have identified a number of concerns including a lack of specific performance 
detail (Harte and Owen 1991), lack of completeness (Abeysekera and Guthrie 2004; 
Adams and Kuasirikun 2000; Adams 2004; Adams and Harte 1998; Deegan and Rankin 
1996), a lack of consistency and comparability of metrics and terminology (Brown and 
Butcher 2005; Clarke and O'Neill 2006; Neilsen and Thomsen 2007; Whitehouse 2006), poor 
accuracy (Rockness 1985) and the tendency for firms to present only positive and self-
laudatory information (Deegan and Gordon 1996) or mere “window-dressing” (Kolk 2003, 
p289).  
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Whitehouse (2006) argues that to enable comparisons of CSR performance across 
different companies “consistent and systematic criteria for evaluating corporate 
performance must be applied, a requirement that is undermined by the adoption of 
differing definitions … [and] alternative terms” (Whitehouse 2006, p294). Furthermore, 
there is recognition of a “growing CSR rhetoric” which has seen critics claim that 
“CSR is primarily about projecting a suitable image in order to placate critics and 
ensure ‘business as usual’” while leaving “important gaps between CSR activities, on 
the one hand, and accountability and fairness on the other” (Hamann and Kapelus 
2004, p87).  Consequently, critics have demanded that, 
For CSR to be anything other than greenwash, it has to guarantee that 
companies are accountable for the direct and indirect impacts of their activities … 
CSR strategies therefore ought to identify and address ‘reflexive’ instruments that 
provide for independent mechanisms of verification …or widely respected 
indicators of CSR performance (Hamann and Kapelus 2004, pp86-7).  
2.3.2.1 The GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines 
The GRI is a multi-stakeholder institution formed to support international progress 
toward sustainable development through the development of reporting guidelines that 
encourage the consistent preparation and communication of CSR information (Woods 
2003). In particular, the GRI’s International Sustainability Reporting Guidelines seek 
“to make sustainability reporting comparable to financial reporting in terms of rigor 
and verifiability” (Bhimani and Soonawalla 2005, p16) by providing a credible and trusted 
reporting framework to “elevate the quality of reporting to a higher level of 
comparability, consistency and utility” (GRI 2002, p9). Issued in draft form in 1999, 
with revisions issued in 2002 and 2006, the GRI’s recommended performance 
indicators are claimed to have achieved global acceptance (Adams and Frost 2007; 
Gallego 2006). 
The GRI framework identifies specific indicators for reporting on various social, 
environmental and economic aspects of performance, including OHS. Industry sector 
supplements have also been developed to address industry-specific process and 
performance issues (GRI 2006). Together this framework guides both qualitative and 
quantitative sustainability disclosures by recommending ‘core’ and ‘additional’ 
indicators for inclusion in corporate disclosures (GRI 2002, 2006). GRI recommended 
indicators for workplace health and safety are shown in Table 2-5 below.     
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GRI Labour Indicators 
(GRI 2006) 
Mining Sector Supplement  
(based on GRI 2002) 
 
LA5.  Practices on recording and notification of occupational 
accidents and diseases, and how they relate to the ILO 
Code of Practice on Recording and Notification of 
Occupational Accidents and Diseases. 
 
LA6.  Description of formal joint health and safety committees 
comprising management and worker representatives 
and proportion of workforce covered by any such 
committees. 
 
LA7.  Standard injury, lost day, and absentee rates and 
number of work-related fatalities (including 
subcontracted workers). 
 
LA8.  Description of policies or programmes (for the 
workplace and beyond) on HIV/AIDS. 
 
LA14. Evidence of substantial compliance with the ILO 
Guidelines for Occupational Health Management 
Systems. 
 
LA15. Description of formal agreements with trade unions or 
other bona fide employee representatives covering 
health and safety at work and proportion of the 
workforce covered by any such agreements. 
Table 2-5: GRI OHS indicators  
(Source: GRI 2006, www.globalreporting.org) 
      
2.3.2.2 Advocates of the GRI 
The pursuit of appropriate indicators and reporting mechanisms has drawn the 
attention of professional and industry associations alike. Recognising similarities 
between accounting for sustainability and traditional financial accounting, such as 
accountability and quality decision-relevant information characterised by accuracy, 
consistency, comprehensiveness, reliability, relevance, validity and auditability (CPA 
Australia 2007), both CPA Australia (CPAA) and the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia (ICAA) have released sustainability reporting research 
reports in recent years (summarised below). 
Institution, Author Date Report title 
CPAA: Jones, Frost, Loftus, 
van der Laan Jul. 2005 Sustainability Reporting: Practices, Performance and Potential 
CPAA: Jones, Frost, Loftus, 
van der Laan Sep. 2005 
Sustainability Reporting: Perspectives on Regulatory and 
Professional Initiatives across the Asia Pacific 
ICAA: Chua Jan. 2006 Extended performance reporting: an overview of techniques 
ICAA: Chua Aug. 2006 Extended performance reporting: a review of empirical studies 
ICAA: BBR Advisory Panel Oct. 2008 Broad Based Business Reporting (BBBR) 
Table 2-6: Sustainability reporting research by the Australian accounting profession 
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In 2005 CPA Australia commissioned a study to explore current practices of 
sustainability reporting in Australia. The report examines the annual reports, 
sustainability reports and websites produced by a sample of the Australian Stock 
Exchange (ASX) Top500 companies, government enterprises and local government 
authorities. The report acknowledged “the growing desire for suitable vehicles to 
enhance sustainability reporting” (p3) and provided an overview of tools such as the 
AA1000 Framework produced by AccountAbility, the Sustainability Reporting 
Scorecard produced by Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu and the Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines developed by the Global GRI (CPA Australia 2005). Nevertheless, in 
conducting the survey of reporting practices, focus was limited to an assessment of 
the extent of disclosures against the GRI only. The report concluded: 
The inability or reluctance of organisations to modify or develop tools, processes 
and frameworks through which they can report their direct and indirect economic, 
social and environmental impacts to stakeholders provides a challenge for the 
accounting profession and policymakers. In particular there is a need to develop 
more accessible approaches and guidelines to enable entities to discharge a 
broader accountability than is currently reflected in reporting practices in the 
public and private sectors in Australia (p19). 
Three years on, guidance on sustainability reporting provided on the CPA Australia 
CSR and the Profession webpage promotes the GRI as “the leading framework for 
the reporting [on] organisational non-financial performance” and the “most significant 
international development influencing the emergence of non-financial reporting” (CPA 
Australia 2007, p1), and provides links to: each of the two studies mentioned above, to 
a fact sheet summarising the GRI-based survey of CSD practices (CPA Australia 2008) 
and to the GRI website. No references to AA1000 or the DTT frameworks are 
provided which suggests that the GRI is the CSD framework advocated by CPA 
Australia to its members. 
Similarly, while the two ICAA studies completed in 2006 (see Table 2-6) provided an 
overview of a range of sustainability reporting (or extended performance reporting) 
techniques (Chua 2006b) and empirical studies (Chua 2006a), more recent research 
efforts have seen the release of ‘Broad Based Business Reporting’ (BBBR) in 
October 2008, a report described as a “leadership paper … that provides a pro-forma 
of key performance indicator (KPI) reporting as well as a starting point for discussion 
on possible KPIs for certain industries” (ICAA 2008, p.i). The format of the proforma is 
“based on formats included in the connected reporting framework produced by HRH 
Prince of Wales’ Accounting for Sustainability Project and Best Practice 
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Environmental and Governance Reporting published by PriceWaterhouseCoopers” 
(p9) and with KPIs largely comprising GRI indicators as identified below: 
Sections six to eight outline our proposed KPIs for the selected industries. Where 
applicable, we have referenced the KPIs to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) 
G3 guidelines and industry supplements. The GRI is one of the worlds most 
widely used ESG reporting frameworks and sets out the principles and indicators 
that business can use to measure and report their economic, environmental and 
social performance (ICAA 2008, p9).  
As best practice, the non-financial KPIs reported should also refer back to GRI 
G3 guidelines where applicable (p21). 
Key principles of non-financial KPIs identified in the ICAA’s BBBR report were also 
drawn from the GRI definitions of reporting content and quality, and where a GRI KPI 
is used, the GRI description and guidance on the relevance of the indicator is also 
provided. The BBBR also recommends the presentation of each KPI to include 
current year, prior year and a baseline against which future performance will be 
assessed. The ICAA, therefore, also appears to promote the GRI although it also 
provides links to the Accounting for Sustainability Project framework and information 
about CSD indices including Corporate Responsibility Index, Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index and FTSE4Good.   
Evidence suggests that various industry associations are also recommending the 
GRI as a model of sustainability reporting to their members. The Minerals Council of 
Australia requires firms that wish to commit to its Enduring Value charter to 
implement the International Council on Mining and Minerals (ICMM) principles and 
elements. These include assessment of risk management systems and public 
sustainability reporting of site level performance including “KPIs self-selected from 
the GRI, the GRI Mining and Metals Sector Supplement or self-developed” (MCA 
2005). Other industry associations have responded more strongly in favour of aligning 
sustainability performance reporting with the GRI’s guidelines. These include, for 
example, the Brazilian Sugarcane Industry Association (UNICA 2008), the Australian 
Fruit Juice Association (AFJA 2007) and the German Energy and Water Industry 
Association (Eon 2008). The CSR Toolkit developed by the Credit Union Industry 
Association “is aligned to the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) international reporting 
framework” (CUIA 2006, p8). Such widespread support for the GRI as a framework for 
sustainability reporting by both the accounting profession and industry suggests that 
GRI indicators may have an important influence on corporate OHS reporting. The 
GRI is therefore examined in more detail in the following section. 
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2.3.2.3 The GRI and OHS disclosure  
Kolk (2003) suggested that through initiatives such as the GRI, the standardisation of 
sustainability reporting is likely to increase both in terms of the quantity and quality of 
CSDs. Research into the application of the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines 
has also begun to emerge in the academic literature with preliminary analysis 
indicating sustainability reports prepared using the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting 
Guidelines and protocols “are of very different standards, despite the fact that all 
companies have used the guidelines in some way” (CPA Australia 2005; Hedberg and 
von Malmborg 2003, p157).  
Like early CSD research, however, research to date has primarily sought to identify 
the extent to which CSDs reported across various sectors, industries and countries 
address the GRI’s indicators. Typically, this has involved content analyses of 
sustainability reports to count the number of firms reporting in accordance with the 
GRI and / or the number of GRI indicators on which each of the various firms report 
(see for example, Frost et al. 2005; Gallego 2006; Guenther et al. 2006; Guthrie and Farneti 
2008; Jones et al. 2007; Morhardt et al. 2002). However, despite attention to the quantity 
of reports issued in accordance with the GRI, limited attention to date has been 
directed to the quality of information produced in accordance with the GRI. This has 
led to suggestions that quality is perhaps being interpreted as the extent to which 
disclosures adhere to the GRI indicator guidelines (Guenther et al. 2006) as opposed 
to the extent to which disclosures based on the GRI’s recommended indicators lead 
to coherent, valid, relevant and reliable accounts of CSR performance.  
A review of the CSD studies published since the GRI’s release suggests 
sustainability reporting guidelines have also had an impact on the empirical 
examination of CSR disclosures. In particular, many studies have used the GRI’s 
standard indicator protocols as a framework to inform disclosure indices for content 
analysis studies of CSR disclosures (see for example, Andrew et al. 1989; Campbell et al. 
2003; Cuganesan 2006; Deegan et al. 2000; Frost et al. 2005; Gallego 2006; Guthrie et al. 
2008; Morhardt et al. 2002) and some intellectual capital reporting studies (see for 
example, Cuganesan 2006; Pedrini 2007; but not Bozzolan et al. 2006).  
An interesting consequence of this development is that corporate OHS disclosures 
have become more visible within the results of broader CSR research studies (see for 
example, Hedberg and von Malmborg 2003). In particular, post-GRI CSR research has 
provided increased evidence as to the general existence of OHS disclosures, by 
frequency of reporting, as well as findings of OHS disclosure across industries 
(Gallego 2006), across firms within an industry (Cuganesan 2006), across disclosure 
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media (Guthrie et al. 2008) and across countries (Pedrini 2007). Nevertheless, while 
each of these studies adds to knowledge of the frequency of OHS disclosure in 
general, they are providing limited insight into the specific content or the quality of 
OHS disclosures provided in accordance with the GRI guidelines.   
2.4 Summary 
The culmination of a global push for productivity and competitiveness, radically 
changing Australian legislative and IR environments and the increasing 
individualisation of employment arrangements has led to mounting OHS complexity, 
increasing risk profiles for Australian employers and changing patterns of workplace 
injury and illness (Bohle and Quinlan 2005; Costello and Merrett 2000; Johnstone 2003b; 
Mayhew and Quinlan 1998; Quinlan 1999). The combination of self-regulatory OHS 
legislation and multiple different, and at times ideologically opposed, institutional 
templates for OHS risk management, means health and safety requirements are not 
interpreted and addressed uniformly by individual organisations. Instead, employers 
and managers make decisions regarding the design, resourcing and implementation 
of OHS control activities for their particular enterprise. Chelius (1991) suggests that 
managers may resist investing in OHS controls at socially desirable levels because 
expenditure is largely discretionary, prevention costs can be significant, benefits are 
difficult to quantify and failure costs are largely externalised.  
The considerable physical, social and financial burden that work-related injuries and 
illnesses impose on a range of external stakeholders (as outlined in section 2.1) 
justifies the obligation for those charged with corporate governance to be 
accountable to stakeholders for their managerial choices. This accountability is 
discharged through the provision of relevant and reliable information about OHS risk 
and outcomes (Ginter 1979). At the same time, decreasing numbers of workplace 
safety inspectors and the removal of trade union rights of entry are together claimed 
to be eroding traditional forms of OHS oversight (Berger 1999; Bluff et al. 2004; 
Johnstone and Quinlan 2006; Weil 1999). Within this context, alternative accountability 
mechanisms, such as the public provision of corporate OHS information, is vital 
(Markey 2004; Peetz 2006; Watson et al. 2003).  
Corporate communication media, such as annual reports, sustainability reports and 
websites, therefore, provide important vehicles through which managers can provide 
an account to stakeholders of their selection of OHS ergonomic or egocentric 
strategy, implementation of OHS control activities and subsequent effectiveness of 
OHS programs as evidenced by injury and illness outcomes. These OHS disclosures 
have the potential to recognise both the intrinsic rights of employees and contractors 
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to a safe working environment and the right of stakeholders to the quality information 
they need “to make informed decisions and to secure the accountability of employers 
for OHS performance” (Corocan 2003; Brown and Butcher 2005, p4). 
The substantial attention devoted to examining CSR disclosures over the past 30 
years has tended to focus on some aspects of reporting, such as reporting on 
environmental performance (Deegan 2006b; Gray et al. 1995b; Mathews 1997), while 
leaving others, such as reporting on OHS, exposed to limited detailed examination 
(with the exception of Brown and Butcher’s [2005] study). Perhaps OHS disclosures 
have failed to capture the same level of academic attention as other CSR issues due 
to recognition of the long history of OHS reporting. Little is therefore known about the 
detail of OHS disclosures or about their information content and quality.  
Consequently, with little attention paid to the construction of corporate accounts of 
OHS (Bottomley 1994, 2000; Stricoff 2000) there is limited understanding of the extent to 
which developments such as the GRI have provided a framework for ensuring the 
provision of high quality OHS reporting that can convey how successful 
organisational safety programs are in achieving their ultimate objective, namely fewer 
occupational injuries and illnesses (Stricoff 2000). This research seeks to address that 
gap by providing insight into the structure, content and quality of OHS accountability 
information and by explaining changes in corporate OHS disclosure over time. 
Chapter 3 now provides a theoretical framework in which OHS corporate disclosures 
are examined. 
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Chapter 3.  THEORY DEVELOPMENT  
This chapter presents a theoretical framework within which the corporate disclosure 
of OHS information is examined. It is offered in two parts. First, section 3.1 considers 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories as frameworks within which to examine the 
public provision of corporate OHS information. In essence, these theories explore 
why organisations should (ethical branch of stakeholder theory), and would 
(managerial branch of stakeholder theory, legitimacy theory), provide public accounts 
of OHS management activities and performance. Section 3.2 then looks to 
institutional theory to explain the choice of information content that organisations are 
likely to report. This explores issues of both topic coverage and presentation and 
examines those factors that are likely to have motivated changes in OHS disclosure 
content over the past decade. 
3.1 Theorising ‘why’ firms provide OHS disclosures  
Academic attention to the public provision of corporate social and environmental 
disclosures has been informed by various research methodologies and theoretical 
perspectives (Mathews 1997; Deegan 2002). These have included stakeholder theory 
(Gray et al. 1996; Gray et al. 1991; Neu et al. 1998; Roberts 1992; Tilt 2001; Ullmann 1985; 
Whitehouse 2006); accountability theory (Kolk 2008; O'Dwyer and Owen 2005); legitimacy 
theory (Adams 2004; Adams et al. 1998; Cormier and Gordon 2001; Deegan and Gordon 
1996; Deegan and Rankin 1999; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Hedberg and von Malmborg 2003; 
Milne and Patten 2002; O'Donovan 2002; O'Dwyer 2003; Patten 1991; Patten 1992; 
Suchman 1995; Yongvanich and Guthrie 2007); political economy theory (Adams and 
Harte 1998; Guthrie and Parker 1989); media agenda-setting theory (Brown and Deegan 
1999; O'Donovan 1999); agency theory (Ness and Mirza 1991); and institutional theory 
(Aerts et al. 2006; Broadbent et al. 2001; Corocan 2003; Hoffman 1997; Hoffman 1999; 
Unerman and Bennett 2004).  
Of these, stakeholder theory and, to a greater extent, legitimacy theory have 
emerged as the dominant theoretical frameworks to explain why organisations 
voluntarily provide corporate social disclosures. The following sections, therefore, 
examine the applicability of each of these two perspectives to the phenomenon of 
corporate OHS disclosure. In doing so, stakeholder theory is considered from a 
fundamentally prescriptive, stakeholder-rights centred perspective of stakeholder 
theory, known as the ethical (or normative) branch, as opposed to the more 
organisation-centred perspective taken by the managerial branch of stakeholder 
theory. 
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3.1.1 Stakeholder theory (ethical perspective) 
From an ethical or rights-based perspective, the obligations of corporations extend 
beyond their responsibilities to their owners “to constituent groups in society other 
than stockholders and beyond that prescribed by law or union contract” (Jones 1980, 
pp59-60). These “constituent groups” are referred to as stakeholders and defined by 
Freeman (1984) as being “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the 
achievement of the organisation’s objectives” (p46). Such effects may be financial or 
non-financial and result from an individual or groups being subjected to risk either 
voluntarily, through some form of resource investment, or involuntarily, as a result of 
the firm’s activities. This element of risk is critical in that without it “there is no stake” 
(Clarkson 1994, p5). It is also worth noting that from this ethical stakeholder theory 
perspective the extent to which “the corporation has any corresponding functional 
interest” in a stakeholder is irrelevant to one’s status as a stakeholder (Donaldson and 
Preston 1995, p67). A stakeholder is, therefore, identified as “groups or individuals who 
benefit from or are harmed by, and whose rights are violated or respected by, 
corporate actions” (Freeman 2004, p58) 
When viewed from an ethical perspective, stakeholder theory asserts that managers 
have a fiduciary duty to manage the business for the benefit of all stakeholders 
(Boatright 2004; Hasnas 2004, p69) and “views the firm not as a mechanism for 
increasing the stockholders’ financial returns, but as a vehicle for coordinating 
stakeholder interests” (Hasnas 2004, p69). This suggests that a firm might be 
conceptualised as “a set of multilateral contracts” among employees, owners, 
suppliers, customers, the community and others which are administered by 
managers (Freeman and Evan 1990, p352). Hasnas (2004) similarly defines a business 
as an “association of individuals, united by a network of [explicit and implicit] 
contracts organised to achieve a specified end” (p72).  
This “organisation – stakeholder interplay” is a “socially grounded relationship which 
involves responsibility and accountability” (Gray et al. 1996, p45). To discharge this 
accountability, organisations have a “duty to provide an account (by no means 
necessarily a financial account) or reckoning of those actions for which one is held 
responsible” (Gray et al. 1996). Indeed, evidence provided by O’Dwyer et al. (2005) 
demonstrates that stakeholders recognise their ‘right to know’ about the impact of a 
corporation on them and have expectations regarding the accountability of firms “for 
their stewardship” of stakeholders’ resources (p22). 
Chapter 2 of this thesis demonstrated that the extent to which management 
succeeds or fails in providing a safe working environment has the potential to affect 
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an extremely diverse range of individuals and groups, from the obvious stakeholders, 
such as employees, co-workers and managers, to imposing various financial and 
non-financial impacts on a range of external stakeholders including shareholders, 
friends and families of injured workers, organisational competitors and even 
individuals and organisations within the wider community. Given that management is 
ultimately responsible for ensuring OHS, and therefore implicitly accountable for the 
impact of OHS failures, (ethical) stakeholder theory argues that firms should “account 
for [their] actions or inaction in some form of report provided for its stakeholders” 
(Holland and Gibbon 2001, pp279-280). This may be summarised as follows: 
• Organisations should be accountable to stakeholders for the impact of their 
OHS decisions. 
• Organisations should provide a written account of OHS actions and 
outcomes to stakeholders. 
Being normative in nature, the above statements are, as with all such prescriptions, 
not empirically testable (Deegan 2006b). Therefore, this study does not propose to 
‘test’ whether organisations ‘should’ or ‘should not’ be held accountable for OHS. 
However, it does seek to gain insight into the extent to which this normative duty to 
account is recognised by those to whom it is owed. Consequently, the following 
proposition is offered.    
P 1: Stakeholders believe organisations should be accountable for OHS. 
Furthermore, whilst normative theories cannot be subjected to empirical testing,  
The premises of a normative theory are capable of empirical verification, and 
such verification is, or should be, a pre-requisite to its acceptance … [since] the 
only relevant verification [of normative theories] revolves around whether the 
rules of logic have been observed in their derivation (Hakansson 1971, p142).  
The logical progression from the normative position of ethical accountability to the 
prescription for written accounts to stakeholders is grounded in the premise that a 
written account is an appropriate mechanism through which accountability may be 
discharged. Indeed, prior research has confirmed the influence of stakeholder 
demand on the provision of CSR information (for example, Deegan and Blomquist 2006; 
Deegan and Rankin 1997; Tilt 1994) and consistently demonstrated corporate OHS 
disclosures as important to stakeholders (see for example, Brown et al. 2005; Deegan 
and Rankin 1997; Deegan and Rankin 1999; Epstein 2008). Proposition two is, therefore, 
P 2: Stakeholders believe a duty to account for OHS should be discharged 
through the periodic public disclosure of OHS information. 
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There is presently a lack of evidence to identify or describe the OHS information that 
stakeholders perceive as important for discharging this accountability. Research is 
therefore needed to explore stakeholder demand for the content, presentation and 
quality of organisational accounts of OHS. This exploratory study seeks to address 
this gap by exploring stakeholder perceptions of OHS accountability and the 
mechanisms for which they deem appropriate for discharging any perceived duty to 
account for OHS. The following research question is therefore posed,     
RQ 1: What information should OHS disclosures contain? 
This section has used the ethical branch of stakeholder theory to explain why 
organisations should provide OHS accounts to stakeholders and what these 
accounts should contain. In contrast, both legitimacy theory and the managerial 
branch of stakeholder theory are commonly used to explain why organisations do 
provide such accounts. The “extensive application” of legitimacy theory to corporate 
social disclosure has seen it “perhaps become the pre-eminent theory in the field” 
(Campbell et al. 2003, p559). The following section examines OHS disclosure within a 
legitimacy theory framework. 
3.1.2 Legitimacy theory  
Legitimacy theory is founded on the idea of an implicit ‘social contract’ operating 
between an organisation and the broader social system in which it operates (Deegan 
2006b). This unwritten contract defines the “desirable, proper, or appropriate” actions 
of the organisation “within some socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995, p574). When perceived as operating within the 
limits and norms of their particular social system, organisations are deemed 
‘legitimate’ by society (Deegan 2006b). Legitimacy therefore reflects “a condition or 
status” (Lindblom 1994) where there is: 
… congruence between the social values associated with, or implied by, [an 
organisation’s] activities and the norms of acceptable behaviour in the larger social 
system of which they are a part (Dowling and Pfeffer 1975, p122). 
Where an organisation is perceived by society as failing to operate in a manner 
commensurate with social norms and expectations it is said to be in breach of the 
unwritten social contract between it and its community (Deegan 2006b; Shocker and 
Sethi 1974). A perceived breach, or ‘legitimacy gap’ (Deegan 2006b; Lindblom 1994; Nasi 
et al. 1997), poses a threat to an organisation because lost legitimacy “affects the 
competition for resources” (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978) and may ultimately lead to a loss 
of its implicit ‘license to operate’ (Deegan 2006b, pp276-77; Dowling and Pfeffer 1975).  
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Organisational legitimacy is therefore vital since an organisation will only exist to the 
extent that it is considered legitimate by the broader social system in which it 
operates (Deegan 2002, p292). Scott (1995) suggests, however, that although 
legitimacy is necessary for an organisation’s survival (Deegan 2002; Deegan 2006b; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977), it is “not a commodity to be possessed or exchanged”, but 
should instead be conceived as “a condition reflecting cultural alignment, normative 
support, or consonance with relevant rules or laws” (Scott 1995, p45).  
The state of legitimacy conferred on an organisation by legitimacy agents52 or 
society53 (Deegan 2002) is, however, shaped not by the organisation but by society’s 
collective knowledge or perceptions of the organisation (Deegan 2006b, p276). 
Suchman (1995) suggests that it is also possible for an organisation to “diverge 
dramatically from societal norms yet retain legitimacy because the divergence goes 
unnoticed” (p574). Where the actions of an organisation are visible to its conferring 
publics, organisations are motivated to obtain and maintain legitimacy by addressing 
public concerns thus avoiding sanctions and onerous regulation, or by obfuscating or 
deflecting attention away from poor performance (Deegan 2006b; Deegan and Gordon 
1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Moerman and Van Der 
Laan 2005). Lindblom (1994) suggests that an organisation may seek to shape 
society’s perceptions of it by pursuing one of the following legitimation goals: 
• educate stakeholders about performance improvements achieved;  
• educate stakeholders about an intention to improve its performance;  
• change stakeholders’ perceptions of performance;  
• manipulate or distract attention away from an issue of concern; or  
• alter external expectations of stakeholder groups regarding appropriate 
levels of performance.  
Notably, only the first of these five legitimation strategies involves any improvement 
in actual performance. The others are concerned with managing the perceptions held 
by relevant publics (Lindblom 1994) including, seeking to align society’s expectations 
with the values of the organisation, rather than the other way around. Corporate 
social disclosures aid this process not by assisting in constructing and presenting a 
particular ‘reality’ of corporate life (Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006, p114; Hines 1988), but 
                                                 
52 Legitimacy agents are defined as “those organisations, such as accreditors and regulators, specifically 
established to confer legitimacy on a certain set of subjects (Deephouse and Suchman 2008, p69; 
Durand and McGuire 2005). 
53 Those constituents conferring legitimacy on an organisation are also known as “conferring publics” 
(Campbell et al. 2003; Deephouse and Suchman 2008, p69; O'Donovan 2002) or relevant publics 
(Lindblom 1994). 
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in constituting a mechanism for legitimation that seeks to ensure outside parties 
perceive the discloser’s activities as legitimate (Deegan 2006b, p275). Jenkins (2007) 
observes, 
[Corporate] reports are permeated with the language of CSR and sustainable 
development, with the themes of mutuality and togetherness emerging strongly. By 
using these analogies the companies are tapping into a robust and widely accepted 
international rhetoric that is likely to gain much support (p32). 
Why organisations provide OHS disclosures 
Prior research suggests that the attention of conferring publics is directed at firms 
with particular organisational characteristics. These include the inclusion of an 
organisation in an industry that is particularly sensitive to changing expectations of 
acceptable behaviour or the degree to which an organisation and its activities are 
visible, or exposed, to public scrutiny (Hoffman 1997; Lim and McKinnon 1993). Large 
firms, being highly visible to stakeholders, were identified as particularly likely to 
provide CSDs (Hoffman 1997), and positive correlations have also been identified 
between the level of environmental disclosure and the environmental sensitivity of 
the industry to which the discloser belonged (Adams et al. 1998; Deegan and Gordon 
1996; Ness and Mirza 1991; Tilt 1997; Yamagami and Kokubu 1991).  
Extending this literature from a corporate environmental to a corporate social context 
suggests that OHS disclosure may be related to the visibility and OHS sensitivity of 
the industry in which the discloser operates. To the extent society finds workplace 
fatality, injury and illness unacceptable, those large organisations operating in 
industries which are known to face significant OHS hazards or risks will be motivated 
to actively ensure continued legitimacy through measures including the public 
provision of OHS disclosures. The third proposition is therefore, 
P 3:  Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
seek to ensure continued legitimacy by providing OHS information to 
stakeholders. 
Prior studies of corporate environmental disclosure suggest that voluntary CSDs 
pursue organisational legitimacy not by simply discharging accountability to 
stakeholders for organisational activity, but by seeking to legitimise those activities 
through the disclosure of positive and often self-laudatory information in publicly 
available corporate reports (see for example, Deegan et al. 2000; O’Donovan 1999; 
Deegan and Gordon 1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Gray et al. 1995; Patten 1992). 
However, given that research has yet to examine in fine detail the content of OHS 
disclosures, legitimacy theory can only provide an explanation for why firms might 
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choose to voluntarily disclose OHS information to stakeholders, not for the choice of 
OHS content. Adams and Harte (1998) further suggest that by failing to examine CSD 
with reference to their wider social and political context, legitimacy theory fails to 
recognise the underlying conflicts and tensions at play. Within this context, legitimacy 
theory can offer, at best, only “a partial explanation” of the motivations for corporate 
disclosure (Adams and Harte 1998, p807).  
The concept of legitimacy is, however, a key component of institutional change 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). Institutional theorists argue that the ability to 
contextualise phenomena under observation and address the “interplay between 
organisational context and organisational action” allows institutional theory to provide 
the rich explanatory power for both individual and organisational action that extends 
beyond the limits of legitimacy theory (Dacin et al. 2002, p45; Greenwood and Hinings 
1996, p1024; Greenwood et al. 2008). Consequently, institutional theory is argued to 
inquire more directly into the way in which “social choices are shaped, mediated and 
channelled by the institutional environment” (Wooten and Hoffman 2008, p130). It can 
therefore provide a useful lens for investigating voluntary CSD by providing insight 
into “how organisations understand and respond to changing social and institutional 
pressures and expectations” (Deegan 2006b, p305). The following section explores 
institutional influences on the construction of corporate OHS disclosures. 
3.2 Theorising ‘what’ OHS disclosures firms provide 
This section begins by providing an overview of institutional theory in section 3.2.1 
and then examining in more detail the key concepts and constructs in 
institutionalisation and deinstitutionalisation processes. The first of these constructs, 
the ‘organisational field’, is explored in section 3.2.2. Section 3.2.3 then examines 
those ‘institutional pressures’ that drive the institutionalisation and 
deinstitutionalisation of particular organisational structures, practices and values. 
Section 3.2.4 presents an overview of ‘institutional templates’, or patterns of 
institutionalised structures and behaviours. Finally, section 3.2.5 relates this 
discussion of organisational fields, pressures and templates to the present study and 
explores the potential for institutionalised OHS disclosure templates.  
3.2.1 The evolution of ‘institutional theory’  
Institutional theories have their origins in the organisational theory literature of the 
1940s and 1950s although they have developed substantially since these early days. 
Of the numerous variants, including institutional sociology, institutional economics 
and institutional political science, it is ‘modern sociological institutionalism’ that has 
captured the attention of many social science disciplines, including accounting (Meyer 
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2008, p790). The evolution in institutional theorising has seen three broad framings of 
development since its early beginnings (Barley 2008). The first, described by 
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) as the ‘old institutional theory’ of Selnick (1949; 1957) 
and Clark (1960; 1972) centres on the individual organisation “infused with value” 
(Selznick 1957) and “issues of influence, coalitions and competing values … along 
with power and informal structures” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996, p1022).  
Institutional theory developments in the 1970s and 1980s, labelled ‘new-institutional 
theory’ (NIT), included the work of Meyer and Rowan (1977), Zucker (1977), Berger 
and Luckmann (1967) and later, DiMaggio and Powell (1983), Meyer and Scott (1983), 
Tolbert and Zucker (1983) and Scott (1987). This phase occurred as organisational 
scholars began to see past the “managerialist engineering approach to 
organizations” and embrace the idea that a substantial portion of organisational 
activity had less to do with competition for scarce resources and the technical tasks 
organisations performed, and more to do with interrelationships embedded in larger 
social structures (Palmer et al. 2008, p739; Scott 1994a). Early NIT work saw institutions 
as cognitive structures and institutionalisation as a socially constructed process 
whereby “social processes, obligations or actualities come to take on a rule-like 
status in social thought and action” (Meyer and Rowan 1977, p341; Phillips and Malhotra 
2008; Scott 1994a). NIT in the 1970s emphasised legitimacy, embeddedness, and “at 
the centrality of classification: routines, scripts and schema” (Greenwood and Hinings 
1996, p1023). Sceptical of “rational-actor models of organization” (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996, p12), institutional theory sought to replace them with: 
An alternative theory of individual action, which stresses the unreflexive, routine, 
taken-for-granted nature of most human behaviour and views interests and actors 
as themselves constituted by institutions (DiMaggio and Powell 1991, p14). 
In the early 1980s focus began to change from explorations of the construction of 
institutions to macro-level effects of institutionalisation (Phillips and Malhotra 2008, 
p707) following concerns of “a perceived overemphasis on normative imagery … [and 
an] implicit lack of agency” (Hinings and Tolbert 2008, p479). DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) extended in two important ways Meyer and Rowan’s (1977) and Zucker’s 
(1977) recognition that “the creation of institutional templates54 serves to drive 
processes of isomorphism … resulting in high levels of homogeneity among 
organisations” (Hinings and Tolbert 2008, p479). First, they specified three sources of 
isomorphic pressure: coercive, normative and mimetic pressures55. Second, they 
                                                 
54 The concept of institutional templates is discussed in further detail in section 3.5. 
55 Institutional pressure and coercive, normative and mimetic isomorphism are discussed in more detail in 
section 3.4. 
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offered the notion of an ‘organisational field’ which “helped to draw attention to the 
array of interacting organisations that give rise to, shape and re-shape 
institutionalised definitions” (Hinings and Tolbert 2008, p479). However, (Greenwood et 
al. 2008) suggest that DiMaggio and Powell’s (1983) framing of institutional 
isomorphism, 
Was often misinterpreted by later researchers, who treated homogeneity as 
synonymous with institutional isomorphism, when in fact homogeneity is only one 
possible effect of institutional pressures … (p6). 
As a result of these misinterpretations, the body of research that followed DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) was soon criticised for conceiving of the organisational field as 
“predominantly static in its configuration, unitary in its makeup and formed around 
common technologies, industries or discrete network ties” and field members as “a 
homogenous collection of organisational actors, each behaving according to a social 
script designed by the social environment” (DiMaggio 1995; Greenwood and Hinings 
1996; Wooten and Hoffman 2008, pp131,134). In the mid-1990s DiMaggio (1995) 
expressed concern that: 
Somewhat to my surprise … papers … cited our [DiMaggio and Powell 1983] paper 
as support for the proposition that all organisations become like all others, 
regardless of field. Somehow the network argument that we authors regarded as so 
central had been deleted in the paper’s reception (p395).  
Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest that the subsequent extension of NIT, which 
was then re-labelled ‘neo-’ rather than ‘new-’, institutional theory sought to capture 
the convergence of prior themes, the “coming together of the old and the new” 
(p1023). This allowed insight into the stability of institutions and institutionalised 
practices over time and provided a framework for understanding radical 
organisational change and organisational adaptation (Burns and Scapens 2000; 
Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Tolbert 1985; Tolbert and Zucker 1983). This phase in the 
evolution of institutional theory gives greater consideration to the role of 
organisational self-interest and agency within an organisational field (Covaleski and 
Dirsmith 1988; DiMaggio 1988) and suggests that responses to institutional pressures 
can be strategic (Oliver 1991).  
Consequently, neo-institutional theory (hereafter shown simply as ‘institutional 
theory’) provides insights that “offer considerable promise in answering the question 
of how affected actors seek to attach or deny legitimacy to new organisational forms” 
(Suddaby and Greenwood 2005, p35) by theoretically exploring the ways in which actors 
create, maintain and disrupt institutions (Lawrence and Suddaby 2006).  
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3.2.2 Contextualising institutional change  
Institutional theory considers the organisational field, rather than the organisation 
itself, to be the unit of analysis as it examines the pursuit of legitimacy through 
institutional change (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). The notion of an organisational 
field “draws heavily on the social constructionist account of reality” with patterns of 
organisational interaction defined by the shared systems of meanings that establish 
field boundaries, field membership and define appropriate behaviours, structures and 
relationships (Greenwood et al. 2002, p59; Lawrence 1999). The following sections 
briefly examine the organisational field and the patterns of behaviour and organising, 
known as institutional templates, which diffuse inside them. 
3.2.2.1 The organisational field 
A central construct of institutional theory is the organisational field56 (Scott 1991), 
which has also been referred to as the institutional field57 (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; 
Greenwood et al. 2002; Meyer and Rowan 1977), institutional sphere (Fligstein 1990), 
societal environment (Meyer 1994) and institutional environment (Scott and Meyer 
1994). An organisational field is generally conceived of as, 
… a community of organisations that partakes of a common meaning system and 
whose participants interact more frequently and fatefully with one another than with 
actors outside the field (Scott 1995, p56).   
While institutional theorists initially conceptualised the field as the primary social 
setting of an organisation such as an industry or a nation-state (DiMaggio and Powell 
1991), later descriptions suggested fields were constituted according to those issues 
important to the goals of a specific collection of organisations (Hoffman 1999). This 
issues-based view of the field reflected the mustering of various constituents “with 
incongruent purposes” rather than members possessing universal technologies or 
industries sharing common interests and “isomorphic dialogue” (Wooten and Hoffman 
2008, p134). Organisation fields could therefore be differentiated from populations, 
industries or networks in that fields comprised a collection of “vertically and 
horizontally interlocking organisations” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996, pp1026-7), and 
that both “interact with one another and are subject to the same regulative, normative 
and cognitive institutional constraints” (Palmer et al. 2008, p742). Consequently, 
although the field could include any constituent which influences58 the organisation, 
such as government, resource providers, professional and trade associations, special 
interest groups and the general public, its boundaries are defined by shared cultural 
                                                 
56 Haveman and David (2008) argue that legitimacy is the central concept of institutional analysis (p579). 
57 Meyer (2008) later offers definitial distinctions between institutional fields and organisational fields (see 
p525). 
58 This influence is unidirectional; not all organisational stakeholders are necessarily field members. 
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and governance structures, rather than simply a discrete list of generic constituents 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 1991, 2001; Wooten and Hoffman 2008).  
Institutional theory suggests that “institutional change is the result of shifts in the 
underlying logic by which legitimacy is assessed” (Suddaby and Greenwood 2005, p35). 
Those fields assuming ideological consensus and a consistent set of social 
expectations are described as tightly coupled (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). In 
contrast, in fields where boundaries are less successfully defined and defended 
(Scott 2001), known as loosely coupled fields, multiple competing ‘institutional logics’ 
may be present with field constituents jostling over “the definition of relevant issues 
and the form of institutions that will guide organisational behaviour” (Hoffman 1999, 
p352). Where institutional pressures present inconsistent cues or signals (DiMaggio 
and Powell 1991; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Schneiberg and Lounsbury 2008; Scott 
1991) space exists for idiosyncratic interpretation and either deliberate (agentic) or 
unconscious variations in practice (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Hirsch 1997; Oliver 
1991; Wooten and Hoffman 2008).  
Consequently, organisational fields may become contested and dynamic, a “field of 
struggles” (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992), “capable of moving toward something other 
than isomorphism” (Wooten and Hoffman 2008, p135). In reconciling contradictory 
institutional arrangements (Seo and Creed 2002) power relationships are revealed 
(Lawrence 2008) and field participants are not assumed to “march quietly down the 
path toward homogeneity” but instead choose a course of action from a well-defined 
set of socially accepted, legitimate options (Wooten and Hoffman 2008, p135).  
Fields, therefore, evolve through the revision and redefinition of field boundaries, 
changes in institutional logics, the influence of institutional entrepreneurs and shifting 
power balances and of field members (DiMaggio 1988; Fligstein 1997; Lawrence 1999). 
They are therefore instrumental to the processes by which socially constructed 
expectations and practices become disseminated and reproduced, as fields construct 
the legitimacy criteria that guides organisational behaviour (Aerts et al. 2006). The end 
result is that, over time, institutional influences become visible in patterns of structure 
or behaviour known as institutional templates.  
3.2.2.2 Institutionalised patterns of behaviour (templates) 
Institutional templates are diffused, rather than created, as a population of 
organisations inside an organisational field “unwittingly accept the prevailing template 
as the appropriate, right and proper way of doing things” and so converge to 
accepted patterns of behaviour and organising that originate and exist outside 
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individual organisations (Greenwood and Hinings 1996, p1027; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
As transmission within a field from one set of actors (organisations) to another 
occurs, shared patterns or templates take on a rule-like and taken-for-granted status 
(Scott and Meyer 1994; Zucker 1977) that can carry substantial mimetic legitimacy (see 
for example Carter and Mueller 2002). Tightly coupled fields, as described above, are 
perceived as having clearly legitimated organisational templates and highly 
articulated mechanisms (such as the state, professional associations, regulatory and 
governance agencies and organisational leaders) for transmitting those templates to 
other organisations within the field (Fligstein 1991; Greenwood and Hinings 1996, p1029; 
Kikulis et al. 1995; Tolbert 1985) 
In a structured context, resistance to change the prevailing template will be high 
(Lewin and Volberda 1999). Nevertheless, Greenwood and Hinings (1996) suggest that 
alternative templates may exist, albeit infrequently in tightly structured contexts and 
more frequently but less coherently formulated in less tightly coupled contexts 
(pp1030-1). For alternatives to become accessible however, the prevailing template 
needs to be seen as one set of rules, rather than the set of rules (Johnson et al. 2000). 
This may occur, for example, due to ‘normative fragmentation’ as increasing 
representation of alternative ideas leads to an erosion of commitment to a prevailing 
template (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Oliver 1992) or critical evaluation suggests 
institutional templates have been inappropriately imported (Macaulay 2007). 
Multiple institutional templates may therefore coexist and compete for legitimacy as, 
for example, the organisation moves from a template-in-use to an articulated 
alternative (Johnson et al. 1999; Johnson et al. 2000, p572; Newman 2000; Shaker et al. 
2000). This change may be radical, revolutionary, discontinuous change from one 
template to another, or convergent, evolutionary, incremental change within an 
existing template (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Scott 2001). It is possible because of 
the pervasive gap between micro (firm level) and macro (field level) frames which 
inevitably lead to the “adjustments, refinements, amendments, shortcuts, 
modifications, departures at the micro level” that take a collective toll on macro-level 
templates (Scott 2001, p188). Sjöstrand (1995) suggests this mismatch between micro 
and macro levels: 
… is explained by the distance between the experiences, thoughts and 
actions of the many single individuals on the micro level on the one hand and 
by the content and regulations embedded in the socially constructed 
institutions on the macro level, reflecting more general perspectives in 
society, on the other (p20). 
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In many cases these change processes are not capable of overturning institutional 
templates on their own (Johnson et al. 1999); they need to be augmented by broader 
regulatory or other macro-level frameworks (Clarke 1999). Consequently, exogenous 
shocks, such as new regulation or technology, “creates slippage” between prevailing 
templates and operational demands (Barley 1986, p80) producing a period of instability 
and experimentation (Johnson et al. 2000) as actors do not necessarily align 
themselves clearly with the new template, but instead proceed with behaviours from 
the prevailing structures and practices and differentially adopt behaviours from an 
alternative template over time (Johnson et al. 2000).  
Transformations in the relative salience and clarity of prescribed ideas about 
institutional templates are therefore driven by external pressures and rationalised 
myths – shifts in institutional logics and the strategic use of rhetoric (Greenwood and 
Hinings 1996; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005). This means organisations continue to 
respond to institutional pressures in rational ways, by endorsing generally accepted 
practices to appear legitimate via a synthesis “shaped and conditioned, on the one 
hand, by temporal-relational contexts of action and, on the other, by the dynamic 
element of agency itself” (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p1004). The following section 
explores the influence of these institutional pressures in shaping institutionalised 
templates of organising and behaviour.  
3.2.3 Institutional pressure and the evolution of templates 
Although institutions, by definition, connote stability and deep-rooted mutual 
acceptance of templates of structure, ritual and practice, they are nevertheless 
subject to, and drivers of, change processes (Scott 2001). A study of 
institutionalisation is therefore a study of change (Greenwood and Hinings 1996). It is 
the examination of how prevailing templates of beliefs, norms and practices emerge, 
become institutionalised, suffer delegitimation or fall into disuse, before becoming 
replaced by new rules, forms and scripts (Scott 2001).  
The primary drivers of the legitimacy criteria that guide institutional behaviour are 
professions and the state (Aerts et al. 2006; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001). 
Indeed, evidence suggests that those structures mandated through regulation in 
particular diffuse more rapidly than structures that are normatively or culturally 
encouraged but not mandated (Haveman and David 2008). Additional sources of 
institutional pressure include an array of actors such as non-governmental agencies, 
scientific associations and various social and cultural networks (Aerts et al. 2006; Scott 
2001). The visible patterns of diffusion that emerge over time in response to these 
pressures reflect behaviours that may be either institutionalised or decoupled – both 
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seeking legitimacy through isomorphism (literally ‘same shape’ or ‘same form’ 
(Haveman and David 2008) but the latter not institutionally driven (Aerts et al. 2006; 
Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Deegan 2006b; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 2001).  
The central idea of institutional isomorphism is that these communities of 
organisations that participate in shared meaning systems are defined by similar 
symbolic processes, are subject to common regulatory and governance processes 
and will conform to ‘rationalised social myths’ about appropriate routines, scripts, 
behaviours, ideas, practices and prescribed organisational structures (Fiss 2008; Scott 
1994b). As growing numbers of organisations conform to these myths, they become 
increasingly institutionalised and their diffusion leads to progressively greater 
institutional isomorphism (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008). A brief examination of the 
pressures motivating institutional isomorphism and decoupling is provided below. 
3.2.3.1 Coercive isomorphism  
Institutional isomorphism may result from coercive pressures exerted on 
organisations by parties upon whom they are dependent. These pressures force 
them to conform to societal expectations to ensure their survival (Dacin 1997; Deegan 
2006b; DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Siegel et al. 1997; Zucker 1977). 
Largely driven by power relationships, politics and resource dependence (Boxenbaum 
and Jonsson 2008), coercive pressures typically include government regulation, and 
the demands of powerful stakeholders (Carpenter and Feroz 2001; Deegan 2006b). 
Although coercive forces tend to accelerate diffusion (Haveman and David 2008) they 
may not necessarily lead to isomorphism (Deegan 2002). State regulations, for 
example, often allow discretion in their interpretation and application thus allowing 
organisations to experiment with micro-level variations in structures and practices of 
compliance (Dobbin et al. 1993).  
3.2.3.2 Normative isomorphism  
Alternatively, organisations may become normatively isomorphic through 
internalisation and socialisation processes whereby they come to share a common 
belief system through the diffusion of group-based institutional norms – often in 
response to training, education or exchanges with professional associations 
(Abercrombie et al. 1994; Corocan 2003; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). This cultural 
influence reflects the interaction of organisational and professional fields. Members of 
professional networks typically obtain comparable education and training and are 
thereby instilled with similar values as to appropriate practice within their professional 
field. As extremely mobile “social carriers” of ideas and institutional beliefs, these 
members then carry their favoured structures and practices into organisations, often 
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provoking micro-level isomorphic change (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Scott 2001, 
p190). Furthermore, (Edelman 1992) suggests that where state regulations allow 
discretion in their interpretation and application, normative pressures will ‘trump’ 
coercive pressures by providing accepted templates to guide organisational 
response.  
Indeed, the ability of professional associations to legitimate institutional change by 
hosting a discourse through which change is debated and endorsed makes them 
“important regulatory agents” within an organisational field (Suddaby and Greenwood 
2005, p58). To that end, prior studies of institutionalisation have emphasised the role 
of professions (see for example Greenwood and Suddaby 2007; Greenwood et al. 2002; 
Lounsbury 2002; O'Connell et al. 2005) and interlocking directorates (Carroll and 
Alexander 1999; see for example Caswell 1984; Chua and Petty 1999; Palmer et al. 1993) 
in normative institutional change.  
3.2.3.3 Mimetic isomorphism  
Haveman and David (2008) argue that, in the absence of coercive or normative 
forces, early adopters of new structures and practices tend to be driven by technical 
rationality and the search for solutions to operational problems. Their novel templates 
provide a model for other firms to follow – particularly where innovations are 
perceived to be of high quality (Aerts et al. 2006). While organisational actors may, or 
may not, initially share the belief in the new template, they may choose to conform to 
the forms and structures by mimicking the institutionalised behaviours of industry 
leaders (Barringer and Milkovich 1998; DiMaggio and Powell 1983). As innovations 
become increasingly accepted and diffused, late adopters may be motivated to 
engage in blind imitation in an effort to secure organisational legitimacy (Haveman and 
David 2008). This may at times be likened to “peer pressure” (Strang and Soule 1998) 
where reformers feel “compelled” to draw from contemporary “best practices” to stay 
in the game (Lin 2006, p63). 
More commonly, mimetic responses may result from environmental uncertainty that 
motivates managers to make social comparisons to aid their decision-making 
(Haunschild and Chandler 2008; Haunschild and Miner 1997). After observing the 
practices of other firms and their industry counterparts’ own imitation patterns, 
managers reflexively enact in their own organisation those practices and structures 
perceived to be accepted by large numbers of organisations, or best practice 
companies (Aerts et al. 2006; Haunschild 2003), to combat uncertainty and achieve 
legitimacy (Deephouse and Suchman 2008; Deephouse and Carter 2005; DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983; Meyer and Rowan 1977; Meyer and Scott 1983). In particular, organisations 
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facing uncertainty tend to mimic those peers they perceive to be successful or 
influential (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Broadbent et al. 2001; Deegan 2002), even in 
the absence of threats to legitimacy or active stakeholder demands (Aerts et al. 2006). 
In mimicking one another, firms confer a degree of legitimacy on each other and 
essentially reinforce the legitimacy of copied ‘institutions’ through furthered imitation 
(Aerts et al. 2006; Palmer et al. 2008; Westphal et al. 2001).  
3.2.3.4 Decoupling 
Institutional theory recognised that for organisations to survive they need to be 
perceived as legitimate by their relevant publics (Deegan 2006b) and accommodate 
“institutional expectations”, although at times these may “have little to do with 
technical notions of performance accomplishment” (Greenwood and Hinings 1996, 
p1025). However, rather than simply acquiesce to the institutional pressures exerted 
on organisations; managers may seek to respond in strategic ways (Oliver 1991). One 
such response is to “decouple” symbolic displays from technical work processes by 
appearing to conform to the institutional structure or practice while failing to integrate 
the practice into day-to-day managerial and operational processes of the 
organisation (Deegan 2006b; Dillard et al. 2004; Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Meyer 1983; 
Meyer and Rowan 1977).  
Decoupled practices are not institutionalised. Instead they enable organisations to 
appear isomorphic and thereby address legitimation gaps, perhaps even to the point 
of superficially adopting new structures without implementing related practices, 
instituting formal sanctions or making public announcements, while at the same time 
keeping the “adopted” structure separate and distinct from actual organisational 
practice (Deegan 2006b; Dillard et al. 2004; Meyer and Rowan 1977) and buffering the 
technical activities from stakeholder scrutiny so as not to be exposed as fraudulent 
(Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Meyer and Rowan 1977). 
Decoupling can be a rational organisational response when institutional (external) 
and technical (internal efficiency) requirements conflict, or when there are competing 
and conflicting institutional pressures that may harm the organisation (Meyer and 
Rowan 1977). The presentation of an espoused and an actual structure or practice 
seeks to resolve these problems by allowing organisations to seek the legitimacy 
attached to isomorphism with rationalised myths while continuing to engage in 
‘business as usual’ (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008, p79) thereby remaining technically 
(economically) efficient and enhancing their survival prospects (Meyer and Rowan 
1977).  
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Empirical research suggests decoupling is least likely where powerful and committed 
actors cared strongly about implementation and could influence the organisational 
response (Fiss and Zajac 2006) and most likely to occur among reluctant (late) 
adopters (Boxenbaum and Jonsson 2008; Westphal et al. 1997; Westphal and Zajac 1994) 
or in situations where managers distrust the source of the institutional pressure 
(Kostova and Roth 2002). Networks and coalitions have also been shown to mediate 
the decoupling response in that executives who had prior experience in decoupling, 
or who had social ties to organisations that did, were more likely to engage in the 
practice themselves (Westphal and Zajac 2001). 
Studies connecting decoupling to impression management suggest firms deliberately 
project (outward) images that give the impression of conformity to institutionally 
acceptable norms so as to obtain legitimacy, while engaging in internal operations 
(practices) that contradict this image (Beverland and Luxton 2005; Deegan 2006b; Fiss 
2008). Prior research has provided evidence, for example, of companies announcing 
ethical codes that are not used (Stevens et al. 2005), varying the degree to which they 
comply with announcements about stock repurchase plans (Westphal and Zajac 2001) 
and CEO incentives (Westphal and Zajac 1994), adopting formal corporate ethics 
programs that are not integrated into business operations (Weaver et al. 1999) or 
delaying implementation of publicised CSR and philanthropic programs (Trullen and 
Stevenson 2006).  
3.2.4 Institutionalised templates of OHS disclosure  
Effective legitimacy-driven reporting does not necessarily imply a universal, clear-cut 
or sophisticated disclosure agenda (Aerts et al. 2006). In seeking to motivate the 
discharge of OHS accountability, multiple macro-level institutional pressures may 
provide inconsistent cues or signals (Greenwood and Hinings 1996; Suddaby and 
Greenwood 2005) and micro-level effects of agency, such as network influences and 
individual interpretation, may lead to the diffusion of OHS disclosure formats and 
content that are less than isomorphic. Furthermore, firms may seek to decouple 
disclosure and accountability whereby they provide legitimating disclosures that 
deliberately project the impression of conformity to institutionally acceptable 
disclosure norms so as to obtain legitimacy, while failing to deliver accountability to 
stakeholders for OHS choices, actions and outcomes.   
Nevertheless, institutional theory argues that firms operating in well defined fields, 
subject to the same institutions and institutional pressures, will tend to adopt similar 
practices (Fligstein 1991) to “conform to external expectations about those forms or 
structures deemed acceptable” (Deegan 2002, p293) and thereby obtain legitimacy 
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and ensure continued survival (DiMaggio and Powell 1983). Large (visible) firms facing 
high levels of similar OHS hazards or risk operate in a shared institutional field, the 
boundaries of which are even more clearly defined if those firms operate within 
shared government, professional and governance structures and are subject to 
similar stakeholder expectations of accountability (Scott 2001). The similar institutional 
pressures exerted on these firms, coupled with potential uncertainty surrounding 
appropriate forms of OHS management and reporting as described in Chapter 2, are 
likely to result in the diffusion of an institutionalised template for corporate OHS 
disclosure to stakeholders. Proposition four is therefore, 
P 4: Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
share an institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
Prior research has suggested, however, that mimetic and coercive institutional 
pressures in particular are paramount in affecting intra-industry diffusion tendencies 
in sustainability reporting (Aerts et al 2006). At present however, there are no 
regulatory requirements for companies to provide external OHS disclosures. The 
development of institutional OHS disclosure templates in the absence of either 
traditional coercive forces of legislation, or an accepted conceptual framework to 
underpin their construction, suggests the influence of some other form of normative 
or mimetic institutional pressure.  
The incorporation of OHS criteria in sustainability reporting guidelines such as the 
GRI (as discussed in Chapter 2) presents both normative and mimetic institutional 
influences on OHS disclosure. Sustainability reporting studies suggest managers 
respond to uncertainty by observing the disclosure practices of other firms and 
benchmarking their reports one against another to ensure acceptance, relevance and 
legitimacy (Hoffman 1999). Firms facing uncertainty about how best to construct 
accounts to stakeholders are likely to be guided by the GRI’s recommended 
disclosure indicators, as are those firms strategically seeking legitimacy through 
identification with symbols such as the GRI and Global Compact. By identifying and 
describing a specific set of indicators through a multi-stakeholder consultative 
process the GRI arguably provides a globally accepted (Adams and Frost 2007; Gallego 
2006) “credible and trusted” reporting framework that can “elevate the quality of 
reporting to a higher level of comparability, consistency and utility” (GRI 2002, p9).  
The GRI, therefore, provides a framework that may guide the development and 
diffusion of an institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. It also exhibits a strong 
normative influence since, as described in Chapter 2, the GRI’s guidelines have 
received widespread acceptance by the accounting profession as well as various 
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industry-based associations and professional organisations. Together this suggests 
the template presented in the GRI’s reporting guidelines is likely to be 
institutionalised in patterns of OHS disclosure. Proposition five is therefore, 
P 5: The GRI's sustainability reporting guidelines form the basis of the 
institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
As identified in Chapter 2 and section 3.1, corporate OHS disclosures may discharge 
accountability to stakeholders by presenting metrics and narratives that communicate 
relevant, reliable and timely information about an organisation’s OHS inputs, 
processes and outputs. Failure to provide this information may result from 
unintended omissions, an inability to provide the required information, a deliberate 
resistance to providing information or decoupling practices such as ‘green-washing’ 
(or ‘safe-washing’ in this case) (see Jones et al. 2007b), ‘linguistic framing’ (Scott 1991) 
and the strategic use of rhetoric (Carter and Mueller 2002). While organisations may 
provide corporate disclosure to ensure continued legitimacy, those disclosures may 
be primarily constructed so as to constitute a mechanism for discharging OHS 
accountability or alternatively a mechanism for legitimising corporate activity (see 
Lindblom’s [1993] legitimation strategies). 
The limited examination to date of OHS disclosure content, and the extent to which 
current disclosures focus on accountability or legitimation is unclear. However, the 
GRI’s efforts to promote “transparency, accountability and sustainable development” 
(GRI 2008b) and to facilitate “transparency and accountability of all organisations … 
across the world” (GRI 2008a) suggests that the influence of the GRI is likely to 
promote accountability-based OHS disclosure. It therefore follows that, to the extent 
that the GRI recommendations meet stakeholder demand for corporate OHS 
accountability, and that an institutionalised template for OHS disclosure is modelled 
after the GRI’s guidelines, OHS disclosures will discharge corporate OHS 
accountability to stakeholders. The final proposition is therefore proposed below. 
P 6:  Information provided in institutionalised templates of OHS disclosure 
will address the accountability demands of stakeholders 
3.3 Summary  
This chapter began by presenting a normative perspective on OHS disclosure. 
Drawing on the OHS responsibilities of employers identified in Chapter 2, stakeholder 
theory principles were applied to demonstrate the ethical obligations of employers to 
provide an account of their OHS choices, actions and performance to stakeholders. 
Given the lack of detailed empirical evidence as to stakeholder perceptions of OHS 
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accountability the following two propositions and one exploratory research question 
were posited: 
P 1: Stakeholders believe organisations should be accountable for OHS.  
P 2: Stakeholders believe a duty to account for OHS should be discharged 
through the periodic public disclosure of OHS information. 
RQ 1: What information should OHS disclosures contain? 
Section 3.1.2 then sought to examine why organisations are likely (or unlikely) to 
provide such accounts using a legitimacy theory framework. The analysis concluded 
that large (visible) organisations operating in a high OHS risk environment are likely 
to provide voluntary disclosures to stakeholders so as to obtain and maintain 
organisational legitimacy. The following proposition was therefore proposed: 
P 3:  Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
seek to ensure continued legitimacy by providing OHS information to 
stakeholders. 
The lack of either regulatory disclosure requirements or a normative framework for 
OHS management has resulted in a combination of self-regulatory OHS legislation 
and multiple, at times ideologically opposed, institutional templates for managing 
OHS risk. Within this context, and given the considerable impact of OHS failures on a 
range of external stakeholders, activities such as external reporting are increasingly 
important mechanisms by which those charged with OHS governance can meet their 
accountability obligations to stakeholders. Furthermore, the particular content 
organisations choose to include in, or omit from, publicly disseminated voluntary 
disclosures “is a conscious decision that communicates a significant message to 
stakeholders” and provides a “snapshot” of the mindset of corporate management 
(Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006, p115).  
The primary focus of this research is therefore not whether organisations should 
provide OHS disclosures per se, but rather what OHS disclosures are provided (if 
any) and whether they meet the needs of stakeholders. As revealed in Chapter 2, 
OHS disclosures may include a broad range of OHS performance information. This 
includes financial costs, lead indicators and lag indicators relating to OHS inputs, 
processes and outcomes. However, the lack of evidence about existing reporting 
practices means there has been little insight to date into the metrics and narratives 
provided in corporate disclosures or the extent to which they provide stakeholders 
with high quality (that is, valid, reliable, and comparable) accounts of the success of 
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OHS strategy in achieving its ultimate objective, namely the elimination of work-
related injury and disease (Stricoff 2000). 
Given the ability of institutional theory to examine organisational action within its 
wider social and political context, section 3.2 then used an institutional theory lens to 
draw predictions about the content of OHS disclosures offered by highly visible 
organisations operating in institutional fields in which OHS risks are common and 
substantial. This analysis considered the construct of an organisational field and the 
role of the field and its constituents in the development and diffusion of institutional 
templates for OHS disclosure. The following additional propositions developed: 
P 4: Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
share an institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
P 5: The GRI's sustainability reporting guidelines form the basis of the 
institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
P 6: Information provided in institutionalised templates of OHS disclosure will 
address the accountability demands of stakeholders. 
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3.4 Research model  
The following theoretical model draws together the various elements explored in Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis. It suggests that institutional pressures 
influence templates of OHS disclosure directly and also indirectly through their influence on processes for organising (that is, through their influence on OHS 
management strategy). To the extent that institutionalised templates promote public accountability for OHS, they are themselves likely to exert institutional 
pressures for particular modes of organising. This model is presented below. 
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Chapter 4. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND METHODS 
I am ... struck by the realization (actually, confirmation of a suspicion) that in 
management accounting (perhaps all accounting), we are parasites, in terms 
of research methods. Experimental research methods are the ‘property’ of 
the psychologists, survey methods of the sociologists, and case methods 
(while it is less clear) are owned variously by cultural anthropologists, 
ethnicists and political scientists. For this we should not apologise. In fact, we 
should be thankful that we can concentrate our limited resources on the 
exploitation of these methods for purposes of shaking loose answers to 
important research questions (Brownell 1994, p2). 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research design chosen to examine stakeholder demand for 
and corporate supply of OHS performance information. Chapters 1 to 3 of this thesis 
outlined the relevant literature and provided a theoretical framework within which to 
examine the various propositions and exploratory research questions. This chapter 
provides the methodological justification for the adoption of a ‘mixed model’ research 
design59 and outlines the methods by which data is collected and analysed.  
The chapter commences by providing a justification for the use of a mixed method 
approach to data collection and a general overview of sampling technique before 
outlining the research design. An overview of the three methods of data collection is 
then presented. In doing so, a review of the rationale for the choice of method, and 
explanation of the sampling procedure, data collection, coding system and analysis is 
presented for each method. Finally, the limitations of the research methods are 
recognised and a summary of the chapter is presented.  
4.2 Research Methodology 
4.2.1 Ontological and epistemological foundations 
Ryan et al. (2002) identified the 1970s as a period of “rapid growth and development in 
accounting research” (p34) although debate surrounding methodological choices in 
accounting research had already surfaced. Following a review of accounting research 
conducted between 1960 and 1970, Dopuch and Revsine (1971) reflected: 
… we note a tendency for researchers in accounting to specialise in one area of 
methodology at the expense of others. The very fact that accounting research can 
be classified by research methodologies is an unfortunate development (p. v). 
                                                 
59 See, Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998). 
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What may have been described as an ‘unfortunate development’ at that time has over 
the past three decades led to the considerable debate which has been described as a 
war raging in the social sciences (Creswell 1994, 2007; Datta 1994; Gage 1989; Rossi 
1994), as scholars jostled over the perceived “superiority of one or other of the two 
major social science paradigms” (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, p3). The dominance of 
particular paradigms in accounting research has shifted through the years. For 
example, Hakansson (1971) noted that, despite the historical concern of accounting 
researchers with “both description and prescription … past and present research has 
clearly emphasised the normative aspects” (p141). In contrast, more recent 
examinations point to a “supremacy” of the “empiricist tradition” with accounting and 
finance research “largely dominated” by quantitative and positivistic studies (Abdel-
khalik and Ajinkya 1979; Bonner et al. 2006; Lowe and Locke 2005; Ryan et al. 2002, p8). 
Interestingly, (Ryan et al. 2002) also observed that, in spite of the dominance of positive 
research, “alternative methodologies now [or perhaps again?] command a significant 
literature” (p9).  
This phenomenon concerned Dopuch and Revsine (1971) who noted instances in 
which researchers specialising in a particular research methodology “tend to belittle, or 
to rank of lower quality” those adopting alternative research paradigm (p.v.), a view 
supported by the appearance of statements such as “Good research uses the scientific 
method” (Cooper and Emory 1995, p40) in research reference material. Such an 
approach to research methodology ignores the fundamental principle that 
methodological choice is inherently dependent on philosophical beliefs about the 
nature of the particular research problem (McMurray et al. 2004; Tomkins and Groves 
1983). This is succinctly illustrated in the following quotation: 
The assumptions which the researcher holds regarding the nature of the 
phenomenon’s reality (ontology), will affect the way in which knowledge can 
be gained about the phenomenon (epistemology), and this in turn affects the 
process through which research can be conducted (methodology). 
Consequently, the selection of an appropriate methodology cannot be done 
in isolation of a consideration of the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions which underpin the research in question (Ryan et al. 2002, 
p35). 
The choice of research methodology therefore hinges on a researcher’s ontological 
assumptions, their fundamental beliefs about what is ‘real’ (ontology) and the way they 
conceptualise valid knowledge or ‘truth’ (epistemology). At the two ends of the 
ontological perspectives are realism, which views reality as subsumed within objects 
and independent of individual perceptions; and idealism, which views reality as 
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subjective, socially constructed and existing in the mind of the subject (Ryan et al. 2002, 
p13). Morgan and Smircich (1980), however, describe ontological assumptions not as a 
dichotomy but as a continuum, as depicted in Figure 4-1. 
Realist 
Reality is 
objective 
 Idealist 
Reality is      
subjective  
 
Reality as a 
concrete 
structure 
Reality as a 
concrete 
process 
Reality as a 
contextual 
field of 
information 
Reality as a 
realm of 
symbolic 
discourse 
Reality as a 
social 
construction 
Reality as a 
projection of 
human 
imagination 
Figure 4-1: Continuum of ontological assumptions 
(Adapted from Morgan and Smircich 1980) 
These ontological assumptions have implications for the selection of research 
methodology because perceptions of reality relate to the way in which knowledge or 
truth is understood. For example, where a researcher perceives the reality of an issue 
at question to be objective, it follows that knowledge about the issue is expected to be 
observable through empirical measurement (McMurray et al. 2004). This lends itself to 
quantitative research adopting inductive and / or deductive processes associated with 
the observation and manipulation of empirical data. These quantitative processes often 
employ the scientific method of inquiry (see Section 4.3.2 below).  
In contrast, where reality is perceived as subjective or “multiple” (Creswell 2007, p17), 
knowledge is perceived as interpreted, socially constructed and requiring researchers 
to “lessen the distance between the researcher and the focus of research” (p16). This 
lends itself to inductive rather than deductive approaches (McMurray et al. 2004), 
employing qualitative methods of inquiry such as phenomenology, ethnographic 
studies, grounded research, feminist research, case studies and narrative interrogation 
(Creswell 2007; Grbich 2007).  
4.2.2 Inductive versus deductive reasoning  
Research founded on inductive reasoning seeks to construct explanations and 
theories to explain phenomenon that have been observed ‘in the real world’. The 
product of induction is a theory, or rather a hypothesis or tentative conclusion (Cooper 
and Emory 1995; McMurray et al. 2004), resulting from an “inferential jump beyond the 
evidence presented” (Cooper and Emory 1995, p27). An inductive approach is described 
by McMurray et al. (2004) as “the only sensible manner of proceeding” when little is 
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known about the phenomenon under examination (p70). The sequence of events 
involved in inductive reasoning are summarised as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-2: The process of inductive reasoning 
 
While the probability of these tentative conclusions may be enhanced by accumulating 
additional corroborating evidence (Abercrombie et al. 1994; McMurray et al. 2004), 
induction is unable to provide a truly valid theory because there remains the possibility 
of alternative explanations (Abercrombie et al. 1994; Cooper and Emory 1995). Arguments 
based on inductive logic are therefore not open to empirical testing in the same 
manner as those founded on deductive logic. 
 
Research methods based on deductive reasoning, in contrast, begin with theories, 
using them to form a logical structure (premises) to support an argument (the 
hypothesis). Once deductively developed, the hypothesis is then tested through 
empirical observation which seeks to identify corroborating (or conflicting) evidence 
that leads to its support (or rejection) (Cooper and Emory 1995; Gill and Johnson 1997; 
McMurray et al. 2004). For a deduction to be valid, it must be impossible for the 
conclusion to be false when the premises are true AND the underpinning premises 
must be true (Cooper and Emory 1995). The steps involved in deductive reasoning are:  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4-3: The process of (hypothetico-) deductive reasoning 
This process of developing a hypothesis through deductive reasoning and then testing 
that hypothesis empirically is known as a hypothetico-deductive approach. It is a key 
characteristic of the ‘scientific method’, a research method which seeks to “bring social 
science research more in line with that of the physical sciences” by providing a 
systematic structure for empirical (statistical), hypothetico-deductive enquiry (McMurray 
et al. 2004, p71).   
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4.2.3 Classifying accounting research 
The preceding sections have demonstrated how a research paradigm is determined by 
the purpose of the study and by the ontological and epistemological assumptions 
inherent in the underlying research problem. Also illustrated were the influence of 
approaches to reasoning and the role of theory in shaping methodological choices. 
These paradigms are summarised in Table 4-1. 
 
Methodology Nomothetic  Ideographic 
Type of research Quantitative methods Qualitative methods 
 Empirical Positive Interpretive / naturalistic 
Ontology Realistic Realistic Idealistic 
Epistemology Objective Objective Subjective  
  = view of the world External and objective External and objective Socially constructed 
Purpose of study Descriptive or predictive Exploratory or explanatory Exploratory or explanatory 
Approach to reasoning  Deductive or inductive Deductive Inductive 
Role of theory Test hypotheses  Generate hypothesis  Generate understanding 
Type of data Quantitative  Qualitative  Qualitative 
Type of generalisation Statistical  Statistical  Theoretical 
Table 4-1: Factors influencing methodological choice in accounting research 
(Adapted from Ryan et al [2002]; McMurray et al. [2004]; and Burrell and Morgan [1979]). 
 
4.2.4 Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods 
The various research methods for gathering data, as identified in the table above, may 
involve primary data collection, such as surveys (interviews or questionnaires), 
observation, experimental techniques, ethnography and case studies, or may employ 
secondary data sources such as database searches and document analysis. Most of 
these methods may be used in either quantitative or qualitative studies although a 
clear distinction lies in the way each collates and analyses data.  
These differences have stirred a ‘historical antagonism’ between those advocating the 
positivist methodology and those advocating the constructivist methodology (McMurray 
et al. 2004). This has, in turn, hampered recognition of both the strengths and 
weaknesses inherent in each approach, and also of the benefits of employing 
techniques from both approaches within a single study (McMurray et al. 2004, p260; 
Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998). Proponents suggest that although multi-method studies 
require additional time and effort to conduct, they increase accuracy by reducing bias 
and eliciting detailed information about a broader range of questions, and potentially 
bridge the gap between the quantitative tendency toward macro-level and qualitative 
tendency toward micro-level investigations (McMurray et al. 2004, pp261-2). 
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Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) provide the following taxonomy of methodological 
approaches underpinning the use of multiple research methods in a single study.  
• Monomethod studies: Where all research methods employed in a study hail 
from either a quantitative or a qualitative approach. 
• Mixed method studies: Where qualitative and quantitative methods are 
combined in a study in one of the following five ways:  
o Sequential studies – a qualitative (or quantitative) phase of the study 
is conducted first then a quantitative (or qualitative). The two phases are 
separate. 
o Parallel / simultaneous studies – separate quantitative and qualitative 
phases are conducted at the same time. 
o Equivalent status studies – the researcher employs equal use of the 
qualitative / quantitative approaches to understand a particular 
phenomenon. 
o Dominant /  less dominant – the study is conducted from a single 
approach with a “small component of the overall study drawn from an 
alternate design” (Creswell 1994, p177). 
o Designs with multilevel use of approaches – different methods are 
used according to different levels of data aggregation. 
• Mixed model studies (or mixed methodology): Where qualitative and 
quantitative methods are combined within the different phases of a research 
process. For example, data collection, including both closed (numerical 
response) questions and open (narrative) responses, or research design 
integrating a field experiment with ethnographic interviews. 
(Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998, pp21-23) 
The mixed model design is therefore the most complex, requiring multiple techniques 
and approaches across each stage of the research. Nevertheless, proponents argue: 
Through its capacity to answer research questions in more depth [mixed 
model] studies generate richer data that may be applied to more robust theory 
building, hypothesis testing, and generalising. In a formal sense, the use of 
multi-methods enhances the validity of research by establishing linkages in the 
form of bridges between the two methods which facilitates the synergy 
between techniques … this may also be referred to as inter-triangulation 
(McMurray et al. 2004, p262). 
The following section outlines the design of this study and justifies the selection of a 
mixed-model approach to data collection and analysis. 
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4.3 Research Design  
The research questions posed in Chapter 3 assume an ontological position that is 
neither completely ‘realistic’ nor completely ‘idealistic’ but at the same time demands 
consideration of both positions. For example, an examination of the reporting practices 
of corporations can capture the objective realties of the number of firms reporting OHS 
information or the number of fatalities disclosed, as well as the subjective assessment 
of the quality of that content. Consequently, the following sections provide a 
justification for a mixed model approach as they present the research objectives and 
the methods that are employed.  
4.3.1 Research objectives 
Stakeholder theory (of the ethical variety) suggests that organisations have an ethical 
duty to account to those stakeholders affected, or potentially affected, by the 
consequences of organisational decisions such as OHS risk management. To this end, 
researchers have long recognised the inclusion of OHS information in corporate 
annual reports, and more recently in sustainability reports and on organisational 
websites. Despite this, prior research has provided little empirical evidence of the 
extent to which these disclosures provide a valid, relevant, comparable and reliable 
account of corporate OHS activity and performance or the degree to which they 
address stakeholder demand for OHS information. This thesis, therefore, seeks to 
examine the content of OHS disclosures, and in doing so provide insight into 
stakeholder demand for OHS accountability (if any) and the content and quality of 
institutionalised patterns of OHS disclosure (if any). 
As identified in Chapter 1, the first objective of this research is to describe stakeholder 
demand for corporate OHS accountability. This requires the development and 
administration of a survey instrument to gather evidence about stakeholder attitudes to 
OHS, perceptions as to their rights to OHS information and expectations as to the 
content and quality of OHS disclosures. The second objective of this study is to 
describe and explain the substance (content and quality) of contemporary OHS 
disclosures. As identified in Chapter 2, considerable change has taken place in both 
CSD practice and OHS regulation over the past decade; this research uses content 
analysis to examine the OHS information presented in a sample of corporate annual 
and sustainability reports issued over this period.  
The third objective of this study is to reconcile evidence of stakeholder demand for, 
and corporate supply of, OHS information. In doing so, this research provides a holistic 
examination of the quality of OHS disclosures and builds a bridge between the OHS, 
CSR and accounting literatures. This review seeks to identify the extent to which OHS 
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disclosures meet, or possibly exceed stakeholder demand and / or to identify any 
stakeholder expectation gaps that are apparent. The results are then used to prepare 
a framework that might assist those preparing OHS disclosures and in particular to 
provide guidance regarding any expectation gaps that may be identified. 
4.3.2 Research methods and model 
The propositions and research question identified in Chapter 3 were framed by the 
research objectives identified above and serve to guide the design of the study and 
selection of research methods. For example, the first two propositions60 and the 
research question61 are exploratory and seek to examine stakeholders’ attitudes and 
expectations with regard to OHS accountability. To reflect the views of a wide range of 
stakeholder groups this required direct input from multiple stakeholders. Consequently, 
a survey method was identified as the most appropriate method of inquiry. 
In contrast, propositions three to five62 sought to test whether theoretically driven 
assumptions about the incidence and content of contemporary corporate OHS 
disclosure could be supported. Testing these propositions requires a detailed analysis 
of current corporate disclosures to be performed. Content analysis has formed the 
basis for much of the prior research into CSDs (Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006). This 
research method is known for its ability to facilitate the capture and organising of 
diverse empirical data (Guthrie et al. 2004) and suitability for tasks such as describing 
trends in communication content, auditing content against standards and comparing 
media or levels of communication (Weber 1990, p9).  Content analysis was therefore 
selected as the most appropriate method to examine the quality of OHS disclosures 
presented in annual and sustainability reports.  
Proposition six63 sought to reconcile evidence of stakeholder demand and corporate 
supply of corporate OHS information. Through a detailed analysis and comparison of 
the results of phases one and two, phase three of this study seeks to identify the 
extent to which disclosures meet stakeholder demands for information. In doing so, it 
seeks to identify examples of best practice and any expectation gaps that might exist 
to enable the construction of a framework to guide corporate OHS reporting.  
                                                 
60 P 1: Stakeholders believe organisations should be accountable for OHS.   
   P 2: Stakeholders believe a duty to account for OHS should be discharged through the periodic public 
disclosure of OHS information.  
61 RQ 1: What information should OHS disclosures contain?  
62  P 3: Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will seek to ensure continued 
legitimacy by providing OHS information to stakeholders.  
   P 4: Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will share an institutionalised 
template for OHS disclosure. 
   P 5: The GRI's sustainability reporting guidelines form the basis of the institutionalised template for OHS 
disclosure. 
63 P 6: Information provided in institutionalised templates of OHS disclosure will address the accountability 
demands of stakeholders.  
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The model shown in Figure 4.4 presents the research design. This model elaborates 
on the four basic research objectives, illustrating the steps required to meet each one 
and the research methods by which each phase of the investigation is conducted. 
 
Figure 4-4: Research design – objectives and methods 
4.4 Conduct of the research 
4.4.1 Stage 1 – Stakeholder survey 
Of the two methods of communication used to gather primary data, namely 
observation and survey, the survey method is widely recognised as more economical, 
efficient and versatile (Cooper and Emory 1995). Surveys administered via 
questionnaires require careful construction and pilot testing to prevent problems such 
as bias and ambiguity and to ensure adequate coverage of the intended phenomenon 
of interest (Cavana et al. 2001). Their inherent weakness is that “the quality of 
information secured often depends heavily on the ability and willingness of 
respondents to cooperate” (Cooper and Emory 1995, p269). The following sections 
1b. Examine stakeholder demand 
for OHS information  
Research type: exploratory 
Research method: survey questionnaire 
Data: qualitative and quantitative 
2b. Examine corporate supply         
of OHS information  
Research type: descriptive / explanatory 
Research method: content analysis 
Data: qualitative and quantitative 
1a. Develop a   
survey instrument 
2a. Develop a 
disclosure index 
All research phases informed by: 
Accounting (measurement) and sustainability reporting literature and  
OHS management and OHS performance evaluation literature 
4. Develop an OHS  
rating scale to 
evaluate disclosures 
3. Reconcile evidence 
of supply and demand 
4. Develop final 
recommendations
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describe the process by which the survey was designed, the sample selected, the 
survey administered and the results analysed. 
4.4.1.1 Survey design 
As noted in Chapters 1 to 3, prior research has identified various stakeholder groups 
including employees, NGOs, trade unions, regulators, shareholders, managers and 
academics as important stakeholders in corporate OHS (Deegan and Rankin 1999; 
Epstein 2008; Hopkins 2005b; Johnstone 2003b; Stricoff 2000) and confirmed that they 
perceive publicly available OHS disclosures as important (see for example Deegan and 
Rankin 1997; Epstein 2008). However, research is yet to examine OHS disclosure in 
sufficient detail to provide an understanding of the particular content and quality of 
OHS information to which they refer. This is important given the concerns raised in 
prior CSR research regarding a lack of consistency, comparability and completeness 
in voluntary CSR disclosures and the general failure to consider issues of content 
relevance to users. Furthermore, the literature outlined in Chapter 2 has detailed the 
wide range of OHS activity and performance issues from which OHS disclosures could 
potentially be drawn. 
The primary objective of the survey was therefore to explore in some detail the 
attitudes to corporate OHS reporting held by those stakeholder groups identified in the 
preceding paragraph. In particular, this sought to identify which OHS issues 
stakeholders thought ought to be addressed in corporate disclosures (content), how 
stakeholders want OHS information presented, why stakeholders thought OHS 
information was important (motivation) and where OHS information should be provided 
(media). The survey was therefore designed to address each of these key questions. 
Additional descriptive information about each respondent was also sought to assist 
with classification and data analysis.  
Question construction was predominantly multiple choice with each question including 
a ‘don’t know / undecided’ response rather than requiring a forced choice. Recognising 
the difficulty in presenting an exhaustive list of all likely responses within a multiple 
choice question (Cooper and Emory 1995), text boxes were also provided with each 
question to provide respondents an opportunity to offer additional comment or 
responses or provide further explanation regarding their choice. A copy of the survey 
instrument is provided in Appendix 3. 
4.4.1.2 Variable selection 
This survey first sought to elicit information relating to respondent characteristics such 
as stakeholder group, industry and experience so as to gain an understanding of each 
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respondent’s potential exposure to OHS issues. Questions exploring OHS philosophy 
and perceptions of OHS impact were also provided to gauge each respondent’s 
attitude to workplace health and safety. This allowed testing of whether OHS 
knowledge and experience corresponded with attitudes to corporate OHS disclosure.  
The selection of variables (or questions) to elicit target data64 was guided by the 
literature presented in Chapter 2. Table 4-2 provides a summary of the section within 
the literature review that provides justification for the construction of each question 
included in the survey. 
Q. Central issue or theme Justification for inclusion 
Respondent characteristics 
1 Respondent experience and gender Explained in the paragraph above 
2 Respondent attitude to OHS practice Chs. 2.2.2,  2.3.2.3 
Attitudes to the provision of OHS disclosures 
3 Motivation for disclosure Ch 2.3.2.3 
4 Presentation (characteristics) of OHS information Chs. 2.3.1,  2.3.2 
5 Provision (disclosure media) for OHS information Ch. 2.3.2.3 
Attitudes to the content of OHS disclosures 
6 Financial information Chs. 2.1.4.1,  2.2.1.1,  2.3.1.2,  2.3.2 
7 Non-financial information: outcome KPIs Chs. 2.1.4.2,  2.2.1.2,  2.3.1.2,  2.3.2 
8 Non-financial information: process KPIs Chs. 2.2.1.3,  2.2.3,  2.3.1.2,  2.3.2 
9 Narratives: explanatory information Chs. 2.2.1,  2.2.3,  2.3.1.2,  2.3.2 
Table 4-2: Justification for survey questions 
The draft survey instrument underwent two rounds of pilot testing, the first with an 
academic who had considerable knowledge of accounting, corporate reporting and 
survey design and the second with a different yet highly qualified accounting academic 
and one OHS professional. The instrument was revised after each round. The first 
required modification to the presentation of some questions (changing from drop down 
menu boxes to options presented across a single line) and the second, minor 
clarification of the wording in two questions.  
4.4.1.3 Sample selection 
Participants targeted in the survey sample were members of those stakeholder groups 
most likely to have an interest in corporate OHS reporting issues. These included 
employees, trade unions, OHS regulators, OHS managers, OHS consultants, 
                                                 
64 Target data are the facts, attitudes, preferences and expectations central to the topic (Cooper and Emory 
1995, p302). 
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shareholders and academics. The selection of the final sample from the population of 
these stakeholder groups was made using judgemental sampling, a subset of 
purposive sampling (Cooper and Emory 1995), in which “sample members are chosen 
on the basis of the researcher’s judgement as to what constitutes a representative 
sample” (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 2000, p14). In two instances, those of trade 
unions and regulators, some multiplicity sampling65 was also employed whereby a 
small number of participants identified through judgement sampling subsequently 
identified “others with the same characteristics” leading to a final sample comprising 
both targeted participants and referrals (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 2000, p15). As 
these sampling techniques are non-probability sampling methods involving non-
random choices by the researcher (and others) the ability to generalise the final results 
to another setting with different stakeholders may be reduced (Cooper and Emory 1995; 
Krippendorff 2004).  
A summary of the stakeholders targeted for this study is provided in Table 4-3. 
Research participants for the survey were recruited as follows: 
• Most participants were recruited at an annual Australian conference of OHS 
professionals. An announcement was made at the conference inviting 
(approximately 150) conference delegates to participate in the survey, 
providing an overview of the study and instructing interested persons to supply 
a business card or contact details to the researcher. Contact details were 
received from 42 OHS managers66, 12 OHS consultants, four OHS regulators 
and 11 OHS advisors, and seven ‘other’ delegates (one lawyer, one purchasing 
officer, one engineer, one research technologist, one geologist, one project 
officer and one military officer). A link to the survey website and a project 
information sheet was then emailed to each of the 76 delegates who had 
expressed an interest in participating in the study. One of the regulators was a 
senior manager who agreed to participate in the study and to forward the link 
and survey details to five or six staff in his OHS team.  
• Twelve trade union officials were identified from a state Union body’s 
(executive) directory. These represented various unions covering a broad 
range of industries. One official provided contact details for five other staff in his 
organisation. All 17 officials were then contacted by telephone and invited to 
participate in the survey. Each agreed to participate and was emailed a link to 
the survey website and a project information sheet. Four responded by email 
                                                 
65 Multiplicity sampling is also known as snowball sampling (Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 2000). 
66 Although OHS managers are also providers of corporate OHS information, the survey questionnaire 
asked them to respond as users of OHS information. Many of the written comments confirmed that 
managers were identifying as users and commenting about what information they wanted other firms to 
provide to them. 
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offering to forward the survey details to colleagues within their respective 
organisations. The number of additional recipients of the survey link is 
unknown. 
• An OHS trainer was also contacted and agreed to distribute a copy of the link 
and a project information sheet to various (non-expert) employees participating 
in a training seminar. Twelve of the 15 participants in the seminar expressed an 
interest in participating and took a copy of the information sheet. 
• Nine shareholders, five academics, three OHS consultants, three employees 
(one each from healthcare, transport and forestry industries) and two small 
business owners, each known to the researcher, were also contacted by 
telephone and invited to participate in the study. Each agreed and was emailed 
a link to the survey website and a project information sheet.  
A summary of the expressions of interest received (and therefore survey details sent) 
is provided in Table 4-3.  
Stakeholder group Surveys sent 
OHS managers 42 
OHS consultants 15 
OHS regulators 4 
Trade union officials 17 
Employees  26 
Employee –  other  9  
Shareholders 9 
Academics 5 
Total surveys distributed   =   127 
Table 4-3: Stakeholder survey sample 
Details of the responses received and the final sample are presented in Chapter 5.  
4.4.1.4 Survey administration  
The survey was created and administered using the online survey provider, 
SurveyMonkey.com. This allowed for email distribution of the survey link, online entry 
of survey responses and web-based, real-time survey collection. Restrictions were 
placed on the collector facility to ensure the identity of respondents was not reported 
with the results and to avoid bias in the results by preventing any respondent from 
completing the survey more than once.  
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Owing to the assurance of anonymity, there was no means of identifying which of 
these potential respondents completed the survey and which failed to do so. As a 
result of the high overall response rate (see Chapter 5: Survey Results for details) and 
inability to single out non-responders, it was decided not to send follow up emails. The 
survey website remained accessible (active) for a period of five weeks.  
4.4.1.5 Data analysis  
At the conclusion of the survey period the responses were downloaded from 
SurveyMonkey into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet. The data were then analysed and 
described. As the majority of data was of an ordinal scale of measurement descriptive 
statistics and non-parametric tests, such as chi squared and t tests, were employed 
(Diamantopoulos and Schlegelmilch 2000). 
4.4.2 Stage 2 – Content analysis  
Content analysis is a research method that uses a set of procedures to make 
replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful matter) to the 
contexts of their use (Krippendorff 2004, p18).  
 
Unlike other content analysis definitions, such as Berelson’s (1952) “content analysis is 
a research technique for the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the 
manifest content of communication” (p18), Krippendorf (2004) does not impose a purely 
quantitative methodology on the process of content analysis. Instead he, like Holsti 
(1969) recognises the indispensable benefits of eliciting both qualitative and 
quantitative data from texts.  Nevertheless, Krippendorf (2004) observes that:  
Proponents of quantification … have been rightly criticised for restricting content 
analysis to numerical counting exercises … and for uncritically buying into the 
measurement theories of the natural sciences. Proponents of qualitative 
approaches … have been criticised for being unsystematic in their uses of texts 
and impressionistic in their interpretations (p87). 
 
The process of content analysis, therefore, requires considerable attention to the 
design phase so as to ensure reliability and validity of the results. Holsti (1969) 
observes content analysis studies must therefore possess five important 
characteristics necessary for scientific enquiry: objectivity, systematic inquiry, 
generality, quantitative data and manifest content. The objectives of each of these 
criteria and the requirements they impose on the design of a content analysis study 
are summarised in Table 4-4 on the following page.  
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 Characteristic Aim Requires 
Objectivity  Coding must be conducted using 
explicitly formulated rules and 
procedures to minimise subjective 
judgements on the part of the coder. 
Categories of classification to be 
clearly and operationally defined. 
Systematic  Coders must ensure content or 
categories are included or excluded 
according to a set of consistently 
applied rules. 
Application of instruments such as 
disclosure indices to ensure 
systematic capture of recording 
units.  
Generality  The findings must have theoretical 
relevance. 
Theoretical justification for the choice 
of disclosure index categories. 
Quantitative Provide quantitative data for statistical 
techniques – e.g. summarising 
findings and improving interpretation 
and inference quality. 
Coding methods to provide clear 
instructions for reducing text to a 
quantitative form (where relevant). 
Manifest The content analysis must be limited 
to manifest content – reading 
between the lines must be reserved 
for the interpretation stage. 
Categories of classification to be 
clearly and operationally defined and 
coders trained to ensure 
consistency. 
Table 4-4: Characteristics of scientific enquiry 
(Adapted from Holsti [1969]) 
The following sections describe the content analytic research process adopted in this 
study, the selection of the sample, development of a disclosure index, including design 
and definition of the coding instrument, and the processes of training, pre-testing and 
coding of the data. In doing so, these sections describe how each of Holsti’s (1969) five 
key characteristics were operationalised to address issues of reliability and validity.  
4.4.2.1 Research context 
Prior studies of CSD indicate that organisational factors such as industry and company 
size influence the level of voluntary disclosure (Belkaoui and Karpik 1989; Brockhoff 1979; 
Cowen et al. 1987; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996; Freedman and Jaggi 
1988; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Hoffman 1997; Roberts 1992; Trotman and Bradley 1981). 
The majority of this research has focused on environmental disclosures and identified 
large firms in those industries perceived to have poor environmental performance, that 
is, firms that are perceived to be highly polluting (Hoffman 1997), as most likely to 
produce environmental disclosures. Given OHS is another category of corporate social 
performance, it follows that those firms most likely to provide OHS disclosures will be 
large organisations operating in industries perceived to have poor OHS performance.  
One industry with a record of historically poor OHS performance is the resource 
sector. The mining industry in particular “remains the most hazardous occupation” with 
a global workforce of approximately 0.4% of the world’s population suffering over 3% 
of total workplace fatalities (ILO 2008c, p1). In Australia this industry represents 1% of 
the national workforce yet accounts for 2% of all compensated workers’ compensation 
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claims (ASCC 2005b). In the 1996/97 year, the mining industry sustained the highest 
rate of compensated workplace illness and injury of any industry in Australia with 48.3 
new workers’ compensation claims per 1000 employees. This was over double the 
national average of 22.5 claims per 1000 employees. The number of workplace 
fatalities has also been significantly overrepresented with fatalities of up to 24 
employees per year (ASCC 2006).  
Responding to this situation, OHS management programs initiated by the mining 
industry saw a reduction in annual fatalities from 24 in 1997/98 to four by 2003/04 
(equating to five fatalities per 100,000 employees) but then a return to 12 fatalities in 
the 2005/06 year (almost four times the national average). New workers’ 
compensation claims have halved since 1997, from 48.3 to 24 claims per 1000 
employees, although still remain 50% higher than the current national average of 16 
per 1000 employees (ASCC 2005a). At the same time, studies reveal that companies in 
the mining sector are demonstrating a high rate of CSD (Guenther et al. 2006).  Given 
the OHS risk profile of this industry, its recent attention to OHS strategy by 
management, tendency to be subject to stakeholder scrutiny and to engage in CSD, 
Australian resource (mining and energy) companies were identified as appropriate 
targets on which to focus this study. 
4.4.2.2 Sample selection 
Research has concluded that large organisations are prime targets for stakeholder 
scrutiny as their activities are more easily monitored by a variety of stakeholder 
groups (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Lim and McKinnon 1993; Nobes and Parker 1991), 
meaning that stakeholders are more likely to notice when large organisations fail to 
meet their societal obligations. Large organisations consequently behave more 
responsibly, have access to greater discretionary resources to support voluntary 
disclosure activities (Oystein 1999; Waddock and Graves 1997) and are more likely to 
provide CSDs (Adams et al. 1998; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Patten 1991). Extending this 
logic to the present study suggests that larger firms operating in high safety risk 
industries will be more likely to provide OHS information than smaller firms.  
The sample selection for this study was therefore biased toward large firms operating 
in the resource industry67. Companies were chosen for examination using a stratified 
sampling technique (Krippendorff 2004) to identify all mining and energy companies 
listed in the ASX100 as at 31 December 2007. The ASX100 is an index that identifies 
the largest 100 public companies (by market capitalisation) listed on the Australian 
                                                 
67 It is acknowledged that limiting the selection to large resource firms may limit the generalisability of the 
final results to other groups of reporting entities. 
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stock exchange. The resultant sample comprised 15 publicly listed mining and energy 
companies, as identified in Table 4-5 and described further in Chapter 7. 
Company ASX code 
Alumina Limited AWC 
BHP Billiton Limited* BHP 
Iluka Resources Limited ILU 
Lihir Gold Limited LGL 
Newcrest Mining Limited NCM 
Onesteel Limited  OST 
Oxiana Limited OXR 
Rinker Group Limited  RIN 
Rio Tinto Limited RIO 
Zinifex Limited  ZFX 
Sub-total (mining)  10  
Origin Energy Limited ORG 
Oil Search Limited OSH 
Santos Limited STO 
Worleyparsons Limited WOR 
Woodside Petroleum Limited WPL 
Sub-total (energy)  5  
Total    15 
Table 4-5: Companies targeted for disclosure analysis  
* Examined BHP 1997-2000 and BHP Billiton Limited 2001-2007. 
4.4.2.3 Research scope 
The CSD literature produced from the 1980s to early 2000s has generally focused on 
analyses of CSR disclosures presented in annual reports (Guthrie and Abeysekera 2006) 
however, different reporting mediums have been shown to reach different stakeholder 
groups (Isenmann and Lenz 2001; Unerman 2000; Wheeler and Elkington 2001; Zeghal and 
Ahmed 1990). Supplementary sustainability reports (including, for the purposes of this 
study, those labelled: Environmental, CSR or EHS reports), have steadily gained 
popularity and importance since the early 1990s as a medium for communicating 
social and environmental information to stakeholders (see Deegan et al. 2006; Deegan 
and Gordon 1996; Guthrie and Parker 1989). Consequently, there is increasing recognition 
that the medium of the annual report may no longer capture all available SEA 
disclosures (Unerman 2000; Unerman and Bennett 2004; Zeghal and Ahmed 1990). 
Corporate annual reports, sustainability reports and websites are, therefore, each 
recognised as vehicles through which managers can provide an account of their 
organisation’s selection of OHS strategy, practices for OHS management and control, 
and subsequent injury and illness outcomes. Websites, however, are transient rather 
than a permanent record since content can be changed or deleted at any time by the 
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site’s author. Annual and sustainability reports, in contrast, are a record from a point in 
time. As such these documents form the primary focus of this study.  
To address propositions three to five, data was collected from corporate OHS 
disclosures provided in annual reports or sustainability reports (including CSR, EHS, 
etc.) issued by each company for the years 1997 to 2007. This particular reporting 
period was selected to observe the impact on OHS disclosures during a period in 
which three important changes in the institutional environment took place. First, and 
most importantly68, it captures the release of the draft GRI sustainability reporting 
guidelines in 1999 and revised versions in 2002 and 2006; second, the legislative 
moves to OHS self-regulation in the 1990s and mid-2000s and finally, the increasing 
search for new metrics for OHS performance evaluation by safety professionals in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s.  
Annual and sustainability reports were primarily obtained from the websites of the 
sample 15 organisations. Where target reports were not available on the corporate 
website, annual reports were obtained from the Connect 4 database69 and 
sustainability reports sought by written request to the organisation concerned. The final 
sample comprised a total of 137 annual reports and 50 sustainability reports. (Further 
details regarding the reports analysed are provided in Chapter 6.)  
4.4.2.4 Category generation  
Content analysis stands and falls by its categories (Berelson 1952, p147). 
Of primary concern in the design of a content analysis study is the “selection and 
definition of categories, the ‘pigeonholes’ into which content units are to be classified” 
(Holsti 1969, p95). The preparation of a coding instrument, also known as a disclosure 
index, is an essential step in ensuring the appropriate identification of categories and a 
systematic approach to data collection. This is achieved by first undertaking a 
thorough survey of the literature on the issue of study and identifying all major 
concepts on a coding sheet (Hodson 1999, p24). These concepts form the categories 
and elements that are the subject of the study and must be reviewed to ensure they 
are each relevant to the purposes of the research, exhaustive, mutually exclusive and 
independent (Holsti 1969). Category construction, therefore, requires consideration of 
both the “theoretical requirements of the problem at hand” and the identification of 
precise, clearly defined categories that allow for reliable coding (Holsti 1969, p67).  
                                                 
68 As outlined in Chapters 2 and 3, the GRI is likely to have been an important influence on disclosure 
patterns over time, particularly in view of the widespread support it has received from a wide range of 
institutions. 
69 Connect 4 is an electronic database of annual reports for the largest 500 organisations (by market 
capitalisation) listed on the Australian Stock Exchange. 
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The development of a disclosure index used to collect data for this stage of the 
research began by reviewing the work of Brown and Butcher (2005). In developing their 
index, Brown and Butcher used the UK Health and Safety Commission70 (HSC) 
Guidelines to define key categories and elements. They observed: 
The similar legislative frameworks between New Zealand and the 
United Kingdom meant the published HSC guidance for OHS reporting 
provided a good basis for comparison with New Zealand reporting 
(Brown and Butcher 2005, p8). 
This similarity also holds in the Australian context since both New Zealand and 
Australian OHS legislation has followed the UKs Robens-style lead71. In developing the 
coding instrument Brown and Butcher added “a limited number of OHS indicators … to 
provide specific supplementary information” (p8). These additional elements, such as 
specific metrics for reporting on injury, illness, sick leave and absenteeism72, were also 
relevant to the objectives of this research and so are retained in the disclosure index 
employed in the present study. 
To address research questions three and five it was necessary, however, to modify the 
instrument by including a number of additional elements. These related primarily to 
performance indicators introduced by the GRI and to indicators identified in prior CSR 
and OHS research. Details of the elements in the final disclosure index and the 
sources from which they were drawn are provided in Table 4-6.  
The results of the stakeholder survey also identified issues for further examination in 
the content analysis. In particular, stakeholders indicated a demand for lead and lag 
process indicators of OHS activities. They also sought the presentation of comparative 
(prior year) data, and held varying views on the presentation of injury outcome metrics. 
The disclosure index was updated so as to also capture these items. 
Finally, additional OHS disclosures became apparent during the coding process itself. 
These included disclosures in annual reports relating to the OHS oversight provided by 
Board of Director sub-committees and the disclosure of contingent OHS compensation 
liabilities. A number of firms also disclosed variance analyses between OHS injury 
outcomes and target levels or industry averages. These items were also incorporated 
into the disclosure index. Relevant disclosure definitions and classification rules are 
provided in Appendix 4 and a copy of the final disclosure index used to capture the 
data is provided in Appendix 5. 
                                                 
70 The Health and Safety Commission is the national regulatory body for OHS in the UK. 
71 A discussion of the Robens legislation is provided in Section 2.1.3.1 of this thesis. 
72 See Table 4-6 for further details. 
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Table 4-6: Sources used in developing the disclosure index 
  HSC UK 
(2000) 
Guidelines
Brown & 
Butcher 
(2005) 
Hackston & 
Milne (1996)
Vuontis-
jarva 
(2006) 
Safety 
literature 
(see Ch2) 
GRI 
(2000) 
GRI 
(2002) 
* = Core 
GRI 
(2006) 
* = Core 
GRI Mining 
Sector 
Supplement
Stakeholder 
survey 
(see Stage 1) 
Final 
Disclosure 
Index 
Principles             
Context (policy, responsibility) ? ? ? ? ?     ? ? 
Significant risks identified ? ?   ?     ? ? 
Goals and strategy ? ?  ?       ? 
Targets (specific) ? ?         ? 
Statement of legislative compliance   ?  ?     ? ? 
Processes (activities)            
HSE plans or progress  ? ?        ? ?+ 
 - Improving workplace ergonomics   ? ? ?     ? See +  
 - Improving hygiene at work   ? ? ?     ? See + 
 - Improving mgt of threats & violence    ? ?      See + 
Incident analysis    ? ? ?     ? ? 
Health and safety training ? ?  ? ?     ? ? 
Policies or programs re: serious disease       HIV * ? * HIV  ? 
OHS system audits (by third parties) ? ?  ? ?     ? ? 
OHS consultation with workers ? ?   ?  ? ? ? ? ? 
OHS topics in formal agreements       ? TU ? ? ? 
Process for OHS recording & notification     ?  ?*  ?  ? 
Compliance with ILO codes / guidelines HMS       ?  ?  ? 
Safety surveys    ?       ?^ 
OHS awards  ? ? ?       ? 
Providing healthcare services   ?        ? 
Total cost of OHS programs      ?(/ wkr)    ? ? 
Performance (outcomes)            
No. of fatalities ? ?   ?  ? * ? * ? (incl sc) ? ? 
No. of occupational injuries (total) ? ? ? ?  ? ? * ? * ? ? ? 
No. of occupational illnesses ?       ? *  ? ? 
 - Response (lost time) measures ? ?   ? ? ? * ? * ? ? ? 
 - Severity (impairment) measures     ?     ? ? 
      ** Detailed examination of metrics  ?   ?      ? 
Rates of absenteeism  ?    ? ? * ? * ?  ? 
Rates of sick leave  ?         ? 
Rates of voluntary staff turnover  ?         ? 
No. of dangerous occurrences ?    ?     ? ? 
No. of  enforcement notices ? ?   ?      ? 
No. of OHS convictions or cost of fines ? ?        ? ? 
Perception measures    ? ?      See ^ 
above 
Cost of injuries and illnesses ?    ?     ? ? 
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4.4.2.5 Data coding and analysis 
The coding of data in content analysis is a process of transforming unedited texts into 
“analysable representations” (Krippendorff 2004, p84). Weber (1990) describes this 
transformation as involving the application of measurement techniques to 
“semantically equivalent textual units such as words, word senses, phrases, issues, 
or themes” (p72). To achieve this, the analyst must make three interrelated choices: 
deciding what categories define the research problem (sampling units), what 
indicators of syntactic or thematic context are used to classify the content (recording 
units) and what system of measurement will be used (enumeration units) (Holsti 1969; 
Krippendorff 2004; Ogden and Clarke 2005). There is no single ‘correct’ answer, but 
rather each set of decisions should be appropriate to the relevant research problem.  
Within the accounting discipline, themes have emerged as the most commonly 
employed recording units by which to examine voluntary CSDs (Ogden and Clarke 
2005), with many studies seeking to identify the presence or absence of particular 
CSD themes, such as the GRI indicators (see Al-Tuwaijri et al. 2003; Bozzolan et al. 
2006; Frost et al. 2005; Gallego 2006; Pedrini 2007); or to quantify the presence of 
themes using enumeration units such as the number of words (Campbell 2004; 
Campbell et al. 2003; Cooke 1989; Deegan and Gordon 1996; Deegan and Rankin 1996; 
Frost 2007; Neu et al. 1998), number of sentences (Buhr 1998; Frost 2007; Guthrie et al. 
2008; see Hackston and Milne 1996; Holland and Foo 2003; Linsley and Shrives 
forthcoming; Milne and Adler 1999; Ogden and Clarke 2005; Tilt 2001; Tsang 1998) or 
number of pages – or some proportion thereof (Adams et al. 1995; Adams et al. 1998; 
Andrew et al. 1989; Cowen et al. 1987; Deegan and Rankin 1996; see Ernst and Ernst 1972-
1978; Gray et al. 1995a, b; Guthrie and Parker 1989; Guthrie and Parker 1990; Harte and 
Owen 1991; O'Dwyer and Gray 1998). These attempts to identify and quantify disclosure 
are grounded in the assumption that the amount of a disclosure signifies its 
importance (Deegan and Rankin 1996; Krippendorff 1980; Neu et al. 1998; Unerman 2000; 
Weber 1990). Measures of volume, therefore, allow the analyst to draw inferences as 
to perceptions of importance placed on the theme by the report preparer (Holsti 1969). 
However, this is not always the objective of accounting CSD research.  
Other studies have instead aimed to draw conclusions about the content itself, 
seeking to describe the content or evaluate the quality of disclosures within a 
framework of stakeholder accountability, organisational legitimacy or economic 
efficiency. These studies adopted alternative approaches to enumeration since 
evidence suggests disclosure quality and quantity are not necessarily synonymous 
(Wiseman 1982). Consequently, many researchers have sought to identify and 
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enumerate particular attributes (or indicators) of disclosure quality. To date, these 
have included: the location of a theme (or disclosure category) within a text (Guthrie 
and Parker 1990; Guthrie et al. 2004); its ‘transparency’ or completeness as 
demonstrated by the presence or absence of ‘good’ (positive) and ‘bad’ (negative) 
information (Beck 2007; Gray et al. 1995a; Hackston and Milne 1996); or its level of detail 
(Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu 2002; SustainAbility 2006; Webb et al. 2008); external 
comparability (Webb et al. 2008); or ‘evidence’ (auditability) in terms of the provision of 
quantitative/monetary, quantitative/non-monetary or qualitative (declarative/narrative) 
information (Aerts et al. 2006; Andrew et al. 1989; Gray et al. 1995a; Guthrie et al. 2008; 
Guthrie and Parker 1990; Guthrie et al. 2004; Hackston and Milne 1996).  
Furthermore, some analysts have sought to bring greater definition to the 
multifaceted construct of quality (Beck 2007; Brown and Butcher 2005; Morhardt 2001; 
Warsame et al. 2002) by examining multiple attributes within a single study. For 
example, Guthrie et al. (2004) and Guthrie and Parker (1990) examined both evidence 
and location, while Gray et. al. (1995a) examined evidence (accountability), 
transparency (news) and volume. Others sought to provide greater definition of 
‘evidence’ by means of rating scales that captured different levels of detail provided 
within a classification of evidence (see for example Cormier and Gordon 2001; Warsame 
et al. 2002; Wiseman 1982) or a combination of detail, evidence and transparency (see 
for example, Beck 2007).  
Nevertheless, Cormier et al (2005) suggest that the quality of a voluntary disclosure is 
determined by an organisation’s accountability to particular stakeholders. Within this 
context quality is defined as a function of “precision, relevance and usefulness” (p6). 
To this end, critics of the above rating scales have drawn attention to the subjectivity 
inherent in coding schemes that required arbitrary distinctions between, for example, 
‘general’, ‘specific’ and ‘detailed’ information and lack attention to the relevance of 
information captured within scoring systems (Cormier et al. 2005; Morhardt 2002).  
Offering an alternative scoring framework, Morhardt (2001), sought to bring greater 
rigour and objectivity to the process of scoring CSDs through the development of the 
Pacific Sustainability Index (PSI)73, a scoring template for rating a wide range of 
environmental and social issues within corporate disclosures (see Morhardt 2001; 
Morhardt 2002; Morhardt et al. 2002; Morhardt et al. 2006). This instrument sought to 
provide clear rules for rating disclosure quality and transparency independent of 
underlying corporate performance and has since been used by academics and 
                                                 
73 A copy of Morhardt’s PSI scoring sheet is provided in Appendix 7.  
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government agencies to evaluate CSDs (for example see Brown and Butcher 2005; 
Morhardt et al. 2006; NZ Dept Labour 2005). As Brown and Butcher (2005) observed, 
The PSI scale included clear and complete descriptions of categories and items 
along with comprehensive criteria and guidelines for scoring each item (p9). 
The present study 
The current PhD study seeks to evaluate OHS disclosure by describing and critiquing 
the content and looking for institutionalised templates, or patterns, of OHS reporting. 
Consequently, an examination of information quality, rather than quantity, was 
deemed appropriate. Building on prior research, disclosure quality was enumerated 
with reference to key indicators of theme, level of detail, transparency and evidence. 
These indicators were captured within a disclosure matrix (see Appendix 5). The 
detailed scoring rules and principles offered by the PSI provided a clear process for 
capturing the quality of the themes (disclosure categories) identified in section 4.4.2.4 
and thereby reduced the subjectivity of the coding process74.  
The modified PSI rating scale 
By rating the quality and depth of the information provided, apart from its mere 
inclusion, Brown and Butcher (2005) observed that the PSI can address the concerns 
of Milne et al. (2003) regarding scoring systems that obscure the distinction between 
firms providing vague disclosures on a number of topics and those providing detailed 
disclosures on a few issues. However, as noted by Brown and Butcher (2005), some 
modification to the PSI’s coding protocol was required because, in its original form 
(see Appendix 7), the PSI is designed to cover a broad range of topics and is not 
sufficiently detailed to pay attention to the various OHS categories under 
examination.  
The modified coding instructions used to examine the OHS disclosures for the 
purposes of this study are identified in Table 4-7. Shown in red italics are the 
amendments and clarifications made by this author to the original PSI scoring rules 
for Social Intent, Social Reporting and Social Performance (as flagged in Appendix 
7). These amendments were based primarily on a need to ensure rating criteria were 
appropriate for an OHS context. The justification for each modification made to the 
original PSI scoring protocol is as follows: 
                                                 
74 This study adopted the scoring rules rather than the full instrument since, as identified by Brown and 
Butcher (2005), the breadth of topics covered by the PSI failed to provide sufficiently detailed attention 
to categories of OHS. 
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Changes: 
1. Owing to the detailed and specific topic area under study, external 
recognition (through receipt of awards) is not relevant (available) for all 
categories of OHS identified in this section. Consequently, internal 
recognition of improvement or excellence, such as reporting of quantitative 
outcomes that demonstrates evidence of improvement is also captured. 
2. The original PSI item, which stated “+ 1 point if there is a discussion on the 
benefits or advantages from the program”, was removed because benefits 
from improved OHS are self-evident and generally well understood by 
users. In its place discussion of programs relating to the identification and 
the management of OHS risks were identified separately. 
Clarifications: 
3. Coding needs to discriminate between plans to implement programs and 
programs already implemented. For example, claims in successive reports 
about plans to implement a program without any evidence of actually 
attempting to do so cannot be counted as high quality disclosure. 
4. Mention or discussion of the topic may include statements such as “our 
performance was better this year” or “we improved by 5% on last year”. 
Neither, however, provides any indication of what level of performance the 
organisation is operating at. For this reason numerical data is interpreted 
as data which reveals a particular level of performance. Typically this will 
include the absolute number or frequency of an event, incident or cost. 
5. The focus of this analysis is quality of reporting not quality of performance. 
Consequently, a positive data trend is not interpreted to mean 
improvement in the reported performance outcomes but rather a positive 
trend in terms of the presentation of data (e.g. completeness or 
sophistication of metrics).  
Table 4-7 presents the modified PSI coding instructions used in this study. Like the 
original PSI coding protocol, this modified instrument allowed for a maximum 
disclosure score of 15 for each sampled report. 
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Pacific Sustainability Index (PSI) coding instructions  
Philosophy: Maximum 5 points 
• 1 point if there is a mention of the 
ideology (i.e. any mention of OHS); 
• + 1 point if there is a discussion of 
the company’s position on the issue 
(includes corporate commitment to 
OHS or the provision of OHS 
policy); 
• + 1 point if the company subscribes 
to at least one internal or external 
social program or policy that deals 
with this issue (i.e. OHS hazard or 
exposure policies or standards); 
• + 1 point if there is an active (action 
required) program / policy the 
company uses to enforce this 
principle (i.e. governance 
mechanisms including Board  
committee);  
• + 1 point if the company explicitly 
states that these guidelines or 
principles are being followed 
(includes both explicit statements of 
compliance or external OHS audit). 
Narrative: Maximum 5 points 
• 1 point if there is a mention of the 
topic (includes planned 
programs) 3; 
• + 1 point if there is a discussion 
of a program / policy the 
company uses to identify OHS 
hazards (programs must be 
implemented) 2; 
• + 1 point if there is a discussion 
of a program / policy the 
company uses to manage known 
OHS hazards (programs must be 
implemented) 2; 
• + 1 point if the program is 
continuously being monitored or 
improved by the company;  
• + 1 point if the company is a 
leader or role model as 
evidenced by external recognition 
or awards – or if internal 
evidence of leadership is 
provided via independently 
verified data)1. 
Quantification: Maximum 5 points 
• 1 point if there is a mention of the 
topic (includes general statements 
regarding metrics used but results not 
disclosed or those disclosed simply as 
percentage changes in performance)4; 
• + 1 point if there is discussion of the 
topic that includes numerical data.  
(must show actual result i.e. quantify  
as number, frequency rate or cost)4; 
• + 1 point if historical data are 
presented; 
• + 1 point if there is a positive data 
trend (in terms of increasing number / 
variety of related data metrics. For 
example showing both a number and 
a rate)5; 
• + 1 point if data are better than peer 
average, if the company is taking a 
leadership position in the sector or if 
data are at maximum possible 
performance (e.g. comparison to 
relevant industry averages –    
preferably national rather than global). 
Table 4-7: PSI scoring criteria 
Notes 1 to 5 in this table refer to the justification provided on the previous page. 
The coding process 
In addition to maximising the objectivity of the score assignment process by providing 
clear and unambiguous instructions for rating disclosures (as shown above), it is also 
important to ensure a systematic and reliable approach to data collection by 
confirming that categories within the disclosure index are clearly and operationally 
defined (Guthrie and Mathews 1985; Holsti 1969). This not only requires the researcher 
to decide which questions to code as open and closed responses and what the 
coding method will be (as outlined in the discussion of the disclosure index provided 
above), but also to develop a written protocol for interpreting passages of text 
applying this protocol to a set of accounts so that the question and answer options 
can be interactively tested and refined with realistic data (Hodson 1999).  
Consequently, the process for coding the data into the disclosure index matrix was 
undertaken as follows. First, testing was undertaken on a sample of two reports 
which were not part of the research sample. Clarification of the rules for categorising 
disclosures was needed and the Disclosures Classification Rules template (see, 
Appendix 4) updated accordingly. Next, the index was tested on the first ten reports 
(five annual reports and five sustainability reports). Again, some minor clarifications 
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and additions to the rules needed to be made. More importantly, the initial coding 
sheet (based on the first column of Table 4-6 above) was found to lack ‘user 
friendliness’. The layout was then redesigned into a Microsoft Excel worksheet. This 
proforma coding sheet provided a master template for collecting and organising the 
data (see Appendix 5). Coding instructions, notes and reminders were entered into 
worksheet cells as comments on the master file so they would appear each time the 
cursor was moved over the cell (see Appendix 6 for an example).  
The data for this study was then captured by creating a separate Excel file for each 
of the 15 companies. Within each file, one worksheet was created for each year from 
1997 to 2007. The coding template was then copied from the master file onto each of 
the 11 worksheets in three places. The first template was copied to the top of each 
sheet (rows 1 to 44) and used to code the annual report issued in the relevant year. 
A second copy was placed underneath (rows 50 to 94) and used to code the 
sustainability report issued in that year. The third copy was located below (rows 100 
to 147) and used formulae to capture disclosure content from the above templates 
and in doing so provided information about OHS disclosures irrespective of reporting 
media. Beside each template were formulae to calculate the relevant PSI score for 
the disclosure. Two additional worksheets were then created within each of the 15 
files, the first for making notes and recording comments or quotes from within the 
company’s reports and the second for creating a detailed list of the various different 
injury and illness performance metrics used. The initial ten reports were then recoded 
using this revised coding system.  
A second coder was then trained in the research method and re-tested the original 
sample of ten reports. Differences were discussed and clarifications updated on the 
template. A separate line item was entered into the master template and into each 
worksheet template to capture disclosures of contingent OHS liabilities. Once this 
was complete, coding of the sample commenced. Two queries regarding unexpected 
disclosures arose during the coding process and were discussed and resolved. Each 
report was coded independently by both researchers. Examples of the coding 
process illustrating the capture of items ‘mentioned’ versus ‘discussed’ are provided 
in Appendix 8. Section 4.5 provides details of tests performed to evaluate the 
reliability and validity of this study.  
Once the sampled reports were coded into the 15 company files, a separate Excel 
file was created which used formulae to extract the data onto a single worksheet 
(reflecting coded data from one annual or sustainability report per row). Descriptive 
information relating to firm, year and report were captured in the first three columns, 
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allowing comparative analyses of the data to be performed. A copy of this 
summarised data was uploaded into SPSS for statistical analysis. The first level of 
data analysis summarised results for each category of disclosure across the sample. 
Further analysis then examined the results by year, industry and organisational size. 
A more detailed analysis of the quality of information relating to OHS outcome 
metrics and to management strategies was then undertaken as these issues 
appeared to provide the greatest variability in results across the sample. Presentation 
and analysis of the results of the final content analysis results and the PSI scores is 
provided in Chapter 6. 
4.4.3 Stage 3 – Reconciling evidence of supply and demand  
Stage three of this research sought to reflect on the results of stages one and two, 
reconciling the detailed evidence obtained as to stakeholder expectations (demand) 
for corporate OHS accountability and the corporate disclosure (supply) of OHS 
information. First, stakeholder expectations for accountability were summarised and 
systematically compared to the corporate disclosures that had been obtained using 
the disclosure indices. This sought to identify the extent to which the information 
supplied met, exceeded, or fell short of stakeholder expectations.  
Immediately apparent, however, was the identification by stakeholders of clear, 
strong and consistent preferences for specific OHS disclosures within a given topic 
area. In contrast, a diverse range of narratives and metrics was disclosed by firms 
and in many cases corporate disclosures relating to topics of concern actually failed 
to meet the information needs of stakeholders. For example, the issue of OHS injury 
and illness outcomes was an issue of deep concern to a great majority of 
stakeholders. However, although a wide range of outcome metrics were provided by 
the sampled firms, stakeholders identified only a limited subset of these as very or 
extremely important. This meant that despite providing data on ‘OHS outcomes’, the 
use of less relevant outcome metrics meant some firms failed to discharge 
accountability in the eyes of their stakeholders.  
Recall Cormier et al.’s (2005) suggestion that the quality of a voluntary disclosure is 
determined by an organisation’s accountability to its stakeholders, with relevance, 
precision and usefulness identified as primary determinants of quality. Within this 
framework, it was clear that the broad themes used to capture OHS disclosure, both 
within the PSI and as evident in prior CSR research outlined above, provided too 
blunt an instrument to evaluate the extent to which OHS disclosure discharges 
accountability to stakeholders. Although they provided important insight into 
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aggregate changes in the level of narrative and quantitative OHS disclosure over 
time, they could not discriminate between those disclosures stakeholders did, and did 
not, perceive as critical for the discharge of corporate OHS accountability. 
Consequently, an alternative instrument was needed to provide a more precise 
evaluation of the extent to which corporate OHS disclosures provided the specific 
information necessary for discharging corporate OHS accountability to stakeholders.  
The OSHAI rating scale 
Recognising this need for an instrument that could better assess corporate OHS 
accountability, a rating scale based on the stakeholder survey results obtained in 
stage one of this study was developed. This scale, the Occupational Safety and 
Health Accountability Index (OSHAI), was developed using similar principles as the 
PSI but designed to capture changes in those items of particular concern to 
stakeholders75 (see Chapter 5 for details of stakeholder expectations).  
The OSHAI scale captured those items reported to be of most importance to 
stakeholders and awarded two points for those items reported to be of most concern 
to all categories of respondents. The first draft allowed for a maximum of 29 points. 
An additional item relating to the inclusion of any lead or lag PPI data was then 
added to acknowledge those firms who may be in the earlier stages of developing 
process indicators. By raising the maximum score for each report to 30, the results of 
the OSHAI coding scale could be easily compared to those of the PSI scale (which 
allowed for a maximum score of 15, as outlined above). The final scoring rules for the 
OSHAI scale are presented in Table 4-8. 
OSHAI scores were then calculated using formulae linked to the data that had been 
captured within the coded Excel disclosure index templates. The final results were 
then analysed and comparisons between the OSHAI and PSI scores were 
undertaken, both by firm and in total. The results of this stage of the study are 
provided and discussed in Chapter 7.  
                                                 
75 However, there was one exception. Although 74% of stakeholders reported that the corporate provision 
of information about recurring injuries was very important or extremely important (see Chapter 5 for 
further details), it was also acknowledged that providing this information may expose firms to legal 
action and therefore they would be unlikely to do so. Consequently, this item was not included in the 
OSHAI.  
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Occupational Safety and Health Accountability Index (OSHAI) coding instructions  
Governance: (Max. 5 points) 
• 1 point if corporate 
commitment to OHS is 
stated explicitly (this may 
include statements from 
CEO or Managing Director; 
includes aspirations such as 
zero harm);  
• + 1 point if the company 
identifies a corporate OHS 
policy or subscribes to a 
formal OHS management 
program or system (e.g. 
Target Zero, Lifeguard, 
Zero4life); 
• + 1 points if governance 
mechanisms for the 
corporate oversight of OHS 
risk management are 
explained (e.g. a specific 
board sub-committee with 
charter for OHS oversight);  
• + 1 point if processes for 
employee engagement on 
OHS issues are explained;  
• + 1 point if external OHS 
systems audits are 
undertaken (point is 
awarded for identifying the 
process, irrespective of 
whether results of these 
audits or evaluations are 
disclosed). 
Processes:  (Max. 10 points) 
• 1 point if OHS programs or processes are 
mentioned (includes planned programs or 
improvements, wellbeing and fitness for work 
programs and philanthropic endeavours –     
i.e. health programs available to employees’ 
families or the wider community). 
• + 2 points if key workplace hazards are 
identified and discussed (where disclosure 
focuses only on safe behaviour programs, 
points awarded here only where underlying 
drivers of unsafe behaviours are identified); 
• + 2 points if processes for managing hazards 
are explained (note, these must be 
implemented); 
• + 1 point if processes for monitoring hazardous 
health exposures or serious disease are 
explained (note, these must be implemented); 
• + 1 point if processes for encouraging safe 
behaviour are explained (note, these must be 
implemented); 
• + 1 point if process indicators (PPI data) are 
provided PLUS 1 point each if those include 
lag PPIs on: 
? Monitoring of OHS processes                    
(e.g. audit non-conformance rates,    
investigation completion rates, training 
completed etc.); 
? Monitoring of OHS hazards                       
(e.g. occupational exposure data). 
Outcome:  (Max. 10 points) 
• 1 point if there is mention of OHS data 
(includes metrics used even if results not 
disclosed or percentage changes in 
performance without actual results); 
• + 2 points each if disclosure includes the 
following for the period (includes where 
zero outcomes are reported): 
?  Number of work-related fatalities; 
?  Number of permanent disabilities.   
• + 1 point for discussing circumstances 
surrounding the above incidents and 
actions taken to prevent recurrence (must 
be specific,e.g.“incident was investigated   
and learnings communicated across the 
firm” is inadequate);  
• + 1 point each if disclosure includes: 
? Rate of long-term (>6 months) 
disability;  
? Rate of total injuries and illnesses           
(e.g. all, total, recordable or lost time 
rates. Occupational illness may be 
specifically included in rate, or shown 
separately); 
? Number of High Potential Injury 
incidents 
?  + 1 point if the total number of fines, 
breaches or infringement notices for the 
period are shown (includes the reporting   
of zero penalties). 
Reporting quality:  (Max. 5 points) 
• 2 points if historical (prior year) data are presented for comparison (1 point for one metric, 1 points for comparative data on 
numerous metrics, figures must match those actually reported in the prior year or provide explanation for differences otherwise 
zero points); 
• + 2 points if clear and detailed definitions are provided to explain how outcome metrics were calculated (includes whether data 
includes OHS outcomes for outsourced labour such as contractors and casuals – 1 point); 
• + 1 point if the reported OHS outcome data is independently verified or assured. 
 
Table 4-8: OSHAI corporate disclosure scoring criteria 
 
4.5 Methodological limitations 
This section addresses two important characteristics of measurement, namely 
reliability and validity. Reliability refers to the accuracy and precision of the 
measurement process (Cooper and Emory 1995) and tests of data reliability are 
concerned with ensuring the replicability of results. Validity on the other hand, relates 
to whether a test actually measures what it purports to measure. If it does, inferences 
drawn from the results are said to be valid. Reliability and validity are both key 
 115
methodological concerns for research such as surveys and content analysis where 
subjectivity may be an issue (Weber 1990). The following sections provide details of 
the efforts taken in both the survey and the content analysis to ensure that results are 
reliable and valid. 
4.5.1 Reliability 
Survey: The survey was administered through the independent survey facility, 
SurveyMonkey76. Respondents entered their answers directly into the online 
questionnaire and these were then downloaded twice from the website, once as a pdf 
file to ensure a permanent record of the detail of all responses and the second time 
as an Excel spreadsheet. The use of the survey facility removed the need for manual 
data entry of results and therefore removed the potential for data entry errors. The 
online analysis tool allowed both detailed responses and an overall summary to be 
downloaded. Summarised data for subsets of responses were generated by applying 
various filters (such as stakeholder type, industry, etc.). All summaries were 
downloaded in pdf format. The analysis was then repeated using the data in the 
Excel file to verify the accuracy of the calculations.  
Content analysis: Rating the quality of disclosure rather than merely its presence or 
absence arguably introduces additional subjectivity to the scoring process (Judd et al. 
1991).  However, although the use of judgement cannot be completely avoided in the 
coding process, subjectivity and bias was minimised in this study through a 
combination of detailed descriptions of categories, coding rules, uniform scoring 
guidelines and the use of rating scales that involved a series of simple dichotomous 
rankings, counting the presence (1) or absence (0) of five attributes of each element 
in the disclosure index. Such ‘counting’-oriented scales require less degree of 
judgement and are more reliable than the use of classification schemes in which 
information is categorised (Milne and Adler 1999). Despite this, the potential always 
remains for some subjectivity in the analysts’ interpretation of text (Deegan and Rankin 
1996; Milne and Adler 1999). Steps to ensure and evaluate the reliability of the results 
were conducted in addition to the training and pre-testing outlined in Section 4.4.2. 
The reliability of the results was examined by testing for both inter-rater and intra-
rater reliability, as follows. Inter-rater reliability tests were performed by training a 
second coder in the coding process and having them analyse the sampled reports. 
The use of multiple, trained coders is recognised to increase reliability (Kolbe and 
Burnett 1991), as results are deemed to be reliable if they can be replicated by an 
                                                 
76 See www.surveymonkey.com. 
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independent researcher (Marston and Shrives 1991). The results obtained by each 
coder were compared against an analysis of the same reports undertaken by the 
primary coder (the author). Eleven differences were identified in the results of the two 
coders (an error of 0.03%). All discrepancies were then individually reviewed and 
resolved by the primary coder.  
The primary coder also repeated the analysis of reports numbered 11-20 to test for 
intra-rater reliability. Given there was a familiarity with those first reports that may 
potentially affect the results of an intra-rater reliability test, the 11th to 20th reports 
were chosen for analysis as these were the earliest reports coded that had not been 
subject to review during the initial stages as the coding process was refined. A time 
period of approximately five months had elapsed between the first and the repeat 
analysis. There were no significant differences found between the first and second 
analysis with two minor errors in coding detected (one relating to the number of prior 
years’ data provided in a sustainability report, the other to the detection of contingent 
liability information in an annual report). Consequently, the author is confident that, 
although the coding process involves inherent subjectivity, given the detailed and 
structured nature of the evaluation process, replication of final results would be 
possible. 
4.5.2 Validity 
The term ‘validity’ is used in various ways within the literature. Weber (1990) 
distinguishes between two key forms of validity: external validity or generalisability, 
and internal validity or correspondence, which is often described as the extent to 
which an instrument measures what its user claims it to measure (Cooper and Emory 
1995; Holsti 1969; Thorndike and Hagen 1969). Internal validity may be further classified 
as including face validity, social validity and empirical validity (the latter comprising 
content validity, construct validity and criterion validity) (Krippendorff 2004). A 
discussion of the various forms of validity relating to the survey and content analysis 
is provided below. 
Survey:  This section discusses efforts to promote or evaluate each of the forms of 
validity relevant to this survey: external, face, social validity and content validity.  
External validity refers to the extent to which research findings may “be generalised 
across persons, settings and times” (Cooper and Emory 1995). The purposive sampling 
technique was used to target a broad range of respondents from across the spectrum 
of relevant stakeholder groups, seeking results that are likely to be indicative of the 
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wider population. Nevertheless, the non-random nature of this sampling process may 
reduce the external validity of the results. 
Face validity has its roots in common sense and refers to the appearance of validity 
(Hodson 1999) in that “a category has face validity to the extent that it appears to 
measure the construct it is intended to measure” (Weber 1990, p18). This is the 
weakest form of validity and is necessary, but not sufficient, for establishing validity 
(Hodson 1999). Face validity was established by pre-testing the survey instrument with 
expert judges from academia, the accounting profession and the safety profession.  
Social validity refers to “that quality of research findings that leads us to them on 
account of their contribution to the public discussion of important social concerns” 
and socially valid research often has “relevance and meaning beyond an academic 
audience” (Krippendorff 2004, p314). The high response rate achieved in this survey 
suggests respondents saw the study as sufficiently important to both contribute to 
and to distribute more widely. Where the survey was distributed, people with no 
direct connection to the researcher were motivated to take the time to complete the 
survey. This demonstrates the strong social validity of the questionnaire. 
Content validity requires an evaluation of the extent to which a measuring instrument 
provides adequate coverage of the various facets and domains of the intended 
research issue. It is primarily concerned with the construction of a research 
instrument rather than its findings (Cooper and Emory 1995; Hodson 1999). Holsti (1969) 
suggests that content validity is established through the informed judgement of the 
researcher or other expert and is normally sufficient to establish validity if the 
purpose of the research is purely descriptive (p143). The content validity of this 
survey was established by surveying the literature to identify relevant topics that 
need to be addressed in the survey (McMurray et al. 2004) and, as mentioned above, 
subjecting the draft instrument to the review of experts. 
Content analysis: Holsti (1969) suggests that in cases such as the present study, 
where content analysis is used for problems where the question is answered from a 
description of the attributes of the content, “the investigator is in large part freed from 
problems of validity, except to the extent that validity is related to sampling and 
reliability” (Holsti 1969, p43). Issues of reliability have been addressed above. In terms 
of sampling, content (and face) validity of the disclosure index instrument was 
promoted by selecting categories and elements for inclusion based on a thorough 
review of the literature (McMurray et al. 2004) as shown in Section 4.4.2. These 
categories were again reviewed following receipt of the stakeholder survey results to 
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confirm that stakeholders had not raised any issues that had not already been 
captured in the disclosure index. Furthermore, the scoring process used to collect 
data was based on a previously used and validated rating system.  
4.6 Summary 
This chapter has presented the methodological foundations for the research, 
revealing a study grounded in the scientific method but incorporating some use of 
qualitative analysis. An outline of the research design is presented along with the 
structure of the research process, and the logical progression from research aim to 
research objectives to research questions is highlighted. In doing so, this chapter has 
shown how the research questions justify the selection of a mixed method approach 
as the appropriate process for data collection and analysis.   
This mixed model approach involved the use of survey questionnaires and content 
analysis to explore a field of enquiry as yet under represented within this literature, 
namely, the construction of corporate accounts of OHS accountability. Consequently, 
the study produced a combination of quantitative and qualitative data for analysis. 
The final section of this chapter has addressed methodological issues of reliability 
and validity that are generally associated with the use of techniques such as surveys 
and content analysis and those specifically relating to the way in which this study has 
been conducted. Chapters 5 to 7 now present an analysis of these results and a 
discussion relating the results to the research objectives.  
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Chapter 5. RESULTS: Survey 
This chapter reports the results of stage one of this research, namely an online 
survey that sought to briefly explore stakeholder attitudes to OHS and examine their 
views on corporate reporting of OHS information. To the extent that stakeholders 
identified OHS reporting as important, the survey also sought to identify the desired 
content of this OHS information. As mentioned in Chapter 4, stakeholder groups 
targeted for this survey were those who were likely to be informed users of corporate 
OHS information. These included employees, OHS regulators, trade unions, OHS 
managers, OHS consultants, business owners, shareholders and academics77.  
This chapter is organised as follows. Section 5.1 provides details about the 
respondents, outlining the sample and the response rate by stakeholder group. 
(Please note: details relating to the general administration of the survey are provided 
in Chapter 4). Section 5.2 presents the findings about the attitudes of respondents to 
OHS in general and to corporate accountability for OHS in particular. This includes 
an overview of stakeholder attitudes to OHS, perceptions of OHS impact and 
demand for corporate OHS accountability. Sections 5.3 and 5.4 then explore the 
content and quality of the information necessary to discharge accountability for OHS 
to stakeholders. In section 5.3, stakeholder perceptions of the relevance of OHS 
information to them are examined, and the issues and metrics respondents identified 
as important for organisations to publicly disclose are revealed. In section 5.4, 
stakeholder perceptions of the information quality characteristics of completeness, 
comparability and reliability are explored. In doing so, stakeholder views on 
appropriate forms of aggregation, presentation and verification of OHS data are 
presented. Section 5.4 also reveals the ‘where’, as opposed to the ‘what’, of OHS 
disclosure by identifying the preferred media for publicly communicating OHS 
information. Finally, a brief summary of the survey results are provided in section 5.5. 
5.1 Overview 
5.1.1 Response rate 
The response rate for this survey was very high which suggests that the survey 
managed to capture the attention and interest of targeted stakeholders. Notably, in 
some categories, the number of completed surveys received exceeded the number 
of requests sent. The potential for this from both regulator and trade union 
                                                 
77 Stakeholders identified as academics were from accounting and OHS disciplines. 
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stakeholder groups was anticipated, as partial multiplicity sampling78 was employed 
with these respondents forwarding the survey link to a small number of colleagues 
within their respective organisations. The greater number of responses than requests 
for the employees’ category of stakeholder was, however, unexpected. This is 
perhaps explained, in part or in full, by participants classified by the author as 
shareholders, consultants or managers unexpectedly self-reporting as employees 
instead. A summary of the expressions of interest and subsequent response rates by 
stakeholder category are provided in Table 5-1. 
Stakeholder group Surveys sent 
Responses 
received 
Response 
rate 
Usable 
responses  
Response 
rate – final 
Employees 35 39    111 % 38    109 % 
OHS regulators 4 8  200 % 8  200 % 
Trade union officials 17 30  176 %  30  176 % 
OHS managers 42 41  98 % 40  95 % 
OHS consultants 15 10  67 % 10  67 % 
Shareholders/owners 9 4  44 %  4  44 % 
Academics 5 5  100 %  5  100 % 
Unknown  1     
Total 127 138  109 % 135  106 % 
Table 5-1: Stakeholder survey sample 
 
Three of the survey responses were unusable and deleted from the sample. Of 
these, one contained no descriptive information (i.e. identification of stakeholder 
group, industry, experience, gender) and so the few answers provided were unable 
to be analysed relative to the rest of the sample. The other two surveys removed 
from the sample contained descriptive details, but no other questions had been 
answered. Consequently, a final sample of 135 usable surveys was obtained.  
5.1.2 Describing the sample 
The sample comprised a balance of both male and female respondents and the 
participants reported a broad range of exposure to OHS issues, stemming from 
varying lengths of work experience obtained across a diverse range of high and low 
safety risk industries. A summary of descriptive information about the survey 
respondents is provided in Appendix 9. 
                                                 
78 Please see section 4.4.1 for details of the multiplicity sampling process. 
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Each participant was asked to select the stakeholder category with which they most 
identified and to respond to questions, as much as possible, from that perspective. A 
small number of respondents nevertheless commented about the applicability of 
more than one category. Each respondent was then coded according to the 
stakeholder group they had indicated. For example, those identifying as employees 
were coded E1, E2, etc. to E38, with the first employee responding to the survey 
coded E1, the second employee E2, etc. Regulators were coded R1 to R8; trade 
unions officials, U1 to U30; managers, M1 to M40; consultants, C1 to C10; 
shareholders, S1 and S2; business owners, B1 and B2; and academics, A1 to A5.  
Given the small number of respondents in some stakeholder categories, 
stakeholders were classified into four groups for the purpose of data analysis. These 
are as follows: 
• Employees 
• Advocates: OHS regulators and trade unions 
• Managers: OHS managers and OHS consultants 
• Other: Business owners, shareholders and academics  
 
Statistical analysis was undertaken to confirm that, where two or more stakeholder 
categories had been grouped together, the responses of individual stakeholder 
categories were not significantly different to each other. For example, within the 
advocate group, non-parametric tests including t-tests and chi-squared tests were 
performed, by question, to confirm that the responses of regulators did not differ 
significantly from those of trade unionists. The most notable apparent79 differences 
occurred within the ‘other’ category, wherein a small number of the responses 
provided by academics occasionally differed to those provided by shareholders and 
business owners. In these instances, responses have been reported for individual 
stakeholder categories rather than as an aggregated ‘other stakeholders’ group. 
Where there were no significant differences between responses across the 
stakeholder categories, results are discussed either as a group or in total. The 
following section now examines the attitudes of these stakeholders to OHS in general 
and to the public provision of corporate OHS performance information in particular.  
                                                 
79 These differences in responses were typically statistically significant, although some differences that 
were not statistically significant have been identified as such and reported in the following discussion.  
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5.2 Stakeholder perceptions of OHS impact and accountability 
5.2.1 Attitudes toward OHS  
Of the 135 stakeholders surveyed, 134 (99%) reported to perceive80 OHS to be an 
important business issue, 130 (96%) an important CSR issue and 131 (97%) a 
human right. Perhaps not surprisingly, employees and advocates (unions and 
regulators) were most likely to strongly agree with the perception of OHS as a human 
right, while managers were most likely to strongly agree that OHS is an important 
business issue. Traditional users of corporate reports such as academics, advocates 
and managers were most likely to strongly agree that OHS is a CSR issue. These 
responses are depicted in Figure 5-1. There was a high level of agreement with each 
of these three statements by all stakeholder classifications (ranging from 94.6% to 
100%) and differences across stakeholder groups were not statistically significant.  
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Figure 5-1: Perceptions of OHS 
Although 96.3% of respondents agreed that OHS is an important CSR issue, those 
who disagreed were all from high risk industries (F = 4.05, p < 0.05); they included 
one OHS manager and two union officials. The OHS manager and one official, each 
having less than two years’ work experience, provided no comment to give insight 
into their response. The second union official (U23), who held more than ten years 
industry experience and who had been exposed to various high risk industries, 
commented on the predictability of injuries and the importance of accountability and 
‘legal responsibility’. This suggests that he may have been concerned that classifying 
OHS as a social obligation would lessen public perception of the seriousness of 
workplace health and safety and its status as a mandatory legal requirement.  
                                                 
80 This refers to the number of respondents that either agree or strongly agree with the statement. 
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Respondents working in high risk industries were also more likely (χ2 = 8.7994 p = 
0.03) to see injuries as generally preventable (36.2%), compared with those exposed 
to low risk work environments (23%). This supports the concerns raised in Chapter 2, 
namely that, to some extent at least, the dangers inherent in high safety risk 
workplaces are often known, in which case the chance of incident is predictable and 
therefore inherently avoidable. This in turn leads to higher levels of accountability for 
OHS impact, an issue addressed in the following section. 
5.2.2 Perceptions of OHS impact 
Respondents in all stakeholder groups reported to perceive the effective 
management of OHS as protecting both the financial and non-financial interests of 
workers, corporations and communities. Respondents identified most strongly with a 
perceived financial impact of OHS on corporations (shareholders) and a non-financial 
impact on workers. A summary of the responses is provided in Figure 5-2. 
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Figure 5-2:  Perceived impact of OHS on stakeholders 
Interestingly, the results reveal that a relatively low proportion of respondents were 
unaware of the financial burden of OHS failures on either workers or external 
organisations. As reported in Chapter 3, 49% of the cost of OHS incidents was borne 
by workers and their families and 47% by external organisations (ASCC 2009). As 
indicated in Figure 5-2, seven respondents (5.2%) rejected the notion that OHS 
failures have a financial impact on workers and a further 16 respondents (12%) were 
unsure. Similarly, two respondents (1.5%) did not identify a financial impact on the 
community (external organisations) while 20 respondents (15%) were unsure. 
Nevertheless, the majority of respondents (and all those identified as ‘regulators’) 
acknowledged both a financial and non-financial impact of poor OHS on all three 
categories of stakeholder: employees, shareholders (owners) and community. This 
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confirms that a wide range of organisational stakeholders recognise the externalities 
arising from OHS and are therefore likely to expect organisations to be accountable 
for them. 
5.2.3 Demand for OHS accountability 
Since the majority of respondents recognised the importance of OHS as both a 
business issue and a CSR issue, and perceived OHS to impact both internal and 
external stakeholders, it was not surprising to find a general expectation that 
organisations be held accountable for OHS to those stakeholders. Overwhelmingly, 
respondents agreed (99.3%) with the statement, ‘Stakeholders have a right to know 
how well a company manages OHS’ (60% strongly agreed, 39.3% agreed and no 
respondent disagreed).  
Most respondents (95%), therefore, reported an expectation that organisations, not 
only those firms facing a high risk of injury and illness, but all firms, should discharge 
this accountability by providing OHS information to stakeholders (54% strongly 
agreed). As indicated in Figure 5-3, managers, academics and unions were most 
likely to support reporting by all businesses. Business owners were more likely than 
other stakeholder groups to support disclosure by high risk firms only (χ2 = 15.6321 p 
= 0.00). 
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Figure 5-3: Stakeholder expectations for OHS reporting 
Respondents identified a mixture of both ethical and economic (enlightened self-
interest) rationales as reasons to provide OHS disclosures. Most respondents 
(95.5%), including 86% of employees, identified disclosure as important for attracting 
and retaining quality employees. This is an important finding as it provides empirical 
evidence to support anecdotal claims to that effect, which have been evident in the 
literature for some time. Some respondents were sceptical however, commenting: 
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Not sure that employees value OHS over other benefits like high pay (C3). 
If all businesses have good practice OHS and reporting then the attract and 
retain staff is negated (M32). 
Respondents also perceived OHS disclosure as important to demonstrate 
accountability (95.4%) and corporate social accountability (94.7%), attract capital 
from socially responsible investors (72.7%) and provide information necessary to 
enable informed decision-making by external stakeholders (77.2%), including 
shareholders (57.1%). Attitudes to the extent to which OHS reporting is important for 
socially responsible investment decisions in particular appeared mixed. For example: 
‘green’ companies are attracting shareholders who have an environmental 
focus, why not safe companies as well? (C9). 
But then: 
My view is that currently [the] socially responsible investors who would act on 
OHS information would be miniscule compared with those in that category 
who would act on environmental performance (M28). 
Other benefits suggested by respondents included the ability of the reporting process 
to: focus companies on providing a safe workplace, preventing workplace accidents 
and promoting safe work practices (U26, M10, B1); expose poor performers (E33, S2, 
A4); and provide data for resource allocation decisions such as tender selection and 
the provision of tax relief (S2).  
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Figure 5-4: Perceived uses of OHS information 
Confirming stakeholder demand for relevant and comparable information, a majority 
(75.4%) of respondents rejected the suggestion that companies should be free to 
choose what information they provide to stakeholders. This varied significantly across 
stakeholder groups (χ2 = 17.2957, p = 0.00) with business owners most likely to 
 126
support discretion in reporting (50%) followed by 14% of managers (all from high risk 
industries) and 13.4% of union officials (all from the public sector). In contrast, 100% 
of responding shareholders, regulators and academics did not support allowing 
discretion regarding the content of OHS disclosures, along with 86.6% of union 
officials and 72.9% of employees. This is consistent with prior studies that show 
business typically opposes regulation and prefers flexibility (see Deegan 2006a). 
These results are depicted in Figure 5-5. 
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Figure 5-5: Support for corporate discretion in OHS disclosure 
 
Evidence of the strong pro-regulation sentiment that had seemed to emerge was 
then confirmed with strong support for the regulation of OHS disclosure. Only 11% of 
respondents indicated that the content of OHS information provided to stakeholders 
should not be regulated. While some expressed the view that regulation was 
‘needed’ to direct the attention of employers to OHS “due to the drivers of greed” 
(E20), dissenters were concerned that stakeholders might misinterpret data provided 
to the public under mandatory disclosure. For example, one OHS manager who 
agreed all firms should provide OHS information but disagreed with the regulation of 
this process suggested: 
The reporting of illness and injury should not be regulated [because] a high 
number of reported injuries does not mean that poor work / OHS practices 
are employed [and] the statistics may be misinterpreted (M21). 
This resistance underscores the need for regulation of OHS data such as injury 
outcomes, which is of greatest relevance to stakeholders. Attitudes towards the 
regulation of OHS disclosure differed significantly across stakeholder groups 
(χ2=15.4489, p=0.00). Overall, 25% of owners, 17.8% of managers and 13.5% of 
employees did not support the regulation of disclosure. In contrast, regulation was 
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supported by 100% of shareholders, 100% of regulators, 100% of union officials and 
100% of academics. These results are consistent with prior research into the demand 
for the regulation of environmental disclosure (see Deegan 2006a). Since reporting 
entities within Australia are now required to disclose environmental information under 
s299F of the Australian Corporations Act, demand for regulation of OHS disclosure 
may translate to pressure for the extension of the s299F requirement to include OHS. 
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Figure 5-6: Support for OHS disclosure regulation agency 
 
As revealed in Figure 5-6, 85% of respondents favoured legislative regulation of OHS 
outcome (injury and illness) disclosures over regulation via accounting standards 
(19%) or ASX requirements (14%). Notably, managers and employees were 
significantly less likely than other stakeholder groups to agree with regulation by law 
(χ2 = 18.8371, p = 0.00). This is not surprising given, as shown above, that they are 
less likely to support regulation of disclosure. 
Despite the generally high level of demand shared by all stakeholder groups for OHS 
accountability and for the disclosure of corporate OHS information, differences in 
stakeholder expectations as to the appropriate content of these corporate accounts 
of OHS were evident. The following section examines the reported demand for 
corporate OHS information. 
5.3 Stakeholder demand: information relevance 
As discussed in section 4.4.2, CSD quality has often been evaluated in terms of the 
extent to which corporate disclosures provide monetary, quantitative and declarative 
information. Little attention has been paid, however, to identifying exactly what OHS 
content stakeholders perceive to be most relevant to their needs. The respondents in 
this study were therefore asked to identify the importance of traditional OHS content 
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areas (or themes), as identified in Figure 5-7. The results suggest that while reporting 
on each theme was at least important to most stakeholders, narratives detailing the 
firm’s engagement in OHS activities and processes and the presentation of 
information about OHS injury and illness outcomes were identified as the most 
important. 
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Figure 5-7: Stakeholder demand for OHS disclosure content 
 
The following subsections expand on these findings to describe stakeholder demand 
for OHS disclosure content. In particular, attitudes to the corporate provision of 
information about OHS expenditure, OHS outcomes and OHS processes are 
examined in detail. It will be interesting to see then whether the corporate reports 
examined in the following chapter reflect the demands of stakeholders outlined 
below. 
5.3.1 Demand for information on OHS expenditure 
The provision of OHS-related cost information to stakeholders generated comments 
from many survey respondents and elicited twice as much written feedback as any 
other topic on the survey (over 100 separate comments). Most of this was negative 
with respondents expressing concern that efforts to direct attention to OHS 
expenditure would have a detrimental impact on employee welfare since “greed 
means there will always be pressure to provide safety down to a price not up to a 
standard” (C2). Many warned that focusing on the bottom line exerts an inappropriate 
cost pressure on OHS (U25, E20) that diverts attention from the welfare and safety of 
people (E38, T14, E21, M24), risks driving a non-reporting culture where incidents and 
injuries appear reduced but are instead hidden from management (E20, M32, U1) and 
devalues the true ‘cost’ of work-related injury and illness (M28, U14) which is most 
appropriately “measured in pain, suffering and misery” (C2, U21).  
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OH&S practice should come from a goal of zero injuries to the people who 
make up our organisation. It is based in compassion and integrity to look after 
the workforce. There are financial implications but this cannot be the driving 
force (E38). 
As one business owner stated, “I struggle to rank the importance of costs. It is the 
cost of not achieving safety, of injury and poor health that is more important” (B1). U5 
observed: “What value is there in measuring the costs if you are not also measuring 
the benefits – in any business transaction you need to look at both sides of the 
ledger”. This shared desire to match costs against benefits was tempered, however, 
by recognition of the many OHS externalities and the inability to reliably identify 
either the total costs or total benefits associated with OHS. For example: 
I think OHS should be managed using a cost / benefit approach if total costs 
and total benefits were accurately costed. Total cost to include health care, 
family, societal costs. Then providing a safe workplace would be cost 
effective. (E10) 
Using cost / benefit approach needs to be a component of OHS management 
but the approach needs to include the equivalent of a triple bottom line 
measurement as all ‘costs’ are not $ and all benefits are not just $. Also, the 
costs and benefits are spread across all participants – workers, employers, 
society, insurers, etc. so identifying and quantifying these true costs and 
benefits is very complex. (M28) 
These responses highlight the difficulties associated with costing OHS, particularly 
given that existing accounting and reporting standards only recognise those costs 
attributed to actual business transaction expenditure. Nevertheless, despite legal 
requirements to provide a safe workplace (irrespective of cost / benefit), as outlined 
in Chapter 2, and the inability to capture financial externalities, it was somewhat 
surprising to see 28% of respondents actually support a cost / benefit approach to 
managing OHS. These respondents included stakeholders exposed to both high and 
low OHS risk workplaces although more were likely to come from those where the 
risk of injury was high (31.8%), than low (21.9%, χ2 = 21.699, p = 0.00). This is 
possibly because respondents operating in high OHS risk environments are more 
aware of both the substantial costs that can be involved in controlling some OHS 
hazards and therefore draw on the defence of ‘reasonable practicality’ afforded by 
existing legislation by arguing ‘reasonable’ on a cost / benefit basis. These responses 
are illustrated in Figure 5-8. 
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Figure 5-8: Stakeholder attitude to cost / benefit approach to OHS management 
Interestingly, consultants were the only stakeholder group more likely to agree than 
disagree with taking a cost / benefit approach to managing OHS. The reason for this 
last finding is unclear although, as shown later, consultants were also the most likely 
stakeholder group to focus on ‘cheaper’ hazard management programs such as BBS 
and may need to argue cost / benefit to justify their engagement. These findings 
suggest the role and attitudes of OHS consultants may be worthy of further research. 
While respondents appeared generally cautious about focusing on OHS costs, most 
nevertheless identified as important the provision of OHS expenditure relating to 
OHS failures. These tended to centre on the “cost of injury opposed to the cost of 
implementation” (M27), with foremost among them, the cost (and number) of OHS 
fines and penalties (97%) and the cost of workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums, or workers’ compensation payments to injured employees for those firms 
that self-insure (93%). Focusing attention on OHS failure costs was suggested to 
help ‘educate’ the organisation (and stakeholders [M21]) about the cost of poor safety 
(R4, U5, C9, M8, M37) and provide a strong (financial) argument for investment in 
effective injury and illness prevention (C9, U1, U4, U19, M23, M29, M36). Typical 
comments were: 
Failure costs may be in excess of implementing adequate control measures, e.g. the 
cost associated with an incident involving unguarded plant versus the cost of 
guarding the plant and questions are asked about why OHS is costing so much (R2). 
My experience is that in high risk industries the costs of most preventative controls to 
address OHS risks of hazards are usually a small percentage of the costs incurred 
should the incident / injury occur. This cost / benefit information would be a strong 
reinforcer of responsible OHS management (C1).   
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Businesses can demonstrate that spending money on OHS saves money on medical 
and rehabilitation costs for injured workers and workers’ compensation insurance 
premiums (M29). 
Providing [failure] cost information might demonstrate how potentially costly 
prevention or improvement measures actually save money over the long-term by 
reducing injuries at work and maintaining healthy staff (A3). 
Figure 5-9 reveals that just over half the respondents also supported some external 
disclosure to stakeholders of costs relating to OHS improvement measures. This 
contradicts one manager’s perception that OHS costs are “important to board and 
management” but external stakeholders “would not be disinterested in how much you 
spent on training and resourcing OHS” (M32). Reporting financial investment in OHS 
was argued to demonstrate that “money and efforts are being made to create a safe 
working environment” (C3) and to provide stakeholders with insight into: the level of 
senior management commitment to OHS (R7, E22, M1, U26); the OHS culture 
operating within the organisation (E22, M10, M40); and the extent to which workers 
are valued (U26). For example, one respondent suggested: 
Stakeholders should be able to gauge the company's interest and action on 
OHS by comparing the expenditure on OHS initiatives. If they are able to 
identify whether the expenditure is proactive or reactive will also tell much 
about the company's attitude and culture (E22). 
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Figure 5-9: Stakeholder perceptions of OHS cost importance (by category) 
Respondents also identified additional cost categories for disclosure. These included 
costs associated with: investigations into workplace fatalities or serious injuries 
(M37); OHS training for replacement employees (M40, E34) and for executives and 
directors (C1); replacing or modifying plant to comply with safety standards or to 
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address safety issues arising from poor purchasing decisions (C9, M18, M28); the use 
of OHS consultants (U12); the purchase of personal protective equipment (PPE) 
(M28); and spending on hazard versus behaviour control initiatives “to know if BBS is 
a backup management tool or the main focus of an OHS program” (A4).  
Nevertheless, many respondents were concerned that program spending disclosures 
may lead stakeholders to incorrect assumptions about OHS outcomes. While larger 
firms might tend to “look better due to the size of their spending” (M34), high 
expenditure does not necessarily mean a safe workplace (E21, M32). It could indicate 
efforts to address / redress significant risks (A1), reflect an abnormal cost or anomaly 
(M28) or to expose an expensive yet ineffective OHS system (M12, U12). In contrast, 
low amounts of OHS expenditure may fail to convey “important changes in behaviour 
and culture, which may have been influenced with a small monetary cost” (M32) and 
"could be interpreted as either a very safe workplace with efficient process and 
procedures, or a very unsafe workplace where OHS is not a priority” (U13).  
In evidence was concern that “some companies will sanctimoniously 'self promote' 
the level of their 'investment'” (M28), or take advantage of the subjectivity inherent in 
quantifying total costs of OHS (M28, M34, U5). Furthermore, rather than the category 
of ‘total OHS spending’ capturing all failure and prevention costs (U14), it was seen 
subjective and open to manipulation, with the process reclassifying OHS components 
of operational and capital expenditures counter productive and inappropriate (M12). 
For example: 
The scope of what should be included in OHS cost is so ill-defined and with 
actual costs spread across multiple stakeholders, published comparison by 
and large are likely to be irrelevant. Most of the meaningful 'costs' which 
make a true difference to improving OHS are integral to the way a company 
does business. To tease them out as a separate item is counter-intuitive to 
the true measurement of an overall successful business. Apart from 
improved internal reporting as part of management accounting and external 
reporting of excessive and abnormal costs and extraordinary items, I see 
marginal importance due to the diversion of focus and skewing of values 
that often arise from such [costing] processes (M28). 
Overall, the scepticism over an implied link between program spending and OHS 
outcomes highlighted a need to differentiate costs relating to OHS hazard control 
programs (seeking to prevent injuries) and OHS failures (injuries incurred). The 
strongest support was evident for corporate disclosure of those failure costs relating 
to OHS fines and workers’ compensation, although respondents also wanted to know 
the total number of fines or prosecutions to contextualise dollar values (M12), what 
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the firm was fined for and what remedial action was subsequently undertaken (M32). 
Similarly, stakeholders wanted descriptions about OHS programs, rather than simply 
cost data arguing: “Safety should be looked at on initiatives and their results” (E21).  
The following sections, therefore, examine stakeholder demand for information on 
both OHS outcomes and initiatives. 
5.3.2 Demand for information on OHS outcomes 
Strong support was found for the corporate disclosure of OHS outcomes (i.e. fatality, 
injury and illness data) with 97% of respondents indicating the disclosure of outcome 
data was at least important, and over 69% indicating disclosure was either extremely 
important or very important. Analysis by stakeholder group revealed that although no 
stakeholder rated disclosure of OHS outcomes as unimportant, regulators were least 
likely to rate disclosure as extremely or very important (42.9%). This is possibly 
because employers already report serious injury and illness outcomes to regulators 
as they occur. As expected, shareholders, business owners and then unions were 
most likely to see the public disclosure of OHS outcomes as extremely important. 
Employees were most undecided, although this was only a small percentage (less 
than 6%). These results are summarised in Table 5-2. 
 
Stakeholder Attitudes to OHS Outcome Information 
 Extremely or     Very important Important 
Total 
important Undecided 
Not 
important 
By Stakeholder Group 
Owners 100.0% 0.0 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
Unions 85.2% 11.1 % 96.3 % 3.7 % 0 % 
Managers 69.6 % 28.3 % 97.9 % 2.2 % 0 % 
Employees 61.9 % 32.4 % 94.3 % 5.9 % 0 % 
Academics 50.0 % 50.0 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
Regulators 42.9 % 57.1 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
By OHS Outcome 
Fatality 85.0% 15.0 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
Injury  84.0% 16.0 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
Illness 80.0% 20.0 % 100.0 % 0 % 0 % 
Table 5-2: Stakeholder attitudes to OHS outcome disclosures 
 
Although 100% of respondents indicated that the disclosure of work-related fatalities, 
injuries and illnesses are important (see Table 5-2), some questioned the benefit to 
be gained from differentiating between injury and illness outcomes given both are 
work-related (S2, A3, M28). In addition to total OHS outcomes, stakeholders were also 
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keen to see separate data presented for both employees and sub-contractors so 
users could “compare 'apples with apples' for firms that outsource and transfer their 
risks to others” (M28). This is consistent with the requirement to report outcomes for 
sub-contractors articulated in the GRI mining sector supplement (as noted in Chapter 
2). Strong support was also evident for data relating to categories of serious injury to 
be provided in addition to, not instead of (M28), total outcomes. These are illustrated 
in Figure 5-10. 
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Figure 5-10: Stakeholder attitudes to the disclosure of workplace outcomes  
Of the various sub-categories of OHS outcomes, respondents were most keen to see 
data reflecting work-related fatalities, with 100% indicating fatality disclosure as 
important. A greater proportion of respondents identified the disclosure of individual 
severity indicators of permanent disability (76%) and temporary disability (68%) more 
important than response-based indicators of LTI (50%) and recordable injury (55%). 
This was consistent with expectations drawn from the literature (see section 2.2.1), 
although contradicted the GRI’s recommendations for the disclosure to stakeholders 
of response-based not severity-based injury information (see section 2.3.2).  
When asked to rank the top four most important outcome indicator disclosures, 
98.6% of respondents included ‘severity indicators’ compared to only 40.9% including 
‘response indicators’. The disclosure of fatality outcomes, however, was placed 
second to severity measures of injury when ranked in order of importance (see 
below). This is possibly because the incidence of work-related fatality compared to 
the incidence of work-related injury is relatively rare in Australian workplaces. These 
results are summarised in Table 5-3. 
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Rank 
 
OHS outcome KPIs  
% of respondents 
ranking this item 
MOST important 
% of respondents 
ranking this item in 
the top 4 
% of respondents 
agreeing disclosure   
is important 
1 Measures of work-related 
fatality 50.0%
A 82.8% D 100% 
2 Severity measures of injury         
(eg PD, TD, MTI, FAI) 20.5%
 B 98.6% E 93.4% 
3 Measures of recurring injuries 25.9% 82.8% 92.6% 
4 Severity measures of illness 0.0% 77.2% na 
5 Response measures of injury 
(e.g. LTI) 0.9%
 C 40.9% F 77.9% 
6 Response measures of illness 0.9% 13.0% na 
Table 5-3: Stakeholder ranking of OHS outcome disclosure KPIs 
Table 5-4 provides a breakdown by stakeholder group of responses for items 
identified A to F in the table above. This reveals that across all stakeholder groups, 
except shareholders, the proportion of respondents prioritising severity (impairment) 
measures is more than double those prioritising response (lost time) measures. In 
contrast, the equal preference of shareholders for both severity and response 
measures confirms their interest in both the social and the financial consequences of 
OHS. These findings are summarised below. 
% of 
Respondents  
Most important  
outcome data 
Listed in Top four  
most important outcome data 
Measures Fatality Severity (i.e. PD TD) 
Response 
(i.e. LTI RI) Fatality 
Severity 
(i.e. PD TD) 
Response 
(i.e. LTI RI) 
Employees 53.3 %  16.7 % 0 % 86.7 % 96.7 % 36.7 % 
Regulators 66.7 % 0 % 0 % 83.0 % 100.0 % 16.7 % 
Unions 48.0 % 16.0 % 0 % 80.0 % 84.0 % 40.0 % 
Managers 42.9 % 34.3 % 2.9 % 71.4 % 95.0 % 42.5 % 
Consultants 62.5 % 12.5 % 0 % 100.0 % 87.5 % 37.5 % 
Shareholders 
/ owners 66.7 % 0 % 0 % 66.7 % 50.0 % 50.0 % 
Academics 40.0 % 20.0 % 0 % 75.0 % 100.0 % 25.0 % 
Total 50.0 A 20.5 B 0.9 C 82.8 D 98.6E 40.9 F 
Table 5-4: Comparison of preferences for outcome KPIs (by stakeholder) 
As illustrated in Table 5-4, the disclosure of data relating to recurring injuries, or 
those injuries caused by previously identified risks, was also rated as very important 
to respondents. Although recurring injuries were acknowledged to be “difficult to 
monitor and prove” (S1), their presentation was nevertheless suggested to be “highly 
educative” (U23) and “very embarrassing to the company but a strong stimulus to 
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improving OHS results” (C1). A number of respondents recognised that admitting a 
known risk had caused an incident both highlighted accountability for a breakdown in 
governance and could also expose companies to prosecution for knowingly failing to 
provide a safe workplace (M23, U23). Importantly, one regulator observed: 
Where the organisation becomes aware of a risk or has accepted a risk rather 
than eliminate it, then they have a responsibility to report [the implications of] that 
risk to its workers (R7).  
Although one respondent suggested measures of minor (e.g. first aid) injury or near 
miss deserved “greater emphasis” because they demonstrate the existence of risks 
that may lead to more serious levels of damage (U20), there was generally less 
support for the disclosure of medical treatment, first aid, and LTIs (see Table 5-4). 
Instead, respondents emphasised the need to focus attention on fatal and permanent 
disabilities (for example, E7, M21) and recurring injuries (M21, U20) observing: 
The other ratings are dangerous because they provide an emphasis in other 
areas lessening the continual need to focus on the main causes of injury which 
would be prevalent in that workplace (U20).  
Furthermore, a number of respondents identified the need for “detail to go with the 
numbers” (for example, U27) to assist reporters to “demonstrate commitment to 
continual improvement in OHS performance” (C9, M29, E38), explain changes in the 
level of risk (E2, U22), and reduce the potential for metrics to be misinterpreted by 
their audience (E10). One respondent suggested:  
Numbers and rates need to be backed up with words to explain their meaning or 
significance. It may be necessary to explain trends over time with some informed 
discussion. For example, Increased reporting of near misses could mean better 
safety culture – i.e. people are willing to report issues or it could be that there are 
just more problems (E10). 
Supporting these comments was a strong demand for discussion of circumstances 
around fatality and serious injury (95.8% of respondents agreed, 0.8% disagreed) 
and for disclosure of those steps, if any, taken to prevent reoccurrences (M32, M21). 
When there has been a fatal accident the company needs to learn from this and the 
investigation needs to address every level of responsibility within the organisation 
and take remedial action to ensure all failing systems that led to the incident have 
been properly addressed to prevent a re-occurrence (M40). 
Transparency in discussing circumstances surrounding serious incidents [is a way 
for a] company’s management to engender trust that OHS responsibilities are taken 
seriously and improvements are planned or undertaken (C1). 
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Overall, respondents were most keen to see information relating to those incidents 
that resulted in the most detrimental damage, be it financial, physical or social. 
Consequently, survey participants expressed the strongest demand for firms to 
disclose indicators of fatalities, permanent and temporary disability and total injury. 
Also very important to the majority of respondents was the simultaneous presentation 
of explanatory information that detailed both the circumstances surrounding fatal and 
serious injuries and the processes (actions, programs and initiatives) by which the 
firms’ sought to prevent recurrence.  
5.3.3 Demand for information on OHS processes 
While information about OHS outcomes explores OHS ‘failures’ (B1), information 
about OHS processes seeks to communicate what the company is doing to address 
OHS risks and prevent workplace injury and illness (B1, E10). Overall, 98.1% of 
respondents agreed that it was important for OHS reports to include a discussion of 
the way OHS is managed (86.5% strongly agreed). Most important to respondents 
was evidence of management commitment to OHS, information about corporate 
OHS policies, programs and initiatives and about significant changes in management 
strategy or OHS risk. These results are illustrated in Figure 5-11 below. 
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Figure 5-11: Stakeholder attitudes to OHS discussion topics for disclosure 
When ranked in order of importance, those issues recommended for discussion by 
the GRI, such as reporting on programs to educate stakeholders on HIV or serious 
disease, disclosing compliance with ILO Health Management System guidelines and 
descriptions of formal agreements with trade unions failed to be identified as the 
primary issues of concern. Instead, stakeholders appeared more interested in details 
about how employers discharge their duty of care to provide a safe workplace. This 
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included demand for explanations about the level of integration of OHS within 
broader organisational and operational structures (M40, C2), the extent to which 
safety commitment was driven from the CEO and senior executive (M24, M40), the 
extent and methods of consultation with both workers and other stakeholders (R3, 
E38, C2, M24, M32, M40), and details of measures taken to eliminate or control OHS 
risks, particularly the extent to which firms seek to eliminate or control hazards rather 
than simply relying on safe behaviour or PPE (M18, M16, U18). These findings are 
summarised in Table 5-5. 
 
Rank 
 
Demand for detail about 
% respondents 
ranking this item 
MOST important 
% respondents 
ranking this item    
as one of the four   
most important 
% respondents 
agreeing disclosure  
is important 
1 Evidence of managerial commitment 52.7% 83.9% 96.7% 
2 Actions to provide a safe workplace 14.3% 78.6% 93.5% 
3 OHS policies and programs 15.2% 67.9% 99.2% 
4 Actions to encourage safe behaviour 2.0% 48.2% 88.6 %* 
5 Operation of OHS committees or 
other forms of OHS consultation 2.7% 21.4% 92.7% 
6 Feedback from regulators 2.7% 17.0% 94.3% 
Table 5-5: Demand for information about OHS processes 
 
The comments provided by respondents suggested that they were concerned about 
the ability of process disclosures to accurately communicate the safety culture 
operating within an organisation and provide evidence as to: the level of “genuine 
commitment” (M18) versus “lip service” (M10); the “tolerance of daily risks” (U23); the 
relative degree of focus on hazard versus behavioural controls (U18, C3, M5, M29); 
and the extent to which the system is driven by a pursuit of employee welfare or by 
cost or productivity (operational) considerations (E20, E21, E38, U2, U19 U20). One 
manager suggested: 
More consistent OHS reporting would ‘force’ a higher level of benchmarking, 
because it would make it very easy for employees and others to see if the 
company was a employer genuinely committed to OHS, or if it was just in 
policy document with no leadership by senior managers e.g. no KPIs and no 
ownership of staff and supervisors (M18). 
Although strongly in favour of the use of OHS process KPIs to support explanation 
about organisational processes, respondents’ preferences for individual indicators 
were more varied than had been evident in respect to the OHS costs or outcome 
KPIs addressed above. For example, 7% of respondents dismissed absenteeism as 
 139
‘not important’, yet 10%81 rated it ‘extremely important’, with a number observing that 
absenteeism is “an important indicator for bullying and harassment” (U5) and for 
“workplace morale which is linked to OHS behaviour” (M19). One respondent 
suggested, “the stakeholder scope is large, different items are going to be pertinent 
to some groups and not others” (M32). Illustrating this, a summary of the attitudes to 
the top 10 process KPIs, presented by stakeholder group, is provided in Appendix 
10. Some respondents also suggested additional KPIs such as measures of OHS 
complaints and ideas (U23), OHS targets and variances against those targets (R7), 
and indicators of leadership, commitment, communication (C2, U26) and 
empowerment (B1).  
 
Rank 
Demand for  
OHS process KPIs  
% respondents 
ranking this item 
MOST important 
% respondents 
ranking this item in 
the top four 
% respondents agreeing 
strongly that disclosure  
is important 
1 Near misses 33.9 68.6% 65.0% 
2 Audit non-conformances 10.4% 56.0% 76.2% 
3 New risks identified 21.7% 55.1% 68.0% 
4 Risks structurally controlled 9.6% 56.9% 67.2% 
5 Hazardous exposures 9.6% 51.5% 73.2% 
6 Training attended 3.5% 36.1% 61.8% 
Table 5-6: Stakeholder attitudes to the importance of disclosing OHS (process) KPIs  
Analysis of the results by stakeholder group revealed all stakeholders prioritised the 
disclosure of data relating to near misses and audit non-conformances as very 
important. Shareholders were most likely to also prioritise absenteeism, reflecting 
perhaps a concern for indicators that give greater insight into potential human 
resource management issues. Interestingly, while managers, consultants and 
employees identified as very important the public disclosure of KPI data relating to 
OHS risks controlled, external stakeholders such as regulators, unions, shareholders 
and academics did not rank them as highly. This may be due to a level of scepticism 
about these types of claims. One shareholder, for example, described these as 
“pointless” suggesting “they give too much room for organisations to invent issues 
they can say have been solved” (S1). 
Nevertheless, the results suggested that KPIs relating to OHS processes were 
preferable to measures associated with OHS commitment or policy. Furthermore, 
respondents were more likely to identify as very important those indicators of the 
outputs of OHS processes than indicators of process inputs or activity. For example, 
66% of those surveyed were very interested in the number of audits completed but 
                                                 
81 The 10% for and 7% against reporting on absenteeism each comprised a similar distribution of 
respondents from employee, manager and trade union representative stakeholder groups. 
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76% sought to know how many audits were ‘clean’, or conversely how many non-
conformances were identified or had been addressed (R3). In the same way, 55% 
were interested in how much OHS training was offered, or conducted, but 62% 
sought data on employees successfully completing OHS training. As one union 
official stated:  
It’s all good to know how many training sessions a company ran or what 
percentage of sites offered training but it’s pointless when you’re left 
wondering if anyone actually went! (U14). 
This is illustrated in Figure 5-12. 
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Figure 5-12: Stakeholder attitudes to disclosing OHS management KPIs 
Overall, survey respondents were particularly interested in the disclosure of 
information relating to OHS programs for providing a safe workplace and processes 
for monitoring both outcomes and programs. Keen for evidence to support these 
disclosures, KPIs relating to near misses, audit non-conformances, health hazard 
exposures, OHS risk control and training were identified as particularly important (as 
identified in Figure 5-12).  
The ability to benchmark OHS progress, in terms of both processes and ultimate 
performance, requires firms to produce reports that are not only complete in terms of 
the relevant financial and non-financial information outlined in this section, but also 
complete in terms of presenting OHS content in a consistent and comparable 
fashion. The attitudes of survey participants to issues of information quality, such as 
information completeness, consistency and reliability (as defined in section 1.3) are 
now examined below. 
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5.4 Stakeholder demand: information comparability, reliability 
A desire for the disclosure of information that is both comparable and reliable was 
evident in the survey results. In addition to problems including a lack of completeness 
in terms of content (as discussed in section 5.3), was concern for the consistent and 
reliable disclosure of OHS data using comparable metrics, presentation approaches 
and levels of aggregation. Some respondents speculated that different levels of 
disclosure may be appropriate to different firms. For example:  
I believe the importance of the issue is influenced by the industry one is looking 
at. For some industries, a narration might be sufficient, whereas for others, such 
as extraction for example, it should be a requirement to report details (A3). 
Reporting on items that do not apply across all businesses and all industries 
cannot be made mandatory, companies already feel put upon by OHS, the 
reporting needs to be simple and effective not cumbersome and emphasising 
potentially non issues for those workplaces. Most of these communication media 
are available simultaneously (M32). 
Nevertheless, as one manager suggested, “a comprehensive, consistent OHS 
reporting framework is needed”, one in which “the starting point needs to be 
something so simple that initial full participation can occur” (M28).  Such a framework 
has been developed from these survey results and is offered in section 8.3 of this 
thesis. The broader issue of data comparability and reliability is examined below. 
5.4.1 Comparability – measurement standards 
The comparability of OHS outcome and process KPIs was very important to 
respondents, with 91% indicating that stakeholders should be able to compare OHS 
data across firms. Less than 2% (one OHS manager and one employee) disagreed. 
A ‘GRI-style’ model was supported by 92% of respondents who supported the 
identification of a specific set of ‘core’ OHS indicators to be commonly reported by all 
firms and additional indicators selected from an agreed suite of metrics. The benefit 
of such standardisation was recognised to enable benchmarking and allow 
employees and other stakeholders to make informed comparisons of performance 
across both firms and time. At the same time, however, concern as to the ability to 
agree a standardised approach was expressed by a number of respondents: 
I'm unsure about OHS indicators being standardised – KPIs on OHS should 
always be best practice and standardising anything always has a danger of 
lowest common denominators (U13). 
I'm all for data reporting, if it can be demonstrated that consistent definitional 
terms across jurisdictions and injuries can be agreed to (R3). 
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With regard to jurisdictions, the level at which respondents believed standardisation 
should occur differed despite their overwhelmingly shared desire for comparability in 
reporting of OHS data. Nationally consistent metrics were supported by 86% of 
respondents, with over 53% of these preferring globally consistent OHS indicators. 
Global standardisation was argued to be most appropriate given “the wide range of 
audiences and reporting interests [by ensuring] consistency across all three – 
internationally, country and industry” domains (M28). One manager reflected on the 
potential difficulty of identifying a comprehensive suite of metrics appropriate for 
diverse organisational profiles but nevertheless stated, “My heart wants it to be a 
national measure” (M8). This was supported by various comments such as “Safety is 
not industry specific” (E21).  
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Figure 5-13: Stakeholder attitudes to OHS indicator comparability  
(Note: high risk industries are those with relatively significant OHS hazards and  
typically high levels of injury or illness; low risk have relatively few OHS hazards.) 
 
As illustrated below, those participants exposed to work environments with significant 
safety hazards were more likely to support national or global measures82. 
Presumably this reflected a perception of the importance of benchmarking 
performance across other firms in similar high OHS risk environments. Some survey 
participants were less keen on standardisation of OHS measurement however, with 
12.1% preferring the industry-specific indicators only and 2% (M14 and U25), rejecting 
OHS measurement standards at any level. There were no significant differences in 
preferences for the level of standardisation across stakeholder groups or length of 
work experience. 
                                                 
82 Although differences in the responses offered by respondents exposed work environments with high 
levels versus low levels of safety hazards were not statistically significant. 
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5.4.2 Comparability – data presentation 
Further to concerns raised in the previous section over the choice of OHS indicators 
and metrics by which OHS performance is communicated, there are presentation 
issues regarding the extent to which OHS disclosures adopted appropriate units of 
measurement, employed appropriate levels of data (dis)aggregation and maintained 
individuals’ rights to privacy. Each of these issues is briefly explored below. 
Units of measurement: The survey responses highlighted preferences for particular 
units of measurement to be applied to different categories of OHS performance data. 
Concern as to whether OHS data should be disclosed as absolute numbers, rates 
(such as frequency rates or percentages) or both was apparent in relation to OHS 
outcomes. For OHS failure costs, there was very strong support for the disclosure of 
both the number and magnitude of OHS fines and penalties given multiple fines can 
be an important indicator of poor OHS management (M12). The number of fines, 
therefore, differentiates single from repeated infringements, while the total cost 
reflects the seriousness of the incident and the financial impact on the organisation.  
Stakeholder preferences for OHS outcomes were generally for each category of 
outcome data to be presented as both an absolute number and a rate (as illustrated 
below), although 83% wanted to see fatalities presented as an absolute (total) 
number of work-related deaths, supported where appropriate by further information 
regarding the number of deaths by region. Similarly, many respondents sought both 
number and rate information for categories of injury and illness outcomes although 
slight preferences were evident for the disclosure of the total numbers of permanent 
and temporary disabilities and for frequency rates of lost time and recordable injury. 
Supporting the disclosure of severity using actual totals one respondent suggested: 
Rates dilute the perception of importance … Most reports include a total 
number of employees. Show how many people were killed or injured and let 
stakeholders make decisions about relativities off the page (U14). 
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Stakeholder preferences for presentation of OHS outcome KPI data
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Figure 5-14: Stakeholder attitudes to the presentation of OHS outcome KPIs 
The preference for the presentation of outcome KPIs as both a number and a rate 
was not so consistently reflected in relation to process KPIs. For example, 
respondents revealed a strong demand for audit non-conformances to be expressed 
as both a number and percentage, but preferred to obtain risk information as a 
number (then both number and rate) and information about absenteeism and 
committees as a rate (then both rate and number). These results are depicted in 
Figure 5-15 below. 
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Figure 5-15: Stakeholder attitudes to presenting OHS process KPIs 
 
Prior year data: To enable effective comparisons of performance over time, support 
was also found for companies to provide appropriate prior year data. As revealed in 
Figure 5-16, 100% of the respondents from four of the seven stakeholder groups 
agreed with the statement “Prior year data should be shown so current and past 
results can be compared”. Strong support was also evident from the remaining 
stakeholder groups as illustrated below. Only one respondent, an OHS manager, 
(M14) indicated prior year comparative data should not be provided to stakeholders. 
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While he represented a very small proportion of the sample, M14’s resistance to this 
aspect of disclosure reinforced the views of 85% of surveyed stakeholders that an 
OHS reporting framework needs to be supported by regulation or standards. 
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Figure 5-16: Demand for the provision of prior year comparative OHS data 
 
Aggregation: As noted above, over 93% of respondents agreed that firms should 
periodically disclose a measure of the total occurrences of work-related fatalities, 
injuries and illnesses to permit stakeholders to make effective overall assessments of 
OHS performance (M28). They also sought various supplementary subtotals 
including measures of permanent disability (with medical discharge), permanent 
disability (with return to work) and long- and short-term temporary disability. Although 
84% of respondents demanded the separate presentation of total injury and total 
illness outcome data, only 20% of respondents were strongly opposed to aggregating 
illness and injury data in the various supplementary severity or response indicators. 
Approximately 74% also sought supplementary disclosures that revealed employee 
versus sub-contractor outcomes separately and 84% sought both total fatal and non-
fatal outcomes and a breakdown by region (for national organisations) or country (for 
multi-national organisations). 
Privacy: Employees, unions and managers also expressed concern that OHS 
outcome information must not be presented in sufficient detail so as to compromise 
the privacy of either those individuals who have sustained an injury or illness, or of 
the families of those killed at work (E22, U29, M16, M33). Most were concerned about 
sensitivity, respect and maintaining the confidentiality of individuals’ names and 
personal details relating to injuries or fatalities, although one manager (M33) 
expressed concern over the confidentiality of individuals’ wage details which could be 
revealed by disclosing self-insurance compensation data.  
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5.4.3 Comparability – disclosure media 
While the preceding section examined how OHS disclosures should be presented to 
ensure comparability, this section explores where respondents would like them 
presented, that is, the reporting media through which disclosures should be 
communicated. Consideration of disclosure media seeks to identify whether 
respondents have preferences for the location of OHS costs, outcome and process 
information.  
Respondents were offered a list of popular corporate disclosure media such as 
annual reports, sustainability reports, websites and corporate brochures, and 
provision was also made for them to identify additional media if required. A small 
number of respondents identified internal communications such as induction 
documents and presentations at staff ‘toolbox’ meetings although, as these are not 
publicly available to stakeholders, they are not included in the data below. A 
summary of the results is provided in Figure 5-17.  
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Figure 5-17: Stakeholder preference for OHS disclosure media 
Given that the express purpose of sustainability reports is to provide a vehicle for 
corporate disclosure of social (and other) information to stakeholders, the results 
revealed a surprisingly high (97.3%) demand for OHS disclosures to be provided in 
annual reports, either in the annual report only or in both the annual and 
sustainability report. As illustrated above, this was not limited to financial disclosures 
(92.1%) but also included quantitative and narrative disclosures relating to OHS 
outcomes (84.8%) and OHS processes (79.4%). Only 3.9% of respondents preferred 
OHS disclosure in the sustainability report only. These findings are relevant to those 
regulators of financial reporting practice such as the Australian Accounting Standards 
Board (AASB), Australian Securities and Investment Commission (ASIC) and ASX, 
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since the strong level of stakeholder demand suggests regulators should perhaps 
consider mandating the inclusion of OHS performance data in annual reports. 
The open-ended stakeholder responses indicated that while websites were valued for 
their ability to provide timely and easily accessible information (U5), there was a 
preference for annual reports. This was driven by perceptions that the content of the 
annual report is more credible and rigorous than alternative reporting media such as 
sustainability reports or corporate websites due to the regulatory requirement that it 
be “signed of by the senior management” (U14). As expected, there was demand for 
“extremely important information [to] be made available through all media; reports, on 
website and also brochures and newsletters” (E5). 
Disclosure type and 
importance 
Annual 
report 
(total) 
Annual 
report 
ONLY 
CSR 
report 
(total) 
CSR 
report 
ONLY 
Corporate 
website 
Other 
(eg 
newsletter) 
OHS  EI 92.1 % 17.8 % 75.3 % 1.0 % 5.0 % 2.0 % 
Costs VI 80.6 % 21.5 % 66.6 % 7.5 % 7.5 % 4.3 % 
 I 67.8 % 29.9 % 41.3 % 3.4 % 18.4 % 10.3 % 
 Total 80.8 % 22.8 % 61.9 % 3.9 % 10.0 % 5.3 % 
Disclosure type and 
importance 
Annual 
report 
(total) 
Annual 
report 
ONLY 
CSR 
report 
(total) 
CSR 
report 
ONLY 
Corporate 
website 
Other 
(eg 
newsletter) 
OHS  EI 84.8 % 10.5 % 79.1 % 4.8 % 4.8 % 5.7 % 
Outcomes  VI 76.7 % 10.0 % 74.5 % 7.8 % 6.7 % 8.9 % 
 I 62.8 % 19.8 % 50.0 % 7.0 % 15.1 % 15.1 % 
 Total 75.5 % 13.2 % 68.7 % 6.4 % 8.5 % 9.6 % 
OHS  EI 79.4 % 15.5 % 70.1 % 6.2 % 5.2 % 9.3 % 
Processes VI 76.7 % 20.0 % 65.6 % 8.9 % 5.6 % 8.9 %  
 I 58.8 % 21.2 % 49.4 % 11.8 % 16.5 % 12.9 % 
 Total 72.1 % 18.8 % 62.1 % 8.8 % 8.8 % 10.3 % 
Table 5-7: Stakeholder preferences for disclosure media 
(EI = extremely important OHS information, VI = very important OHS information, I = important OHS information) 
 
 
5.4.4 Reliability – external verification 
Given the various concerns about OHS information completeness, comparability and 
rigour outlined in this chapter, it was not surprising to find strong support among 
respondents for the independent verification of OHS data. In total 86.5% agreed with 
the statement, “OHS data should be externally audited or verified”, while only 3% 
disagreed. These results were consistent across all respondent categories including 
stakeholder group, industry risk profile and length of work experience. Support for 
verification was high (>80%) across all stakeholder groups and highest for 
shareholders (100%). One suggested externally verified data is important because: 
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Internally provided information is too easily manipulated by the organisation to 
make it look better than it is. (S2) 
This was supported by the call for OHS measures to be “reported and validated in 
the same way as financial measures” (M37). It also highlights the way in which 
regulation and verification may play complementary roles. 
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Figure 5-18: Stakeholder attitudes to external verification of data 
Despite the very strong support for OHS data to be externally audited, a number of 
managers sought to differentiate between voluntary and mandatory verification. 
Concerns were raised about the cost burden of external audit and one manager 
suggested companies should only be “required” to undergo external verification 
“when inconsistencies are found” because the high cost of mandatory audit “makes 
the idea of standardised reporting become untenable” (M32). It was unclear who this 
manager assumed would find the inconsistency or to whom it should be reported. 
5.5 Summary 
The results of this survey demonstrate that although respondents failed to recognise 
the full range of impact of poor OHS on stakeholders, most identified both financial 
and non-financial consequences for workers, corporations and the community. The 
majority of respondents also deemed organisations accountable to stakeholders for 
this impact. Strong support was therefore found for research proposition one:  
P 1: Stakeholders believe organisations should be accountable for OHS.  
The results revealed a high level of demand for public disclosure of financial, 
quantitative and explanatory OHS information and for the regulation and independent 
verification of such disclosures. This provided support for proposition two:  
P 2: Stakeholders believe a duty to account for OHS should be discharged 
through the periodic public disclosure of OHS information. 
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These results are consistent with the results of other studies of stakeholder demand 
for CSR information and reflect a high level of concern for the presentation of 
relevant, reliable and comparable data. Somewhat unexpected was stakeholder 
demand for presentation of all OHS information in the annual report rather than the 
sustainability report. This was reported to stem from a general perception that annual 
report disclosures were more credible than those provided in alternative reporting 
media. Together these results highlighted not only a demand for voluntary corporate 
OHS disclosures but also a level of stakeholder concern over OHS disclosure quality. 
In seeking to describe stakeholder demand for the content of corporate OHS 
disclosure (research question one) the results revealed shared expectations as to the 
means by which firms should discharge their duty to account to stakeholders for 
OHS. For example, stakeholders identified highly relevant OHS information as that 
relating to both OHS outcomes and processes. Those most important quantitative 
disclosures included information about the physical injuries, illnesses and fatalities 
that have occurred and any associated expenditure on fines, penalties and workers’ 
compensation. Stakeholders appeared particularly keen to receive data about work-
related fatality, recurring injuries, and injury and illness classified by severity. 
Stakeholders were generally suspicious, however, of attempts to quantify and report 
OHS program expenditures, highlighting problems associated with measurement 
objectivity, reliability and ultimately, reader interpretation. Furthermore, respondents 
were particularly concerned that directing attention to OHS program and 
infrastructure costs may have a negative impact on OHS culture and OHS 
resourcing.  
OHS process disclosures were argued to provide insight into the activities and 
processes that constitute an OHS system in a way that is “far more encouraging than 
apportioning blame” (C1) by focusing on failure measures alone. Indeed, 
stakeholders were interested in information on a range of processes including hazard 
identification, risk assessment and management, OHS audit and OHS training. 
Notably, however, respondents appeared to value measures of the results more than 
measures of process and activity inputs. They also reported a strong interest in 
information about OHS governance including details about managerial commitment, 
policies and the circumstances surrounding serious outcomes.  
Together these findings have identified the OHS disclosures of most relevance to 
survey respondents, many of which are consistent with expectations drawn from the 
literature outlined in Chapter 2. A somewhat surprising finding, however, was the 
general failure of the demands of respondents to correlate well with stakeholder 
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expectations for OHS disclosure articulated in the GRI guidelines (also outlined in 
Chapter 2). Although both the survey results and the GRI guidelines emphasise the 
need for firms to report on OHS outcomes and processes, including measures of 
fatality, injury, consultation and training, the relevance of particular indicators and 
topics was quite different, with the GRI adopting a more overtly managerial 
emphasis.  
For example, the GRI recommends reporting outcomes using response indicators, 
while the surveyed stakeholders were more interested in severity indicators; the GRI 
advocated discussion based around formal consultation and management systems  
while survey respondents identified as more important those discussions about the 
circumstances surrounding fatal and serious injury, changes in risk profile and 
programs and policies relating to risk assessment, safe design and hazard 
management. This suggests that if firms are following a template for OHS disclosure 
based on the GRI guidelines, their disclosures are unlikely to meet the needs of the 
stakeholders participating in this survey.  
These findings have implications for those advisory bodies, including accounting 
professional bodies in Australia, who promote the GRI guidelines as an appropriate 
framework for CSR disclosure. Specifically, the findings caution against using the 
GRI guidelines as a template for OHS reporting or the evaluation of OHS disclosure. 
This is because, with the exception of fatality data, the GRI guidelines fail to 
recommend those OHS indicators and disclosures which are reported to hold 
greatest importance for a wide range of stakeholders. At a broader level, these 
findings provide the necessary detail to inform the development of a framework for 
OHS accountability that can guide the preparation and evaluation of OHS disclosure. 
This framework is presented in Chapter 8. 
Having essentially identified two different sets of stakeholder expectations for OHS 
disclosures, those provided by survey respondents and those provided by the GRI, 
the following chapter empirically examines disclosures offered by a sample of large 
firms. It seeks to identify and describe corporate OHS information provided to 
stakeholders in corporate reports and to discover whether common patterns of 
disclosure are evident. A reconciliation of the findings of this content analysis 
(Chapter 6) against the stakeholder expectations (outlined in Chapter 5) will then be 
presented and discussed in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6. RESULTS: Content Analysis 
This chapter presents the results of phase two of the study, namely a content 
analysis of OHS information disclosed in the corporate annual and sustainability 
reports of all 15 mining and energy firms listed on the 2007 ASX Top 100 index. First, 
section 6.1 provides an overview of the sampled firms and reports by type, year and 
sector before identifying the extent to which OHS disclosures were present. Section 
6.2 then describes an evolution in the content of these disclosures over the period of 
study, identifying a steady increase in the average provision of both narrative and 
quantitative information. This relates primarily to issues such as OHS governance, 
outcomes and activities while the disclosure of other OHS information, such as OHS-
related expenditure, appears less routine.  
The results presented in section 6.2 are then compared in section 6.3 to the 
recommendations offered by the GRI’s Sustainability Reporting Guidelines to explore 
what influence, if any, the GRI’s LA6-9 (OHS) Indicators have had on the content and 
quality of OHS disclosures presented by sampled firms. Finally, the content analysis 
results are summarised in section 6.4. A comparison of these results to the 
stakeholder expectations (outlined in Chapter 5) is then presented in Chapter 7. 
6.1 Describing the sample  
As identified in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, phase two of the study sought to explore the 
public provision of corporate OHS information by examining disclosures offered by a 
sample of large (ASX Top 100) resource companies. A longitudinal analysis of 11 
consecutive years of corporate reports was undertaken. As detailed in Chapter 4, the 
time period 1997 to 2007 was deliberately chosen to enable comparison of 
disclosures made before and after the release of each version of the GRI guidelines. 
This was in recognition of the GRI’s potentially significant role in shaping CSR. 
The final sample consisted of 187 corporate reports, being 137 annual and 50 
sustainability reports, issued by the largest five energy and ten mining companies83 
listed on the ASX. As illustrated in Figure 6-1, nine of these firms operated for the 
entire period of study, with the remaining six firms commencing operation between 
2000 and 2004. Each produced an annual report for every year of operation. Figure 
6-1 below, depicts the number of firms issuing some form of stand-alone 
sustainability report for each year.  
                                                 
83 Note: as reported in section 4.4.2, these 15 firms comprise all mining and energy firms listed in the ASX 
Top 100 as at December 2007. 
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Overview of the Sample
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Figure 6-1: Annual and sustainability reports examined 
The following sections describe the sample in further detail and identify the incidence 
of OHS disclosure presented within each type of report. Details of the sampled 
annual reports are presented in section 6.1.1 and the sampled sustainability reports 
in section 6.1.2. 
6.1.1 Annual reports 
As outlined above and in Chapter 4, external reports provided by 15 firms were 
targeted for analysis. Nine of these firms operated for the full 11 years covered by the 
study while the remaining firms listed on the ASX between 2000 and 2004. Annual 
reports for each firm were obtained for every year of operation within the 1997 to 
2007 period, providing a total sample of 137 annual reports.  
Although organisations are not required to report publicly on OHS, each annual 
report included at least some voluntary reference to workplace health and safety – 
with the exception of those issued by two firms. The first, an energy firm, failed to 
provide any information relating to workplace health or safety in their 2000 annual 
report (only). Notably, it appears that the firm’s health and safety performance had 
deteriorated substantially since the previous (1999) report. The second, a mining 
firm, failed to make any OHS disclosures in its earlier annual reports (issued between 
1997 and 2001) but provided OHS information from 2002 onward. The following 
Table 6-1 provides details of the sampled annual reports by year and industry. 
Annual reports 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total
Energy Companies 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 47 
% including OHS data 100 % 100 % 100 % 75 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 98 % 
Mining Companies 6 6 6 7 8 8 9 10 10 10 10 90 
% including OHS data 83 % 83 % 83 % 86% 88 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 100 % 94 % 
Total annual reports 9 9 9 11 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 137 
Table 6-1: Summary of annual reports examined (by year and industry) 
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6.1.2 Sustainability reports 
Sustainability reports were provided on at least one occasion during the period 1997 
to 2007 by 12 of the 15 sampled firms (80%). This proportion was consistent across 
the two industry groups with four of the five sampled mining firms (80%) and eight of 
the ten sampled energy firms (80%) issuing at least one sustainability report over the 
period. One mining firm claimed to have issued sustainability reports annually over 
the full period of study; however, copies of the reports produced in 1997, 1998 and 
1999 were not available on the website. Also, one other firm was missing the 2006 
sustainability report on its website, having linked the 2005 report pdf file to the urls for 
both 2005 and 2006. Efforts to acquire copies of the missing reports directly from 
these two firms, by both phone and email, were unsuccessful. The final sample 
comprised a total of 50 sustainability reports as detailed in Table 6-2. The missing 
reports are indicated with a ‘U’. 
 
  Mining firms’ reports 
 
 
 
 
    Company not listed 
Year 
Sustainability Reports  Energy firms’ reports 
1997     X X U           X X X X 
1998      X X U           X X X X 
1999      X X U           X X X X 
2000         X  ?  ?          X X X 
2001         X  ?  ?  ?         X X 
2002        ?    ?  ?  ?  ?     ?  X X 
2003        ?    ?  ?  ?  ?       X X 
2004  ?      ?    ?  ?  ?  ?  ?       
2005   ?    ?    ?  ?  ?  ?  ?     ?   
2006  ?  ? ?  ?    ?  ?  ?  ?  ?     U   
2007  ?  ?   ?    ?  ?  ?  ?  ?   ?   ?   
Y
ea
r 
 Firm E1 E2 E3 E4 E5 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 M10 
Table 6-2: Sustainability reports issued and analysed (by year and firm)  
Table 6-2 reveals that the proportion of firms producing a sustainability report rose 
from 18% of sampled firms in 2000 to 67% of sampled firms by 2007 (see also 
Appendix 11 for a table showing reporting percentages by year and industry). The 
above table also shows a gradual increase in the number of pre-1997 listed firms 
providing a stand-alone sustainability report during the 1997 to 2007 period. By 2007 
100% of these firms had issued at least one sustainability report. In contrast, 50% of 
firms listing on the stock exchange during the period of study issued a sustainability 
report within two to three years of listing while 50% failed to issue a sustainability 
report at all. Interestingly, none of the pre-1997 energy firms (labelled E1 to E3) 
issued any sustainability reports until at least two years after a new entrant, an 
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energy firm listed in 2000, issued its first sustainability report. This suggests that 
while mining firms may have followed the example of an established industry leader 
(M1) in producing sustainability reports, energy firms appear to have been motivated 
by the reporting activity of a new entrant to the marketplace (E4). 
Report Title 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
Sustainability Report, Sustainability Review or 
Sustainable Development Report 10 8 7 4 3 3   
Stakeholders – our essential partners  1       
Report to the Community    1 1 1   
Health, Safety, Environment & Community Report   1 1 1 1 1  
Social and Environmental Review     1 1 1 1 
Community and Environment Report       1 1 
Total 10 9 8 6 6 6 3 2 
Table 6-3: Sustainability report titles (by year) 
 
As summarised in Table 6-3, changes were not only evident in the number of firms 
producing sustainability reports over time but also in the labels assigned to them. For 
example, the diverse range of titles assigned to CSR reports in the years 2000 to 
2003 gradually evolved to incorporate the term ‘sustainability’ in all CSR report titles 
by 2007. These included ‘Sustainability Report’, ‘Sustainability Review’ and 
‘Sustainable Development Report’. This did not appear to have had implications for 
the orientation of content; for example, the change from a HSEC Report to 
Sustainability Report may lead to a decrease in focus on OHS content and an 
increase on content relating to the environment. The following section now examines 
and describes in detail the content of these 50 CSR reports, hereafter referred to as 
‘sustainability’ reports, and the 137 annual reports.   
6.1.3 Overview of OHS content 
A document search and supplementary electronic keyword search revealed that 
every sustainability report and all but six84 of the 137 annual reports contained at 
least some OHS information. This ranged from a single brief statement of managerial 
commitment to workplace health and safety (more common in the earlier years), 
through to detailed accounts of OHS management practices and injury and illness 
outcomes provided more recently, either in the firms’ annual report, sustainability 
report, or both.  
                                                 
84 As noted previously, one energy firm made no reference to OHS in their 2002 annual report and one 
mining firm made no reference to OHS in any of the five annual reports dated 1997-2001. 
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This was notable because, as reported in Chapter 5, most stakeholders wanted all 
important OHS information presented in the annual report, perceiving the annual 
report as more rigorous since it is authorised by senior management. Examination of 
the sampled disclosures revealed a propensity for firms to provide more OHS 
information in sustainability reports than annual reports and more importantly, to 
report on some OHS issues primarily in annual reports, others primarily in 
sustainability reports, and in some cases alternative disclosures between the two 
media in different years. This is illustrated in Figure 6-2 which depicts the disclosure 
of occupational fatality data across both annual reports and sustainability reports. 
Notably, those firms reporting larger numbers of fatalities, that is more than ten 
fatalities in a given year, tended to disclose their results in both annual and 
sustainability reports. 
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Figure 6-2: Data distribution across reporting media 
 
This seemingly random distribution of OHS disclosures across annual and 
sustainability reporting media left both sets of reports essentially incomplete. 
Consequently, stakeholders would need to read both annual reports and 
sustainability reports in their efforts to find all the available OHS information. Given 
these findings, references to OHS ‘disclosure’ within this chapter refer to disclosures 
made in either the annual report or sustainability report unless stated otherwise.  
Comparative analysis of the identified OHS data revealed an increasing volume and 
diversity of OHS information reported over time. These changes are reflected in the 
increase in PSI scores over time with the average score increasing from 47% to 86% 
over the period of study (see full details of PSI scores, by firm, in Appendix 15). 
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Disclosures comprising both quantitative and qualitative information may be 
summarised into three broad categories as presented in Table 6-4.  
 
Summary of OHS Disclosure Categories  
Category Qualitative disclosures included: Quantitative disclosures included: 
 
OHS  
governance 
Descriptions of OHS strategy: 
• Executive commitment to OHS 
• OHS Policy and Strategy 
• Oversight of OHS risk 
 
 
OHS 
processes 
Explanation about the processes 
(programs, practices and activities) 
adopted to address OHS risk and reduce 
injury and illness outcomes. These 
included: 
• Risk assessment  
• Incident analysis  
• Consultation and training 
• Hazard management 
• Occupational health programs 
• OHS compliance auditing 
• Behavioural safety programs 
Leading and lagging process KPIs relating 
to: 
• Risk assessment programs 
• Consultation and / or training  
• Compliance audits 
• Exposure monitoring 
• Hazard / behaviour management 
• Near miss and HPIs 
• Safety culture or incentive systems  
OHS expenditure on: 
• Training 
• Hazard and / or behaviour control 
programs 
 
OHS  
outcomes 
Description of and explanation for 
changes in: 
• The number or severity of OHS injury 
and illness outcomes 
• Trends in the cause of fatalities and 
serious injuries   
• Workers’ compensation and contingent 
liabilities 
• OHS fines and penalties 
OHS outcome data (KPIs) including: 
• Fatality data  
• Severity measures of injury / illness 
• Response measures of injury / illness 
OHS expenditure 
• Workers’ compensation expenses 
• Contingent compensation liabilities 
• Fines, penalties and legal costs 
Table 6-4: OHS disclosure categories and items 
 
Indeed, by 2007, 100% of the sampled firms were providing information on each of 
the three major OHS disclosure categories in their 2007 annual or sustainability 
reports: governance, processes and outcomes (see Figure 6-3). While this may 
suggest that practices of corporate OHS disclosure were deeply institutionalised by 
2007, it is necessary to critically examine the detail of those disclosures, both in 2007 
and over time, to assess the homogeneity and stability of the content. This will 
confirm whether the 100% reporting rates observed in 2007 reflect institutionalised 
patterns of disclosure or are a mere anomaly. The following section explores the 
incidence and content of sampled OHS disclosures over the decade of study.  
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6.2 Patterns of OHS disclosure  
Using the framework provided by the disclosure matrix (see Appendix 5), various 
patterns of OHS disclosure85 were detected. First, the total incidence of reporting on 
the three broad categories of OHS governance, activities and outcomes between 
1997 and 2007 is summarised86 and graphed to reveal reporting trends over the 
period. Sub-categories of OHS senior management commitment to OHS and the 
provision of quantitative data (process KPIs and OHS expenditure) are teased out for 
comparison. This is illustrated in Figure 6-3. 
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Figure 6-3: Total OHS disclosures by category 
This analysis of disclosures for the full period of study (1997 to 2007) suggests that 
disclosure of information on each topic has become increasingly institutionalised in 
corporate reporting practice. Most notably, Figure 6-3 reveals that at the beginning of 
the period a high proportion of firms were already reporting statements about 
commitment to OHS (89%) and making reference to at least one OHS activity (78%) 
such as training. However, these early reports provided relatively little supporting 
evidence (such as details of governance structures, processes or KPI data relating to 
outcomes, processes or costs) to suggest the claims of managerial commitment were 
anything more than the strategic attempts at legitimation. 
                                                 
85 Note: unless otherwise specified, references to disclosures refer to OHS information provided in either 
the annual or sustainability report. PSI scores for disclosures identified in annual and sustainability 
reports are provided in Appendix 12.  
86 The measures capture the percentage of firms who disclosed the target item in either an annual or 
sustainability report operating in a given reporting period. 
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As the number of firms claiming commitment to OHS rose to 100% of sampled firms 
by the middle of the period, there was also a noticeable increase in the proportion of 
firms providing confirmatory evidence. In particular, the number of firms reporting 
information on OHS governance and OHS outcomes each rose from less than 45% 
in 1997 to 100% from 2005 onwards. A comparison of the number of firms offering 
these disclosures in their annual reports versus sustainability reports87 is provided in 
Table 6-5.   
 Percentage of firms reporting information on this item in either report 
Percentage reporting the item in the Annual Report  / Sustainability Report 
Topic 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Commitment 89 89 89 82 
82 / 100 
83 
83 / 100
100 
100 / 83 
100 
93 / 83 
93 
93 / 67 
100 
100 / 88 
100 
100 / 78 
100 
100 / 90 
Governance 44 56 67 55 
55 / 50 
67 
67 / 100
69 
69 / 17 
77 
71 / 67 
87 
87 / 67 
73 
60 / 88 
100 
87 / 67 
100 
100 / 70 
Process 78 67 89 73 
73 / 100 
92 
92 / 100
100 
100 / 83 
100 
93 / 100 
87 
80 / 100 
100 
87 / 100 
100 
100 / 89 
100 
93 / 100 
Outcomes 44 67 78 82 
82 / 100 
75 
75 / 100 
92 
92 / 100 
92 
86 / 100 
93 
93 / 100 
100 
100 / 100 
100 
93 / 100 
100 
80 / 100 
Expenditure 11 22 22 9 
9 / 50 
17 
17 / 33 
31 
15 / 50 
15 
14 / 17 
27 
27 / 17 
40 
33 / 25 
53 
33 / 44 
47 
27 / 30 
Table 6-5: Annual versus sustainability report disclosures 
 
Together this overview suggests that reporting of OHS information is a phenomenon 
in the process of institutionalisation. In particular, practices of providing evidence of 
managerial commitment to OHS by identifying OHS processes and presenting OHS 
outcome data have been adopted by each of the sampled firms. However, the extent 
to which these disclosures provide the necessary evidence to discharge 
accountability for OHS, or are simply attempts to legitimate corporate activity, is 
unclear without a more detailed examination of the reported content. Sections 6.2.1 
to 6.2.3, therefore, examine each of the three key areas of disclosure: governance, 
processes and outcomes. In doing so, the detailed content of OHS disclosure is 
documented and trends or patterns that become evident over the period of study are 
described. 
6.2.1 OHS Governance 
Annual and sustainability report disclosures relating to OHS governance addressed 
three issues: management commitment to ensuring OHS; the reflection of this 
                                                 
87 Note: not all firms issued sustainability reports. The percentages shown reflect the number of issued 
sustainability and / or annual reports that contained information on the target disclosure.  
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commitment by providing details of OHS policy and strategy; and structures for Board 
level oversight. The attention devoted to each is illustrated in Figure 6-4. 
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Figure 6-4: Institutionalisation of OHS governance disclosures 
6.2.1.1 Corporate commitment to OHS 
The proportion of firms offering statements of corporate commitment to OHS was 
high, ranging from 89% of sampled firms in 1997-99, dropping slightly in 2000-01 and 
then rising to 100% of firms from 2002 through to the end of the sampled period 
(2007). Declarations such as “Safety is our highest priority” appeared in 67% of 
annual reports, Managing Director’s reports and / or Chairman’s statements. Some 
were accompanied by claims of (usually improving) injury or fatality rates, or 
unquantified references to improving or deteriorating OHS outcomes, statements of 
management’s regret or disappointment at recent injuries or fatalities, a need to 
“redouble our safety effort” (see for example, ED2006, MJ1998, MJ2004, MH2004), and 
the desire to eliminate all work-related injuries. 
Indeed, statements proclaiming the corporate pursuit of “zero injuries and illnesses” 
appeared increasingly institutionalised over time. In some cases, firms provided no 
details about how the elimination of all injury was to be achieved or even how it 
related to existing levels of performance. This ‘zero harm’ goal was reportedly 
underpinned by a fundamental belief (stated explicitly by an increasing number of 
firms over time, 67% in 2007) in the ability to prevent all workplace injury and illness. 
Statements, often repeated in consecutive annual reports, claimed for example: 
[This firm] believes that all injuries are preventable and its goal is zero injuries (MJ 
2003, p55; 2004, p55; 2005, p56; 2006, p32), [and] We believe all injuries are 
preventable (MJ 2007, p88). 
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We believe that all workplace incidents are preventable (MB 2005, p9; 2006, p13).  
[This firm] believes that all injuries, incidents and occupational illnesses are 
preventable... The clear business objective is to achieve zero injuries (MC 2005, 
p28).    
[This firm] demonstrates a strong commitment to occupational health and safety, 
believing that all injuries, occupational illnesses and incidents are preventable ... 
Achieving zero injuries is a clear objective in all [our] businesses (MC 2006, p28; 
2007, p28). 
 
In one case, it was interesting to see a firm report not “we believe injuries are 
preventable”, but rather:  
We seek to create a mindset and an environment where people believe it is 
possible to work injury free (MH 2007, p114, emphasis added).  
Despite claiming to believe all injuries were preventable, one firm suggested that 
“continuing to set annual 50 per cent [injury] reduction targets is not realistic (MJb 
2003, p3). Indeed, claims of zero harm often contrasted sharply with both actual injury 
performance and annual targets that were often well above zero. This suggests that 
firms are either taking a long-term approach to the achievement of their ‘zero harm’ 
goal and are content to work incrementally toward improved OHS performance or 
that claims of zero harm are merely motherhood statements provided for legitimation 
purposes which remain decoupled from day-to-day practice.  
The tension between stakeholder accountability and corporate legitimacy motivations 
for OHS reporting was perhaps most evident in the changing way in which OHS 
responsibility was framed. The explicit recognition of an organisation’s responsibility 
to ensure OHS within the context of social responsibility, accountability and human 
rights was evident in early reports. For example: 
Significantly, we must also meet emerging standards in the areas of safety, the 
environment and community relations. We must respect the mandate to operate 
that the community has given us … All of us at [MH] must accept accountability for 
what has to be done (MH 1997, p6). 
As noted above, numerous reports identified safety as “the highest”, “greatest” and 
“most important”, organisational priority. Some argued, however, that safety and 
profitability were not mutually exclusive goals. 
If a conflict arises between safety and other business priorities, safety will take 
priority … [This firm] has demonstrated in the past and expects in the future that 
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financial success and high levels of HSE performance are entirely complementary 
goals (EE 1999, p3). 
Seizing on this notion of a business case for safety, a number of firms framed OHS 
control from a financial perspective, citing an “economic justification” (EA 1999) or a 
“very strong business case” for OHS effort (MF 2006, p36). This was most evident in 
annual reports, which is perhaps not surprising given the target audience tends to be 
financial stakeholders such as shareholders and analysts. Nevertheless, although the 
business case argument gained popularity in the early 2000s it was undermined by 
the negative correlation often observed between reported safety performance and 
financial performance. Notably, revelations of deteriorating safety performance 
coincided on multiple occasions with declarations of significant cost-cutting 
achievements. In most cases the safety performance of these firms had previously 
been improving.  
Later reports moved away from framing OHS specifically as either an economic or 
human rights issue (each of which favoured particular stakeholders) and instead 
framed OHS in terms of a broader issue of ‘risk management’. This was noticeable, 
as illustrated in Figure 6-5, in the steady increase in the number of firms framing 
OHS from a risk management perspective: from one firm in 1997 to 11 firms by 2006.  
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Figure 6-5: Disclosures presenting OHS within a risk framework 
While later reports tended to present OHS as an important element of organisational 
risk, the way in which that risk was interpreted (for example, as human health risk, 
financial risk, reputational risk or legal risk) was not clearly articulated. The 
prevalence of OHS governance information in annual reports perhaps suggests OHS 
risk has been primarily conceived of as a financial rather than a human risk, 
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particularly given the predominantly commercial focus of annual reports versus the 
broader (social) stakeholder audience targeted by sustainability reports. 
The increase in the number of firms identifying OHS as an organisational risk in their 
2006 reports is perhaps explained by the 2005 introduction of ASX Listing Rule 
4.10.3 requiring firms to specify in annual reports the extent to which corporate 
governance recommendations have been followed. These include Principle 7: 
Recognise and Manage Risk. Indeed, the governance section of one report stated: 
Where once financial risks were our primary consideration, it is also now non-
financial risks that we formally identify, assess, monitor and manage to ensure 
long term business success and growth. We do this by setting accountability and 
governance at the highest governing level in the organisation (MJb 2007, p10).  
6.2.1.2 Corporate board oversight 
For many firms, articulating governance structures for OHS oversight ‘at the highest 
levels’ included the identification of committees of the Board of Directors, whose 
charter included OHS supervision. Although health, safety and environment 
committees, or similar, were reported by only two firms (22%) in 1997, 11 of the 15 
sampled firms (73%) reported on board committees with responsibility for OHS 
oversight by 2007. This reflected a surge in attention to workplace health and safety 
at the highest levels of corporate governance.  
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Figure 6-6: Disclosures of board sub-committees with OHS oversight charter 
As illustrated in Table 6-6, two of the 10 HSE88 committees identified were replaced 
with a more broadly oriented ‘sustainability’ committee, suggesting perhaps a re-
                                                 
88 The most common committees were Health, Safety and Environment (HSE); Safety, Health and 
Environment (SHE) and Health, Safety, Environment and Community (HSEC). 
 163
prioritising of attention to environmental over OHS concerns. In contrast, one firm 
reported that the disbanding of its Health, Safety, Environment and Social committee 
reflected a decision to:  
[R]educe [from six] to three the number of Committees and to put in place new 
Committee Charters that remove the overlapping of responsibilities previously 
existing (EC 2006, p66). 
Although there was no suggestion either in the annual report or on the company’s 
website that any of the three remaining committees, the ‘Audit Committee’, the 
‘Finance and Risk Committee’ or the ‘Remuneration and Nominations Committee’, 
had any specific charter for OHS oversight. It is acknowledged, however, that in the 
absence of a sub-committee, the ultimate responsibility for OHS resides with the full 
board of directors.  
Board Committees Charged with OHS Oversight 
2007                                Committee 
2006                                  Safety & Technical 
2005                                  HSE, SHE or HSEC
2004                                  Sustainability 
2003                                  Compliance 
2002                                 No sub-committee 
2001                                   
2000                                  
1999                                  
1998                                  
1997                                  
Y
ea
r 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15    
    Firm    
Table 6-6: Corporate boards of directors’ committees with OHS responsibility 
The existence of committees with oversight of OHS emphasises the importance of 
OHS risk oversight at the highest levels of corporate governance and therefore 
enhances the credibility of claims of corporate commitment to zero harm. The 
summary of OHS committees’ oversight in Table 6-6 reveals that the majority of firms 
operates committees oriented toward the combination of OHS and environment 
although the relative focus on issues of OHS versus environment was unclear.  
6.2.1.3 OHS Policy 
A key measure implemented by most corporate boards (100% of energy firms and 
90% of mining firms) was the development of a formal OHS policy to guide OHS risk 
management effort. Reference to OHS policies was inconsistent although increased 
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over time. While the reproduction of a corporate OHS or HSEC policy was evident in 
mid-stage sustainability reports (for example, MH 2001, 2002, 2005) or annual reports 
(for example, MC 2000 to 2005), later reports tended to provide a url for the webpage 
where readers could view or download the relevant policy.  
As illustrated in Figure 6-7, the number of firms referring to an OHS policy has 
fluctuated over the decade from 33% of both mining and energy firms issuing annual 
reports in 1997 to 13 of 15 firms by 2007 (100% of energy and 80% of mining firms). 
Most references to OHS policy were observed in the annual report only (see MG2007, 
MF2007, MK2002-2007, ED2000-2006), or in both annual and sustainability reports. 
Only two firms made reference to OHS policy in the sustainability report only (see EA 
2005-06, MI2007). This is consistent with the other governance disclosures above 
which were also more prevalent in annual than sustainability reports.  
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Figure 6-7: Disclosures relating to OHS policy 
 
Together, references to OHS policies and the identification of board committees 
responsible for managing OHS risk provided support for the declarations of corporate 
commitment to zero harm that have emerged as strong themes within recent 
corporate reports (particularly in annual reports). Despite this, very few firms provided 
details as to the processes for board oversight of OHS risk, explained how production 
/ OHS conflicts are resolved or outlined specific actions taken to ensure managers 
and employees comply with corporate policies. Instead, OHS governance disclosures 
tended to focus on declarations of commitment to zero harm and to future 
performance improvements although the credibility of ‘zero harm’ as anything other 
than a purely aspirational goal often appeared disingenuous given stated injury 
targets and performance levels.  
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6.2.1.4 Summary 
Overall, these results suggest that firms are providing disclosures on the OHS 
governance issues that are of interest to stakeholders. All firms offered declarations 
of managerial commitment to ensuring workplace health and safety and many made 
reference to OHS policies and oversight structures. However, few supported these 
claims with evidence in the form of descriptive detail that sought to explain the way in 
which this oversight was actually discharged. Instead, a legitimacy-seeking rhetoric 
of OHS governance appeared to be an institutionalised characteristic of external 
corporate reporting for most firms.  
The following sections explore the extent to which these claims of managerial 
commitment to OHS appear decoupled from organisational activity or were 
alternatively supported by detailed disclosures of OHS processes and outcomes. 
 
6.2.2 OHS processes 
Each of the sampled firms provided information about engagement in OHS risk 
management at some point through the period of study. These disclosures included 
the identification of at least one OHS activity or program used to reduce the risk of 
workplace injury or illness, such as “[this firm] investigates and reports all accidents, 
near misses and hazards” (EB 2000), although relatively few provided detailed 
narratives to explain how these activities were performed. The number of activities 
addressed within a report differed across firms and reporting media, with discussion 
tending to focus around a select few of the identified activities.  
 
Table 6-7: OHS activities per report 
 
Furthermore, most (88%) annual reports mentioned at least one OHS activity as did 
all sustainability reports. This is illustrated in Figure 6-8 and Figure 6-9 below, 
 
Per Annual Report Per CSR Report Number of 
Activities: Minimum Maximum Average Minimum Maximum Average 
Identified 0 14 7 1 16 9 
Discussed 0 5 3 0 9 6 
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Figure 6-8: Disclosure of OHS activity in annual reports 
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Figure 6-9: Disclosure of OHS activity in sustainability reports 
 
Viewed together, these figures highlight changes over time in both the number of 
firms reporting on OHS processes and the range of activities these disclosures 
address. They also highlight changes in distribution of information between the 
annual report and sustainability report. See, for example, the number of activities 
identified in 2005 annual versus sustainability reports. Similarly, 2004 saw an 
increase in activities discussed in the annual versus sustainability report which then 
appeared to reverse in 2005. These changes back and forth over time suggest, 
perhaps, some uncertainty on the part of preparers as to what to cover in terms of 
content and whether to disclose particular activity data in annual reports, 
sustainability reports or both. It also leaves stakeholders unclear as to where they are 
most likely to find OHS information.  
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6.2.2.1 Patterns of reporting on OHS activities 
Given that the purpose of sustainability reporting is to provide a vehicle for the 
communication of social and environmental information, it is not surprising that firms 
tended to provide a broader range of information about OHS processes in 
sustainability reports than annual reports. These included details about behavioural-
based safety initiatives (90% of sustainability reports versus 62% of annual reports); 
safety culture (66% versus 39%); hazard management (66% versus 41%); 
compliance auditing against OHS standards (62% versus 44%);  programs for 
managing serious disease (60% versus 28%); and emergency response drills (42% 
versus 22%).  
Furthermore, while each firm disclosed information relating to safety training, risk 
assessment and risk management, industry effects relating to the approach in 
dealing with particular OHS risks were apparent. For example, mining firms were 
more likely than energy firms to report on occupational exposures, health and hazard 
reduction (100% versus 80%); the use of personal protective equipment (70% versus 
40%); and near misses (80% versus 60%). In contrast, energy firms were more likely 
to report on absenteeism (40% versus 0%) and safety compliance auditing (100% 
versus 90%).  
The focus of OHS activity disclosures also changed over time. This is depicted in the 
following overview of the proportion of firms reporting on particular processes and 
programs over three time periods: 1997-99; 2000-04 and 2005-07. 
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Figure 6-10: Disclosure of OHS activities over time 
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Figure 6-10 above reveals OHS training, safety standards and compliance audits to 
be the activities most often reported in earlier disclosures (i.e. 1997 to 1999 
inclusive). Other issues, such as risk assessment, exposure monitoring, hazard 
control, behaviour control and emergency readiness received slightly lower levels of 
attention in these early years.  
The disclosure index employed in this study89 identified both the number of firms 
reporting on each type of activity and the level of detail provided. This included 
capturing the extent to which a disclosure was: 
1. Identified: A report mentions the existence of an OHS activity such as 
OHS training, OHS compliance audit, exposure monitoring, or health and 
fitness programs.  
2. Briefly discussed: A sentence is provided that briefly explains the activity 
or presents a simple measure of change in the activity (e.g. a comment 
that 20 staff took up nicotine patches in a quit smoking program. 
3. Detailed explanation: Discussion provides explanation about how the 
activity is conducted and / or a breakdown of outcome measures of 
performance by category or over time (e.g. detailed explanation of health 
exposure monitoring programs with data showing exposure levels to 
various health hazards). 
 
The following analysis of OHS disclosures is therefore possible. Notably, very little 
detail about the conduct of OHS programs or activities was provided in early years, 
while toward the end of the period, increases in both the number of firms reporting on 
particular issues and the level of detail provided were evident. 
                                                 
89 This is explained in detail in section 4.4.2. 
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Figure 6-11: Activity detail presented (1997-99) 
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Figure 6-12: Activity detail presented (2005-07) 
By the end of the period (2005 to 2007), relative emphasis on OHS audit, exposure 
monitoring and emergency preparedness had reduced considerably while attention to 
employee behaviour and safety culture had become increasingly institutionalised. 
This reflected the first of three important changes in OHS activity disclosure over the 
period. The first was a change in the type of OHS management disclosures offered 
and highlighted an increasingly institutionalised focus on behaviour-based safety. 
The second saw attention to occupational health move away from monitoring health 
exposures and adopt a more philanthropic stance. The third was the provision of an 
increasing amount of detail and, in particular, quantitative KPI data, to support 
narratives about OHS activities. A brief examination of each of these three changes 
is presented in sections 6.2.2.2 to 6.2.2.4. 
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6.2.2.2 Trend 1: Behaviour-based safety for OHS risk management  
As illustrated in Figure 6-12, disclosures relating to safe behaviour and safety 
incentive schemes for employees and managers increased from the fifth and 
thirteenth most frequently reported activities in the early years of the study to the 
most and second most frequently reported (respectively). By 2007, more firms 
reported on behaviour control programs than reported on hazard control programs. 
This is illustrated in Figure 6-13. 
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Figure 6-13: Focus of OHS risk management programs  
This increasing focus on BBS was also evident in the growing level of detail 
contained in BBS disclosures compared to other forms of risk management activity. 
For example, by 2007, 60% of firms provided detailed discussion about behaviour 
management programs while only 33% provided similar detail about hazard 
management (see Figure 6-14). Furthermore, the presentation of safe behaviour 
information exceeded disclosures relating to plant, equipment and hazard-based 
programs, including OHS training, safety standards, audit and health exposure 
monitoring, and references to OHS training and risk assessment increasingly 
presented safe behaviour examples suggesting perhaps that these activities too were 
adopting a more behavioural focus.  
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Figure 6-14: Level of detail provided about BBS activity 
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The increasing dominance of BBS disclosures was surprising since, as identified in 
Chapter 2, the widely accepted hierarchy of control model upon which both normative 
and legislative guidance is based advocates a primarily ergonomic approach to OHS 
management, in which attention is primarily directed toward activities and processes 
that identify and eliminate (or control) workplace hazards. Within an ergonomic 
framework BBS initiatives will be viewed as supplementary, not primary, control 
mechanisms for addressing OHS risk management.  
The shifting focus to BBS, including increased reporting on BBS programs, incentive 
schemes and safety culture, represented a noticeable change in both strategy and 
language. For example, the analysis identified an increasing number of claims, 
particularly in annual reports, of the need for a “strong safety culture” (EC 2005-7, EB 
2007, MF 2005-7, MJ 2007), the importance of “visible safety leadership” (MH 2002-7, 
MJ 2003-6, MC 2006-07), and in particular, the need to ensure “individual 
accountability” for safety performance (EB 2001, EC 2004, ED 2003-7, MC 2000-5, MF 
2005-7, MG 2002, MH 2004,07, MJ 2002-6). 
These appeared to reflect one of two underlying positions. For some firms, BBS 
disclosures were offered as part of a discussion of integrated systems of hazard and 
behaviour management consistent with the ‘hierarchy of control’ approach to OHS 
management advocated by legislation and the OHS profession. This recognises the 
complementary role BBS can play in managing workplace OHS risk. For example: 
We are developing a safety culture that focuses on: minimising and removing 
unsafe conditions; and reducing and eliminating unsafe acts (MF 2004, p27). 
For example, three firms provided case studies that identified unsafe behaviours, 
then traced them to the unsafe condition (hazard) that was deemed to drive the 
behaviour, and then presented the solution implemented to address the underlying 
hazard (for example, MH2005, p209). Others explicitly linked disclosures on BBS 
programs back to the hazard management objectives, using more general 
statements such as: 
The Safe Behaviour Observation (SBO) process has also been implemented 
across all operations … focusing on the root causes of unsafe acts (rather than 
just the acts) (MG 2007, p37). 
[Our] programme of interactive behavioural audits or safety interactions … 
involves managers, supervisors and superintendents being present in the 
workplace and actively discussing safety with employees. Managers interact with 
employees after observing them at work. They recognise and discuss the safe 
and less safe behaviours observed, along with any other safety issues before 
affirming with the employee what needs to be done to ensure continued safety 
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for the individual and the group. This enables supervisors and managers to 
observe the performance of normal work activities, reinforce safe work practices 
and correct unsafe acts and conditions (MJ 2005, p13, emphasis added). 
In other cases, however, BBS disclosures appeared to contrast both the normative 
and legislative guidance outlined above by implying that the firm had moved away 
from an ergonomic model where unsafe acts are examined to identify an underlying 
root cause (hazard) and toward an egocentric model of OHS where unsafe acts 
themselves are seen as the root cause of injury. This was inferred by the explicit 
emphasis on individual employee behaviour in some reports and the increasing 
tendency to only present information on the identification and elimination of ‘unsafe’ 
acts. Statements ranged from the recognition of individual behaviour as one of many 
OHS risk factors, through to those inferring the central tenet of OHS strategy centred 
entirely on safe behaviour control. A sample of the range of comments follows: 
In order to embed the concept of zero injuries in [our] culture, we must move 
from focusing solely on systems to focusing on individual intentions and 
behaviour, while ensuring our systems remain ‘fit for purpose’. Management, for 
its part, ‘walks the talk’, getting out in the workplace to be a visible presence, 
talking to people, recognising and rewarding safe behaviour, and discussing and 
correcting unsafe behaviour (MJ 2006, p12). 
It was clear that systems development and polices alone were not sufficient. Real 
and sustainable improvements in safety are achieved only with ongoing 
commitment to a change in behaviour and attitude by all employees and 
contractors (MG 2005, p41). 
Changing behaviours will remain the focus for achieving ongoing health and 
safety improvements (MB 2005, p15).  
Strong emphasis on the Target Zero initiative continued throughout the year, 
reinforcing the principle that every injury and incident is preventable by modifying 
the behaviour of all employees and contractors (MG 2006, p36).  
We do not accept that injuries are inevitable. Most injuries result from a person 
committing an unsafe act (MJ 2004, p12). 
Our major initiatives, during 2005/06, were directed at changing our safety 
culture and strengthening our safety leadership. We introduced a policy of zero 
tolerance for unsafe acts. Any of our people who deliberately act in an unsafe 
manner now undergo a formal disciplinary process which may result in dismissal 
(MB 2006, p13). 
These last few quotes suggest the pursuit of a legitimation strategy designed to 
influence stakeholder expectations as to the accountability for OHS outcomes of 
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employers versus employees. This is consistent with the concerns evident in the 
literature, as outlined in Chapter 2, which suggests BBS may offer a means by which 
employers seek to abdicate responsibility for OHS and transfer blame to employees 
for poor OHS outcomes. This was particularly notable where firms sought to report 
on OHS by supplementing injury and fatality outcomes only with information about 
unsafe acts (largely driven by employees) while remaining silent on structural, 
administrative or workflow hazards and controls (largely driven by employers).  
Indeed, moves to promote the individual accountability of employees for OHS were 
reflected in increasing disclosure of OHS incentive schemes that adopted either a 
compliance approach, emphasising penalties or counselling for engaging in unsafe 
acts (for example, MB 2005-06, MH 2004), or an incentive approach that rewarded 
either safe behaviour (for example, EA 2003, MJ 2002, 2006-07) or improvements in 
total workplace injury outcomes (for example, EA 2005-7, ED 2006-7, MB 2005-7, MC 
2004-7, MJ 1999-2007). No mention was made, however, of the potential for 
dysfunctional outcomes that may result from the use of such sanctions or incentives 
(Frederick and Lessin 2000; Hoogervorst et al. 2004; Hopkins 2006c; O'Neill and Gray 2008; 
Petersen 1999). The logical consequences for health and safety, as articulated in the 
safety literature, were indeed evident with the introduction of BBS programs in a 
number of firms associated with deteriorating, rather than improving, OHS injury 
outcomes. These injury and illness outcomes are discussed further in section 6.3.  
6.2.2.3 Trend 2: Occupational health as corporate philanthropy 
The second notable change in activity disclosure was the increasing attention to 
occupational health and, in particular, to philanthropic well-being and fitness 
programs for employees, their families and communities. At the beginning of the 
period the proportion of firms reporting on the identification and control of hazardous 
health exposures to, for example, chemicals, viruses, toxins, carcinogens, 
environment and radiation (33%) was slightly greater than those reporting on well-
being and disease prevention programs (22%). By 2007, this had reversed with the 
number reporting on exposures rising marginally to 47% of firms while those 
organisations reporting on health, fitness and disease prevention programs tripled to 
67%. The types of issues addressed in occupational health exposure, well-being and 
fitness for work program disclosures are summarised in Table 6-8.  
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Occupational health disclosures 
Testing exposure: Well-being programs: Fitness for work: 
Environment:  Healthy eating programs Drug testing 
  noise, heat, light, etc. Quit smoking programs Alcohol testing 
  dust, fibres, asbestos  Weight and fitness programs Fatigue 
management  
Emissions: 
  radiation, toxic fumes 
Disease awareness courses        
– HIV/Aids, malaria, TB, etc. 
Counselling 
programs 
Heavy metals Influenza vaccinations  
  lead, aluminium, etc. Stress reduction courses  
Toxic chemicals  Gym memberships  
Viruses and bacteria 
Other  
  irritants, carcinogens 
Specific health check programs  
–  blood pressure, 
cholesterol, diabetes,  
general health 
 
   
Table 6-8: Occupational exposure and health programs 
 
Sustainability reports were twice as likely as annual reports (78% compared to 39%) 
to describe processes for identifying and managing excessive levels of exposure to 
workplace health hazards. These disclosures respond to the growing public 
awareness of significant personal (health), financial and reputational consequences 
of poor occupational exposure management and the need to assure stakeholders 
that occupational exposures are effectively monitored and controlled. This public 
concern has been reinforced by substantial media attention to cases such as the 
litigation against James Hardie Pty Ltd for mesothelioma suffered by workers and 
consumers affected by exposure to asbestos fibres.  
Despite this, however, analysis of results by year (shown in Figure 6-15) indicates 
that detailed disclosures on occupational exposure hazards were generally low. 
Instead, firms appeared to be focusing increasing attention on health programs such 
as fitness for work assessments (drug and alcohol testing in particular) and voluntary 
well-being programs offered to employees, their families and / or members of the 
local community. The findings, therefore, do not support speculation presented in 
Chapter 2 that firms would increase disclosures relating to occupational exposure in 
response to publicity surrounding cases such as James Hardie Pty Ltd. Instead, the 
proportion of firms reporting on occupational exposure remains relatively low with all 
but one firm decreasing the level of exposure data presented. 
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Figure 6-15: Level of detail of occupational health disclosures 
Rather than focusing efforts on accountability for industrial health exposure, many 
firms instead appear more concerned with promoting perceptions of corporate 
citizenship through disclosures about voluntary introductions of employee and 
community initiatives. This is consistent with the legitimacy-seeking behaviour 
outlined in the previous section in that it represents a shift in focus from ‘negative’ 
disclosures based largely around organisational risk to ‘positive’ disclosures 
revealing philanthropic activities such as voluntary employee well-being and 
community health programs.  
6.2.2.4 Trend 3: Process KPIs as evidence of OHS effectiveness  
The third change identified in corporate OHS process disclosure related to the 
increasing use of quantitative indicators of OHS activity inputs and outputs. These 
process indicators consisted of two broad groups of activity-based performance 
measures (as opposed to injury outcome measures):  
• lead indicators, or measures of inputs or resources allocated to OHS processes 
(e.g. the number of training sessions held or safety audits conducted)   and 
• lag indicators, or measures of the outputs or results of these OHS processes                         
(e.g. the number of staff trained or the number of audit non-conformances).  
The firms examined in this study appeared to view all process indicators as lead 
indicators (processes lead injuries) and did not explicitly differentiate between the 
lead and lag PPIs as described above. This is consistent with the literature in 
Chapter 2 and is illustrated in the following quotation taken from an annual report: 
The majority of sites have introduced lead indicators that support the measurement 
and tracking of their critical safety interventions. A lead indicator is a metric used to 
drive and measure activities carried out to control and prevent injury, damage or 
loss. When measured and monitored effectively, they provide data to enable 
effective intervention to address or reverse a negative trend before it results in 
injury, damage or loss. A guideline document and presentation were developed to 
increase knowledge, create discussion and promote the wider use of lead 
 176
indicators as a driver to safety improvement across the Company. Injury statistics 
or other lag indicators provide an overall estimate of the progress required to 
achieve our vision of Zero Harm but do not measure the effective implementation 
of safety programs, proactive action plans and preventative activities in place ... It 
is therefore important that a mix of lead and lag indicators are used to measure 
overall safety effectiveness and performance (MH 2005, p180). 
The disclosure index used in this study captured both lead and lag90 PPIs. It also 
identified both PPI data actually presented as well as those PPIs which firms 
reported to capture but did not disclose. Overall, the results highlight the progress 
these firms have made in recent years in developing both lead and lag process PPIs. 
As illustrated below, the number of firms reporting to monitor at least one lead PPI 
increased from two to 13 and those actually presenting lead PPI data from zero to 
ten. Increases in the number of firms identifying and disclosing lag PPIs were also 
evident, albeit to a lesser extent, with firms identifying at least one lag PPI over the 
period, increasing from one to 10 firms and those presenting lag PPI data increasing 
from one to five91. Figure 6-16 demonstrates these efforts although reveals an overall 
low rate of PPI reporting and a fall in the number of firms actually disclosing PPI data 
in recent years.  
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Figure 6-16: Disclosure of lead and lag PPIs 
The results suggest that while most firms claim to be engaged in a range of OHS 
activities, and to be capturing various related PPIs, only around half are presenting 
lead PPI data and even fewer identify or present lag PPIs within either sustainability 
or annual reports. Sustainability reports were the primary vehicle for identifying those 
leading PPIs captured by firms (2007: 78% versus 46%), presenting leading PPI data 
(2007: 56% versus 25%), identifying lagging PPIs (2007: 50% versus 19%) and 
presenting lagging PPI data (2007: 34% versus 14%).  
                                                 
90 Lag indicators of OHS outcomes, or injury and illness KPIs, are discussed separately in section 6.2.3. 
91 The maximum number of firms to present lead and lag KPIs was seen in 2005 (lead) and 2006 (lag). 
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The PPIs reported by the greatest number of firms were those that did not present 
negative information about the entity, namely activities relating to employee 
behaviour, philanthropic health programs and those relating to the promotion of OHS 
education such as incident analysis and training. In contrast, those indicators 
presenting evidence of OHS failures or hazards were reported by decreasing 
numbers of firms over time. Table 6-9 provides a summary of the disclosure of PPI 
data by OHS activity. The proportion of the 137 cases in which each OHS activity 
was discussed can be contrasted with the proportion in which supporting evidence 
was provided in the form of either lead and lag PPIs: a) identified as being used by a 
firm; or b) PPI data was actually provided.  
Percentage of cases1 in which each activity and lead or lag PPI was disclosed 
(number of firms reporting PPI data on this topic) 
Year Discuss Activity  
Identify 
Lead 
KPIs 
Show 
Lead 
KPI 
Identify 
Lag 
KPIs 
Show 
Lag   
KPIs  
Year Discuss Activity 
Identify 
Lead 
KPIs 
Show 
Lead   
KPI 
Identify 
Lag   
KPIs 
Show  
Lag   
KPIs 
Behaviour management   
(9 firms)  
Hazard management  
(3 firms) 
 2005-07 87% 38% 22% 4% 4%  2005-07 62% 9% 0% 0% 4% 
 2000-04 73% 9% 5% 2% 2%  2000-04 53% 6% 2% 0% 0% 
 1997-99 30% 11% 7% 4% 0%  1997-99 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Health and well-being programs  
(8 firms)  
Safety audit 
(5 firms) 
2005-07 62% 36% 18% 9% 11%  2005-07 53% 29% 9% 20% 16% 
2000-04 41% 11% 8% 8% 8%  2000-04 59% 9% 6% 2% 2% 
1997-99 26% 4% 0% 7% 7%  1997-99 41% 4% 0% 0% 0% 
Exposure monitoring  
(3 firms) 
 Emergency preparedness  (4 firms) 
2005-07 38% 31% 18% 13% 13%  2005-07 36% 13% 11% 0% 0% 
2000-04 42% 31% 8% 14% 11%  2000-04 38% 17% 14% 0% 0% 
1997-99 30% 7% 0% 7% 7%  1997-99 30% 7% 7% 0% 0% 
OHS training 
(7 firms) 
 Safety standards (4 firms) 
2005-07 80% 18% 11% 0% 0%  2005-07 73% 13% 4% 2% 2% 
2000-04 64% 8% 6% 0% 0%  2000-04 59% 6% 5% 0% 0% 
1997-99 48% 11% 0% 7% 7%  1997-99 44% 4% 0% 0% 0% 
Incident analysis 
(8 firms) 
 Risk assessment (3 firms) 
2005-07 62% 9% 4% 16% 9%  2005-07 73% 9% 4% 4% 4% 
2000-04 44% 3% 2% 6% 6%  2000-04 63% 2% 2% 0% 0% 
1997-99 19% 0% 0% 0% 0%  1997-99 30% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Safety incentive systems  
(1 firm) 
 Safety culture assessment (3 firms) 
2005-07 82% 0% 0% 0% 2%   2005-07 67% 9% 4% 4% 2% 
 2000-04 30% 2% 0% 0% 0%   2000-04 44% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 1997-99 11% 0% 0% 0% 0%   1997-99 11% 7% 0% 0% 0% 
Near miss / High potential incidents  
(5 firms)  
Absenteeism 
(2 firms) 
2005-07 49% 36% 22% 20% 13%  2005-07 49% na na 4% 4% 
2000-04 28% 3% 2% 9% 6%  2000-04 28% na na 6% 6% 
1997-99 11% 0% 0% 0% 0%   1997-99 11% na na 0% 0% 
1 These results are a percentage of the 137 cases for the 11-year period (one for each firm reporting in any given year). 
Table 6-9: Disclosure of safety PPIs 
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This summary again confirms that while the provision of lead and lag PPI data was 
generally low, those PPIs relating to health and behaviour-based safety initiatives 
were most prevalent. Disclosures relating to BBS programs included lead PPIs such 
as the administration of drug and alcohol tests, recorded number of conversations 
about safety issues, or percentage of target workplace safety observations achieved 
while lag PPIs captured outcomes such as rates of unsafe behaviour and, in one 
case, a reported percentage of safety incidents “that could have been prevented if 
people had followed the safety rules” (EE 2006, p45). Indicators relating to health 
programs included lead PPIs reflecting the number of sites on which programs were 
offered while lag PPIs reflected take-up rates or measures of improvements in health 
assessments. Similarly, examples of health exposure PPIs included lead indicators 
such as the number of sites monitored and number or percentage of employees 
tested, while lag PPIs identified as a number or rate the incidence of exposures 
outside standard (acceptable) parameters.  
Analysis by industry revealed that energy firms were more likely than mining firms to 
present PPIs for wellbeing or fitness for work programs (80% compared to 40%) and 
safety training (80% compared to 30%). In contrast, exposure data was only provided 
by mining firms (MF, MH, MN), highlighting the greater relevance of hazardous 
occupational exposures to the mining industry. Mining firms were also more likely to 
provide BBS data, with 70% of firms presenting BBS PPIs between 2001 and 2007, 
compared to only 40% of energy firms. This suggests that although the reported 
adoption of BBS appears increasingly institutionalised in large mining firms, the 
relevant organisational field boundaries for BBS diffusion may not extend to other 
resource sectors such as energy firms. This perhaps reflects the normative influence 
of the mining industry association, rather than the safety profession more generally, 
in driving the diffusion of BBS data disclosure across the field or alternatively, a 
mimetic process in which sampled mining firms have followed the example set by two 
industry leaders. 
Proactive OHS measures, such as absenteeism and near miss events, were 
mentioned by 12 firms although only six provided quantitative data. This included 
PPIs such as the number of near misses, number of high potential incidents (HPI), 
ratio of near misses (or HPIs) to either hours worked or to the number of employees, 
and the ratio of near miss incidents to injuries sustained. Despite the interest of 
stakeholders in HPI data (see Chapter 5), disclosure of proactive injury data was 
infrequent with most of the five firms providing data in one year only and no firm 
providing data in more than three of the 11 years examined. The failure to regularly 
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report on proactive injury outcomes was consistent with findings of the presentation 
of actual injury and fatality data which is discussed in the following section.  
6.2.2.5 Summary 
This section has revealed that each of the 15 firms reported processes for managing 
OHS hazards, employee behaviour and occupational health. It also outlined the 
substantial improvement evident over the period in the detail disclosed about OHS 
risk management activities. This provided information for the 98.1% of stakeholders 
who identified as very important those disclosures about the OHS hazard control 
strategy and processes adopted by firms. One respondent described this as the need 
for “detail to go with the [injury outcome] numbers” (TU27).  
As illustrated in Table 6-10, both stakeholders and reporters appeared to view OHS 
risk management as the most important activity disclosure, although the focus for 
each group was completely different. Stakeholders preferred disclosures about 
hazard management with 78.6% of respondents identifying these as extremely or 
very important. Safety hazard disclosures were only provided in 50.4% of cases and 
safety standards were reported in 59.9%, a total of 68.6% of the 137 cases, revealing 
hazard-based reporting. In contrast, although stakeholders failed to rank BBS in the 
top five most important disclosures and only 48.2% of stakeholders even identified 
them as very important, behaviour management was reported more frequently by 
firms with BBS initiatives (reported in 67.2% of cases) and supporting incentive 
structures (reported in 42.3% of cases) bringing the total incidence of BBS reporting 
to 72.3%. Notably, between 1997 and 2001 the percentage of firms reporting on 
hazards was higher than those reporting on BBS in four out of five years (1997, 
1998, 1999 and 2001). Between 2002 and 2007, however, the percentage of firms 
reporting on hazards was only higher once in six years (2004).  
Reconciling OHS Activity Narratives to Stakeholder Expectations  
 Disclosures 
(% of cases) 
Managing 
behaviour 
Managing 
hazards 
Incident 
analysis  
Managing health 
exposure 
Regulatory 
feedback 
Identified 75.9 % 68.6 % 43.1% 38.7 % 9.7 % 
Discussed 49.7 % 27.6 % 25.7 % 34.7 % 0 % 
Explained    
in detail  31.7 % 12.4 % 11.1 % 12.0 % 0 % 
Stakeholder 
expectation 48.2 % 78.6 % 63.9 % 65.0% 64.2% 
Table 6-10: Meeting expectations for OHS activity disclosure 
The results presented above suggest that firms are directing greater effort toward the 
presentation of detailed information on issues of less relevance to stakeholders, such 
 180
as BBS, while failing to provide the comparable levels of detail about those issues 
stakeholders perceive to be of more importance. This table also reveals that less 
than half the sampled firms are meeting stakeholder expectations in regard to the 
provision of information about incident analysis, occupational health exposure and 
feedback from regulators. In the latter instance it was observed that, of all the firms 
reporting serious incidents subject to investigations by statutory authorities or fines 
for breaches of compliance with OHS legislation, only one provided details about 
feedback from regulators. Again, this demonstrates that given the voluntary nature of 
OHS disclosure, firms are failing to present the explanatory information identified as 
being of paramount importance to stakeholders and are instead focusing on those 
topics which arguably present them in a more favourable light.   
This was further evidenced by PPI disclosures. For example, 14 firms presented lead 
PPIs over the period of study, with the numbers rising from no firms in 1997 to ten by 
2005 and back to eight by 2007. In contrast, ten firms provided lag PPIs over the 
period, rising from one in 1997 to seven by 2005 and back to six by 2007. These 
covered a range of PPIs with few firms reporting on the same indicators.  
Reconciling OHS Activity PPIs to Stakeholder Expectations 
              OHS audit / compliance  
OHS         
training   
Hazardous 
exposures  
Health / fitness 
programs   
Incident 
analysis 
Safe 
behaviour 
  Lead KPI 
Lag  
KPI  
Lead 
KPI 
Lag  
KPI 
Lead 
KP 
Lag  
KPI  
Lead 
KPI  
Lag 
KPI 
Lead 
KPI  
Lag 
KPI 
Lead 
KPI 
Lag   
KPI 
Firms / 15  
4 
27% 
4 
27%  
  7 
47% 
1 
7% 
3 
20% 
3 
20% 
8 
53% 
5 
33% 
7 
47% 
5 
33%  
9 
60% 
2 
13% 
Cases / 137 
8 
6% 
10 
7% 
10 
7% 
2 
1.5% 
13 
10% 
15 
11% 
13 
10% 
14 
10.5%
3 
2% 
9 
6.5% 
13 
10% 
2 
1.5% 
Stakeholder 
expectation 65.6% 76.2%  56.1% 61.8% 73.2% 65.0% 65.0% 50.4% 
Table 6-11: Meeting expectations for OHS PPI disclosure 
(Note: only the most frequently presented lead and lag indicators have been shown above.) 
 
While survey respondents reported to be more interested in measures of the 
outcomes of OHS processes (lag PPIs) than the processes themselves (lead PPIs), 
Table 6-11 illustrates firms were more likely to provide lead than lag data. For 
example, 47% of firms provided PPIs revealing the number of training courses 
offered but only 7% reported on the number of employees actually trained. This is 
well below the expectations of the 56.1% and 61.8% of stakeholders (respectively) 
who had sought OHS training performance data. Similarly, while 76.2% of 
stakeholders indicated the disclosure of OHS audit non-conformance rates was 
extremely or very important, this data was only provided by four of the 15 firms and 
then only in 24% of the reports those four firms issued (7% of all cases).  
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This shows that a large proportion of firms are failing to support narratives about 
OHS processes with the quantified evidence stakeholders expect which may have 
implications for perceptions of the credibility of activity disclosures. Furthermore, the 
lack of PPI reporting by some firms and the lack of consistency in PPIs presented by 
others again raises concerns about the ability of stakeholders to benchmark 
performance data across firms and time. While early trends suggested PPI disclosure 
was an emerging phenomenon, the number of firms reporting PPIs has in fact 
reduced since 2005. Together the general failure of firms to provide evidence-based 
disclosures on those outcomes and processes of primary interest to stakeholders 
reflects an important reporting gap. This issue is examined further in Chapter 7. 
6.2.3 OHS Outcomes  
Data on OHS outcomes, that is, the incidence of workplace fatality, injury and illness, 
was provided by 67% of the sampled firms in 1997, rising to 100% of firms from 2005 
onward. This data was grouped into four broad categories of disclosure: the number 
of work-related fatalities, measures of injury severity, the frequency of work-related 
injury and measures of occupational illness and disease. The trends in reporting on 
each of these four categories of OHS outcome were found to be quite different. 
Figure 6-17, reveals an increasingly institutionalised presentation of injury data over 
the period with the frequency of reporting on injury rising steadily from 56% of firms in 
1997 to 100% by 2005 and thereafter, a 20% increase in reporting on work-related 
fatalities from 2006 and a dramatic 44% increase in reporting on injury outcomes 
over the period. This contrasts with the 13% fall, and ultimately the cessation, in 
severity disclosure which means that despite the number of firms reporting on injury 
frequencies increasing to 100% over the period, the ability of stakeholders’ to 
evaluate the degree of non-fatal human impairment was actually withdrawn.  
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Figure 6-17: Disclosure of OHS outcomes 
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Furthermore, given the substantial increase in attention to occupational health 
initiatives presented in the previous section, the comparatively slight 14% increase in 
reporting on health outcomes highlights a lack of transparency by most (although not 
all) of the sampled firms in regard to the outcomes of the health-related initiatives 
described in the previous section. Disclosures of each of these four categories of 
OHS outcomes are now examined in turn.     
6.2.3.1 Work-related fatality disclosures 
Fourteen of the 15 sampled firms (93%) reported on the number of work-related 
fatalities at least once during the decade, although with only a few exceptions (as 
shown below) reporting was generally ad hoc and inconsistent. Fatality disclosures 
were identified in only 55 (40%) of the 137 possible reporting periods (34.3% of all 
annual reports and 66% of all CSR reports). This includes the 13 occasions on which 
firms reported zero total fatalities (see Table 6-12). On a number of occasions firms 
appeared to report only in those years in which no fatalities were sustained (for 
example M7 in Table 6-12). These left stakeholders unclear as to whether fatalities 
had actually occurred in the years in which fatalities were not mentioned. Within the 
voluntary context of OHS outcome reporting it appears some firms, at least, are 
choosing to report opportunistically.  
 
Summary of fatality disclosures by firm and year 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
% of yrs 
reported
E1                 F^    F (4) 18% 
E2         F             9% 
E3           F       F F 27% 
E4      F^  F^    F       F 50% 
E5                 F^     17% 
M1 F (1) F F F F F F F (1) F (2) F (1) F# 100% 
M2           F^   F F    27% 
M3   F F F F (6) F F (1) F F F (1)  F (2)  91% 
M4      F     F   F   F^  F^ F 55% 
M5                F^ F^ 18% 
M6 F F F F F             45% 
M7          F^ (1)   F^ (4)     25% 
M8                    0% 
M9                 F   F^  50% 
M10               F   F  F^ 75% 
N=15 2 3 3 5 5 5 4 5 8 7 9 41% 
 22% 33% 33% 45% 42% 38% 31% 33% 53% 47% 60%  
F = Fatalities disclosed,   F# = ‘Total’ fatalities disclosed    F^ = Zero fatalities,  (x) = Number of prior years’ comparative data 
shown 
Table 6-12: Reported incidence of fatality 
Comparative (prior year) fatality data was provided by only four firms. This appeared 
designed to present the current data in a favourable light by including sufficient 
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historical data to reveal results had improved or by omitting prior year data that 
appeared more favourable. In numerous cases, failure to disclose fatalities was 
identified by comparing reported prior year data to reports actually issued in those 
previous years. This undermined the perceived reliability of data and highlighted the 
danger in assuming that no disclosure means zero fatalities. It also underscores the 
importance of the recent improvements evident in reporting on work-related deaths. 
Raising further concerns over data reliability were discrepancies evident in the 
fatalities reported by three firms. One firm reported an additional fatality in the annual 
reports for 2001 and 2007 than it did in the corresponding sustainability reports, while 
a second identified two fewer fatalities in the annual report than in the sustainability 
report in 2007. A third firm reported three fatalities in the 2001 annual report but 16 
fatalities in the corresponding sustainability report. Examining reports issued in 
subsequent years by this last firm suggested the differences may be partly 
attributable to inconsistencies in the disclosure of contractor data and partly due to a 
merger between this and another business entity around that time. 
Indeed, the lack of clarity and consistency around the presentation of fatality data by 
employment type was clearly apparent. Only eight of the 14 firms reporting on work-
related fatalities identified, as recommended by the GRI mining sector supplement, 
whether reports of deceased workers related to employees only, contractors only, or 
some combination of the two. That is, some firms provided data separately identifying 
the number of employee and contractors fatalities while others reported an 
aggregated total of both employee and contractor fatalities. Not only did these 
classifications vary across firms but some companies presented different categories 
of fatality data from year to year and, in some cases, in the same year across 
different reporting media. Notably, contractor rates were often identified separately 
when they were higher than employee fatality data or when seeking to illustrate the 
success of a contractor management program in reducing contractor fatalities and 
injuries (see for example, EB2007). The following graph illustrates the different 
approaches used across the 55 occasions on which fatality data was identified. 
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Disclosure of Fatalities by Employment Type
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Figure 6-18: Fatalities by employment type 
The degree of explanatory detail provided about the circumstances surrounding fatal 
incidents also differed across firms and over time. While some reports, particularly in 
earlier years, simply stated the number of fatalities, others identified location and / or 
employment type and many expressed regret or disappointment. Interestingly, three 
firms took a personal approach, naming the deceased and expressing their 
condolences – with one identifying not only the deceased but also the names of his 
widow and each of their three young children. This was in contrast to stakeholder 
calls to respect the privacy of individuals as reported in Chapter 5. 
In just over half the cases, fatality disclosures were accompanied by a brief 
explanation of the circumstances which led to the fatality, identifying general causes 
such as vehicle accidents, falling objects, interactions with machinery or falls from 
heights. In later years, these supplementary narratives appeared to polarise into two 
groups: those providing illuminating case studies or transparent examples that 
outlined specific incidents and the measures taken to prevent reoccurrences, and 
those that simply offered generic statements about unspecified ‘lessons’ that had 
apparently been learned and communicated across the organisation. An example of 
a statement that sought to provide details follows. 
After an extensive investigation by [the Company and relevant authorities], it 
has been determined that the tragic helicopter crash that occurred in 2006 was 
a Controlled Flight into Terrain due to human factors with inadvertent entry into 
Instrument Meteorological Conditions. Further to the accident, a number of 
learnings and improvements to aviation safety management within [the 
Company] have been implemented. These include: 
• A flight-following system review. 
• Improved pilot recruitment and training. 
• Local conditions familiarisation. 
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• A management Aviation Review Board. 
• Improved communication and review of aviation contractor operating and 
maintenance schedules. 
• Ongoing audits of aviation providers (EC 2006, p58). 
 
In contrast, some firms provided considerably less detail about the actions taken 
following an incident investigation: 
Regrettably, a fatality occurred at … [An] employee was killed when the loader 
he was operating rolled over. A comprehensive investigation was conducted 
into the causes of the incident with the learnings being applied at [site x] and 
other [Company] operations, with the aim of preventing any further incidents of 
this nature (MI 2004, p40). 
A total of 42 high potential incidents in 2007 were reported, a reduction of 14% 
from our 2006 performance. Three of these incidents had the potential for a 
major accident event to occur. Every high potential incident is rigorously 
investigated to determine the root causes and learnings applied to prevent a 
repeat incident. Our learnings from these and previous incidents have helped 
us develop integrity improvement programs (EE 2007b, p54). 
 
Other reports of fatalities, however, appeared to be justified by claims of a need to 
improve employee behaviour and safety culture. For example: 
The deterioration on safety is both disappointing and unacceptable. The growth 
of the industry and of [the company] itself is considered to be contributing 
factors in the increase in incidents resulting in injuries. Many new and 
challenging projects, a surge in the number of new employees and 
inexperienced contractors, and a sense of urgency to complete tasks to meet 
demanding schedules have increased the potential for injury. Investigations 
reveal that the underlying cause of most incidents is people's failure to follow 
established rules and procedures … Statistically, it is proven that the majority of 
accidents are caused by people’s actions (EE 2006 CSR, pp44-45). 
[but later … the report claimed] The Plan focuses on three key areas – Plant, 
Processes and People. To have the best line of defence between hazards and 
incidents we believe it is necessary to improve our management of safety on all 
three fronts (EE 2006, p45). 
More often, however, reports of one or two workplace fatalities were accompanied by 
deflections to progress being made in reducing aggregated LTIs. The problem with 
this argument was nicely articulated by one firm which reported on a number of ‘key 
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strategic learnings’ which had ’emerged for the organisation’. These included the 
‘knowledge’ that:  
1. Low injury frequency rates do not mean low fatality rates. 
2.  Injury reduction programs alone will not prevent fatalities. 
3.  High near miss reporting often correlates with declining injuries or fatalities  
 (MH 2004, p7). 
Overall, firms failed to present clear and complete measures of occupational fatality 
although the reliability of fatality reporting appeared to improve considerably over 
time. In contrast, the presentation of data relating to severity of non-fatal injury, 
identified as the second most important outcome measure by stakeholders, 
deteriorated over the period. This is outlined below.  
 
6.2.3.2  ‘Serious’ injury and illness disclosures 
Despite many firms highlighting reductions in the number and frequency of injuries 
over the period, relatively little attention was dedicated to transparently reporting on 
injury severity. In total, 11 of the 15 firms reported on injury severity between 1998 
and 2006, although few provided severity data in more than one year. Included in 
these were five firms that reported on permanent disabilities (PDs) although these 
appeared in only seven out of a possible 137 reporting occasions (a PD reporting 
frequency of less than 6%).  
For example, one firm reported zero permanent disabilities in the 2000 and 2001 
reports only but made no mention of whether or not PDs had been sustained in any 
other year. Another identified a PD sustained in 2000 and again in 2005 while the 
remaining three firms each reported a PD on one occasion during the 11 years 
examined. These last four firms each failed to identify whether the reported PD was 
the total number of permanent disabilities for that year or simply an example of a 
serious OHS outcome.  
The potential under-reporting of PDs was underscored by data such as a table of 
severity categories reported by one firm in which a significant safety incident 
(Categories III and IV) was defined as an incident that had the potential to cause a 
serious injury or fatality. Although the report indicated that the four category IV 
incidents had caused five workplace fatalities, there was no mention of how many 
PDs, or other serious injuries, actually resulted from the 180 category III incidents 
that had occurred during the year. This was also despite the number of category III 
 187
incidents increasing by over 110% from the previous year. Another firm reported 
experiencing 1840 HPIs across its operations in 2006 but again, although three 
fatalities were identified, no mention was made of any permanent or long-term 
temporary disabilities that resulted from this large number of HPIs. Notably, this firm 
then failed to present the number of HPIs in future years, instead showing only a 
frequency rate (2.5 in 2007).  
Furthermore, no reports of PDs identified whether these were PDs requiring medical 
discharge or those which, despite permanent impairment or disfigurement, did not 
prevent the employee returning to work. Without any clear definition of PDs provided 
and given the low number of PDs reported, one might expect these only referred to 
cases of permanent occupational incapacity. It is also interesting to note that while 
fatalities continued to be presented in annual reports, disclosure of permanent 
disability was made only in annual reports until 2004 and then only in sustainability 
reports from 2005 to 2007. These results are summarised in Figure 6-19. 
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Figure 6-19: Disclosure of permanent disability 
 
Like disclosure of PDs, transparency about average injury severity was also limited. 
Injury severity indicators were presented by only seven of the 15 sampled firms and 
presentation was again generally infrequent with only two firms reporting severity 
indicators in more than two consecutive years. As shown in Table 6-13, a number of 
firms offered vague, ad hoc references to improving severity rates in the latter half of 
the period of study although failed to provide any supporting performance data. A 
summary of injury severity disclosure is provided in Table 6-13. 
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  Energy firms Mining firms     Legend 
  1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10      
1997                      Annual report only 
1998                                 Both annual and  CSR report 
1999             ?                  CSR report only 
2000 ?         ? ? ?                 Mentioned direction but provided no data 
2001 ?          ?                    
2002 ?          ?        ?         ? Improved performance  
2003          ?                    ? Worse performance  
2004 ?                                 
2005                      ?           
2006   ?   ?          ?               
2007                   ?                
 % of reports issued that included outcome severity data (by firm) 
% 75 18 0 0 0 18 45 18 9 20 0 0 0 0 0        
Table 6-13: Reported incidence of injury severity  
Again, the distribution of information across both annual and sustainability reports 
meant stakeholders would need to read both media to locate all available severity 
data. Firms also disclosed different severity metrics with one firm presenting three 
different injury severity measures in reports issued between 2000 and 2005. This use 
of dissimilar metrics in different years again reduced accountability and transparency 
by hindering the ability of stakeholders to assess changes in performance over time. 
Indeed, the seven firms reporting severity rates used a total of eight different metrics 
or potentially as many as ten metrics depending on the precise definitions attributed 
to the construct of ‘days lost’ or ‘days away’. 
Reported by Reported Severity Indicator       Definition provided  
Firm 1     Total recordable case severity rate Sum of injury severities for the period per 1,000,000 hours worked    
Firm 2  Days lost to injury (DLTI) * Days lost per LTI and restricted duty  
Firms 3 & 7 Duration rate * Days away from unrestricted duty per injury 
Firm 4     Average working days lost  Working days lost per employee 
   “ Injury severity Hours lost per 1,000,000 hours worked 
   “ 
Average days lost per LTI * 
Average number of days lost to injury 
(excludes medical treatment & first aid) 
Firm 5 Severity rate Average shifts lost per 200,000 hours 
Firm 6   Days lost per claim Days lost per workers’ compensation claim 
note:          * These metrics appear to use the same definition         
Table 6-14: Reported severity rate indicators 
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The second firm to report regularly (over five years) on injury severity presented data 
in consecutive annual reports between 1998 and 2002 only. In 2002, the company 
achieved its best result to date and provided four years of prior data for comparison. 
However, no further mention of injury severity was made after 2002. One can only 
speculate as to the motivations for the cessation of reporting to stakeholders on this 
important indicator. The first may be that results had deteriorated and the firm 
decided against transparently making this data public. The second possible 
motivation is that the firm had reflected on the decreasing rate of severity data 
disclosure among its peers. As shown in Table 6-13, the disclosure of severity data 
became increasingly deinstitutionalised around that time with the already low rate of 
disclosure halving from four firms in 2000 and 2001 to only two firms in 2002 and 
2003. By 2007, none of the sampled firms reported on severity. In contrast, the 
disclosure of increasingly aggregated injury frequency rates had become ever more 
institutionalised, as outlined below.  
6.2.3.3 Total injury and illness  
Rather than distinguish between permanent or temporary disability or between short- 
or long-term absences from duty, work-related injuries tended to be classified and 
reported using categories reflecting an organisation’s responses to injury (e.g. lost 
time, medical treatment and first aid treatment). Disclosures issued early in the 
period of study, particularly those issued by energy firms, appeared largely self-
laudatory, presenting only best practice examples of site or divisional excellence and 
failing to provide stakeholders with company-wide injury performance outcomes. For 
example, one energy firm included a question and answer section in the 1998 annual 
report which asked: 
Given the sensitivity of safety and environmental issues, what are [Company’s] 
records in these areas? (EC 1998). 
The response failed to discuss the company’s overall safety record or to disclose the 
firm’s injury rate of 2.7 LTIs per million hours which compared favourably to the 
year’s industry average of 3.1, but instead cited examples of selected tasks and sites 
where no injuries had been recorded for the period. The disclosure concluded: 
Importantly however, some companies fail to translate their verbal commitment 
on safety and the environment into tangible results … [This company] is 
absolutely committed to safety, health and environmental issues affecting its staff 
as well as the community and environment in which we operate. Our verbal 
commitment is demonstrably translated into outstanding results (EC 1998). 
 190
Although the same firm’s LTI rate deteriorated to 3.4 LTIs per million hours the 
following year (62% higher than the industry average of 2.1), the only safety results 
presented again related to an “excellent safety record”, this time focusing on one 
selected project which had achieved one million hours without a LTI (EC 1999, p17).  
Over time, however, the presentation of organisational injury data, rather than 
selected best practice subsets, became increasingly commonplace in both annual 
and sustainability reports. Figure 6-20 shows that this was most notable in energy 
firms where rates of injury reporting increased from 33% of firms in 1997 to 100% of 
firms consistently reporting corporate injury outcomes in both the annual and 
sustainability reports from 2003 onward. Although 100% of mining firms also reported 
work-related injuries after 2003, up to four firms presented injury data only in 
sustainability rather than annual reports. As highlighted previously, these failed to 
meet stakeholder expectations for such disclosures to be provided in annual reports. 
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Figure 6-20: Disclosure of injury by industry and reporting media 
 
This evidence of reporting on work-related injury92 is consistent with the injury 
disclosure findings in the prior literature (for example, Kolk 2003; Brown and Butcher 
2005; Jones et al. 2005; Vuontisjarva 2006). However, a detailed examination revealed 
surprisingly high levels of data inconsistency that made both comparability of 
performance over time and benchmarking of performance across firms extremely 
difficult. This stemmed from first, inconsistencies in the choice of metrics disclosed by 
the various firms and second, inconsistencies in the method of calculating indicators.  
                                                 
92 A number of firms aggregated lost time arising from work-related illness with lost time due to work-
related injury. Consequently, the injury metrics referred to in this section may reflect injury and illness 
outcomes rather than injury outcomes exclusively. However, all organisational performance KPIs 
dealing specifically with occupational disease are discussed separately in section 6.2.4.4. 
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The most frequently presented injury KPIs were response-based metrics relating to 
the frequency of ‘lost’ time including the LTI and RI indicators, along with measures 
of those injuries requiring only medical treatment (MTI). Although less prevalent, data 
relating to the incidence of injuries leading to restricted duties, first aid and measures 
of ‘all injury’ were also evident. These trends are illustrated in Figure 6-21. 
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Figure 6-21: Frequently disclosed injury and illness KPIs 
Notably, examination revealed the emergence and increasing institutionalisation of 
OHSA’s93 recommended RI indicator for measuring OHS outcomes. As described in 
Chapter 2, the RI is essentially the sum of lost time and medical treatment injuries 
(LTI + MTI). In 1997 and 1998 each of the sampled firms presented LTI data, but in 
1999 one energy firm began to report using only the more aggregated RI metric. With 
the exception of 2001 and 2003 where this firm provided both LTI and RI data, the RI 
was presented as its sole injury KPI. Other firms then began providing RI metrics 
(either as a single RI statistic or by disclosing both LTI and MTI data). This is 
illustrated in Figure 6-22. 
                                                 
93 As discussed in Chapter 3, OSHA is the Occupational Safety and Health Administration in the United 
States. The RI indicators it recommends essentially aggregate the more serious injuries identified by the 
LTI with less than the serious MTI category of injuries. 
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Disclosure of LTI versus RI injury data
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Figure 6-22: Disclosure of LTI and RI indicators 
 
Over time the number of firms reporting RI data, either as an RI indicator or a 
combination of LTI and MTI indicators, rose from one firm in 1997 (25% of those 
reporting on injuries) to 14 firms (100%) by 2007. In contrast, the number presenting 
LTI data dropped from 100% in 1997-98 to 68% by 2006. This trend is illustrated in 
Figure 6-22 and was most noticeable in the energy sector where, in 2004, only 40% 
of firms presented LTI data although all five disclosed an RI metric. LTI data 
continued to be provided by 90% of mining firms, with 100% providing RI data – half 
presenting an RI metric and the other half providing the combination of LTI and MTI 
data which allowed stakeholders to calculate RI yet still at least identify the incidence 
of lost time versus the more minor medical treatment injuries. 
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Figure 6-23: Institutionalisation of RI rate reporting 
Given that the LTI is often criticised for being too aggregated to provide useful 
information for stakeholders about serious injury outcomes, the increasing focus on 
the even more broadly aggregated RI metric is somewhat disappointing. Whether this 
is a strategic move by firms to appear transparent and accountable by reporting on 
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injuries without actually providing any information about injury severity remains 
unclear. However, the following case is worth highlighting.  
A report issued by an energy firm identified a reduction in the rate of LTIs from the 
previous year. At the same time an increase in the average injury severity was also 
reported. Read together, this data suggested that while fewer injuries had occurred, 
they were more serious in terms of the impairment sustained by the injured 
individuals. Rather than offer a commitment to focus on reducing the incidence of 
serious injury, the narrative revealed that a decision had been taken to cease 
providing both LTI and severity rates in future reports and instead to provide only one 
outcome indicator. The intention was to: 
… shift the focus of incident reporting to the Total Reportable Case Frequency 
Rate so that it becomes our prime safety indicator (ED 2002). 
This move served to aggregate an even broader array of minor injuries and thereby 
removed any ability for stakeholders to make an informed assessment of the impact 
of OHS on employees and other stakeholders.  
Indeed, a number of other firms reported improvements in LTI rates and cited 
behaviour-based initiatives as their key to success. While improvements in work-
related injuries are of course commendable, section 2.2.3 detailed how the use of 
BBS is often associated with reductions in the incidence of high volume, yet minor 
injuries, which can in turn reduce the LTI while masking unfavourable changes in the 
incidence of more serious injury. Reflecting on this literature, it was disappointing to 
see firms touting successful BBS interventions evidenced by improved safety 
performance (measured by LTI, RI or TCRF) while simultaneously experiencing 
increasing fatality rates and withdrawing the public disclosure of injury severity data. 
For example, MI 2007 reported “The Target Zero program has encouraged an overall 
improvement in safety performance in 2006-2007, based on injury statistics” (p36). 
Although the LTI had improved from 1.3 to 1.1, fatalities had increased and the firm 
ceased reporting a severity rate in 2001.  
By 2007, each of the 15 firms surveyed was providing measures of LTI, RI or both. 
However, it was surprisingly difficult to compare performance either across firms or 
across time. This was primarily due to the variety of different metrics employed to 
calculate and report on work-related injury. Multiple injury KPIs were presented 
across reports with different combinations of injury metrics not only issued by 
different firms, but also by the same firm from one year to the next. Indeed, the 
average number of times an organisation changed the combination of injury KPIs 
presented between one year and the next was 3.27 times per firm over the 11-year 
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period. The diversity of injury outcome classifications is illustrated in the following 
summary of numerators used to calculate OHS frequency or incidence rates (see 
Table 6-15). 
Categories of OHS Injury Outcome Disclosed 
Lost time injury (LTI) 
• lost time injuries 
• lost time incidents 
• lost time injury / illness 
cases  
• lost workdays 
• classified injuries 
 
Recordable injury (RI) 
• recordable injuries 
• recordable incidents 
• total recordable cases 
Minor injury (MTI) 
• restricted duty injuries94 
• medical treatment injuries 
• medical treatment cases  
• medically referred injuries 
• moderate medical 
treatment 
 
First aid injury (FAI) 
• first aid injuries 
• first aid cases 
 
Total injury 
• reportable injuries 
• all injuries 
• total injuries 
 
 
Near misses 
• significant near 
misses 
• high potential 
incidents 
 
 
Table 6-15: Numerators for OHS outcome rates 
 
In addition to the variety of outcome classifications used to measure injury rates (as 
shown above), different approaches to calculating the ‘same’ metrics were also 
evident. For example, the 14 firms reporting a rate of LTIs over the period 1997 to 
2007 adopted ten different approaches to their measurement. The calculation basis 
for a further five lost time measures were not identified, which leaves potentially 15 
different approaches to measuring the lost time rates of OHS outcomes provided by 
the sample of 15 firms (see Appendix 18 for a detailed listing).  
Of the variants for which a definition was provided, two included fatalities while one 
expressly excluded fatalities; one firm captured employees only while another 
expressly included contractors; and some firms used a denominator of 1,000,000 
working hours, exposure hours or man hours, while others used 200,000 hours. 
Differences were also apparent in timing with some definitions requiring an injury to 
prevent a person from returning to work ‘on the following shift’ or ‘their next 
scheduled day’ while others suggested an absence ‘any time after the injury or illness 
would be counted as lost time (see Appendix 18 for details). Most firms excluded 
partial days lost from LTIFR calculations, requiring instead an absence of ‘one or 
more full rostered shifts’ or an absence of ’more than 24 hours off work’ before any 
injury is recognised as a LTI (eg EB, MI, MM, MN). In contrast, another two firms 
counted time spent at work while on restricted duties as lost time (see MF, MG).  
                                                 
94 Some firms classified restricted duty cases as medical treatment, others as lost time and one firm as 
classified injury. 
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Together these differences in LTI calculation methods at firm level meant that while 
measuring and reporting on OHS outcomes appeared to be an increasingly 
institutionalised practice, the metrics themselves were not generally accepted. The 
resulting lack of comparability meant OHS outcome data was not able to be 
benchmarked across firms and in many cases was not even comparable across a 
given firm over time.  
Discrepancies in calculation methods were also evident across other indicators. Most 
notable was the RI metric which was reported by 11 firms, five of which provided no 
definition of their metric. The remaining six firms offered ten different definitions – 
four offered by just one firm. The ten definitions typically varied as to whether or not 
they included various combinations of fatality, LTI, MTI, ‘moderate MTI’, restricted 
duty, first aid and illness. These variations are summarised in Table 6-16 and 
presented in detail in Appendix 18. The substantial differences in both the range of 
metrics presented and their underlying method of calculation again prevented 
meaningful comparisons of performance to be undertaken. 
Injury classification Number of firms reporting this item 
Number (potential number95) 
of different metrics used 
LTIs 13 9 (14) 
Classified injuries96 1 1 
RI 11 10 (16) 
Medical treatment 8 6 
Restricted duties 2 3 
First aid injuries 1 1 
All (reportable) injuries 3 2 
Table 6-16: Reported injury and illness classifications 
 
Further complicating attempts to benchmark organisational performance was an 
increasing tendency among some firms to omit injury statistics from annual reports in 
the years where performance deteriorated (13 occasions across eight firms were 
particularly obvious: two firms in 2000, four in 2001, one in 2003, two in 2005, one in 
2006, three in 2007). Indeed, analysis showed a statistically significant relationship 
between the occasional failure to disclose particular injury indicators in annual 
reports and worsening workplace safety performance (F=10.153, p=0.002). In 
contrast, however, there were no occasions on which a company failed to provide at 
least some measure of injury performance in a sustainability report, although in a 
                                                 
95 The potential number of metrics takes into account those instances in which the reporting entity failed to 
provide a definition to explain the calculation method for the metric (see Appendix 18 for details). 
96 As noted above, the definition for classified injury was very similar to LTI frequency rate although 
included cases in which an injured worker returned to work on restricted duties. 
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number of cases changes in performance were obscured by variations either in the 
choice of injury metric or the underlying method of calculation.   
Despite these inconsistencies, a majority of firms provided sufficient comparative 
information to provide some insight into changes in the overall safety progress. For 
the most part this reflected a substantial improvement in safety outcomes over the 
decade across both mining and energy firms. Interestingly, sustainability reports were 
three times more likely to specify future injury targets than annual reports (22% to 
7%). Analyses of current performance were also likely to make reference to prior 
year targets, industry averages or national averages. For example, one firm reported: 
The lost time injury frequency rate in 1998 was reduced to 4.3 incidents per 
million hours worked. The result, 27% lower than in 1997, improved on our 
target of 5.0 incidents. This was achieved by: emphasising safety as a business 
priority through key performance indicators, increasing employee, contractor 
and management involvement and ownership of safety and health issues, 
auditing safety and health activities and performance (MK 1998, p8). 
Comparisons to industry averages included a shifting array of industry, national and 
global benchmarks. This may reflect the challenge for firms in identifying appropriate 
comparative information for global organisations or conversely, may reflect a more 
instrumental strategy of finding a favourable benchmark for comparison. The latter is 
perhaps encouraged by some CSR evaluation tools, such as the PSI rating scale 
discussed in section 4.4.2 which, in its original form, awards additional points for 
sustainability disclosures that present ‘better than average’ results.  
6.2.3.4 Occupational disease 
Examination of the injury indicator definitions discussed above revealed that at least 
two firms captured work-related illnesses in their injury indicators. In contrast, three 
firms reported measures of occupational disease separately to occupational injury 
and a fourth made fleeting reference in one report (only) to improvements in 
occupational illness outcomes. These are summarised in Figure 6-24, with a different 
colour used to depict each firm. 
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Figure 6-24: Disclosure of occupational illness data 
Of the companies to report information about new cases of work-related disease, one 
reported outcomes annually over the 11-year period while two others each provided 
data for four and six years between 2001 and 2007. The comparability of 
occupational disease data also differed across these firms. One provided four years 
of prior year data in each report from 2004 to 2007, another provided little prior year 
comparative data but sought to contextualise current outcomes in terms of change 
from an historical ‘baseline’. In contrast, the third firm only provided prior year results 
in those years in which outcomes had improved. Similar problems of inconsistent 
indicator definitions were also identified in relation to occupational disease as had 
been found with occupational injury. Although only three firms reported data for 
occupational disease indicators, 12 different types of illness KPIs were used. (These 
are identified in Appendix 18). 
Furthermore, as identified in Figure 6-24, the provision of work-related disease KPIs 
in annual versus sustainability reports was again inconsistent. Unlike occupational 
injury disclosures, however, the choice of occupational disease disclosure media did 
not appear to be related to the favourability of the outcomes presented. For example, 
Firm 1 reported a disease KPI in both annual and sustainability reports in 2003 and 
2006 but chose only the sustainability report in which to reveal improved results for 
2004 and worsening results for 2007. Firm 2 revealed 2006 disease data only in the 
sustainability report but disclosed a significantly worse 2007 result in both reports. 
This level of transparency suggests that these few firms were keen to demonstrate to 
stakeholders that the incidence of occupational health was being actively monitored. 
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Interestingly, increasing numbers of new occupational disease were not always 
presented as a negative outcome. Instead, disclosures suggested that increases in 
identified illness did not necessarily mean increasing incidence of occupational 
illness but rather improved measurement and surveillance processes. For example: 
Higher rates of workplace exposures have been reported in 2003. This is most 
likely a result of increased monitoring of workplace conditions, as required by 
the occupational health standards (MI 2003, p5). 
Similar problems of inconsistent metrics and calculations were identified in relation to 
occupational disease as had been found with occupational injury. Although only three 
firms reported data for occupational disease indicators, 12 different types of illness 
KPIs were used. (These are identified in Appendix 18). 
6.2.3.5 Summary 
The preceding discussion reveals that although each of the sampled firms are 
reporting to stakeholders on OHS outcomes, the quality of this data is relatively poor 
with disclosures frequently incomplete and generally incomparable. Furthermore, 
although many firms are meeting the expectations of some stakeholders for 
information on total LTI outcomes, they are nevertheless failing to provide the 
severity-based data reported by survey respondents to be of most importance. These 
findings are summarised in Table 6-17 (see Appendix 12 for details by firm and year). 
Reconciling OHS Outcome KPI Disclosure with Stakeholder Expectations 
  Fatality Long-term disability#  
Permanent 
disability 
Average 
severity 
LTI         
(or RI) 
Medical 
treatment 
Minor   
injury 
Workplace 
disease^ 
Firms / 15  
14 
93% 
0 
0%  
  5 
33% 
7 
47% 
15 
100% 
8 
53% 
2 
13% 
3 
20% 
Cases / 137 
55 
40.1% 
0 
0% 
7 
5.1% 
19 
13.9% 
114 
83.2% 
29 
21.2% 
6 
4.4% 
22 
16.1% 
Stakeholder 
expectation? 85% 76 % 75 % 73 % 68%* 52 % 32 % 10% 
? Results shown only reflect the percentages of stakeholders identifying each item as very or extremely important. 
# Includes cases of permanent disability and temporary long-term incapacity ( > 6 months). 
^ Refers to separate measures of occupational illness (rather than included in injury data). 
* Note: only 40.9% of stakeholders ranked the disclosure of LTI or RI data in the top five most important outcome KPIs compared 
to 98.6% ranking severity measures such as permanent and long-term disability in the top five most important KPIs. 
Table 6-17: Meeting expectations for OHS outcome disclosure 
The combination of incomplete fatality and disability data, decreasing reporting of 
injury severity indicators and increasing institutionalisation of aggregated response-
based injury metrics such as LTI and RI KPIs, rendered many of the sampled 
disclosures incapable of conveying a meaningful sense of the impact of OHS on 
stakeholders. Consequently, with the exception of those reports issued by a handful 
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of firms as indicated above, the ability of sampled disclosures to deliver 
accountability to stakeholders on OHS outcomes was questionable. 
6.2.4 OHS Expenditure 
Although 13 of the 15 sampled firms disclosed OHS cost information on at least one 
occasion and the number of firms providing information on OHS expenditure 
appeared to rise over the period, disclosure rates were generally low. OHS costs 
were present in only 22% of the 137 annual reports and 32% of the 50 sustainability 
reports. Figure 6-25 illustrates the number of firms disclosing each type of OHS cost, 
by cost category, year and reporting media (i.e. annual or sustainability report). 
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Figure 6-25: Disclosure of OHS expenditure by classification 
As shown above, different firms reported cost information in different years and 
addressed different types of costs (for example, expenditure on outcomes such as 
fines or compensation, or on processes such as training or health programs). For 
example, firms reporting on fines did not report on compensation and while only three 
firms (20%) reported two different types of cost data, no firm disclosed more than two 
categories of expenditure.  
Reporting on OHS fines (including zero fines) was the most frequently cited OHS 
cost disclosure, although these were provided by only four firms. This was surprising 
given work-related fatalities were sustained by 11 of the 15 firms during the period, 
with seven firms sustaining multiple fatalities in at least one period. Furthermore, two 
firms revealed zero fines on one occasion each (2006 sustainability report for MF and 
2007 sustainability report for MI) which raised questions about whether they had 
actually incurred fines in the many other years in which they had failed to mention the 
issue.  
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Providing a welcome contrast, two firms appeared to be transparently disclosing 
OHS fines and penalties. The first provided detailed disclosures that revealed 
separate annual totals for fines relating to health and safety violations and also 
offered prior year comparative data. A second firm provided a total OHS fine amount 
in four of seven sustainability reports and gave a breakdown of those fines by site 
and a brief description of the incident that had led to each breach and penalty. This 
was the only firm to meet stakeholder expectations for details as to the number of 
fines or prosecutions driving the total expenditure (to identify single versus repeated 
infringements as multiple fines can be an important indicator of poor OHS 
management), the magnitude of fines (reflecting both the seriousness of the incident 
and the financial impact on the organisation) and the circumstances surrounding 
each penalty.  
A further six firms reported on workers’ compensation premiums or related contingent 
liabilities although no firm reported on both fines and compensation cost and just two 
firms provided compensation-related data annually. This seems a very low rate of 
disclosure given both the volume and severity of injury and fatality rates identified by 
most of the 15 firms and suggestions in the accounting literature that compensation 
is the most accessible and most informative financial OHS outcome data (see 
Chapter 3). Disclosure of compensation data was provided in annual reports only, 
while OHS fines were revealed only in the sustainability report by two of the three 
firms from 2000 to 2006 and then by all three firms disclosing fines in 2007. This 
means stakeholders seeking OHS cost information would need to review both annual 
and sustainability reporting media to locate any available cost data.   
Contingent liabilities relating to OHS fines or potential fines were not disclosed in the 
financial statements of any firm, despite reports of summonses and known fatalities 
under investigation. References to contingent compensation liabilities were made 
only by five firms licensed to self-insure for workers’ compensation. These 
organisations were therefore required to make provision for estimated future 
compensation claims. Two provided compensation liability data in the financial 
statements while three offered notes to the accounts, with two of these 
acknowledging that legal actions relating to claims including safety were in process, 
and outcomes were not deemed material and the other, that claims relating to 
asbestos liabilities were outstanding but not deemed material. 
The presentation of OHS program costs was even less frequent than failure cost 
disclosures. Six firms reported on costs associated with OHS programs, one from 
1997 to 1999 on the costs of a counselling program for employees and their families 
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which, not surprisingly, revealed cost increases in those years where the numbers of 
work-related fatalities were greater. Five others each reported OHS expenditure in 
one year only, typically revealing OHS training costs although failing to identify 
whether this expenditure related to risk assessment, skill development or retraining 
after injury. 
Together these results suggest that, although 97% of survey respondents sought 
information on OHS-related expenditure, with most primarily interested in failure 
costs, these expectations were only met by a small number of firms. Notably, 
different firms appeared to meet expectations for the various types of expenditure. A 
summary of financial disclosures in annual and sustainability reports relating to those 
items of most interest to survey respondents is offered in Table 6-18, with detail by 
firm and year provided in Appendix 13.   
Reconciling OHS Cost Disclosure with Stakeholder Expectations 
  Fines & penalties 
Workers’ 
compensation 
Contingent 
liabilities 
Training 
programs Other 
Firms / 15  
4 
27% 
3 
20%  
  5 
33% 
5 
33% 
1 
33% 
Cases / 137 
16 
11.7% 
12 
8.8% 
14 
10.2% 
5 
3.6% 
3 
2.2% 
Stakeholder 
expectation? 75% 66.1 % na 60.5 % 46.8 % 
? Stakeholder expectation results shown reflect only the percentages of stakeholders that identified each item as 
very or extremely important. 
Table 6-18: Meeting expectations for OHS cost disclosure 
As reported above, only one of the four firms to report on fines presented a brief 
description of the related incident in addition to details about the magnitude of each 
penalty (including those disclosing zero fines or penalties). The provision of 
explanatory detail was identified as very important by 64% of respondents which 
again demonstrates a failure to address the expectations of stakeholders on issues 
of primary concern. Some annual reports also reported that the firm deemed 
immaterial those contingent liabilities associated with workers’ compensation or 
litigation. Given the importance of these particular items to a range of organisational 
stakeholders, this data is likely to be material to interested stakeholders irrespective 
of the magnitude of the potential liability relative to other financial disclosures. These 
findings provide further support for calls to regulate the disclosure of failure costs 
associated with OHS injuries and illness although, given that the majority of costs 
associated with OHS failures are externalised, this perhaps underscores the 
importance of transparency in regard to reporting OHS outcomes to stakeholders.  
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Not surprisingly, in light of the above findings, no firm attempted to report on total 
OHS expenditure. This will be welcomed by the many stakeholders who branded 
such aggregated cost disclosures as problematic and potentially misleading. Overall 
most firms appeared reluctant to provide financial information relating to any OHS 
programs or injury and disease outcomes. These reflected, at worst, a lack of 
accountability to financial stakeholders, such as shareholders, for convicted breaches 
of regulatory requirements or for the financial impact of poor OHS and, at best, an 
oversight in reporting an absence of OHS penalties.  
6.3 The GRI and OHS disclosure  
The release of the GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines sought to improve the 
quality of CSR disclosures by promoting enhanced reliability, relevance and 
comparability of reporting content. Since the release of the GRI’s guidelines, a steady 
increase in the number of sampled firms providing a stand-alone sustainability report 
is evident (from one of nine firms in 1997 [7%] to 11 of 15 firms by 2007 [73%]). 
Statistical analysis confirms that organisations claiming to report based on, or in 
accordance with, the GRI were significantly more likely to provide disclosures on 
HIV/Aids (F=18.735, p=000) than those who did not. Organisations basing their 
sustainability disclosures on the GRI were also more likely to use the sustainability 
report rather than the annual report as a primary vehicle for reporting to stakeholders 
on OHS performance (F=107.217, 0=000). This move away from OHS disclosure in 
the annual report to the sustainability report is an important finding given that the 
stakeholder survey (see Chapter 5) identified a clear desire among respondents for 
OHS performance indicators to be provided in annual reports.  
With the exception of the association between the GRI and corporate reporting on 
programs relating to HIV/AIDS, the release of the GRI’s sustainability reporting 
guidelines in 2000 and revised versions in 2002 and 2006 appear to have had limited 
influence on either the content or quality of reported OHS information. Reporting on 
lost time and fatalities was evident at similar levels both prior to, and following, the 
release of the GRI guidelines. Furthermore, there is little evidence that the GRI has 
motivated widespread reporting of all injury, absenteeism or disease information 
among the sampled firms or to have elicited the expected degree of information 
about programs relating to serious disease and OHS consultation. Overall, the 
disclosure of GRI recommended indicators in annual reports or sustainability reports 
was found to be generally very low. These findings are summarised in Table 6-19.  
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Annual Report Sustainability 
Report % of CSR or annual reports providing  
 the following information  1997-99 
% 
2000-05 
% 
2006-07 
% 
 2000-05 
% 
2006-07
% 
Reference to the GRI within the report 0  21 13 22 78 
 Based on… 0  21 10 19 56 
In accordance with… 0 0 3 3 22 
Rates of:    All injury 7 3 10 10 6 
Disease 9 0 6 10 17 
Lost days 59 69 50 87 72 
Absenteeism 0 4 0 6 6 
# Fatalities (by region) 30 31 30 35 44 
Percentage of the workforce represented in formal joint 
worker-management OHS committees that help monitor 
and advise on occupational OHS programs. 
0 7 0 17 10 
Education, training, counselling, prevention and risk control 
programs in place to assist workers, their families and 
communities regarding serious disease. 
11 8 0 0 6 
OHS topics covered in formal agreements with trade 
unions. 0 0 0 0 10 
GRI 2002 items (not present in 2006 guidelines)      
Description of policies or programmes (for the workplace 
and beyond) on HIV/AIDS. 0 21 13 29 33 
Practices on recording and notification of occupational 
accidents and diseases, and how they relate to the ILO 
Code of Practice on Recording and Notification of 
Occupational Accidents and Diseases or ILO Guidelines for 
OHMS. 
0 0 0 3 6 
Description of agreements with unions or employee 
representatives covering OHS and proportion of the 
workforce covered by such agreements.  
0 0 0 3 6 
Table 6-19: Disclosure on GRI recommended indicators 
 
The preambles observed in the recent sustainability reports of a number of mining 
firms suggest that they seek to report in accordance with the GRI because, as 
members of the ICMM, they are committed “to implement the ICMM Sustainable 
Development Framework and comply with policy statements of the ICMM Council” 
(MH 2007, pi). This reflects a normative institutional pressure exerted by the peak 
industry association on these firms.  
However, as noted in section 2.3.2, the ICMM only requires the disclosure of 
sustainability information “including indicators self-selected from the GRI, or the GRI 
Mining and Metals Sector Supplement, or other indicators” (ICMM 2008, p1). The 
ability to self-select indicators appears to have led to a low proportion of those firms 
claiming to report in accordance with the GRI actually demonstrating consistent 
reporting on many of the recommended OHS metrics. It is possible that firms might 
not perceive the GRI recommended indicators as highly relevant to their 
stakeholders. Indeed, the GRI guidelines fail to recommend those measures, such as 
injury severity and descriptions of risk management processes, identified as 
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extremely important to surveyed stakeholders while recommending others, such as 
absenteeism and reporting on ILO codes of practice, that were of minimal interest to 
the survey respondents (see section 5.3.3).  
Furthermore, the GRI protocols do not appear sufficiently detailed, or sufficiently 
institutionalised, to provide the template necessary to improve reporting quality in 
terms of the comparability and reliability of injury and illness performance data. For 
example, the results presented in section 6.2 above demonstrate that firms are either 
failing to follow the GRI’s protocols for calculating ‘lost time’ and ‘all injury’ data or 
employing a range of different calculation methods and assumptions where the 
indicator protocols are silent. Exacerbating the uncertainty facing report users, most 
reports fail to include adequate definitions regarding the method used to calculate 
outcome data. Consequently, despite an increase in the number of firms reporting 
LTI and RI outcomes, and claiming to report in accordance with the GRI, the release 
of the GRI’s sustainability reporting guidelines appears to have motivated little 
improvement in data quality. This is somewhat unexpected given that the express 
purpose of the GRI is to provide a reporting framework that could address 
comparability and reliability concerns, in particular. Overall, it appears that the GRI 
guidelines have had little influence on the patterns of OHS disclosure, which is 
evident in section 6.2. 
6.4 Summary 
This chapter has presented an analysis of the OHS content of annual and 
sustainability reports issued by 15 large resource firms between 1997 and 2007 
(inclusive). The findings reveal an evolution over time in both the breadth and depth 
of disclosures about OHS governance, processes and outcomes. These include 
increasing efforts to support the largely declarative and self-laudatory statements 
contained in earlier reports with narratives97 about OHS management, substantiated 
by examples and quantified measures of effectiveness and performance.  
The increasing organisational attention to OHS over the period was reflected in a 
commendable improvement in safety performance across the resource industry with 
substantial decreases in reported injury and fatality rates. For one firm, the reported 
annual fatality rates dropped from a three-year average98 of 12.0 to 0.7 over the 
decade. In others, LTI rates decreased from the first reported rate of 16.0 in 2000 to 
1.7 by 2007 and 4.3 in 1997 to 0.1 by 2007. In many cases these decreases were 
                                                 
97 The poor relevance of some of these narratives to stakeholders will be discussed later in this chapter.  
98 The three-year averages used encompass the first three years of the study, 1997-99, and the final 
three, 2005-07. 
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quite rapid with reductions in injury rates over the first two years of the study as high 
as 50-65%. Claims of improvement were typically supported by data which also 
revealed declining injury severity and a desire for further progress backed up by 
explicit future workplace injury targets or stretch goals. Notably, however, 
opportunistic reporting was also apparent with evidence in numerous cases of the 
selective disclosure of injury and illness outcomes and, in particular, the omission of 
unfavourable performance data. 
As rates of injury improvement slowed, and in some cases deteriorated, firms 
increasingly turned attention to promoting their OHS efforts, emphasising continued 
commitment to OHS and providing information about OHS activities and programs. 
Outlined in section 6.2.2 was a shifting emphasis from reporting on the management 
of workplace hazards to employee behaviour, from identifying and controlling 
occupational health exposures to reporting on philanthropic health programs and a 
narrowing of the range of disability, severity and injury outcome indicators to a select, 
few response-based outcome performance metrics.  
Also evident was the emerging development of process performance indicators of 
OHS systems and activities. These sought to assist in evaluating and communicating 
OHS efforts (as opposed to outcomes), although disclosures relating to PPIs were 
relatively infrequent and inconsistent and few firms provided PPI data to substantiate 
claims about the effectiveness of OHS programs.  
Together these changes could be seen as increasingly legitimising given they tended 
to redirect attention away from inherently ‘workplace’ risks and serious injury 
outcomes to employee behaviour, OHS governance, corporate philanthropy and 
corporate citizenship (such as employee and community well-being programs) while 
at the same time replacing severity data with less informative99 injury performance 
metrics. Nevertheless, as stated above, each of the sampled firms was clearly found 
to be monitoring and reporting to stakeholders on a broad range of OHS governance, 
process and performance issues. Consequently, strong support is found for 
proposition three:   
P 3:  Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
seek to ensure continued legitimacy by providing OHS information to 
stakeholders. 
                                                 
99  These refer to response-based metrics which are said to be more easily managed, more easily 
manipulated and less relevant to stakeholders because, unlike the severity measures that had 
previously been reported, response-based measures fail to provide meaningful information about OHS 
risk and therefore about the outcomes that drive stakeholder impact. 
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Emerging patterns of OHS disclosure described in the preceding section appear to 
be in the process of institutionalisation. At a macro level in particular, patterns of 
OHS reporting reflected generally accepted OHS themes around which corporate 
narratives and performance data were structured, namely: OHS governance, 
processes and outcomes. This is reflected in the following table reproduced from 
Figure 6-3 in Chapter 6.  
Institutionalised OHS Disclosures 
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Some diffusion of these reporting practices was expected given the shared industry-
based economic, social and legal pressures, an active and influential industry 
association and the substantial degree of networking, and cross-ownership evident 
across the institutional field. At the macro level, these visible patterns reflected a 
template of OHS reporting in the later stages of institutionalisation.  
At the micro level however, findings were somewhat mixed. On the one hand, 
disclosures citing corporate commitment to OHS, reporting on similar programs of 
safe behaviour and OHS risk management and proclaiming the pursuit of zero work-
related injuries and illnesses, appeared largely institutionalised by the end of the 
period of study. Sampled reports not only portrayed these similar themes but also 
exhibited a shared rhetoric particularly in regard to phrases such as ‘zero harm’, 
‘safety leadership’ and the pursuit of a ‘strong safety culture’.  
Similarly, at a conceptual level at least, a shared vision of an appropriate means of 
communicating OHS risk management and performance evaluation to stakeholders 
appeared to be emerging. This was reflected in trends toward particular forms of risk 
management disclosure (as identified above) and the gradual replacement of a broad 
array of disability, severity and injury outcome indicators evident in earlier reports 
with a narrow range of response (LTI and RI) metrics. In particular, the latter 
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appeared to reflect an emerging institutional logic of performance evaluation and 
reporting, focused around managerialist notions of lost time.  
The assumption that lost time measures had become engrained as legitimate and 
highly institutionalised mechanisms for evaluating OHS outcomes was however 
tempered by the lack of any accepted method of classifying, measuring or reporting 
this data. Instead closer examination revealed numerous calculation methods 
employed to derive lost time and recordable metrics which together confirmed these 
indicators were not institutionalised in an operational sense. Similarly, although all 
firms reported, at least to some extent, on the processes, activities and programs 
employed to identify, assess and control OHS risk, there was substantial variation in 
both the level of detail and in the extent to which firms sought to provide quantitative 
indicators of the effectiveness of these processes.  
These results show that although a macro-level template for OHS disclosure 
appeared institutionalised within this field, the unexpected absence of an 
institutionally driven framework for OHS evaluation, or of generally accepted 
measurement standards, is clearly evident at the micro level. Together this suggests 
an emerging template for OHS reporting in the early stages of an institutionalisation 
process (or what Berger and Luckmann (1967) describe as the ‘externalisation stage’ 
(Scott 2001)). Over the period of study, broad structures for reporting have become 
shared by field participants but alternative views on appropriate content continue to 
co-exist and compete for legitimacy. Consequently, support for proposition four was 
mixed:  
P 4: Large firms operating in a field with similar and high levels of OHS risk will 
share an institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
This emerging template for OHS disclosure did not, however, appear to have been 
influenced to any great extent by the release of the GRI’s sustainability reporting 
guidelines. As detailed in section 6.3, the guidelines have had little impact on the 
quality of OHS disclosure – either in terms of content or comparability. Evidence that 
a small number of firms were beginning to report on indicators such as absenteeism, 
all injury rates and serious occupational disease shortly after the initial release of the 
guidelines in the early 2000s soon dissipated. Instead, disclosure of most of the 
GRI’s OHS indicators (LA6-9) was found to be largely absent and the GRI’s 
recommended indicators did not appear as widely promoted by the sampled firms as 
was expected from the literature. This was in spite of the direct involvement of 
representatives from some of the sampled mining firms in the GRI development 
process and the support shown by relevant industry associations for the GRI 
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framework. Together this suggests that the GRI guidelines are not perceived by 
sampled firms to present a legitimate framework for OHS reporting to stakeholders. 
The results, therefore, failed to provide support for proposition five: 
P 5: The GRI's sustainability reporting guidelines form the basis of the 
institutionalised template for OHS disclosure. 
The final proposition presented in Chapter 3 argued that an institutionalised template 
for OHS disclosure would provide a framework for discharging OHS accountability to 
stakeholders. This was based on a premise that the strategy underlying generally 
accepted forms of OHS disclosures was to meet the needs of stakeholders rather 
than simply legitimation. Cormier et al. (2005) argue that it is this ability to discharge 
accountability to stakeholders that is the primary determinant of voluntary disclosure 
quality. High quality disclosure is therefore defined as a function of “precision, 
relevance and usefulness” (Cormier et al. 2005, p6).  
The analysis presented in this chapter has confirmed that the sampled OHS 
disclosures do address each of the three broad accountability issues of concern to 
stakeholders: OHS governance, processes and outcomes. Furthermore, a (small) 
number of firms were shown to produce complete, evidence-based, high quality 
accounts of OHS to stakeholders. However, despite the generally increasing breadth 
of information and mounting evidence to support declarations of OHS risk oversight 
and management provided by sampled firms, the overall patterns of reporting did not 
appear to adequately address those issues of most concern to stakeholders. 
Consequently, the extent to which the prevailing disclosure template is promoting the 
delivery of high quality disclosures needed to discharge accountability is unclear and 
requires further examination.  
The following chapter focuses attention on this issue of disclosure quality, providing 
an evaluation of reported OHS information using two alternative rating scales. A 
detailed examination of the qualitative characteristics of relevance, comparability and 
reliability of this information is also presented. Together, this analysis is then used to 
draw conclusions about the extent to which the prevailing disclosure template has 
enabled sampled firms to succeed in discharging accountability to stakeholders. 
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Chapter 7. DISCUSSION: Perceptions of Disclosure Quality 
This chapter examines the extent to which the corporate OHS disclosures provided 
by sampled resource firms appear to meet stakeholder expectations for OHS 
accountability. As outlined above, a review of OHS disclosure content identified a 
strong increase in the public provision of quantitative and explanatory OHS 
information over the period of study. Such an assessment fails to discriminate, 
however, between the presentation of that OHS evidence which was more, or less, 
relevant to discharging accountability for OHS to stakeholders. This chapter therefore 
seeks to assess the extent to which two approaches to evaluating information quality 
are each able to provide insight into the level of corporate accountability to 
stakeholders. 
Chapter 7 is structured as follows. First, section 7.1 uses the modified PSI100 rating 
scale to evaluate the quality of OHS disclosure contained within each sampled 
report. This tool has been validated in prior research and is used to capture the 
extent to which firms present corporate declarations about OHS philosophy and 
management and support these claims with narrative and quantitative evidence. In 
doing so, a score is calculated for each sampled annual and sustainability report. 
Limitations of such scales are then identified.  
Next, sections 7.2 to 7.4 examine the impact of these limitations on perceptions of 
disclosure quality, revisiting the annual and sustainability reports and providing an 
analysis of the relevance, comparability and reliability of OHS content. In doing so, 
essential criteria for the discharge of accountability through external disclosure are 
identified. Reflecting on these findings, section 7.5 then uses an alternative rating 
tool, the OSHAI which was developed in Chapter 4, to evaluate the quality of 
reported OHS content as defined by the criteria most important to stakeholders as 
identified above. The results of the OSHAI assessments are contrasted with ratings 
obtained using the PSI scale. These findings are then used to develop 
recommendations for legislators, standard setters, corporate reporters and others. 
The recommendations are presented in Chapter 8.  
7.1 Evaluating quality using PSI scores 
The analysis presented in Chapter 6 suggests that the OHS content identified in 
sampled annual and sustainability reports provides information to stakeholders on 
each of the three broad issues of concern: OHS governance, OHS processes and 
                                                 
100 A modified version of the PSI was developed in Chapter 4, section 4.4.2. 
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OHS outcomes. It also indicates that the quality of these disclosures has improved 
over time, as measured by the extent to which narrative, quantitative and monetary 
evidence is provided (this approach to measuring quality is consistent with prior research, 
see for example Aerts et al. 2006; Andrew et al. 1989; Gray et al. 1995a; Guthrie and Parker 
1990; Hackston and Milne 1996).  
This observed improvement in the overall quality of OHS information is confirmed by 
the PSI scores calculated for the sampled reports (see Table 7-1 for average PSI 
scores and Appendix 15 for details of scores by firm). Notably, the average PSI score 
rose from 7/15 (42%) in 1997 to 13/15 (86%) by 2007, with three firms achieving total 
scores of 0%, 13% and 33% in 1997, and no firm scoring less than 47% in 2007. 
Indeed, more than half the sampled firms scored over 90% in the final year of the 
study. Table 7-1 summarises changes in the quality of OHS disclosures provided in 
annual and sustainability reports by 15 firms over the 11-year period. These changes 
relate to each of the three disclosure categories of philosophy, narratives and 
quantitative data (as a percentage of the possible five points awarded per category) 
as well as changes in the average total PSI score (both as a raw score out of a 
possible 15 points and as a percentage).  
Modified PSI Score Data for All Sampled Reports by Category and Year 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
# Firms 9 9 9 11 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 
Philosophy            
   Maximum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
   Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 60% 60% 60% 40% 60% 60% 
   Average (%) 60% 69% 71% 64% 73% 85% 82% 88% 80% 91% 92% 
Narrative            
   Maximum 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
   Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 20% 40% 20% 40% 40% 40% 
   Average (%) 49% 51% 56% 47% 75% 74% 78% 79% 83% 81% 88% 
Quantitative             
   Maximum 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
   Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 0 20% 40% 60% 40% 60% 
   Average (%) 40% 44% 62% 56% 62% 68% 82% 79% 83% 80% 83% 
Total PSI (%)            
   Maximum 87% 80% 87% 93% 93% 100% 93% 100% 93% 100% 100% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 33% 33% 20% 33% 40% 47% 
   Average 42% 47% 55% 49% 63% 73% 78% 80% 81% 82% 86% 
Raw PSI 
scores ( /15)            
   Maximum 13 12 13 14 14 15 14 15 14 15 15 
   Minimum 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 3 5 6 7 
   Average  7.0 7.8 9.1 8.1 10.2 10.9 11.8 12.0 12.1 12.3 12.9 
Table 7-1: Summary of average PSI scores (by year) 
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Despite these PSI scores confirming an overall improvement in the quality of OHS 
information, as defined above, the extent to which observed patterns of disclosure 
succeed in discharging accountability to stakeholders for OHS remains unclear. This 
uncertainty stems from a lack of clarity about the degree to which this narrative and 
quantitative information actually provides stakeholders with the relevant OHS data 
needed to discharge accountability for OHS strategy, processes and outcomes (see 
Cormier et al. 2005). 
To this end, prior studies101 of CSR disclosure quality, whether based around the 
PSI, GRI or some other disclosure index, have tended to search for the existence of 
narratives pertaining to OHS policy and program and metrics relating to OHS injury 
and other outcomes (see for example, Hackston and Milne 1996; Adams 2004; Brown and 
Butcher 2005). These fail to recognise that, as demonstrated by the survey results 
presented in Chapter 5, particular OHS narratives and outcome metrics are 
perceived as significantly more relevant, informative and important to stakeholders 
than others. Consequently, this suggests that to provide a valid assessment of 
disclosure quality, analyses need to explicitly consider accountability criteria such as 
the relevance, comparability and reliability of the OHS information examined.  
7.2 Data relevance 
The content analysis results described in Chapter 6 identified that, although most 
firms are providing detailed, evidence-based OHS disclosures, the meaningful 
assessment of performance is often hampered by a failure to report on those issues 
of most relevance to report users. For example, stakeholders identified the incidence 
of permanent disability and injury severity among the most important disclosures for 
firms discharging accountability for OHS. This was to be expected since severity is 
the primary driver of both financial and non-financial OHS externalities and, as such, 
is critical to an analysis of the stakeholder impact of work-related injury and illness.  
It was therefore surprising to see so little disclosure about permanent disability, long- 
term temporary disability or impairment (disability) duration – especially given that all 
15 firms regularly reported injury performance data and most had reported at least 
one severity measure on at least one occasion (prior to 2004). This suggests that 
firms recognised the relevance of severity disclosures to stakeholders but had 
nevertheless chosen to withdraw the provision of this data in favour of providing 
stakeholders with aggregated, and more easily managed, response-based measures 
                                                 
101 A more detailed discussion of this prior literature is provided in Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.1. 
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of injury (these were ranked among the top five most important outcome metrics by 
only 40.9% of survey respondents).  
This severity reporting gap is likely to be explained by a mimetic process in which 
response-based measures of injury have taken on a rule-like status as legitimate 
performance assessment metrics in the collective logic of report preparers. The 
perceived legitimacy of these particular indicators is further reinforced by their 
inclusion in corporate disclosure rating scales such as those produced by the GRI, 
ARA102 and ACCA103. These findings suggest that corporate reporters have either 
failed to recognise, or conversely chosen to ignore, the fact that response-based 
measures are largely incapable of providing useful information for stakeholders about 
changes in those injury outcomes that produce the majority of financial and non-
financial consequences for external stakeholders. 
As described in detail in Chapter 6, a lack of completeness in reporting on issues of 
paramount interest to stakeholders was also mirrored in disclosures relating to OHS 
governance and processes. Although there were notable exceptions, many firms 
failed to report on issues such as workplace risk and hazards, consultation 
processes, compliance audit and training processes and outcomes. These failures 
provide support for the concern over OHS disclosure quality already evident within 
the literature (see for example, Adams 2004; Brown and Butcher 2005) and support calls 
for the regulation of OHS disclosure – particularly in regard to disclosure of 
information about the drivers of OHS impact on stakeholders.  
7.3 Data comparability 
The previous section has highlighted concerns over the relevance and completeness 
of OHS disclosures. Data relevance is closely related to that of comparability in that 
even the intermittent absence of relevant information, like inconsistent approaches to 
presentation and performance measurement, has implications for the extent to which 
OHS systems and their effectiveness can be evaluated and compared.  
Indeed, the comparability of OHS information was very important to respondents with 
91% indicating that stakeholders should be able to compare OHS performance 
across firms and over time. Examination of the sampled reports suggests 
comparability was hampered by three factors. The first was the failure to consistently 
report all relevant data in each period, as indicated in section 7.1. The second was 
the failure to provide consistently the historical data needed to enable comparisons 
                                                 
102 ARA refers to the Australasian Reporting Awards. 
103 ACCA refers to the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants. 
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with prior performance. The third was the failure of sampled firms to adopt a 
consistent method of capturing and reporting on OHS data. The failures to present 
historical data and to report comparable metrics are explored further below. 
7.3.1 Lack of historical data 
Evidence provided by the content analysis suggests report users would need to 
review both the annual and sustainability reports to locate available OHS data and in 
many cases would also need to review prior year reports to obtain the necessary 
information to ascertain changes in performance from one period to the next. This 
was because the provision of historical data was inconsistent and in many cases, 
opportunistic. For example, Table 7-2 reveals the annual number of fatalities reported 
by one mining firm and the number of prior periods shown in each report.  
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
# of fatalities disclosed in annual and sustainability reports 
 AR   8 7 5 3 13 3 17 3 3 8 
CSR     16 13 3 17 3 3 8 
# Prior years 
shown 0 0 0 0 
6 
(AR) 0 1 0 0 1 2 
Table 7-2: Reporting of annual and historical fatality data by M3 
The firm appeared to be engaged in impression management, strategically choosing 
the number of prior periods to report so as to reflect current results in the best 
possible light. This is most evident in the decision to reveal six years of historical data 
in the 2001 annual report where the current result was historically low yet no prior 
year result in 2002 when the current result was uncharacteristically poor. The 
reporting of only one prior year in 2003 alluded to a significant improvement (13 to 
three fatalities) although users are unlikely to realise the 2002 result was 
considerably higher than previous years.  
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Figure 7-1: Disclosure of comparative (fatality) data 
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Indeed, as illustrated above, prior year comparative fatality data was only provided by 
four firms (19.6%) and no firm consistently reported a particular number of prior 
period results from one year to the next. In terms of other OHS outcome indicators, 
such as injury data, some firms provided up to 15 years’ historical data in clear 
graphs or tables, while others provided between zero and three years of historical 
data, often in simple bar graphs that were not able to convey a precise 
measurement. Surprisingly, two firms presented graphs showing a 12-month cycle of 
rolling monthly averages as their only historical data. While this information may be 
useful for monthly monitoring by a Board of Directors, the year’s data provided little in 
the way of useful historical information for a report that is, itself, issued annually.  
Overall, the presentation of historical data was generally very poor. This has 
implications for the extent to which report users can make informed assessments 
about changes in performance over time. The opportunistic presentation of data also 
suggests strategic efforts to mislead stakeholders through impression management. 
7.3.2 Inconsistent performance metrics 
Also apparent was the disparate range of injury and illness metrics employed to 
evaluate OHS performance outcomes. These included indicators such as the number 
or rate of: all injury, LTI, lost time incident, lost workday, lost workday case, total 
recordable injury, total recordable case, permanent disability, medical treatment 
injury, moderate medical treatment, classified injury, restricted day case, new 
occupational disease case and various KPIs relating to injury severity and lost time 
duration. A summary of these and other outcome KPIs identified in corporate annual 
and sustainability reports is offered in Appendix 18. 
This use of inconsistent metrics not only posed problems for comparing performance 
across firms but also for comparing performance over time within a single firm. 
During the period of study (1997-2007) 87% of sampled companies changed at least 
one indicator in the suite of KPIs on which they reported, 47% changed all KPIs used 
to report on performance and 53% changed the calculation method of at least one 
KPI without changing the KPI name. Overall, only three firms reported consistently on 
their injury metrics for each year – and those metrics were each common only to that 
firm. Table 7-3 summarises the broad types of OHS outcome indicators reported by 
the sampled firms. Where changes in calculation methods were reported, these have 
been identified in the table. 
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 Firm 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 %  
E1 - L A D  L R D  M L R* D L R D L R D L R D* L R D L R D L R D  W R D 91% 
E2  - - R R L R R L R R R R  R 82% 
E3 - - -  -  -  L L L R L R* R R 55% 
E4     L  L  L  L M R L M R LM R  Rx2 Rx2  100%
E5           - - L R L R R* L R*  67% 
M1 L D L A D  D L R D L M D L D L D L D L D L A D L M 100%
M2 L L L L L L L R L*  R L R  L R  L R 100%
M3 L L L -  D L D C C C D C R  C R D  91% 
M4 -  L L L L D^ L L L L* L L R 91% 
M5 L M L L M L M L W R W* R W R W R W R  - 91% 
M6 - - - - - L L L*  R L R L R L R* D 55% 
M7   L L M L* M L M A L M F A  L M F  A L M F  A L M F 100%
M8         L M L M L M L M L M L M L M 100%
M9               LMr L Mr  L Mr L Mr 100%
M10               R R R R 100%
  5 7 7 8 10 12 12 15 15 15 14   
% firms 
reporting 44% 67% 78% 73% 83% 92% 92% 100% 100% 100% 93%  
  L = lost time injury (or similar) Li = lost time injury and illness (or lost time incident) W = lost workday case (or similar)         
C = classified injury  M = medical treatment injury Mr = Medical referral injury  R = recordable injury 
 F = first aid injury  A = all injury    D = illness or disease 
  - = no performance data reported *  = changed KPI calculation method 
Table 7-3: Injury and illness indicators reported (by firm and year) 
 
The inconsistencies revealed above in the choice of injury and illness outcome 
metrics were further exacerbated by the failure of most firms to define the 
measurement method(s) employed. Consequently, the similarities and differences 
between indicators were not always apparent. Furthermore, it was often necessary to 
review four to five consecutive years of annual or sustainability reports before finding 
one in which a definition was provided. Of course, given the discrepancies outlined 
above, one could not be certain that a definition in one report was applicable to the 
data presented in a different report.  
In some cases, a review of reported definitions revealed that different firms 
presenting a particular indicator (such as LTIFR) used a variety of different formulae. 
This arose through managerial choices to include or exclude: illnesses, contractors, 
fatalities, restricted duties, medical treatment, first aid and lost time commencing 
more than 24 hours after the incident, or by varying the denominator number of hours 
on which the metric was based. Other firms reported differently labelled indicators 
that, upon closer inspection, appear to have been based on identical formulae. For 
example, one firm reported a Total Injury Case Rate of 0.16 and the following year 
identified a “prior year” Total Recordable Incident Frequency rate of exactly the same 
performance result (0.16 ). This suggests both metrics measure the same thing. 
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Together these findings reveal an array of metrics that were, and are, likely to cause 
confusion for those stakeholders seeking to understand OHS performance and to 
present challenges for those who seek to benchmark performance not only across 
firms but also within a given firm across time. This supports stakeholders’ demands 
for OHS KPIs, injury and illness KPIs in particular, to be standardised at a global or at 
least national level (preferred by 53.2% and 86.3% of stakeholders respectively). 
7.3.3 Inconsistent units of measurement 
Chapter 5 identified various stakeholder concerns relating to the levels of data 
aggregation and the use of absolute (numbers) versus relative measures (rates) to 
report on OHS activity and outcomes. These are summarised in Table 7-4 which also 
illustrate how choices about the level of data aggregation enabled firms to meet, or 
conversely fail to meet, stakeholder expectations for OHS accountability.  
Issue Stakeholder concerns Evidence of reporting practice 
Illness and injury  Generally comfortable with 
occupational illness data to be 
aggregated with injury data in the 
presentation of injury KPIs since both 
are work-related OHS outcomes. 
Mixed: Some firms aggregated illness and 
injury data, some showed illness and injury 
separately, although most did not mention 
illnesses at all. 
Outcome severity Strong concern evident over the 
aggregation of injury frequency 
involving various levels of injury 
severity. Wanted separate disclosure 
of fatality, PD, long-term TD and 
short-term TD frequency rates.  
Mixed: Although 41% of reports did identify 
fatalities separately, firms generally failed to 
meet stakeholder expectations in respect of 
non-fatal injury and illness: only 6% identified 
PDs, no firms identified long-term TDs. In 
contrast, 71% aggregated LTIs regardless of 
severity and 54% further aggregated LTIs with 
MTIs. 
Outcomes by 
employment status 
Stakeholders sought outcome data 
for both employees and contractors.  
Mixed: Some reports showed aggregated 
outcomes for employees and contractors, 
others reported on employees and contractors 
separately while a few reported only on 
employees and fewer again reported only on 
contractors.  
Outcomes by 
location 
Stakeholders sought aggregated 
organisational measures of OHS 
outcomes. Some were interested in 
OHS outcome data by site, region or 
country but only if total corporate 
outcomes were also shown. 
Generally succeeded in meeting expectations. 
Although earlier reports tended to report only 
on single sites with exceptional performance, 
later reports were more likely to provide 
aggregated corporate OHS outcome results. 
OHS fines and 
penalties 
Stakeholders were interested in both 
the aggregated cost of fines and also 
details about cost by incident or 
breach. 
Failed: Twelve out of 15 firms did not provide 
any information about fines. Of the three firms 
disclosing total annual cost of OHS fines only 
one provided both aggregated and 
disaggregated cost information. 
Individual privacy A number of stakeholders expressed 
privacy concerns relating to 
disclosures surrounding fatal and 
serious incidents. 
Generally succeeded in meeting expectations. 
Most firms maintained privacy of injured 
individuals, with only a few naming those who 
had suffered fatal work-related injury. One 
exception was a report in which a widow and 
three young children were each named. 
Table 7-4: Data aggregation and disaggregation 
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Stakeholders also expressed preferences for the presentation of particular OHS 
performance measures as absolute numbers, rates (such as frequency rates or 
percentages) or both. For example, most stakeholders (83%) preferred fatality data 
to be presented as an absolute (total) number of work-related deaths for the period. 
As indicated below, analysis confirmed that all 14 firms reporting on work-related 
fatalities met this expectation. 
The majority of stakeholders (84%) also expressed a desire for occupational illness 
data to be presented as the absolute number of cases of illness identified in a period 
with (67%) seeking this to be supplemented by a frequency rate. Evidence of illness 
disclosure, however, was both limited and mixed. Only three firms reported explicitly 
on occupational illness with two thirds of these disclosures showing number of cases 
(67%), just over half reporting rates of illness (58%) and only 25% providing both a 
number and rate. Furthermore, some firms failed to disclose illnesses separately, 
reporting instead to capture illnesses in aggregated injury frequency metrics.  
Stakeholder preference for permanent disability data was also for absolute number of 
incidents (81%), although a preference for frequency rates of all other non-fatal injury 
(75%) was reported. These results are summarised in Table 7-5. In some cases the 
efforts by firms to report relevant performance data were undermined by the less 
appropriate choice of OHS metrics. This meant that although data was provided, it 
may not have been in the form needed to meet the information needs of 
stakeholders.  
Reconciling the presentation of outcome data to  
stakeholder expectations 
KPI data presented as: 
Disclosure  # Firms reporting Number 
(#) 
Rate    
(%) 
Both      
# and % 
Number 
only 
Rate      
only 
 
Fatality 14 100% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
Stakeholder demand 83 % 8% 53% 30% 0% 
      0 0 0 
Illness 3 67% 33% 25% 42% 8% 
Stakeholder demand 84 % 15% 67% 17% 0% 
 
Injury / illness      0 0 
PD 7 73% 27% 0% 73% 27% 
Stakeholder demand 81% 61% 76% 5% 0% 
 
MTI 8 13% 88% 31% 0% 57% 
ALL 3 17% 83% 0% 17% 83% 
LTI 14 7% 93% 30% 0% 63% 
RI 11 8% 92% 19% 0% 73% 
Stakeholder demand 63% 75% 54% 9% 21% 
Table 7-5: Preferences for presenting OHS outcome KPIs 
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Nevertheless, at least 11 firms met stakeholder expectations by presenting injury 
data as both a number and rate on at least one occasion. These appeared in 
sustainability reports while disclosures in the annual report tended to be presented as 
frequency rates only. The proportion of firms presenting both a number and a rate of 
injury for each year, by report type, is summarised in Appendix 14.  
Stakeholders also reported preferences for activity KPIs to be presented as either a 
number, a rate, or both (see Table 7-6 below). For example, while firms tended to 
report all PPIs as frequency rates, respondents preferred the number of outcomes (or 
events) for most PPIs including audit non-conformances (73%), exposure to health 
hazards (74%), risks identified (81%). In contrast, stakeholders did indicate a 
preference for frequency rates of absenteeism and OHS committee attendance.  
Stakeholder preferences for the presentation of activity data 
PPI data to be presented as: 
% of stakeholders Number 
(#) 
Rate    
(%) 
Both      
# and % 
Number 
only 
Rate      
only 
HPI (or near miss) events 74% 64% 54% 20% 10% 
Work-related exposures 74% 67% 55% 19% 11% 
Worker absenteeism 59% 78% 45% 14% 33% 
OHS training courses held 64% 50% 36% 29% 14% 
OHS training completed 67% 66% 43% 23% 22% 
OHS audits undertaken 72% 50% 34% 37% 16% 
OHS audit non-compliance 73% 67% 52% 21% 15% 
New risks reported 73% 39% 32% 41% 7% 
Total risks identified 81% 42% 38% 43% 4% 
Risks controlled through 
processes or equipment 65% 55% 39% 27% 16% 
Risks controlled through PPE 63% 57% 40% 24% 17% 
OHS committees 49% 68% 35% 14% 33% 
Table 7-6: Stakeholder preference for PPI format 
Overall, few reports discussed PPI data and even fewer presented PPI results on a 
regular basis. This lack of consistency mirrored those relating to the provision of 
outcome data. The following section extends this analysis, examining inconsistencies 
in data presentation with reference to errors and potential motives for bias. 
7.4 Data reliability  
Data reliability refers to the freedom of data from bias or error (Carlon et al. 2008). 
Evidence of poor reliability was linked to poor comparability in that some firms 
disclosed data differently from year to year, presenting results in the most favourable 
light. This further hampered the comparability of reported OHS information.  
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7.4.1 Evidence of bias 
As mentioned in Chapter 6, all 15 firms reported inherently ‘bad’ news in the form of 
OHS failures (such as injuries, illnesses and fatalities) and a number of firms, such 
as EA, MH and MN appeared particularly forthcoming and transparent in some years. 
Some bias was evident, however, in the failure of a number of firms to report injury or 
fatality information in those periods in which safety performance had deteriorated 
(see section 6.2.3.3). Further evidence of bias was detected in the way in which 
injury and illness performance was discussed. For example:  
• One firm described an 18% deterioration in LTI rates as “results plateaued” 
while a second company described a similar deterioration in LTI rates as a 
“slight improvement” (MI 2001 and MN 2007). In one case, the previous 
year’s rate was omitted from the report thereby preventing users from 
calculating the rate of change. In the other, the reported ‘prior year’ rate 
differed substantially from that disclosed in the previous year’s report.  
• Similarly, another mining firm reported LTIs to have improved 6% to a rate of 
1.6 and MTIs improved to 11.7. Again, comparative prior year data was not 
provided in the report although a review of the previous report identified more 
favourable rates of 1.3 and 11.2 respectively. It was interesting to also 
observe that this was the first time in a number of years that this firm had not 
presented a four-year historical graph of safety performance in the annual 
report. 
• For another firm, a rise of 8.5% in the LTIFR from the prior year saw the firm 
fail to mention LTIFR in the report and instead its sole OHS disclosure, 
located in the Managing Director’s statement, reported on an improvement in 
the more aggregated measure of minor and LTIs (TRIFR):  
Our social performance spans health and safety, our community relations effort 
and employee relations. Our approach is underpinned by our core value of 
respect, for the individual, for each other, for stakeholders and for cultures. 
There was a renewed focus on safety within the organisation, and while our 
performance measured by TRIFR improved, it was still higher than our overall 
target for the year (MJ 2007, p5).  
• Indeed, in another stand-out example, the full sustainability report issued by 
one firm, revealed LTI, RI and AI data. Some basic mathematical analysis 
enabled one to identify a 1417% annual increase in their most serious 
category of OHS outcomes (LTIs) for one major division, and an 825% 
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increase in LTIs in another. In contrast, a 15% improvement was reported in 
all injury outcomes (calculated after aggregating the LTIs, with those many 
injuries requiring medical treatment or basic first aid). The accompanying 
discussion failed to address the significant increases in those more serious 
injury categories and instead simply stated: 
In 2007 there were no fatalities at our operations however we did not achieve 
our target of zero lost work day or recordable injuries, both of which saw an 
increase in our [Division A] and [Division B] operations. While this is 
disappointing, we did achieve a 15 per cent reduction in the all injury rate for 
our [Division B] operations in 2007 (MK 2007, p53). 
In this firm’s summary sustainability report all references to the 1417% and 
825% increases in the most serious work-related injuries were completely 
omitted and the firm simply reported on their ‘achievement’ of the small 
improvement in the All Injury rate stating: 
The reductions in our all injury rates are a leading indicator of the success our 
safety programs are providing and we will continue to drive safety as the 
number one priority for our organisation (MK 2007, p5). 
The presentation of bias, particularly in regard to performance data, potentially 
reflects a legitimation strategy whereby report preparers actively seek to manage the 
impressions of stakeholders. In the last example presented above, it is possible that 
preparers expect most users to read the summary report only and therefore justify 
the presentation of a more flattering picture of performance in the summary CSR 
report by arguing a more complete set of data had been provided elsewhere. 
Furthermore, preparers may recognise that less informed users reading the full report 
are unlikely to appreciate the significance of the statistics shown in the table and rely 
instead solely on the narratives. This offers a potential explanation for their focus on 
the more positive aspects of performance, providing a particularly sympathetic 
impression of the results, and failing to highlight the significant deterioration in safety 
outcomes for the year. 
7.4.2 Evidence of errors 
Further compromising the perceived reliability of OHS data was the failure of a 
number of firms to present prior year injury data that matched the results actually 
disclosed in the previous year. While this could reflect a legitimate change in severity 
due to deterioration in an injured worker’s health status, firms failed to explain the 
differences or to identify adjustments or corrections to prior year data. For example, a 
summary of the performance data issued by one firm is provided in Table 7-7.  
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Table 7-7: Evidence of errors in performance data 
While these discrepancies potentially resulted from undeclared differences in the 
year end dates of the two reports, or legitimate but unstated adjustments, they did 
not engender confidence in the reliability of the data. Errors identified in other reports 
included a case in which two different rates were provided for the same metric 
presented on the same annual report page. Instances were also identified where 
data presented in the annual report and sustainability report for the same year did not 
agree. It was therefore, perhaps not surprising to see disclaimers such as the 
following in the reports (sustainability reports in particular): 
All reasonable effort has been made to provide accurate information in this [CSR] 
Report but [the company] does not warrant or represent its accuracy (EB 2006, p2). 
Anyone seeking to rely on information in this report or seeking to draw detailed 
conclusions from the data should contact the Company for verification and assistance 
(MH 2004, p4). 
Discrepancies were observed regularly in the reports of one particular firm and the 
process of external assurance was observed to promote noticeable improvement in 
reliability (or at least transparency). This case is detailed in the following section. 
7.4.3 Use of external verification 
The stakeholder survey revealed strong support (from 86% of stakeholders) for the 
independent verification of publicly disclosed OHS data. It was surprising, therefore, 
that OHS information, and injury data in particular, was only verified in ten of the 50 
Discrepancies in Reported OHS Performance Data  
Year Annual report CSR report 
2006 TRCF = 24.1 (20.9), RI = 5.5 (5.0) 
LTIFR = approx 3.8 (approx 2.6), 
RI = 5.5 (5.0)  
2005 LTIFR = 2.3 (2.6), TRCF = 17.1 (20.7),  LTIFR = 2.5 (2.6),  RI = 5.3 (7.4)  
2004 
LTIFR = 2.8 (3.1),  TRC = 20.8 (24.5),  
        RI = 7.4 p7,  7.5 p22 (8.8)  
LTIFR = 2.8 (3.1)  
RI = 7.3 p0, 7.5 p10 (8.1^)  
2003 LTIFR = 2.7 (3.6),   TRCF = 25 (33.7)  LTIFR = 2.9 (3.6), RI = 8.8 
2002 LTIFR = 3.0 (4.9) ,  LTI = 14 (21)  LTIFR = 3.6 (4.9) 
2001 LTIFR =  4.9 (6.7),  LTI = 21 (29)  - 
2000 LTIFR = 6.0 (3.1),   LTI = 25 (13)  - 
Note:  Figures in brackets are the comparative (prior year) data provided in the current report. 
     ^   This report was audited and a note provided stating the difference between the prior year result (8.1) and 
the previous data (8.8) was the result of an error in the previous report. 
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sustainability reports (20%) and in none of the 137 annual reports. These ten verified 
reports were issued by only four of the 15 firms: one energy and three mining firms.  
Highlighting the potential benefits stakeholders can derive from this process, 
verification provided by one firm was associated with a substantial improvement in 
the provision and clarity of injury indicator definitions from those that had been 
provided in previous years. For another firm, the only year in which the report was 
independently verified was also the only year in which the repeated discrepancies 
between comparative data and the results actually shown in the previous report was 
addressed. In this particular year a footnote was provided simply stating that an error 
had been made in the previous report. The unverified reports issued in all prior and 
subsequent years failed to explain these recurring discrepancies.  
Most notably, it was observed that one firm disclosed lower (more favourable) injury 
rates in the (unverified) annual report than the higher (less favourable) outcomes 
presented in the (verified) sustainability reports for each of the years in which the 
CSR external verification scope covered OHS data. This suggests the unverified 
annual report data may have been biased to present a less negative image of 
performance. The assured CSR reports also explicitly identified corrections to prior 
year data where discrepancies between data in consecutive reports were evident. 
After 2006 the OHS data presented in this firm’s sustainability report was no longer 
verified and from that point forward the sustainability report no longer reported less 
favourable rates of injury than those presented in the annual report. One may expect 
this to weaken the perceived credibility of the data; however, the lack of verification 
may go unnoticed by stakeholders because so few firms engage in such processes.  
Indeed, it was unexpected to see such little verification of OHS disclosures given the 
obvious benefits to stakeholders, as highlighted by the above examples, and the 
benefits to firms in terms of stakeholder perceptions of data reliability. It was even 
more surprising to observe that some organisations had engaged independent 
assurance firms to audit the financial statements and the environmental performance 
information but expressly excluded the OHS data from the audit scope. This seems 
curious given the uncertainties associated with many aspects of environmental 
performance, in contrast to the ease of verifying OHS data, a fact highlighted in one 
directors’ report which explicitly stated that safety performance data “are capable of 
measurement and can be easily audited” (EE 2006, p25).  
It would appear from these results that firms are generally reluctant to engage in the 
process of external verification of OHS data. Further research would need to be 
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undertaken to identify whether this reluctance stems from concerns over the cost of 
verification services, from a failure to recognise either the benefits of, or stakeholder 
demand for, verification or a more deliberate resistance to ensuring the reliability of 
reported results.  
7.5 Evaluating quality using OSHAI Scores 
Together, sections 7.2 to 7.4 reveal serious concerns with levels of comparability, 
reliability and relevance of OHS information reported by a number of the sampled 
firms.  Nevertheless, the PSI scores for these reports suggest a very high level of  
reporting quality with between 11 and 13 of the 15 firms achieving a score of 80% or 
higher in each year from 2004 to 2007 (with three firms achieving a score of 100%). 
This suggests broad criteria such as ‘quantitative measures of OHS outcomes’ are 
too vague to tease out the extent to which the evidence-based OHS data reported by 
organisations is actually providing the relevant and useful information needed to 
discharge accountability to stakeholders. Like the disclosure indices used in much of 
the prior research, the PSI, both in its original form and as employed in this study, 
appears too blunt an instrument to capture these distinctions.  
This demonstrates the need for a more tailored assessment tool – one that can better 
reconcile the disclosure of corporate OHS information with specific stakeholder 
demands for OHS accountability. To address this need the OHSAI rating scale was 
developed, as detailed in Chapter 4, drawing from both the reported stakeholder 
preferences identified in Chapter 5 and the disclosure coding principles of the PSI. 
This rating scale sought to enable objective evaluations of the extent to which OHS 
disclosures provide the reliable, consistent and relevant information that stakeholders 
deem necessary to publicly demonstrate accountability for OHS or, conversely, 
whether disclosures merely present “safewash”104 by exhibiting the albeit evidence-
based, but largely irrelevant, self-laudatory or legitimation focus that has attracted 
criticism in other studies of (primarily environmental) sustainability reporting.  
Subsequent, analysis of these OSHAI scores revealed a general improvement in the 
quality of OHS disclosure across the period of the study. This confirms the trend 
provided by the PSI scores identified in section 7.1, although given firms achieved an 
average final score of only 16.8 / 30 (56%) by 2007, the results suggest companies 
have some way to go to provide the quality disclosures stakeholders are seeking. 
Analysis of the OSHAI data revealed the greatest improvement to be in scores for 
OHS processes (with average results increasing from 27% in 1997 to 63% by 2007). 
                                                 
104 The term ‘safewash’ refers to the presentation of information that infers a greater level of attention to 
safety or superior safety outcomes than exists in reality.  
 224
OSHAI scores for outcome performance data saw the least improvement, however, 
increasing from 20% to just 47%. The overall quality of OHS data was also relatively 
low with average ratings of less than 30% in the 1990s, rising to only 53% by 2007. 
Together this suggests that the prevailing patterns of OHS reporting address some of 
the accountability demands of stakeholders but generally fail to address the quality of 
OHS performance data in particular. Consequently mixed support is found for 
proposition six: 
P 6:  Information provided in institutionalised templates of OHS disclosure 
will address the accountability demands of stakeholders 
A summary of the average OSHAI scores across the 15 sampled firms is provided in 
Table 7-8, by category of analysis and year. Detailed results of the OSHAI 
assessments by firm, category and year are also provided in Appendix 16. 
OSHAI Score Data for All Sampled Reports by Category and Year 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
# Firms 9 9 9 11 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 
Governance            
   Maximum 60% 60% 80% 100% 100% 100% 100% 80% 100% 100% 100% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 40% 20% 20% 40% 40% 
   Average (%) 37% 41% 49% 48% 50% 58% 55% 52% 59% 65% 67% 
Process            
   Maximum 70% 70% 80% 80% 80% 80% 90% 80% 90% 90% 90% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 0% 20% 30% 10% 
   Average (%) 27% 29% 31% 31% 50% 49% 53% 54% 61% 62% 63% 
Outcomes            
   Maximum 70% 70% 50% 70% 60% 60% 60% 60% 70% 70% 70% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 10% 10% 10% 20% 
   Average (%) 20% 23% 29% 29% 30% 35% 32% 33% 40% 42% 47% 
Quality             
   Maximum 60% 60% 60% 80% 60% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 80% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 40% 
   Average (%) 20% 22% 27% 36% 39% 37% 46% 47% 53% 44% 53% 
Total OSHAI (%)            
   Maximum 57% 67% 53% 80% 73% 63% 67% 70% 77% 83% 80% 
   Minimum 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 10% 13% 7% 13% 23% 30% 
   Average 24% 28% 31% 35% 41% 44% 45% 46% 52% 52% 56% 
Raw OSHAI      
Scores (  / 30)            
   Maximum 17 20 16 24 22 19 20 21 23 25 24 
   Minimum - - - - - 3 4 2 4 7 9 
   Average      7.2    8.3      9.4    10.4   12.3   13.1   13.4   13.7    15.7    15.7   16.8 
Table 7-8: Summary of average OSHAI scores (by year) 
Comparison of the OSHAI scores to the PSI scores obtained previously revealed the 
OSHAI scale to rate the quality of most reports considerably lower than the PSI 
scale. This suggests that of the OHS information presented, a sizeable proportion 
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was either less relevant to stakeholders or of poor quality. There were notable 
exceptions, however, such as those provided for the more recent disclosures issued 
by the firm coded as MH. This is illustrated in Figure 7-2 and suggests that the great 
majority of information provided by MH in its 2005, 2006 and 2007 reports in 
particular was both relevant and of high quality.  
In contrast, comparisons of the PSI and OSHAI scores suggested that the increasing 
provision of narrative and quantitative data over time in some reports had actually 
coincided with a reduction in the disclosure of high quality OHS information. For 
example, see the change in PSI versus OSHAI scores in 2006 and 2007 for firm EE 
as illustrated in Figure 7-3 below. Analysis of scores by category (see Appendix 16) 
reveals that despite an increase in quantitative OHS disclosures from the 2006 to the 
2007 report (which drove the rise in the total PSI score), there was a simultaneous 
and significant decrease in the provision of relevant narratives about OHS processes 
(with a resulting decrease in the OSHAI process quality score from 60% to 20%).  
Figure 7-2: PSI and OSHAI scores for MH 
 
 
Figure 7-3: PSI and OSHAI scores for EE 
 
In most cases however, the PSI and OSHAI scores tended to move in the same 
direction. This suggested that the increasing disclosure of OHS narratives and 
metrics observed over time was associated with increasing accountability to 
stakeholders. Interestingly, a notable exception was provided by firm MF in that 
comparison of PSI and OSHAI scores revealed a largely negative correlation 
between annual changes in OHS disclosure and accountability (see Appendix 17).  
These differences between the PSI and OSHAI scores confirm the OHS reporting 
gap identified in section 7.2. They also provide a means of quantifying the extent to 
which the reported OHS narratives and metrics succeed or fail in providing the 
relevant and reliable OHS information necessary to discharge accountability to 
stakeholders for OHS governance, processes and performance.  
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Chapter 8. CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides a summary of the study in section 8.1. Section 8.2 then 
outlines the implications of the findings for both research and practice. In doing so, a 
number of suggestions for future research are identified. These include projects that 
are the extensions of the present study and additional opportunities for research that 
have emerged during the course of this project. In section 8.3 three sets of 
recommendations for practice are also offered: first to policy makers and legislators; 
then to the GRI’s labour indicator technical committee; and finally to preparers of 
corporate reports. Finally, a number of limitations of the study are acknowledged in 
section 8.4 and the final conclusions are presented in section 8.5.  
8.1 Summary of research project  
This study set out to explore the extent to which corporate accounts of OHS risk 
management and performance are of sufficient quality to meet stakeholder demand 
for the discharge of OHS accountability. Quality was defined in terms of the 
relevance, completeness, comparability and reliability of OHS information provided. 
This was achieved by first administering a survey instrument to a sample of 
stakeholders to ascertain the OHS issues they perceived to be of most interest. The 
survey results identified a range of topics on which stakeholders reported an 
expectation of accountability, such as OHS governance, processes and fatal and 
severe injury and illness outcomes. They also highlighted various quality concerns 
relating to OHS disclosure relevance, reliability and comparability. 
Content analysis of a sample of 187 publicly available corporate reports (137 annual 
and 50 sustainability reports) was then conducted. This sought to examine the 
content and quality of OHS disclosures provided by large mining firms over an 11-
year period from 1997 to 2007. This particular date range enabled an analysis of the 
influence of the GRI sustainability reporting guidelines on OHS disclosure content. 
The content analysis findings were described in Chapter 6. In Chapter 7, the 
stakeholder survey and content analysis findings were reconciled so as to 
demonstrate the extent to which the disclosures that had been issued by sampled 
firms appeared to meet stakeholder expectations for corporate OHS accountability. 
Various reporting gaps were identified as firms failed to report on many issues of 
most importance to users, instead presenting loosely related but substantially less 
relevant information. A brief summary of the project including the key findings is 
provided in Table 8-1. 
 227 
 
Project Aims Research Propositions Research Method Research Findings 
1. To explore stakeholder 
perceptions of corporate OHS 
accountability and the demand 
for corporate disclosures of 
OHS information. 
P1: Stakeholders believe 
organisations should be 
accountable for OHS. 
P2: Stakeholders believe a duty to 
account for OHS should be 
discharged through the periodic 
public disclosure of OHS 
information. 
RQ 1: What information should OHS 
disclosures contain? 
 
Online survey instrument: 
 
135 stakeholders  
(including employees,      
OHS professionals, 
regulators, unions) 
P1:   Supported – 99% of stakeholders 
indicated that organisations should be 
publicly accountable for OHS. 
P2:   Supported – 95% of stakeholders 
indicated that all organisations should 
publicly disclose OHS information. 
RQ1: Stakeholders demand provision of high 
quality information on OHS governance, 
management processes and severity-
based outcome measures. 
2. To evaluate and describe the 
quality of corporate accounts of 
OHS performance.  
• to identify whether 
institutionalised patterns of 
accountability exist across 
organisations and across 
time;  and  
• to explore the extent to which 
the GRI has influenced the 
content and / or quality of 
OHS disclosures. 
P3:  Large firms operating in a field 
with similar and high levels of 
OHS risk will seek to ensure 
continued legitimacy by providing 
OHS information to stakeholders.  
P4: Large firms operating in a field 
with similar and high levels of 
OHS risk will share an 
institutionalised template for OHS 
disclosure. 
P5: The GRI's sustainability reporting 
guidelines form the basis of the 
institutionalised template for OHS 
disclosure.
 
Content analysis:  
 
OHS disclosures in  
137 annual reports  
& 50 sustainability reports 
P3:  Supported –100% of sampled firms 
provided OHS information to stakeholders 
(average OSHAI score increasing from 24% in 
1997 to 56% by 2007, with 2007 minimum 30% 
[up from 0%], maximum 80% [up from 57%]).   
P4:  Mixed support – macro-level templates 
appear institutionalised. However, 
inconsistencies in micro-level content 
suggest legitimacy criteria is in the early 
stages of institutionalisation. 
P5:  Not supported – few of the recommended 
GRI OHS indicators are included in the 
emerging OHS disclosure template.  
3. To reconcile evidence of 
stakeholder demand for,         
and corporate supply of,           
OHS information. 
P6: Information provided in 
institutionalised templates of OHS 
disclosure will address the 
accountability demands of 
stakeholders. 
Compare the results    
of the stakeholder survey  
and content analysis 
P6:  Mixed support – prevailing disclosure 
templates provide some information on 
governance and processes but inadequate 
performance data to demonstrate OHS 
accountability to stakeholders. 
Table 8-1: How the research objectives have been met 
 228
8.2 Implications of research findings 
The results of this study have important implications for both research and practice. 
Section 8.2.1 details various contributions to theory and outlines implications of the 
findings for those academic researchers using the GRI guidelines to guide content analytic 
studies of CSR disclosures. In section 8.2.2 implications for practice are identified 
including issues of relevance to both report preparers and report users. 
8.2.1 Implications for research 
8.2.1.1 Contributions to theory 
The findings outlined in Chapters 5 to 7 present three important implications for theory 
development. These are briefly summarised below.  
1. Important insights are provided into the OHS disclosure expectations of multiple 
stakeholder groups, each possessing varying degrees of power and influence over 
organisations. Adopting a stakeholder theory perspective, the ethical branch of 
stakeholder theory suggests that organisations should be accountable to all 
stakeholders, that is, all individuals and organisations who are placed at risk by a 
firm’s activities irrespective of the intrinsic levels of influence they are each able to 
exert (Freeman 1984). From a managerial perspective of stakeholder theory, 
organisations are argued to attend to the particular needs of those stakeholders 
with greater power or influence (Deegan 2006b).  
The findings demonstrate, however, that stakeholders from both powerful and less 
influential groups report very similar preferences for OHS disclosure, prioritising 
measures of fatality and severity, details of the circumstances surrounding serious 
injury and explanations of OHS risk management processes. Only owners 
(shareholders and small business owners) ranked the provision of response-based 
injury measures equally important to severity measures. Nevertheless, examination 
of corporate reports revealed a tendency to report only on response measures, 
essentially ignoring most of the severity indicators that were clearly of paramount 
importance to all groups of stakeholders. This suggests neither the ethical nor 
managerial branches of stakeholder theory will explain the corporate practice of 
OHS disclosure. These findings present opportunities for further research in terms 
of understanding the motivations for the choice of OHS disclosure content and 
exploring whether similar failures to address the specific information needs of 
powerful stakeholders are evident in other forms of CSR disclosure. 
2. Delving further into the content of OHS disclosures, the results have revealed 
changing patterns of information over time and documented apparent evidence of 
institutional processes. In particular, the findings distinguish between institutional 
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change at macro and micro levels. At macro-level, institutionalised patterns of 
disclosure are readily evident in a shared structure for reporting on broad themes 
of OHS governance, processes and performance. At micro-level, divergent 
perceptions of appropriate content continue to co-exist and compete for legitimacy.  
The ability of sampled disclosures to discharge OHS accountability to stakeholders 
therefore appeared undermined by differences in the presentation of performance 
data that rendered disclosures incomparable across firms and time. Furthermore, 
the increasingly institutionalised focus on behaviour-based safety disclosures such 
as corporate accounts of OHS risk management may be seen as analogous to 
producing financial statements containing only a balance sheet. While information 
on OHS culture and behaviour is important, it is not sufficient to communicate a 
meaningful account of corporate OHS risk management to stakeholders.  
Overall, patterns of OHS disclosure content appear to be in the early stages of 
institutionalisation. Further examination of this process, in terms of both the future 
development of OHS reporting templates and the institutional forces shaping these 
disclosures, is needed. This presents numerous opportunities for future research. 
3. Finally, the distinctions between macro- and micro-level processes of OHS 
reporting outlined above may have broader implications for understanding the 
intent of report preparers. In particular, the largely institutionalised patterns of 
reporting on themes of governance, processes and outcomes recognise public 
expectations for accountability on these issues. However, examination of the detail 
contained within these disclosures appears to suggest that where firms have a 
choice of metrics, indicators or topics (relating to each of the three major themes) 
strategic decisions are being made that produce narratives focused more on 
engendering legitimation of corporate behaviour than delivering accountability to 
stakeholders. This has implications both for an understanding of the institutional 
processes involved in the design and delivery of corporate OHS disclosures. 
Considered together these findings provide important insight into stakeholder expectations 
for OHS accountability and how the form of current disclosure patterns may appear to 
meet stakeholder demands, although the substance of the information fails to do so. This 
has relevance for regulators, should they consider the introduction of mandatory OHS 
reporting requirements. They are also relevant to anybody who seeks to critique the 
quality of OHS disclosures, including those organisations issuing reporting awards. 
Implications for practice are detailed further in section 8.3. 
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8.2.1.2 Implications for research method 
This study has examined the content of OHS disclosure and sought to understand the 
fundamental quality of various OHS performance indicators. In doing so, the thesis has 
demonstrated that different OHS metrics provide inherently different information content. 
Consequently, some are more capable of discharging accountability to stakeholders for 
OHS performance than others. This finding has two important implications for the future 
conduct of content analytic research. 
1. Researchers are encouraged to consider whether the performance categories 
captured within their disclosure indices are fundamentally capable of providing the 
relevant information needed to evaluate the level of corporate disclosure quality 
and transparency. As shown above, efforts to identify corporate disclosures of 
‘OHS injury performance’, as undertaken in various prior studies of CSR reporting, 
will capture a wide range of performance indicators – many of which bear a 
particularly poor relationship to outcomes for stakeholders and are therefore largely 
incapable of discharging accountability to report users.  
Particular reference is made to the GRI’s recommended OHS performance 
indicators which focus on lost time measures of injury. As noted above, these may 
be relevant to managers but are less capable than severity measures of reflecting 
changes in those outcomes that drive stakeholder impact. This was supported by 
the poor correlation between those KPIs demanded by stakeholders and those 
recommended by the GRI. This suggests caution should be exercised in assuming 
that corporate reporting on GRI recommended indicators will necessarily equate to 
evidence of the disclosure of high quality (relevant) information to stakeholders. 
Careful attention should therefore be given in research design to identifying 
appropriate levels of analysis and targeting those particular indicators that can 
provide valid measures of each issue of interest.  
2. The results also revealed that despite the stated purpose of the GRI to improve the 
quality of CSR reporting, disclosures of a GRI recommended indicator may not 
necessarily provide data which is comparable and reliable across organisations. 
This is particularly important where indicators are constructs, such as lost time, for 
which no objective scientific measurement is possible (as opposed to water use 
which may be objectively measured in litres). OHS indicator definitions proposed in 
the GRI protocol needed to be more explicit and detailed to remove the need for 
those subjective judgements at an organisational level that appear to have 
undermined data reliability and comparability. To ensure that firms are reporting on 
a particular indicator of interest, researchers need to ensure not only that the 
indicator is present, but also that definitions provided in the report confirm that the 
indicator conforms to a particular method of measurement. 
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Together these findings revealed important implications for the use of existing rating tools 
and reporting frameworks, such as the use of GRI sustainability reporting guidelines, as 
frameworks or disclosure indices for CSR research. In particular, they imply that reporting 
on GRI recommended metrics does not necessarily guarantee high-quality disclosure and 
conversely, that a failure to report in accordance with the GRI does not necessarily equate 
to a failure to deliver high quality, accountability-focused information. While the GRI 
guidelines may provide a useful starting point for the development of a disclosure index, 
one must evaluate the appropriateness of individual indicators for the intended users and 
closely examine disclosures to ensure they are comparable.  
8.2.2 Implications for practice 
The findings of this study further demonstrate that efforts to report to stakeholders on the 
management and evaluation of OHS appear to be undermined by the poor reliability, 
comparability and completeness (infrequency) of OHS data presented in corporate 
disclosures. This is further compounded by the repeated failure of sampled firms to report 
relevant information about the particular issues which are of greatest concern to users.  
Together this suggests that for OHS disclosures to be effective in discharging corporate 
accountability to stakeholders, reporters need to devote greater attention to ensuring 
approaches to performance measurement and disclosure are relevant, consistent and 
transparent. For example, the increasing disclosure of behaviour-based safety initiatives 
appears to have coincided with a noticeable fall in the presentation of injury severity 
information and a tendency to present increasingly aggregated105 injury outcomes data. If 
OHS disclosures are to enable firms to discharge accountability for their managerial 
choices, report users need to be able to ascertain the impact of OHS strategy on 
outcomes. This means being able to evaluate the impact of programs such as BBS on 
those injury and illness outcomes that have the greatest stakeholder impact. In the 
absence of voluntary efforts to improve the OHS disclosure quality, regulation to require 
mandatory reporting of data on the incidence of serious injury and illness may be required. 
Whether voluntary or mandatory, however, it is evident that corporate reporters need 
clear, detailed guidance to assist them in reliably calculating those OHS KPIs which matter 
most to stakeholders. This will require, however, a fundamental shift in presentation of 
OHS performance given the prevailing response-based patterns of corporate disclosure. It 
will also require a similar shift in the specific criteria used by those rating organisations 
who seek to evaluate and award OHS disclosure in particular and CSR disclosure in 
general. In view of the implications outlined above, a number of recommendations are now 
offered. These aim to encourage change that should improve transparency and 
accountability for OHS in general and for serious workplace injury in particular. 
                                                 
105 Aggregation in this case refers to the aggregation of disabling and LTIs in the LTI and increasingly, LTI 
further aggregated with the more frequent and less serious medical treatment cases. 
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8.3 Recommendations 
Various issues surrounding the quality of these OHS disclosures offered to discharge 
accountability to stakeholders have been highlighted in Chapters 6 and 7. In particular, 
critical reporting gaps were identified between stakeholder demand for relevant, reliable 
and comparable information on the one hand, and the evidence of current disclosure 
practice on the other. This section offers a number of recommendations in an effort to 
address these gaps. 
8.3.1 Recommendations for policy-makers and the professions 
The findings of this study confirm concerns raised in prior research (see for example, Brown 
and Butcher 2005) by revealing the varying quality of OHS disclosures provided in sampled 
annual reports. Recommendations to improve disclosure quality include:  
• Develop a clear and comprehensive framework within which OHS injury and illness 
outcomes can be defined and standard indicators can be developed.  
In particular, ensure that definitions of injury categories, unlike those provided in 
AS4804 Australian Standard on Injury Recording, clearly articulate whether each 
class of lower and higher order injuries are included. Also, specify whether an 
indicator includes contractors and whether it includes illnesses. Where frequency 
rates are advocated, also specify the number of hours.  
• Include a mandatory OHS reporting requirement in s299f of the Corporations Act. 
Require reporting of those issues of most importance to stakeholders, such as 
fatalities, permanent disabilities, infringements of the Occupational Health and 
Safety Act and fines, in the Directors’ Report under s299f. Like environmental 
incidents, OHS incidents can have significant stakeholder impact, both financially 
and socially. When section 299f was first introduced some firms reported on both 
environmental and OHS breaches, perhaps anticipating an earlier move to extend 
this requirement. Indeed, a number of sampled firms regularly referred to fines and 
infringement notices within their annual and sustainability reports. 
• Develop a standard injury severity classification ranking. 
The development of an injury severity classification scheme, similar to that used for 
environmental incidents, may assist firms not only in preparing disclosures for the 
Directors’ Report but also in communicating the number of injuries and illnesses 
sustained at various degrees of severity or impairment. This data should also be 
relevant for internal OHS decision-making. The following example is offered:  
  Proposed Severity Classification Scale 
Category  V: Fatality  
Category IV: Permanent disability (no return to work)  
Category III:   Permanent disability, impairment or disfigurement (but able to return to 
work), or long-term (> 6 months) temporary disability (including either 
lost time or restricted duties for a combined total period in excess of six 
months)  
Category II: Temporary absence (or LTI and restricted duties for periods of less than 
six months) 
Category I:  Medical treatment injury  
Figure 8-1: Proposed severity classification scale 
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8.3.2 Recommendations for rating agencies 
The findings of this study demonstrate that many of the indicators currently promoted by 
rating agencies are, in fact, less relevant measures of stakeholder impact, and therefore 
corporate accountability, than the available alternatives. These results, therefore, suggest 
that changes to the performance criteria used by those agencies that judge and bestow 
CSR reporting awards, most importantly to shift from response-based to severity-based 
outcome data, is likely to assist in improving the quality of reporting. 
8.3.3 Recommendations for preparers of corporate reports 
In view of the evidence provided in sampled annual and sustainability reports, the 
following recommendations are offered to preparers of corporate OHS disclosures. These 
seek to assist in improving the overall quality of publicly disseminated OHS information.  
• Use a standard method of calculating OHS indicators. 
Much of the poor reliability and comparability of existing report disclosures stem 
from the tendency of preparers to create unique names and definitions for illness 
and injury indicators. Credibility could be substantially improved by using accepted 
indicators and providing a clear definition in the glossary to inform readers as to the 
exact way in which these metrics were calculated.  
• Provide severity information. 
When reporting on injury and illness outcomes, identify the number of fatalities, 
permanent disabilities and long-term temporary disabilities sustained over the 
period. If there were none, say so. This assures the reader that no serious injuries 
occurred rather than leading them to wonder whether serious damage was simply 
being hidden. Provide recordable injury data as a supplementary measure to give 
an overarching indication of total injury and illness. 
• Explain relevant OHS processes and outcomes. 
This is an aspect most firms appeared to be doing well already. When providing 
stakeholders with an overview of the processes by which OHS risk is managed, it 
is important to remember the need for evidence – whether this takes the form of 
process-related positive performance indicators (PPIs) or descriptive examples. 
Stakeholders also share an expectation for firms to provide details of the 
circumstances surrounding serious and fatal incidents. Here the need for sensitivity 
in reporting is urged. Firms are encouraged to carefully balance privacy 
considerations and their desire to express condolences in such a public forum.  
• Ensure data are complete. 
The tendency for organisations to omit items, particularly when results were poor, 
from annual and sustainability reports was clearly evident in this study. If the 
objective of OHS disclosure is accountability, rather than ‘safewash’, accounts 
need to be complete, with important metrics presented consistently and reliably 
from year to year. 
Completeness is enhanced by ensuring key OHS performance indicators are 
provided in the annual report (or both the annual and sustainability report) and by 
ensuring prior year data is provided for comparison. 
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• Provide an OHS scorecard (see below). 
OHS disclosures need not be lengthy. This study has identified a number of firms 
already producing current and prior year LTIs, fatalities and OHS fines in the 
financial performance highlights table at the front of the annual report. If these were 
to be supplemented with data on permanent disability and perhaps occupational 
disease then each of the essential outcome disclosures would be addressed.  
For those wanting a simple but more comprehensive scorecard, perhaps Table 8-2 
below, drawn together from the stakeholder responses identified in Chapter 5, may 
be of use. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8-2: OHS Scorecard 
8.3.4 Recommendations for the GRI technical committee 
The stakeholder survey results reveal expectations for the corporate provision of a range 
of accountability disclosures not currently identified within the GRI framework. Most 
important among these are the provision of injury severity data and of disclosures relating 
to the identification and control of work-related health and safety risks. 
• Revise and clarify the recommended injury indicators. 
As indicated in the stakeholder survey results, 92% of respondents supported the 
widespread reporting by all firms of a ‘GRI-style’ set of ‘core’ OHS indicators, with 
additional optional indicators selected from an agreed suite of metrics. The current 
managerial focus of GRI injury indicators (for example, LTI, RI, AI) provides an 
OHS Scorecard 
OHS Outcomes  Current year Prior year 
Fatality # # 
Permanent disability # # 
Recordable injuries1 # and % % 
Occupational disease # and % #   
 
Regulatory Breaches  Current year Prior year 
Fines and penalties # and $ # and $ 
 (Show data per fine and include a brief description of the circumstances surrounding each incident) 
 
OHS Process PPIs  Current year Prior year 
OHS training completed av. hrs / employee av. hrs / employee 
Audit non-conformance # # 
Incidents analyses completed % % 
Corrective actions completed % % 
High potential incidents  # # 
Health exposure monitoring                              where relevant to the organisation 
Note: 
1.  Alternatively provide separate measures of LTI and medical treatment injury. 
2.  Measures of compensation costs and OHS-related contingent liabilities should be 
provided in the notes to the financial statements (with the exception of compensation 
payments made by a self-insured entity to a single injured employee given such 
disclosure could reveal confidential remuneration data).  
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indication of the overall frequency of work-related injury and illness and potentially 
the impact on organisational productivity. However, the analysis provided in 
Chapters 7 and 8 has confirmed that response-based metrics are inadequate for 
evaluating OHS risk or discharging accountability for OHS outcomes to external 
stakeholders due to their poor relationship to changes in the magnitude of financial 
and non-financial stakeholder impacts.  
If LTI and RI indicators are to remain as GRI recommended metrics for OHS 
performance evaluation, they must be supplemented with those severity indicators 
that can tease out the number of Category III, IV and V injuries identified in the 
proposed injury classification rating scale provided above.  
• Provide more detailed definitions for injury indicators. 
As mentioned in section 8.3, more detailed definitions of the indicators such as the 
LTIFR are needed to promote strictly comparable OHS injury and illness data. 
Together these recommendations offer a range of suggestions to aid in improving the 
quality of OHS disclosure and in turn improve the level of corporate accountability to 
stakeholders for OHS performance. 
8.4 Limitations  
Various limitations associated with survey and content analysis research methods have 
been identified in Chapter 4. The following limitations in respect of this study are 
emphasised. First, the extent to which the findings of this study are able to be generalised 
to the wider population of resource firms, or indeed to firms in other industries and 
countries, are limited by both the non-random selection of subjects and the restriction of 
these subjects to large resource firms listed on the ASX.  
Second, the small sample size, particularly for the survey, also limits the extent to which 
statistical inferences can be drawn from the findings. This is most evident in respect of 
conclusions regarding the preferences of the small numbers of shareholders and business 
owners participating in the survey. This highlights opportunities for further research in 
terms of replication studies that examine responses from a larger sample. 
8.5 Conclusion 
This study has demonstrated that large mining and energy firms are devoting resources to 
the management and reporting of OHS performance with many providing detailed 
accounts of OHS governance, processes and performance to stakeholders. Analysis of 
this content revealed, however, that although corporate OHS disclosures generally met 
stakeholder expectations for information on OHS governance, they were generally 
inadequate for addressing stakeholders’ needs for performance data, either in terms of 
OHS activity indicators or work-related injury and illness outcomes. This important 
reporting gap stemmed primarily from the poor quality of reported performance data. This 
was due to a lack of completeness, consistency and comparability which made 
performance evaluation and comparison across the sample extremely difficult. 
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The inability of stakeholders to make informed evaluations of OHS performance, 
particularly in terms of the most severe injury outcomes, is even more problematic given 
the recent shift in the focus of OHS risk management strategy. For organisations to be 
accountable to stakeholders for their implementation of initiatives such as behavioural- 
based safety programs, stakeholders need to be provided with information that informs 
them of changes in corporate strategy and processes, and also allows them to evaluate 
the effectiveness of these programs in terms of the subsequent impact on organisational 
performance. This was not possible in this study due to the tendency of sampled firms to 
replace severity measures with increasingly aggregated frequency rates that obscure the 
incidence of permanent and long- term disability within larger numbers of moderate and 
minor injury occurrences.  
Furthermore, this study has confirmed that the problems of poor comparability, reliability 
and completeness of OHS disclosures have not been resolved by the release of the GRI’s 
sustainability reporting guidelines. This appears to be due to a combination of factors 
including a lack of specificity in the definitions provided within the GRI indicator protocols, 
the voluntary nature of GRI-based reporting and, more importantly, the failure of the GRI 
guidelines to recommend the presentation of those issues of particular concern to 
stakeholders, such as injury severity measures, failure costs and process-based KPIs. 
Together these findings support stakeholder demand for the development and detailed 
specification of generally accepted OHS indicators and for the regulation of minimum 
standards of OHS disclosure by employers. Clearly, further effort is required if firms are to 
meet their duty to stakeholders by delivering the evidence-based, relevant, comparable 
and reliable performance information that is necessary to discharge accountability for OHS 
to stakeholders. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Economic Cost Burden to Employer, Worker and Community 
 
Source: ASCC (2009, p12) 
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Appendix 2: Potential Sources of OHS Hazards 
      Sources of work-related hazards are widely recognised to 
include: 
• Inappropriate organisation of work processes, tasks, schedules or 
environment. 
• Psychological hazards such as stress, time pressure, work load, work 
pace or bullying. 
• Ergonomic hazards including those tasks which involve awkward 
postures or movements, repetitive movements or prolonged stooping 
or crouching. 
• Physical hazards such as dangerous or poorly designed machinery or 
vehicles, excessive noise, inappropriate levels of heat, cold, vibration 
or electricity. 
• Chemical hazards including corrosive or poisonous liquids, toxic 
vapours and fumes. 
• Radiation hazards arising from exposure to radioactive materials or 
environments. 
• Biological hazards such as infectious diseases, moulds, viruses and 
pathogens. 
(Bluff et al. 2004; CCH 2006a) 
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Appendix 3:  Survey Instrument 
 
 
                                                                    Where 
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Q4: Available choices 
 267
 
Q6 & 7: Available choices 
 
Q8: Available choices 
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The available choices for 
all questions beginning 
‘how important…’ are: 
Q10b & 12b:  
Available Choices 
 269
Q13: Available choices 
 270
Q 16: Choices are  
Q17: Available choices 
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Appendix 4: Disclosure Classification Rules 
Disclosure Classification Rules: 
Category Names 
Category 
Label 
PSI  
code
Open 
close Definition / content Comments / additional 
Principles       
Context (policy, responsibility) CTXT P C Overall OHS vision, mission,  policy (includes zero injury goal)  
 - ergonomic management FHOC P C Hierarchy of control programs, OHS hazard / risk management  
 - behaviour management FBBS P C Behaviour-based safety programs  
Significant risks identified RISK P C Identify OHS risks facing employees and contractors  
Targets (specific) TRG P C Fatality / illness / injury targets – as per HSE guidance, goal of    
zero injuries insufficient unless already very close to zero 
Goals and targets combined – definition poor 
Statement of legislative compliance with OHS LEGC P C State regulations on OHS   
Compliance with ILO codes / guidelines HMS ILOH P C Refers to ILO codes / guidance on health management systems  
Best practice – awards received AWDS  O List any external awards received including inclusion on indices  
Processes (activities)      
Incident analysis  ANLS N C Efforts to identify risks or hazards that contribute to incidents Show if refer to ‘cause’ or ‘contribute’ 
OHS progress or plans PROG N C OHS programs (processes) described 
OHS training – activity TRNA Q C Training available, training offered, courses run  
OHS training – output TRNO Q C Employees and / or contractors completing training 
OHS system audits – activity AUDA Q C Audits undertaken, audits completed 
OHS system audits – output AUDO Q C Non-conformances, audit failures, problems detected 
Cost of OHS programs CSTP Q O Financial expenditure on OHS prevention and monitoring activities
Processes for evaluating safety climate SURV N C Use of safety surveys to assess safety climate / safety culture 
 
Identify if activities relate to ergonomics, hygiene, 
violence or behaviour. If >1 show separately 
 
Note: 
• if training provided to employees, contractors or both 
• if audits are third party or internal 
• where available record costs by type of program  
OHS consultation with workers CONS N C Employee meetings, communication programs  
OHS topics in formal agreements FTUG N C e.g. OHS topics explicitly included in individual contracts or EBAs  
Process for recording & notification RECD N C Description of the process in place for recording incidents,  
and for notifying relevant authorities relating to incidents 
 
Policies or programs re: serious disease HIV N C Programs for employees, families or community relating to serious 
disease, including but not limited to HIV/Aids 
Note: if programs relate specifically to HIV/Aids (for GRI) 
Providing healthcare services HCRE N C Provision of healthcare to workers, families and / or community  
Incentives programs INCT  C Incentives provided to managers  / workers  
Performance (outcomes)      
No. of fatalities FATL Q O Work-related fatalities. Include contractors and bystanders 
No. of occupational injuries (total) RPTI Q O Total reportable injuries or total injury / illness 
No. of occupational illnesses RPTD Q O Total reportable illness 
 - Response (lost time) measures LTIR Q O Includes LTIs, RIs 
 - Severity (impairment) measures SEVT Q O Measures of total or partial permanent disability (or incapacity) 
 - Average lost days measures SEVA Q O Or other severity metric, or rates of temp. vs. permanent disability 
Rates of absenteeism or sick leave ABST Q O Any mention of absenteeism / or of sick leave 
Rates of voluntary staff turnover VTOV Q O Any mention of staff turnover, including voluntary redundancy 
 
 
 
Identify outcome metrics and calculation base 
record if r=rate n=number or b=both  
 
No. of dangerous occurrences MISS Q O Include terms such as significant incidents, ‘near misses’, ‘HPI’ 
No. of enforcement notices ENFC Q O Receipt of warnings, regulatory enforcement or prohibition notices
No. of OHS convictions or cost of fines FINE Q O Fines for breach of safety legislation, health legislation or OHS 
Identify basis for measurement  
record if r = rate, n=number or b=both 
specify if fines are health, safety or OHS 
Compensation cost CSTW Q O Cost of workers’ compensation premiums paid, or liabilities   
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Appendix 5: Disclosure Index (Matrix) 
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Appendix 6: Example of Excel ‘Comment’ Function for Coding Rules  
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Appendix 7: Overview of Pacific Sustainability Index 
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Appendix 8: Examples of Data Coding 
Examples: Coding of narrative and quantitative data 
Narratives (examples relating to occupational hazards) 
Mention 
 
We consider it unacceptable that any member of our staff or a contractor should go 
home injured from our workplaces. We therefore strive to ensure this does not 
happen, with the application of rigorous risk assessment, hazard analysis, 
management systems and procedures that seek to minimise the chance of any 
incident occurring (EC 2003, p32). 
Discussion Codes of Practice are aimed at managing the major hazards and risks within the 
business. They represent the non-negotiable standards that apply across ‘MM’ and 
cover 15 areas including forklift safety, confined space, contractor management, 
isolation, molten materials and other key hazards. The Assurance Program 
ensures compliance of various parts of ‘MM’ with the Codes of Practice through 
auditing, reporting and ensuring close out of actions. Business leaders have been 
selected and trained to conduct assurance audits. A significant proportion of ‘MM’ 
operations have had audits performed. A common ‘MM’ computer system for injury 
and incident investigation, hazard registers and tracking of corrective actions has 
been developed and is being implemented. This will improve consistency of 
reporting, ease information sharing, as well as bring rigour to ensuring completion 
of agreed actions. A safety intranet site has also been developed to provide a 
central point of reference for information. (MM 2007, p28). 
Monitoring Target: 
Implement a baseline survey on occupational exposure hazards and establish 
occupational hygiene monitoring and health surveillance programs. 
Annual reduction in exposures above occupational exposure limits, expressed 
as a percentage of people in the workforce. 
Performance:   
97%of required sites have implemented baseline surveys. 
Potential occupational Noise Exposure, if not for the use of PPE, increased by 
4% from 2005/06, resulting in no change compared to the base year of 
2002/03. 
During the year, the Exposures, if not for the use of PPE, reduced by 1% from 
2005/06, and reduced by 6% compared to the base year 2003/04 (MH 2007, 
p108). 
Quantitative 
Mention There was a renewed focus on safety within the organisation, and while our 
performance measured by the TRIFR improved, it was still higher than our overall 
target for the year (MJ 2007, p6). 
Discussion Injury rate as measured by total recordable case frequency rate fell by 17% to 5.3 
in 2007 (EB 2007, p26). 
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 Appendix 9: Descriptive Information – Survey Respondents 
Stakeholder Employee OHS  regulator Trade union OHS manager OHS consultant Shareholder Academic Total 
Industry  #   #    #    #    #    #    #    #    
Mining & Energy 2 5.3% 0 0.0% 2 6.7% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 5 3.7% 
Construction 1 2.6% 1 12.5% 2 6.7% 6 15.0% 2 20.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 12 8.9% 
Healthcare 12 31.6% 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 3 7.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 17 12.6% 
Agriculture  5 13.2% 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 1 2.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 7 5.2% 
Manufacturing 1 2.6% 1 12.5% 2 6.7% 9 22.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 13 9.6% 
Transport 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 2 5.0% 0 0.0% 1 25.0% 0 0.0% 5 3.7% 
Government 10 26.3% 3 37.5% 11 36.7% 5 12.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 29 21.5% 
Education 2 5.3% 0 0.0% 2 6.7% 3 7.5% 1 10.0% 2 50.0% 5 100.0% 14 10% 
Other – high risk 2 5.3% 3 37.5% 2 6.7% 3 7.5% 1 10.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 11 8% 
          – med risk 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 5 16.7% 6 15.0% 6 60.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 18 13% 
          – low risk 1 2.6% 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 2 5.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 3.0% 
  38 100.0% 8 100.0% 30 100.0% 40 100.0% 10 100.0% 4 100.0% 5 100.0% 135 100% 
Experience                                 
< 2 years 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 20.0% 0 0.0% 1 20.0% 3 2.2% 
2-5 years 8 21.1% 2 25.0% 6 20.0% 5 12.5% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 21 15.6% 
6-10 years 2 5.3% 1 12.5% 1 3.3% 1 2.5% 3 30.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 8 5.9% 
11-20 years 10 26.3% 1 12.5% 5 16.7% 9 22.5% 2 20.0% 1 25.0% 2 40.0% 30 22.2% 
21-35 years 17 44.7% 2 25.0% 12 40.0% 22 55.0% 2 20.0% 1 25.0% 2 40.0% 58 43.0% 
> 35 years 1 2.6% 2 25.0% 6 20.0% 3 7.5% 1 10.0% 2 50.0% 0 0.0% 15 11.1% 
  38 100.0% 8 100.0% 30 100.0% 40 100.0% 10 100.0% 4 100.0% 5 100.0% 135 100% 
Gender                                 
Male 17 44.7% 3 37.5% 17 56.7% 23 57.5% 7 70.0% 2 50.0% 2 40.0% 71 52.6% 
Female 21 55.3% 5 62.5% 13 43.3% 17 42.5% 3 30.0% 2 50.0% 3 60.0% 64 47.4% 
  38 100.0% 8 100.0% 30 100.0% 40 100.0% 10 100.0% 4 100.0% 5 100%  135 100% 
                 
Total 38 28.1% 8 5.9% 30 22.2% 40 29.6% 10 7.4% 4 3.0% 5 3.7% 135 100% 
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Appendix 10: Attitudes to OHS Process KPI Disclosure (by stakeholder type) 
Perceived importance of OHS (activity) KPIs to each stakeholder group % of respondents 
(by stakeholder 
group) who ranked 
each KPI as … Near 
misses 
Hazardous 
exposures 
Absentee
-ism 
OHS 
training 
offered 
OHS 
training 
attended 
OHS 
audits 
completed 
Audit non-
conformance 
OHS risks 
identified 
OHS risks 
controlled 
OHS 
committee 
representation 
Other  
The most important % % % % % % % % % % % 
Employees  16.7 20.0 3.3 0.0 3.3 10.0 10.0 26.7 10.0 0.0 0.0 
Regulators  57.1 0 0 0 14.3 0 14.3 14.3 0 0 0 
Unions  33.3 3.7 0 7.4 3.7 3.7 11.1 25.9 11.1 0 0 
Managers  54.3 5.7 0 5.7 0 8.6 5.7 11.4 8.6 0 0 
Consultants  12.5 12.5 0 0 0 0 0 50.0 25.0 0 0 
Shareholders / 
owners  0 0 33.3 0 33.3 0 33.3 0 0 0 0 
Academics  20.0 20.0 0 0 0 0 40.0 20.0 0 0 0 
One of the  
top four most important % % % % % % % % % % % 
Employees  47.5 64.4 6.8 20.3 27.1 30.5 47.5 71.2 67.8 16.9 0 
Regulators  71.4 42.9 0 28.6 57.1 42.9 71.4 57.1 28.6 0 0 
Unions  67.9 49.1 3.8 22.6 41.5 45.3 64.2 49.1 45.3 7.5 3.8 
Managers  88.2 44.1 17.6 14.7 41.2 29.4 50 44.1 61.8 8.8 0 
Consultants  66.7 40.0 0 0 26.7 40.0 66.7 80.0 66.7 13.3 0 
Shareholders / 
owners  66.7 0 33.3 0 33.3 33.3 33.3 33.3 66.7 0 0 
Academics  50.0 100.0 50.0 0 0 50.0 75.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 0 
Total             
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Appendix 11: Summary of CSR Reports Examined (by year and firm type) 
Number of firmsSustainability reports 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
Total Reporting  
Energy Companies    
(total number of firms by year) 3 3 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 47   
No. of sustainability reports 
produced during the period 
by firms listed before 1997  
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
1     
33%
0     
0% 
1     
33%
3     
100%
2     
67% 6 3 3 
No. of sustainability reports 
produced during the period 
by firms listed after 1997  
na na Na 0     0% 
0     
0% 
1     
50%
1     
50%
1     
50%
1     
50%
1     
50%
1     
50% 6 2 1 
Total # sustainability reports 
examined 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
1 
20%
2 
40%
1 
20%
2 
40%
4 
80%
3 
60% 13 5 4 (80%) 
Mining Companies     
(total number of firms by year) 6 6 6 7 8 8 8 10 10 10 10 89   
No. of sustainability reports 
produced during the period 
by firms listed before 1997  
1    
20%
1    
20% 
1    
20% 
2     
33%
3     
50%
4     
67%
4     
67%
5     
83%
5    
83%
5     
83%
6     
100% 33 6 6 
No. of sustainability reports 
produced during the period 
by firms listed after 1997  
na na Na 0     0% 
0     
0% 
1     
25%
0     
0% 
0     
0% 
1     
25%
1     
25%
1     
25% 5 4 2 
Total # sustainability reports 
examined 0
^ 0^ 0^ 2 3 5 4 5 6 5^ 7 38 10 8 (80%) 
Total sustainability 
reports 
0 
0%
0 
0% 
0 
0% 
2 
18%
3 
25%
6 
46%
6 
43%
6 
40%
8 
53%
9 
60%
10 
67% 50 15 12 (80%)
^As indicated above, four sustainability reports were issued but copies could not be obtained. 
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Appendix 12: Reconciling Outcome Disclosure to Expectations 
Reconciling OHS Illness & Injury Disclosure with Stakeholder Expectations (by firm and year) 
  Fatality 
Long- 
term 
disability#  
Permanent 
disability 
Average 
severity  
LTI       
(or RI) 
Medical 
treatment 
Minor   
injury 
Workplace 
disease^ 
Disclosures by firm (as a % of cases) 
E1  38% -  - 75% 100% 63% 33%  - 
E2 27% - 9%  - 45%  - -  - 
E3 9% -  - 18% 82% 18% -  - 
E4 17% -  -  - 67%  - -  - 
E5 18% - 18%  - 91%  - - 55% 
M1 45% -  -  - 100% 9% -  - 
M2 91% -  - 9% 91%  - - 45% 
M3 25% -  -  - 88% 75% 50%  - 
M4 27% - 9% 18% 91%  - -  - 
M5 55% - -  45% 100%  - -  - 
M6  - - -   - 100% 100% -  - 
M7 27% - 18%  - 55% 9% -  - 
M8 60% - -  20% 80%  - -  - 
M9 100% - -  18% 91% 27% - 100% 
M10 50% - 25%  - 75% 100% -  - 
Disclosures by year (as a % of cases) 
1997 22% -     100%   -   
1998 33% -   22% 91%   - 45% 
1999 33% -   22% 88%   -   
2000 27% - 9% 36% 91% 18% -   
2001 33% -   33% 100% 17% -   
2002 38% -   15% 100% 15% -   
2003 31% -   15% 45% 23% -   
2004 33% - 7% 7% 100% 33% -   
2005 53% - 13% 13% 55% 27% -   
2006 47% - 13% 7% 80% 33% -   
2007 67% - 7%   91% 40% - 100% 
Average 
disclosure 
provided     
41% 0 % 5.1 % 13.9 % 83.2% 21.2 % 4.4 % 16.1% 
76 % 75 % 73 % 68% 52 % 32 % 
Stakeholder 
expectation 85% Ranked severity KPIs in 5 most important: 
98.6 % 
Ranked rsponse-based KPIs in 5 most 
important:   
40.9 % 
10% 
# Includes cases of permanent disability and temporary long-term incapacity (>6 months) 
^ Refers to separate measures of occupational illness (rather than included in injury data) 
 
  289
 
Appendix 13: Reconciling OHS Expenditure Disclosure to Expectations 
Reconciling OHS Expenditure Disclosure with Stakeholder Expectations  
(by firm and year) 
Year Fines & penalties 
Workers’ 
compensation
Contingent 
liabilities 
Training 
programs 
Other 
programs 
Disclosures by firm (as a % of cases) 
E1   - -  -  13% - 
E2  - -  -  9% - 
E3  - -  -  9% - 
E4  - -  50%  - - 
E5  - -  -   - - 
M1  - -  9% - 27% 
M2 36% -  -   - - 
M3  - 13% -   - - 
M4 9% -  -   - - 
M5  - -  -   - - 
M6  - 100% 71%  - - 
M7 9% -  -   - - 
M8  - -  20%  - - 
M9 91% -  -  9% - 
M10  - 100% 100% 25% - 
Disclosures by year (as a % of cases) 
1997 -  -  -  -  11% 
1998 11% -  -  -  11% 
1999 11% -  -  -  11% 
2000 9% -  -  -  - 
2001 8% 8% 8% 8% - 
2002 15% 8% 8% 8% - 
2003 8% 8% 8% -  - 
2004 7% 13% 13% -  - 
2005 13% 13% 13% 13% - 
2006 20% 20% 20% 7% - 
2007 20% 13% 27% -  - 
Average 
disclosure 
provided     
11.7% 8.8% 10.2% 3.6% 2.2% 
Stakeholder 
expectation 75% 66.1 % n/a 60.5 % 46.8 % 
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Appendix 14: Format of Injury Data Presented by Year 
Proportion of firms presenting injury data as  
a rate and / or an absolute number  
(by reporting media) 
Year AR CSR  
 Either # or % Both # & % Either # or % Both # & % 
2007 80% 13% 100% 40% 
2006 93% 20% 100% 11% 
2005 87% 20% 100% 25% 
2004 93% 27% 100% 29% 
2003 77% 38% 83% 17% 
2002 77% 23% 83% 17% 
2001 67% 17% 67% 33% 
2000 64% 9% 100% 0% 
1999 78% 11% 
1998 67% 0% 
1997 44% 11% 
na 
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Appendix 15: Adapted PSI Scores (by category, firm and year) 
PSI Annual Reports ( score / 15)  CSR Reports ( score / 15)  All Reports (as a % of maximum score) 
Scores 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Philosophy 4 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 5       4 5 4  80 100 80 80 80 80 60 60 80 100 100 
Narrative 5 4 5 3 5 4 5 5 3 4 3       4 5 5  100 80 100 60 100 80 100 100 80 100 100 
Quantitative 0 3 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 4       4 4 4  0 60 80 80 60 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Total EA 9 12 13 11 12 12 12 12 10 11 12       12 14 13  60 80 87 73 80 80 80 80 80 93 93 
Philosophy 4 2 4 3 3 4 4 4 5 5 5     4   5 5  80 40 80 60 60 80 80 80 100 100 100 
Narrative 3 0 2 2 3 5 2 4 3 5 5     5   4 5  60 0 40 40 60 100 100 80 60 100 100 
Quantitative 0 0 3 3 4 3 4 3 3 3 4     4   3 3  0 0 60 60 80 60 80 60 60 60 80 
Total EB 7 2 9 8 10 12 10 11 11 13 14     13   12 13  47 13 60 53 67 80 87 73 73 87 93 
Philosophy 2 5 5 0 4 5 5 5 3 5 5        4   40 100 100 0 80 100 100 100 60 100 100 
Narrative 2 2 2 0 3 4 4 4 4 5 5        3   40 40 40 0 60 80 80 80 80 100 100 
Quantitative 1 0 0 0 0 2 5 5 5 5 4        5   20 0 0 0 0 40 100 100 100 100 80 
Total EC 5 7 7 0 7 11 14 14 12 15 14        12   33 47 47 0 47 73 93 93 80 100 93 
Philosophy    5 2 5 4 5 2 4 4    4 3 2 2 2 4     100 40 100 80 100 60 80 100 
Narrative    3 4 4 1 2 0 2 3    3 5 4 4 2 5     60 80 80 100 100 80 40 100 
Quantitative    4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4    4 5 5 5 2 4     80 80 80 100 100 100 80 80 
Total ED    12 10 13 9 11 6 10 11    11 13 11 11 6 13     80 67 87 93 100 80 67 93 
Philosophy      3 3 4 4 5 5                60 60 80 80 100 100 
Narrative      2 2 3 5 2 2                40 40 60 100 40 40 
Quantitative      0 1 4 4 2 4                0 20 80 80 40 80 
Total EE      5 6 11 13 9 11                33 40 73 87 60 73 
Philosophy 5 4 5 5 5 5 4 5 5 4 5  5 4 4 4 5 4 4 4  100 80 100 100 100 100 80 100 100 80 100 
Narrative 3 3 3 4 4 4 3 3 4 4 5  5 4 5 5 5 5 5 4  60 60 60 100 80 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Quantitative 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  4 3 5 5 4 4 4 3  100 80 80 80 80 100 100 80 80 80 80 
Total MF 13 11 12 13 13 13 11 12 13 12 14  14 11 14 14 14 13 13 11  87 73 80 93 87 100 93 93 93 87 93 
Philosophy 2 3 4 4 5 3 4 3 4 4 5  3 5 3 2 2 3 4 4  40 60 80 80 100 60 80 60 80 80 100 
Narrative 0 1 3 4 5 4 4 3 0 3 2  2 5 4 1 2 4 3 3  0 20 60 80 100 100 80 60 80 80 60 
Quantitative 0 2 4 4 4 3 5 3 2 0 0  3 4 2 4 3 5 4 4  0 40 80 80 80 60 100 60 100 80 80 
Total MG 2 6 11 12 14 10 13 9 6 7 7  8 14 9 7 7 12 11 11  13 40 73 80 93 73 87 60 87 80 80 
Philosophy 4 5 3 2 4 5 5 5 4 5 4   5 5 4 4 4 4 4  80 100 60 60 100 100 100 100 80 100 80 
Narrative 3 4 1 1 3 5 5 5 1 2 4   5 5 5 5 5 5 5  60 80 20 20 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Quantitative 4 3 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 4 4   4 3 4 4 4 4 4  80 60 60 40 80 60 80 80 80 80 80 
Total MH 11 12 7 5 9 12 13 12 7 11 12   14 13 13 13 13 13 13  73 80 47 40 93 87 93 93 87 93 87 
Maximum score for each category = 5, total = 15.  ‘All reports’ percentages reflect total score for each category (i.e. philosophy, narrative, quantitative or total) as a percentage of maximum available. 
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PSI Annual Reports ( score / 15)  CSR Reports ( score / 15)  All Reports  (as a % of maximum score) 
Scores 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Philosophy 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3 3    3 4 4 4 4 4  40 60 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Narrative 2 4 4 4 3 3 3 4 3 3 5    2 1 3 3 3 3  40 80 80 80 60 60 60 80 60 60 100 
Quantitative 3 5 5 5 4 4 5 5 5 4 4    4 3 5 5 4 4  60 100 100 100 80 100 100 100 100 80 80 
Total MI 7 12 13 13 11 11 12 12 11 10 12    9 8 12 12 11 11  47 80 87 87 73 80 80 87 80 73 87 
Philosophy 0 0 0 0 0 3 4 3 3 4 4      5 4 5 4  0 0 0 0 0 60 80 100 80 100 80 
Narrative 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 2 2 1      3 5 5 5  0 0 0 0 0 20 80 60 100 100 100 
Quantitative 0 0 0 0 0 3 3 5 4 4 0      5 4 5 5  0 0 0 0 0 60 60 100 80 100 100 
Total MJ 0 0 0 0 0 7 11 8 9 10 5      13 13 15 14  0 0 0 0 0 47 73 87 87 100 93 
Philosophy 4 4 3 3 4 5 4 4 2 4 4         3  80 80 60 60 80 100 80 80 40 80 80 
Narrative 4 5 5 3 5 3 2 1 2 2 0         3  80 100 100 60 100 60 40 20 40 40 60 
Quantitative 4 3 5 3 4 3 3 2 3 4 0         4  100 60 100 60 80 60 60 40 60 80 80 
Total MK 12 12 13 9 13 11 9 7 7 10 4         7  60 53 67 40 60 40 33 20 33 40 47 
Philosophy    4 3 2 4 4 3 3 3    4          80 60 80 80 80 60 60 60 
Narrative    1 4 3 3 4 4 5 4    4          20 80 80 60 80 80 100 80 
Quantitative    2 2 3 5 5 5 5 5    5          40 40 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total ML    7 9 8 12 13 12 13 12    13          47 60 87 80 87 80 87 80 
Philosophy     5 5 5 5 5 5 5               100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Narrative     4 3 4 4 4 4 5               80 60 80 80 80 80 100 
Quantitative     4 4 4 4 4 4 4               80 80 80 80 80 80 80 
Total MM     13 12 13 13 13 13 14               87 80 87 87 87 87 93 
Philosophy        5 5 5 5       4  5         100 100 100 100 
Narrative        5 5 5 2       5  5         100 100 100 100 
Quantitative        2 2 4 2       4  5         40 80 80 100 
Total MN        12 12 14 9       13  15         80 93 93 100 
Philosophy       2 5 5 5 5                  100 100 100 100 
Narrative       0 4 5 4 4                  80 100 80 80 
Quantitative       0 4 3 4 3                  80 60 80 60 
Total MO       2 13 13 13 12                  87 87 87 80 
Average                                 
Philosophy 3.0 3.4 3.6 3.1 3.6 4.1 3.9 4.2 3.7 4.3 4.5  4.0 4.7 3.8 3.4 3.7 3.6 4.0 4.0  60 69 71 64 73 85 82 88 80 91 92 
Narrative 2.4 2.6 2.8 2.3 3.6 3.5 3.0 3.4 3.0 3.5 3.3  3.5 4.7 3.8 3.4 3.7 4.4 3.9 4.2  49 51 56 47 75 74 78 79 83 81 88 
Quantitative 1.9 2.2 3.1 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.6 3.7 3.6 3.7 3.1  3.5 3.7 3.8 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.0 4.1  40 44 62 56 62 68 82 79 83 80 83 
 Total   7 8 9 8 10 11 11 11 10 11 11  11 13 12 11 12 13 12 12  42 47 55 49 63 73 78 80 81 82 86 
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Appendix 16: OSHAI Scores (by category, firm and year) 
OSHAI Annual Reports   (score / 30) CSR Reports   (score / 30) All Reports  (as a % of maximum score ) 
Scores 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Governance 3 3 2 3 4 4 2 1 1 1 4      2 3 3 60 60 40 60 80 80 40 20 40 60 80 
Process 4 6 7 6 7 6 4 4 7 2 4      6 8 6 40 60 70 60 70 60 40 40 80 80 60 
Outcome 1 2 2 5 2 2 2 2 2 2 6      7 4 7 10 20 20 50 20 20 20 20 70 40 70 
Quality 0 2 1 2 2 1 3 3 3 1 3      4 1 4 - 40 20 40 40 20 60 60 80 20 80 
Total EA 8 13 12 16 15 13 11 10 13 6 17      19 16 20 27 43 40 53 50 43 37 33 70 53 70 
Governance 2 1 4 3 1 4 5 4 5 4 5    5   4 5 40 20 80 60 20 80 100 80 100 80 100 
Process 2 0 2 2 5 6 4 3 4 7 7    7   6 7 20 - 20 20 50 60 70 30 40 70 70 
Outcome 0 0 2 2 5 2 3 2 2 2 2    3   2 3 - - 20 20 50 20 30 20 20 20 30 
Quality 0 0 3 2 2 3 3 3 2 3 3    2   3 3 - - 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Total EB 4 1 11 9 13 15 15 12 13 16 17    17   15 18 13 3 37 33 47 50 60 40 47 53 60 
Governance 1 3 3 0 2 3 3 3 2 4 3       2  20 60 60 - 40 60 60 60 40 60 60 
Process 1 1 1 0 3 4 3 6 6 7 7       3  10 10 10 - 30 40 30 60 60 70 70 
Outcome 1 0 0 0 0 4 2 2 3 7 5       6  10 - - - - 40 20 20 30 70 50 
Quality 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 3 3 2       3  - - - - - 20 40 60 60 60 40 
Total EC 3 4 4 0 5 12 10 14 14 21 17       14  10 13 13 - 17 40 33 47 47 67 57 
Governance    4 2 3 3 3 1 3 4   1 0 0 1 0 3    60 40 60 60 60 40 60 80 
Process    6 4 7 1 2 0 2 4   7 6 5 7 3 5    60 40 70 60 60 70 40 50 
Outcome    4 4 4 6 3 2 1 1   2 5 6 4 1 5    40 40 40 60 60 40 20 50 
Quality    2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2   2 4 4 3 1 3    40 40 40 80 80 60 60 60 
Total ED    16 12 16 13 10 5 8 11   12 15 15 15 5 16    50 40 53 63 63 53 40 57 
Governance      2 2 2 3 3 3              40 40 40 60 60 60 
Process      1 1 1 7 6 2              10 10 10 70 60 20 
Outcome      0 1 2 5 1 2              - 10 20 50 10 20 
Quality      0 0 2 2 0 2              - - 40 40 - 40 
Total EE      3 4 7 17 10 9              10 13 23 57 33 30 
Maximum scores: governance = 5, process = 10, outcome = 10, quality = 5, Total = 30. ‘All reports’ percentages reflect total score for each category as a percentage of maximum available.  
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OSHAI Annual Reports   (score / 30) CSR Reports   (score / 30) All Reports (as a % of maximum score ) 
Scores 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 20002001200220032004 200520062007199719981999200020012002200320042005 2006 2007 
Governance 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 4 1 2 3 2 1 1 60 60 60 100 100 60 60 60 60 60 60 
Process 5 7 8 6 4 6 4 7 6 5 6 8 8 6 8 7 6 7 6 50 70 80 80 80 60 80 80 60 70 70 
Outcome 6 7 5 6 6 6 5 5 5 5 5 7 2 5 5 6 5 6 5 60 70 50 70 60 60 50 60 50 60 50 
Quality 2 3 0 3 3 3 2 3 1 2 2 3 2 3 3 4 3 3 1 40 60 - 80 60 80 80 80 60 60 60 
Total MF 16 20 16 18 16 18 14 18 15 15 16 23 16 15 18 20 16 17 13 53 67 53 80 73 63 67 70 57 63 60 
Governance 1 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 1 3 1 1 0 2 3 3 20 40 40 40 60 40 40 40 60 60 80 
Process 0 0 1 4 7 4 8 7 0 2 2 2 7 6 1 4 5 5 5 - - 10 40 80 60 80 70 50 50 50 
Outcome 0 2 3 3 2 2 2 3 4 0 0 3 2 4 2 2 5 7 3 - 20 30 30 20 50 20 30 50 70 30 
Quality 0 0 1 2 0 3 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1 1 - - 40 60 - 60 40 - 40 40 40 
Total MG 1 4 7 11 12 11 13 12 7 5 5 6 12 11 5 6 14 16 12 3 13 27 40 43 53 47 40 50 57 47 
Governance 2 3 2 1 3 3 3 3 3 4 3  3 3 3 3 3 4 4 40 60 40 20 60 60 60 60 80 100 80 
Process 4 3 1 0 3 4 6 6 1 2 7  8 8 7 8 9 9 9 40 30 10 - 80 80 90 80 90 90 90 
Outcome 2 5 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6  6 6 5 5 6 7 7 20 50 50 40 60 60 50 50 60 70 70 
Quality 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 0 2 2  3 1 1 2 4 4 4 40 20 20 20 60 20 60 60 80 80 80 
Total MH 9 12 9 6 12 12 15 14 8 13 18  20 18 16 18 22 24 24 33 40 30 20 67 60 67 63 77 83 80 
Governance 1 1 4 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 2   1 3 3 2 3 4 20 20 80 60 60 60 80 60 40 80 80 
Process 1 3 3 4 4 3 3 5 4 4 5   1 3 3 4 4 5 10 30 30 40 40 30 30 50 40 40 50 
Outcome 2 3 3 6 4 4 6 6 6 5 6   2 5 5 6 5 5 20 30 30 60 40 40 60 60 60 50 60 
Quality 1 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2   1 1 3 2 2 2 40 40 60 60 60 40 60 60 40 40 40 
Total MI 5 9 12 15 13 12 14 15 14 14 15   5 12 14 14 14 16 20 30 43 53 47 40 53 57 47 50 57 
Governance 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 2 2 2 3     3 4 4 4 - - - - - 40 60 60 80 80 80 
Process 0 0 0 0 0 3 7 0 4 1 1     6 8 8 8 - - - - - 30 70 60 80 80 80 
Outcome 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4 4 2 0     6 2 6 6 - - - - - 20 20 60 40 60 60 
Quality 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 2 0     1 3 2 2 - - - - - 20 - 40 60 40 40 
Total MJ 0 0 0 0 0 8 12 7 12 7 4     16 17 20 20 - - - - - 27 40 57 63 67 67 
Governance 2 2 1 1 2 3 3 3 1 3 3        1 40 40 20 20 40 60 60 60 20 60 60 
Process 7 5 4 7 6 3 1 0 2 3 0        1 70 50 40 70 60 30 10 - 20 30 10 
Outcome 7 6 5 3 5 2 2 2 2 2 0        5 70 60 50 30 50 20 20 20 20 20 50 
Quality 3 1 3 0 1 1 2 0 0 1 0        3 60 20 60 - 40 40 40 - - 40 60 
Total MK 19 14 13 11 14 9 8 5 5 9 3        9 57 40 40 33 43 23 17 7 13 23 30 
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OSHAI Annual Reports   (score / 30) CSR Reports   (score / 30) All Reports (as a % of maximum score) 
Scores 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Governance    3 1 2 2 3 2 2 2   2         60 20 40 40 60 40 40 40 
Process    1 4 4 8 8 8 8 9   8         10 40 80 80 80 80 80 90 
Outcome    1 1 2 2 2 5 2 2   5         10 10 50 20 20 50 20 20 
Quality    0 1 1 2 2 3 3 3   2         - 40 40 40 40 60 60 60 
Total ML    5 7 9 14 15 18 15 16   17         17 27 57 47 50 60 50 53 
Governance     3 5 3 3 3 3 3             60 100 60 60 60 60 60 
Process     4 4 3 4 4 5 7             40 40 30 40 40 50 70 
Outcome     2 2 2 2 2 2 2             20 20 20 20 20 20 20 
Quality     3 3 3 3 3 2 3             60 60 60 60 60 40 60 
Total MM     12 14 11 12 12 12 15             40 47 37 40 40 40 50 
Governance        3 3 4 3      5  4        60 100 80 80 
Process        6 8 8 2      8  8        60 80 80 80 
Outcome        1 4 2 1      5  7        10 50 20 70 
Quality        0 0 2 0      2  3        - 40 40 60 
Total MN        10 15 16 6      20  22        33 67 53 73 
Governance       1 3 3 3 3                60 60 60 60 
Process       0 7 6 5 5                70 60 50 50 
Outcome       0 5 1 6 5                50 10 60 50 
Quality       0 3 1 1 2                60 40 40 40 
Total MO       1 18 11 15 15                60 40 53 50 
Average                               
Governance 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 3 3 3 37 41 49 48 50 58 55 52 59 65 67 
Process 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 5 4 4 5 5 8 6 5 6 7 6 6 27 29 31 31 50 49 53 54 61 62 63 
Outcome 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 5 3 4 4 5 5 5 5 20 23 29 29 30 35 32 33 40 42 47 
Quality 3 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 2 3 20 22 27 36 39 37 46 47 53 44 53 
Total 7 9 9 10 11 12 11 12 12 12 12 15 16 13 14 15 17 16 17 24 28 31 35 41 44 45 46 52 52 56 
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Appendix 17: Comparing Trends in PSI and OSHAI Scores (by firm and year) 
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Appendix 18: Injury and Illness Classifications 
Indicator Calculation method Denominator Incl 
MTI 
Incl 
FAI 
Occupational illness (TROI) Any work-related abnormal condition or disorder that has 
resulted from an exposure at work 
1,000,000  
hrs 
Y Y 
TRCOIRMT Occupational illness that results from continuous 
exposure requiring medical treatment or first aid 
1,000,000  
hrs 
Y Y 
TRCOIRMT Occupational illness requiring medical treatment other 
than first aid 
 Y N 
ND New cases of occupational disease na   
Rate of occupational disorders 
(ROD) 
New cases of occupational disease 10,000  
hrs 
  
 
Indicator Calculation method Denominator 
(hrs) 
Incl 
death 
Lost workday cases 
(LWC) 
One or more days away from work other than the day on 
which the illness or injury occurred 1,000,000  Yes 
Lost workday frequency 
(LWF) 
? 200,000  
work hrs ? 
Lost workday rate average 
(LWR) 
? ? ? 
Lost time incident frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Lost days (undefined) plus restricted work days  200,000  ? 
Classified injury (CIFR) Lost days (undefined) plus restricted work days  1,000,000  ? 
Lost time incident frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Number injuries preventing employees: returning to their 
next shift / working on their next scheduled day of work 1,000,000  ? 
Lost time injury / illness case rate 
(LTII) 
? 200,000  ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
A work-related injury or illness that results in a permanent 
disability or time lost of one complete shift or day or more 
any time after the injury or illness 
1,000,000  No 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Injuries that result in death, permanent disability or lost 
work time 1,000,000  Yes 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Injuries resulting in the person being absent from work 
due to injury (no length of time specified) 1,000,000  ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Number of lost time injuries (undefined) due to workplace 
accidents which require more than 24 hours off work 1,000,000  ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
An injury where the person misses one or more full 
rostered shifts 1,000,000  ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
Number of injuries preventing an employee or contractor 
returning to their normal duties the following shift 200,000  ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
? ? ? 
Lost time injury frequency rate 
(LTIFR) 
? 
1,000,000  ? 
 
Indicator Calculation method Denominator 
Total recordable case severity 
rate (TRS) 
Sum of injury severities (see index table)  1,000,000  
hrs worked 
Injury severity  Total hours lost  1,000,000  
hrs worked 
Severity Average working days lost Employee 
Average days lost per LTI Average number of days lost  LTI  (excludes MTI & FAI) 
LTI severity  Days lost to injury  ? 
Severity rate (DLTI) Number of days lost to injury and restricted duty ? 
Duration rate Number of days away from unrestricted duties  Injury 
Severity of classified injuries ?  
Days lost per workers' 
compensation claim (SWC) 
? WC Claim 
Average shifts lost ? 200,000 
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Indicator Calculation method Denominator Incl. 
Death 
Total recordable case frequency 
rate (TRC) 
Fatality + LTIs + MTIs + RDs due to injury or illness 1,000,000 Yes 
Total recordable cases 
(TRC) 
LTIs + MTIs + RDs due to injury or illness 1,000,000 No 
Total injury case rate (TICR) OSHA method (no further detail reported)  ? 
Recordable case rate (RCR) ? 200,000 ? 
Total recordable incident 
frequency rate (TRIFR) 
Fatality + LTIs + MTIs + RDs         (includes illness?) 1,000,000 Yes 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
Fatality + LTIs + MTIs + RDs 1,000,000 Yes 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
Fatality + LTIs + MTIs + RDs 200,000 Yes 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
LTI + MMTI + CLTI 1,000,000 ? 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
LTI + MMTI (excluding ‘minor’ medical treatment injuries) 1,000,000 ? 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
LTI + MTI 1,000,000 ? 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
Any injury requiring more than first aid treatment 1,000,000 Yes 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
LTI + MTI + FAI 1,000,000 ? 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
? 1,000,000 ? 
Total recordable case frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
? ? ? 
Total recordable injury frequency 
rate (TRIFR) 
? ? ? 
Recordable injury (RI) rate ? ? ? 
 
Indicator Calculation method Denominator 
(hrs) 
Incl 
LTI 
Incl 
RD 
Moderate Medical Treatment 
Frequency Rate (MMTFR) 
? 1,000,000   
Persons requiring medical 
treatment (MTI) 
? N/a   
Three-month index for 
medically treated injuries   
(MTI) 
? 1,000,000   
Medically referred injury 
frequency 
(MTI) 
Injuries that require medical treatment more serious 
than first aid including LTI and MTI and any other 
injuries that result in a person not being able to perform 
their normal duties. 
1,000,000 Yes Yes 
Medical treatment injury 
frequency rate 
(MTIFR) 
A medical treatment injury is an injury which is 
attributable to a workplace incident, requires medical 
treatment [including restricted work] and which results 
in less than a full shift of work being lost. 
1,000,000 No Yes 
Medical treatment injury 
frequency rate 
(MTIFR) 
Any work-related injury that a) requires treatment by, or 
under the specific order of, a medical practitioner or any 
injury that could be considered as being one that would 
normally be treated by a medical practitioner; b) results 
in less than a full shift being lost from work. 
1,000,000 No ? 
 
Indicator Calculation method Denominator  Incl LTI 
Restricted day injury frequency rate 
(RDIFR) 
? ? ? 
Restricted duties injury frequency rate   
(RDIFR) 
Any injury requiring more than first aid  1,000,000     
hrs 
Yes 
Restricted work day injury  
(RWD) 
? absolute 
number 
No 
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Indicator             Definition provided  
Number of occupational illness cases 
1  Number of new cases of occupational 
disease    
Number of new cases of occupational disease    
2  Total recordable occupational illness Number of occupational illnesses including those requiring first 
aid 
3  Total recordable occupational illness Number of occupational illnesses excluding those requiring first 
aid 
4  Medical examinations completed Number of people completing medical examinations through 
the year as a percentage of those requiring medical exams 
5  Compensatable disease Number of new cases of occupational disease or illness cases 
registered ‘compensatable’ (i.e. confirmed as requiring 
compensation) 
6  Number of new cases of illness by 
type 
Number of new cases of: 
- noise induced hearing loss  
- respiratory disease 
- repetitive trauma 
Rates of occupational illness 
1   Rate of occupational disorder (later 
identified as: Rate of new cases of 
occupational illness) 
Number of new cases of occupational disorder per 10,000 
employees 
2   Rate of occupational illness Any work-related condition or disorder that has resulted from 
an exposure at work per 1,000,000 hours worked 
3   Total recordable cases of 
occupational illness (TRCOIMT) 
Occupational illness that results from continuous exposure 
requiring medical treatment including first aid per 1,000,000 
hours 
4   Total recordable cases of 
occupational illness (TRCOIMT) 
Occupational illness that results from continuous exposure 
requiring medical treatment other than first aid per 1,000,000 
hours 
5   Total recordable occupational illness 
frequency 
Frequency of occupational illness including those requiring first 
aid per 1,000,000 hours worked 
6   Total recordable occupational illness 
frequency 
Frequency of occupational illness excluding those requiring first 
aid per 1,000,000 hours worked 
 
